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 This dissertation defends the claim that Walter Burley (died c. 1345) develops a 
sophisticated account of the proposition, where a proposition is an entity fulfilling 
various semantic and epistemic roles – first and foremost, to be the primary bearer of 
truth value. In doing so, it attempts to correct longstanding misconceptions about a key 
aspect of Burley’s philosophy.  
 In contrast to most approaches in the literature, which claim that Burley is 
principally concerned with the nature of states of affairs, this dissertation argues that he is 
concerned rather with the metaphysics of the proposition. Motivated by two deeper 
semantic commitments, Burley argues that a proposition is a complex entity composed of 
“things outside the soul” (res extra animam). The proposition that Barack Obama is a 
human, for example, is composed of Barack Obama and the property of humanity. 
Moreover, encouraged by the view that truth is fundamentally a matter of the mind’s 
correspondence to the world, Burley argues that cognitive agents have the ability to 
arrange things together into propositions, where that arrangement is the exercise of a 
capacity to represent the world’s being some way or other – for example, to represent  
that Barack Obama is a human. Consequently, on Burley’s view, propositions are 
structured; they are complex, truth-conditional entities composed of things by mental 
acts.  
 This dissertation situates that account of the proposition within Burley’s wider 
 account of thinking and demonstrative science. To that end, it argues that Burley 
develops a theory of mental language, according to which thinking is fundamentally a 
matter of mind’s use of sentences composed of concepts, that is, of mental 
representations. Burley’s commitment to mental language accomplishes a number of 
goals. Most significantly, it helps him integrate his account of the proposition into his 
account of demonstrative science, by resolving tensions brought on by the opacity of 
belief. 
 Finally, this dissertation examines the evolution of Burley’s account of the truth 
conditions of the proposition, arguing that the final account of those conditions involves 
the radical claim that things – the referents of categorematic expressions in natural and 
mental language – must have certain intrinsic semantic properties. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. THE NATURE AND AIMS OF THE PROJECT 
 This dissertation focuses on Walter Burley’s (c. 1275 – c. 1345) account of the 
proposition.1 For Burley, a proposition is a complex entity composed of “things” (res) – 
concrete particulars such as Socrates and properties humanity.2
                                                            
1 Likely born in Burley-in-Wharfedale, Yorkshire, in 1275, Burley was a Master of Arts and fellow at 
Merton College, Oxford, by 1301, where he taught for about half a decade. He resigned his position as 
fellow of Merton College sometime between 1307 and 1309 to take up theological studies at the 
Sorbonne. Those studies, and much of the rest of Burley’s career, were largely funded by ecclesiastical 
appointments that came with pensions. By 1324, he had become a Master of Theology. Sometime around 
1324, he held a quodlibetal disputation at Toulouse, and appears to have taught in Paris as a Master of 
Theology from 1324–1327. From 1327 to 1334, Burley’s focus turned from academic concerns to 
political ones. In 1327, he served as ambassador to the papal court in Avignon for King Edward III, and 
again (now as the king’s “beloved clerk”) in 1330. In roughly 1334, Burley joined the patronage and 
intellectual circle of Richard de Bury, tutor of Edward III, at which point Burley returned to intellectual 
pursuits. That circle included other prominent intellectuals of the day: Thomas Bradwardine (future 
Archbishop of Canterbury and a member of the Oxford calculators, who proved the mean speed 
theorem), Richard Kilvington (another member of the Oxford calculators), Robert Holkot, John Mauduit, 
and Richard FitzRalph. Briefly imprisoned in 1336 for a forestry offense, Burley held a quodlibetal 
disputation in Bologne in 1341, and travelled to Avignon in 1343 to present his commentary on the 
Politics to Pope Clement VI (a former schoolmate at Paris). He died sometime thereafter. Burley 
authored at least fifty – and as many as seventy – distinct works, including a number of commentaries on 
Aristotle’s logical treatises, the Physics, the De Anima, the aforementioned Politics, and the Ethics, and 
as well as independent treatises and longer works on various topics in logic, the philosophy of language 
and the philosophy of mind. He may also have authored a work titled ‘On the Lives of the Philosophers,’ 
containing philosophical biographies stretching from Priscian back to the pre-Socratics; the authenticity 
of his authorship is disputed, however. For more on Burley’s life, see Jennifer Ottman and Rega Wood, 
“Walter of Burley: His Life and Works,” Vivarium 37 (March 1, 1999): 1–23; Mary Catherine Sommers, 
“Walter Burley,” ed. H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
 Moreover, Burley argues 
that a proposition is structured by a mental act of predication, the exercise of a capacity 
2 Socrates presents a somewhat complicated case here, as he does not currently exist, and so, as Burley 
argues in the Art.Vet, has merely objective being, that is, exists merely as an object of thought. In 
contrast, an individual that does currently exist – such as, at the time of this writing, Barack Obama – has 
subjective being, and it is that subjective being, Barack Obama himself, which is a component in the 
proposition that Barack Obama is a human. (On the distinction between subjective and objective being, 
see ch. 2, pp. 56–100 passim.) Setting aside that complication, however, and without prejudice to the 
ontological status of the components of any proposition, I will use Socrates as my standard example of a 
particular throughout the rest of this dissertation. 
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of the mind to represent the world’s being various ways. That propositions are structured 
by the mind in that way has two important consequences. First, propositions are bearers 
of truth and falsity. In fact, they are the primary bearers of truth and falsity. Sentences in 
natural and mental language have truth conditions, but only because they signify 
propositions, that is, because they have propositions as their semantic contents, which 
propositions have the truth conditions that they do essentially. Second, propositions are 
the objects of one’s attitudes, such as belief. However, propositions constitute the objects 
of one’s attitudes in a somewhat non-standard or loose sense for Burley, since he takes 
one’s attitudes to be not strictly speaking relations to propositions but rather acts of the 
mind by which that very propositional content is produced. To believe that Socrates is a 
human, for example, just is to predicate humanity of Socrates assertively, rather than to 
be related to some independent object as its content. 
 Burley’s account of the proposition is in many ways unique from anything else 
one finds in medieval discussions of the proposition – so unique, in fact, that Burley’s 
own contributions to the long history of philosophical investigation into the proposition 
went largely unappreciated during his own career, and have been largely misunderstood 
since then. However, it is an account borne out of the intersection of Burley’s more 
general semantic, cognitive and metaphysical commitments. Those commitments 
together constitute one expression of an intense, general philosophical interest throughout 
fourteenth-century Europe – and at Oxford in particular – in issues at the intersection of 
the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. William Ockham 
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(d. 1347) is perhaps the best known representative of this movement.3
 However, scholars are only beginning to understand key elements of Burley’s 
overall philosophical project. The main cause for this has been that, relative to other 
figures in the late medieval period (e.g. John Duns Scotus (d. 1308) and Ockham), Burley 
has received little scholarly attention. The attention that Scotus and Ockham in particular 
have received is certainly well-deserved. Both are towering philosophical figures, whose 
intellectual acumen resulted in novel and sophisticated philosophical claims that touch on 
fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology and the 
philosophy of language. Ockham’s philosophical project in particular was paradigm-
shifting, setting a philosophical framework within which friend and foe alike largely 
 He combines a 
metaphysical commitment to a relatively bare, nominalist ontology, according to which 
the created world is populated only by particular substances and the particular qualities 
which inhere in them, with a semantic account meant, inter alia, to explain our ability to 
have thoughts with general content and to express such thoughts in natural language. 
Burley’s broad philosophical program parts with Ockham’s nominalist project at a fairly 
fundamental level, affirming that the reality of extra-mental universals and the nine 
Aristotelian accidental categories are essential to a successful epistemic and semantic 
theorizing. Burley, then, represents an important and sophisticated realist strand running 
through late medieval philosophical thought, distinct from the much more studied 
nominalist threads that begin at the first half of the fourteenth century.  
                                                            
3 On Ockham’s program and influence, see Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham, 2 vols. (University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1987). 
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operated for more than a century.4 But the relative lack of scholarly attention paid to 
Burley has less to do with his philosophical abilities than it does more general 
institutional forces. Unlike Scotus and Ockham, for example, who were Franciscans, 
Burley was a so-called secular. That is, while a member of the church hierarchy for much 
of his life, Burley was not a member of a religious order. As such, there was no 
organization with a vested interest in preserving his philosophical works and promoting 
his philosophical contributions. The main consequence of this for present scholarship has 
been that Burley’s own works are far less readily available to the scholarly community 
than those of more well-known philosophical luminaries in the high and late middle ages. 
Whereas modern critical editions of the works of Ockham can be easily obtained at major 
educational research institutions, for example, and the works of Scotus are, if not entirely 
critically edited, at least readily available in some modern format, Burley’s philosophical 
corpus is being made available slowly, in only a piecemeal fashion. That even some of 
Burley’s corpus has been made available to the scholarly community is due to the work 
of a few individuals – Stephen Brown, Philotheus Boehner, Mary Sommers and Herman 
Shapiro especially – who have devoted their energies to publishing select works of 
Burley.5
                                                            
4 Perhaps another reason why Burley’s own philosophical contributions never received the sort of 
philosophical attention they deserved is that many of his philosophical assumptions fell outside of the 
Ockhamist form of nominalism that came to dominant much of the fourteenth century.  
 However, those publications are but a small part of his much larger corpus, one 
which exists for the most part in manuscript form in rare book and manuscript libraries at 
various educational institutions around the globe.  
5 Other notable scholars in this regard include Alessandro Conti, L.M. de Rijk, Sten Ebbesen, Marek 
Gensler, Romauld Green, Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, M.J. Kitchel, M.J. Kiteley, Frederick Scott, E.A. 
Synan, Mischa von Perger, and Hans-Ulrich Wöhler. 
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 Because of the relative lack of readily available source material, and the 
piecemeal fashion by which what is available has been published, philosophical 
scholarship on Burley has been relatively sparse, and the community of serious Burley 
scholars is comprised of only a handful of individuals. Since the community of Burley 
scholars has been small, and given the relative dearth of textual resources, it is 
unsurprising that the scholarship remains unsettled on even some of the most 
fundamental and central commitments of Burley’s philosophical project. For example, 
Burley is often known to scholars of medieval philosophy for his commitment in the 
second half of his career to “exaggerated” realism, according to which substantial 
properties (such as humanity) are not parts of the concrete substances that they inform. 
But Burley scholars are only just now coming to grips with the ontological implications 
of that account, as well as its role in Burley’s larger philosophical project.6
 Likewise, Burley is perhaps most known within medieval philosophical 
scholarship for his so-called theory of the propositio in re. But there is a great deal of 
scholarly disagreement about what, exactly, that theory amounts to.
  
7
                                                            
6 On early scholarship on Burley’s “exaggerated” realism, see Herman Shapiro, “A Note on Walter 
Burley’s Exaggerated Realism,” Franciscan Studies 20 (1960): 205–14. The expression persists in the 
scholarship today. See, e.g., Hans-Ulrich Wöhler, “Universals and Individuals,” in A Companion to 
Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician and Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 
167–89. 
 Some argue that it is 
a theory of propositional content; others argue that it is a theory of states of affairs. Some 
7 See, e.g., Alessandro Conti, “Walter Burley,” Fall 2008, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/burley/; Cesalli, “Le Réalisme Propositionnel de 
Walter Burley,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 68 (2001): 155–221; Stephan 
Meier-Oeser, “Walter Burley’s Propositio in Re and the Systematization of the Ordo Significationis,” in 
Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, by Stephen Brown (Leiden: Brill, 
2009), 483–506; Joël Biard, “Le Statut des Enonces dans les Commentaires du Peri Hermeneias de 
Gautier Burley,” in Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages: Essays on the Commentary 
Tradition, ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis and C.H. Kneepkens, Artistarium supplementa 10 (Groningen: 
Ingenium Publishers, 2003), 303–18.   
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argue that one finds a consistent theory of the propositio in re throughout Burley’s 
philosophical corpus; others argue that that theory evolves significantly over the course 
of his career. In fact, I consider this concern with the theory of the propositio in re in 
Burley scholarship to be somewhat of a red herring. It is a red herring precisely because 
(like so much of his vocabulary) Burley uses the term ‘propositio in re’ to refer to 
entirely different kinds of objects at different points in his long career, with the 
consequence that there is simply no “theory of the propositio in re,” consistent or 
evolving, running throughout Burley’s corpus. A far better approach, I believe, is to look 
beyond Burley’s philosophical vocabulary towards some of the philosophical puzzles 
with which Burley is concerned – puzzles about the semantic contents of sentences, the 
objects of propositional attitudes, and the bearers of truth. It is partly in response to these 
sorts of puzzles, I argue, that Burley develops his theory of the proposition.  
 Though some of the particulars of Burley’s account of the proposition are 
exceptional in philosophical history, his interest in the sorts of puzzles I have mentioned 
also places him firmly within a tradition of philosophical inquiry into the proposition that 
stretches from Plato to the present day. Contemporary interest in the proposition begins 
with Gottlob Frege and Betrand Russell (or perhaps even further back, with philosophers 
such as Franz Brentano and Anton Marty). But that interest itself is typically driven by 
puzzles having to do with the semantic content of complex expressions, propositional 
attitudes and truth – exactly the sorts of puzzles with which Burley and others in the 
medieval period wrestled. Those puzzles allow for a certain functional definition of a 
proposition, where a proposition is that which is (a) the primary bearer of truth and 
falsity, (b) the object of one’s propositional attitudes, and (c) the semantic content of 
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sentences in natural and mental language.8
 The main aims of this dissertation are threefold. First, I aim to shift the debate 
within Burley scholarship about the sorts of puzzles and projects that lie at the 
intersection of Burley’s semantic, cognitive, and metaphysical programs. While some of 
the confusion in the scholarship is simply exegetical, a significant portion of that 
confusion is brought on by certain expectations about the broad conceptual framework 
within which Burley is working. Those expectations can, at times, be reinforced by the 
vocabulary that Burley himself employs. But the effects of assuming that framework 
have been wholly unsatisfying, resulting in reconstructions of Burley’s larger semantic 
and cognitive project that either fail to cohere with significant portions of the texts they 
putatively explain, or are in tension with some of his more basic philosophical 
commitments, or both. By understanding Burley’s philosophical concerns and interests in 
 Defined in this way, one’s finds inquiry into 
the nature of the proposition not just in the last century or so, but at a number of points in 
philosophical history. In fact, when defined in that way, interest in and serious reflection 
upon the nature of the proposition during the late medieval period seems to me to rival 
anything one finds on the philosophical landscape today. In that respect, Burley’s interest 
in the proposition makes him far from a singular figure in the late medieval period, but 
rather a product of his age. 
                                                            
8 There is a temptation in contemporary philosophy to define propositions not just functionally but also 
ontologically, with widespread agreement that a proposition must be abstract. For Burley (and most 
everyone else in the late medieval period), however, propositions are concrete rather than abstract. 
However, I do not think that ontological component is essential to the discussion. Consequently, I will 
assume a purely functional definition in this dissertation, one which allows for a more coherent 
conversation between medieval and contemporary philosophers.    
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the way I will suggest, in contrast, I believe that we find a philosophical project that is 
not only more coherent but more philosophically interesting as well. 
 Second, I aim to explain in a clear and convincing manner Burley’s account of the 
proposition, and to articulate how that account is meant to respond to the semantic, 
cognitive and alethic concerns I have mentioned. While his response concerns issues that 
are perennial in philosophy, Burley’s account of the proposition itself is exceptional. 
Burley defends an account according to which propositions are entities composed of 
things, but structured by mental acts of predication. It also assumes that the truth-
conditionality of the proposition – and representationality more generally – is explained 
in terms of mental activity. One goal, then, is to provide a reasoned defense of that 
account, to show that that account is not ad hoc but rather motivated by deeper 
philosophical theses to which Burley is committed.  
 Because of his unique account of the proposition, Burley’s response to the 
concerns that motivate it is somewhat unorthodox. Propositional attitudes, for example, 
receive a non-relational analysis, such that attitudes are not a matter not of being related 
to a proposition but rather of crafting it. Likewise, the truth-conditional character of a 
proposition is itself analyzed in terms of the kinds of mental acts that the mind performs, 
which acts give a proposition its truth-conditional structure. A further goal, then, is to 
provide a defense of Burley’s response to those concerns both in terms of how Burley’s 
response to those concerns coheres with his larger semantic and cognitive program, and 
in terms of why those responses should have independent philosophical appeal. In 
particular, I intend to highlight how that account can provide new and important insights 
into the nature of propositions, and their roles as semantic and cognitive contents. 
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 Third, and less immediately that the other two aims, I intend to advance research 
into those philosophical strands running through late medieval philosophical thought 
which run counter to the Ockhamist philosophical tradition that comes to dominate the 
fourteenth century. Burley is an interesting case study in this regard. Burley’s 
philosophical career was especially long, spanning more than four decades. Moreover, in 
the middle of his career, the philosophical landscape in England, and continental Europe 
shortly thereafter, underwent significant upheaval, as Ockham’s metaphysical views, and 
the complex semantic and cognitive theories that were meant to support it, began to gain 
widespread acceptance. Of course, Burley himself rejected Ockham’s philosophical 
program. And that rejection required significant revision to some aspects of Burley’s own 
realist philosophy. In the most obvious case, Burley’s theory of properties evolved from a 
moderate realist account (where properties were understood to be really the same as the 
particular substances which possessed them) to what has come to be called “exaggerated” 
realism.  
 Perhaps just as interesting as the ways in which Burley’s philosophical program 
was forced to evolve, however, are the ways in which it stayed the same. In particular, 
Burley’s semantic and cognitive programs remain relatively consistent throughout his 
career. I believe that the consistency of his semantic program in particular tells us 
something important about Burley: that Burley was not primarily driven by the largely 
metaphysical concerns of the thirteenth century, but rather was (like Ockham) a product 
of the linguistic turn in philosophy that began in Oxford at the turn of the fourteenth 
century. Consequently, Burley is perhaps far less a “conservative innovator,” as some 
have labeled him, whose primary goal is to retain the conceptual framework that 
10 
 
dominated the philosophical landscape before Ockham, than he is someone who takes a 
similar approach to philosophical problems as Ockham himself, by engaging in a deep 
study of the nature of language.9
 
 The differences between Burley and Ockham represent 
not so much a clash of philosophical worldviews, then, as it does what results from very 
different starting assumptions about the nature of meaning itself. 
2. PROPOSITIONS IN THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD 
2.1. The Semantics of Sentences before the Fourteenth Century 
 As has already been emphasized, while Burley’s account of the proposition was 
unique for his time, the interests and concerns which motivated it are perennial to 
philosophy. To properly appreciate Burley’s own contributions to that line of 
philosophical inquiry, then, it is important to situate Burley within a larger historical 
framework. It is to that project that I turn now.10
 Interest in the nature of propositions can be traced as far back as Plato. A more 
sophisticated approach to the subject matter can be found in Stoic doctrine of the 
axioma.
 
11
                                                            
9 For the notion of Burley as a conservative innovator, see Laurent Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” in A 
Companion to Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician and Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: 
Brill, 2013), 91. 
 But medieval interest in the proposition has its roots mainly in Aristotle. That 
interest comes from two directions: the nature of the semantic content of sentences in 
10 This section draws heavily from Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval 
Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (North-Holland Pub. Co, 1973), and from Susan 
Christine Brower-Toland, “Late-Medieval Theories of Propositions: Ockham and the 14th-Century 
Debate over Objects of Judgment” (Cornell University, 2002), chap. 1, pp. 7–21.  
11 On the stoic theory of the axioma, a kind of lekton, see Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 45–74. 
11 
 
natural language, on the one hand, and the nature of the objects of one’s attitudes, on the 
other.  
 Medieval interest in the semantic contents of statements in natural language (and 
the semantic contents of expressions in natural language generally) were encouraged, 
both directly and indirectly, by the “old” logic, and in particular by Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione. In the first chapter of that work, Aristotle articulates the semantics of 
expressions in natural language generally according to the thoughts that they signify. 
“Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections of the soul, and written marks symbols of 
spoken sounds [...]. But what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – 
are the same for all; for what these affections are likeness of – actual things – are also the 
same.”12
 Moreover, echoing the distinction he makes in the Categories between those 
which are said in combination with one another and those which are not said in 
combination, Aristotle states that those said in combination are truth-evaluable, whereas 
those said without combination are not, since “truth and falsity have to do with 
combination and separation.”
 Expressions in natural language signify certain features of the mind, then, which 
features are likenesses, or representations, of things in the world.  
13
                                                            
12 Aristotle, “De Interpretatione,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. J.L. 
Ackrill, vol. 1, Bollingen Series 71 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 16a4–8, p. 25. 
 In other words, Aristotle distinguishes statements from 
the nouns and verbs that compose them. The former contain alethic properties while the 
latter do not. Moreover, Aristotle also suggests that statements, and sentences generally, 
13 Aristotle, “De Interpretatione,” 16a10–13, p. 25. See also Aristotle, “Categories,” in The Complete Works 
of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. J.L. Ackrill, vol. 1, Bollingen Series 71 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), 1a17–20, p. 3. 
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have semantic content, just like the nouns and verbs that compose them. “A sentence is a 
significant spoken sound some part of which it significant in separation – as an 
expression, not as an affirmation.”14 In the fifth century CE, Boethius will connect these 
two the theses, arguing that a statement is “a complex expression (oratio) signifying 
something true or something false.”15
 While one finds treatments of semantic issues generally before the twelfth 
century, it is during the twelfth century, especially within the works of Peter Abelard (d. 
1142), that the semantics of sentences in particular come to be treated in a systematic and 
thorough-going fashion. As a general matter, Abelard argues that it is important to 
distinguish two kinds of significates that an expression in natural language has.
 
16
                                                            
14 Aristotle, “De Interpretatione,” 16b27–29, p. 26. 
 First, 
expressions in natural language signify intellectus, mental acts of attending to objects in 
the world. Expressions in natural language signify acts of that sort in the sense that 
speakers use words to express (exprimere) their thoughts. It is this notion of signification 
that Aristotle treats in the De Interpretatione, where he writes that a word establishes an 
understanding (constituit intellectum). In addition to an expression’s signifying a certain 
mental state, however, Abelard argues that some expressions – nouns and verbs, for 
example – also signify in the sense of naming objects in the world. ‘Socrates’, for 
example, expresses a certain mental act of attending to Socrates and names Socrates 
himself. 
15 “Propositio oratio verum falsumve significans.” Cited in Norman Kretzmann, “Medieval Logicians on 
the Meaning of the Propositio,” The Journal of Philosophy 67, no. 20 (October 22, 1970): 771, n. 6.   
16 See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 139–63. 
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 Just like nouns and verbs, Abelard argues that statements (propositiones) express 
mental states. Moreover, like statements in natural language, Abelard takes mental states 
of this sort to be compositional, composed of an act of thinking about what the subject 
and predicate terms nominate, respectively, as well as a unique mental act, which, while 
not itself an intellectus (since it has no referential content), is rather an act of joining 
referring intellectus together. The result is a complex mental act, in which the mind 
thinks of one thing inhering in another. However, Abelard argues that, unlike nouns and 
verbs, statements are not referring expressions. That is, they do not name anything. They 
do not name anything, Abelard argues, because there is not anything for them to name. If 
they were to name, they would need to name things within the Aristotelian categorical 
system. But they clearly do not, since what is asserted in a statement is something’s being 
the case, but nothing like that is found within the Aristotelian categorical system.  
 Rather than in naming, Abelard argues that the semantic function of a statement is 
in saying (in dicendo). That is, a statement is used to make an assertion, and Abelard calls 
what it asserts a dictum. A dictum, Abelard emphasizes, is not a thing (res), nor a 
something (aliquid), nor even a complex of a number of things. It is also not nothing 
(nihil). It is none of those precisely because the use of those expressions to characterize a 
dictum is a kind of category mistake, those names being correctly applied only to objects 
within the Aristotelian categorical system. What can be used to “name” a dictum, in some 
very loose sense, is an accusative plus infinitive construction.17
                                                            
17 ‘Socratem legere librum’. Abelard calls these sorts of constructions quasi-names. By the late medieval 
period, quod- (or that-) clauses – for example, quod Socrates legit librum, ‘that Socrates reads a book’ – 
were seen as equivalent to an accusative plus infinitive construction.  
 But that doesn’t serve to 
refer to, or name, anything, properly speaking, because such a thing would need to be 
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either a substance or an accident. A construction of this sort, however, does not name 
either a substance (e.g. it does not name merely Socrates) or an accident (e.g., it does not 
name merely the accident of reading a book). While (or perhaps rather because) dicta fall 
outside of the Aristotelian categorical system, Abelard argues that dicta are the primary 
bearers of alethic and modal properties, a feature of the account made more even explicit 
in the generation or so following Abelard. Statements in natural language, and the 
complex mental acts that they express, then, have the truth-values they do on account of 
the dicta that they express.18
 Abelard’s doctrine of the dictum was both innovative and challenging. It is one of 
the first systematic attempts to work through issues having to do with sentential content 
in the medieval period. The introduction of the notion of the dictum also served to 
highlight aspects unique to propositional content (e.g. truth-conditionality, modality) and 
to try to work out those issues against a broadly Aristotelian framework. But it also left 
the ontological status of the dictum itself somewhat opaque. In the generations following 
Abelard, some of his semantic insights were adopted, refined and disputed. Perhaps most 
important for our purposes is the debates that developed about the ontological status of 
the dictum.  
  
 Abelard’s metaphysical account of the dictum was mostly negative, telling us 
what a dictum is not. Subsequent generations attempted to describe the dictum in more 
positive ways. The author of one particular work – the Ars Meliduna – sets out three 
                                                            
18 As Susan Brower-Toland notes (see Brower-Toland, “Late-Medieval Theories of Propositions,” 15, n. 
25), it is curious that Abelard does not use his theory of the dictum to address theological puzzles having 
to do with the object of belief. It seems that it wasn’t until sometime around the turn of the fourteenth 
century that questions about the significatum of a sentence were explicitly connected to questions about 
the objects of belief and other attitudes.  
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different analyses of the dictum. First, a dictum might be a linguistic entity of some sort: 
either a sentence in natural language or a complex act of thinking. Call this the 
complexum view. On the complexum view, a dictum is, in fact, something (aliquid), 
namely, a certain mental sentence-token. Second, a dictum might be identical with or 
reducible to things in the Aristotelian categorical system – the inherence of the property 
of whiteness in Socrates, for example. Call this the res view, since it claims that the 
dictum is not an intentional state but a thing, or res, towards which a mental state can be 
directed. On the res view, a dictum is again something, since it exists either within some 
or other Aristotelian category, or is at least something composed out of and ultimately 
reducible to things from one or more of the Aristotelian categories. Third, a dictum might 
be a sui generis entity, belonging (as the author of the Ars Burana remarks) to a category 
– the enuntiabile – distinct from the ten categories of Aristotle. Call this the complexe 
significabile view, following the terminology developed by Adam Wodeham (and 
subsequently Gregory of Rimini) in the mid-fourteenth century. On the complexe 
significabile view, the dictum of a sentence is not a thing, because it is not identical or 
reducible to thing(s) within one or more of the ten Aristotelian categories, nor is it a 
token-sentence in a language. It is, rather, extra-categorical.19
 For the most part, philosophers in the thirteenth century tended to avoid 
investigations of the semantics of the sentence, favoring instead a close study of the 
semantics of the parts of a sentence (including a fairly rigorous debate about the grammar 
 As we will see, all three 
sorts of positions were developed and defended in the late medieval period. 
                                                            
19 This still leaves unsettled what role complexe significabilia play in meaning and thought – whether they 
are propositions, for example, or states of affairs. Both Wodeham and Gregory appear to take complexe 
significabilia to be states of affairs. 
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of sentences themselves). By the end of the thirteenth century, however, it appears that at 
least some philosophers were interested in applying the results of that study to the 
signification of sentences considered as a whole. Perhaps most notable in this regard was 
Scotus.20
 Scotus himself mentions that there was, during his day, a great altercation about 
the significata of expressions of first intention in natural language – whether they directly 
signify things (res), or only indirectly signify them, by direct signifying mental 
representations (conceptus) of those things.
 Scotus is an especially important philosopher for the our purposes, because it 
seems highly likely that Scotus’s theory of sentential signification, and the larger 
philosophical concerns out of which it arises, had a significant impact on the debates 
about meaning and cognition that flowered at Oxford at the beginning of the fourteenth 
century. Indeed, that theory likely directly influenced the theory of the proposition that 
Burley would develop. Burley reports that he attended lectures by Scotus at Oxford, 
likely in 1297-98, and the similarities that Burley’s account shares with Scotus’ certainly 
suggests that Scotus had an impact on Burley’s account of the proposition. 
21
                                                            
20 Curiously, Scotus is almost completely absent from Nuchelmans’ seminal work on ancient and medieval 
theories of truth-bearers, as point noted by E.P. Bos in E.P. Bos, “The Theory of the Proposition 
according to John Duns Scotus’ Two Commentaries on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” in Logos and 
Pragma : Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriël Nuchelmans, 
Aristarium Supplementa III (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1987), 121–39. This is unfortunate, as 
Scotus appears to have been central in the development of that tradition during the late thirteenth and 
very early fourteenth centuries. 
 Scholars disagree about whether Scotus in 
fact ever adopts a position in this debate. At least one plausible interpretation, however, 
argues that Scotus thinks the disagreement about the direct, or primary, significata of 
categorematic expressions in natural language is built on, on the one hand, a deficient 
21 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, vol. 6, Opera Omnia (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1963), 
I.27.1–3, n. 83, p. 97. 
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account of cognition and, on the other, an ambiguity in the terminology at issue. First, 
Scotus argues that, with respect to mental representation, one needs to carefully 
distinguish between the act of thinking, on the one hand, and what that thinking is about, 
on the other – or, put in another way, between vehicle and content. Second, the usual way 
in which the disagreement about signification is put does not seem to respect this 
distinction between vehicle and content, since ‘conceptus’ is ambiguous between vehicle 
and content, and ‘res’ is likewise ambiguous between content, which exists merely 
objectively in the mind, and the extramental reality, which exists subjectively outside the 
mind. In response, then, Scotus argues that expressions in natural language signify things 
as they are understood (res ut intelligitur), distinguishes them from species, vehicles of 
content, on the one hand, and existing things (res existentes), which have extramental 
existence, on the other. 
 Scotus combines that semantic thesis with a thesis to which Burley himself is 
committed: intellectualism. A consequence of intellectualism is that the primary bearers 
of truth are products of intellectual activity, being produced by the mind’s composing or 
dividing something (in a non-technical sense of “thing”) from another. Scotus argues that 
the things which the mind puts together are concepts – that is, contents of the mind, 
things as they are understood.   
[T]he composition is not out of species but out of things – not, however, as they 
exist but as they are understood. And therefore truth and falsity are said to 
concern the composition and division of the intellect, because that composition is 
caused by the intellect and is in the intellect as it is cognized in the one cognizing, 
not as an accident in a subject.22
                                                            
22 “[C]ompositio est illarum rerum, non tamen ut existentium, sed ut intelliguntur, et ideo dicitur veritas, et 
falsitas cirac compositionem et divisionem intellectus, quia illa compositio ab intellectu causatur, et est 
in intellectu, ut cognitum in cognoscente, non autem ut accidens in subiecto” (John Duns Scotus, Super 
librum I Perihermeneias, vol. 1, Opera Omnia (Paris: Vives, 1891), q. 2, n. 9, p. 543). 
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Scotus will go on to argue that it is a composition of things (compositio rerum) that 
sentences in natural language signify. 
And through a spoken statement it is not a composition of species that it is 
signified but a composition of things, just as a composition of utterances is not 
signified through a written sentence but rather a composition of things.23
What a sentence in natural language signifies, then, is a certain composition of things as 
they are understood, that is, a certain complex content that the mind forms out of the 
contents of its species. Scotus’s account of a compositio rerum seems to have had an 
important impact in Oxford at the beginning of the fourteenth century. First, Burley 
appears to have been deeply influenced by it. Like Scotus, Burley argues that sentences in 
natural language signify a certain composition of things. Burley, as we will see, goes 
further. First, in his early works, he will explicitly label that composition of things a 
propositio in mente, or a mental sentence. Consequently, Burley will argue that a 
composition of that sort has predicate (or linguistic) structure, in virtue of which it can be 
said to have terms with certain semantic properties. Second, he will argue that a mental 
sentence is composed not just of things as they are understood, but rather of existing 
things, that is, things which have real, extramental existence. But the roots of Burley’s 
theory can be traced back to Scotus. Beyond Burley, Ockham too seems to have been 
influenced by Scotus (though not immediately, but rather likely via Scotus’s influence on 
the Oxford community). Like Burley, the early Ockham identifies the compositio as a 
mental sentence. More faithful to Scotus, however, the early Ockham holds that general 
 
                                                            
23 “Videtur ergo dicenum ad istud, quod quantumcumque per idem multa signficentur, quorum unum 
significatur, inquantum est signum alterius, si illud componatur in oratione cum alio, non est compositio 
signorum sed signatorum ultimorum, quae sunt signa, et per orationem prolatam non significatur 
compositio specierum sed rerum” (Ibid., q. 2, n. 5–6, pp. 542–3). 
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mental sentences contain ficta, that is, contents which have merely objective existence in 
the mind, as their terms. 24,25
2.2. Propositional Attitudes before the Fourteenth Century 
  
 While Abelard and his immediate successors in the twelfth century (in a 
philosophical guise, at least) engaged in serious philosophical investigation into the 
nature of the semantic content of sentences in natural language, different but related 
problems were being discussed in theological quarters, concerning the nature of the 
objects of one’s attitudes.26
 Augustine claims in his commentary on the gospel of John that what is believed is 
the same for all believers, despite the fact that the antiqui, such as Abraham, believed, for 
example, that Christ will be born, whereas the moderni, such as Augustine himself, 
 Two problems in particular interested the theologians of the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries: the nature of the objects of religious faith, and the 
immutability of divine knowledge.  
                                                            
24 Many of Ockham’s critics note the connection to Scotus. Adam Wodeham, for example, notes that 
“Scotus follows the same approach” as the early Ockham about the ontology of the terms of a mental 
sentence (Adam Wodeham, “The Object of Knowledge,” in Mind and Knowledge (The Cambridge 
Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts), trans. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 327, quoted in Brower-Toland, “Late-Medieval Theories of 
Propositions,” 18, n. 32). 
25 Karger notes that, for the early Ockham, the subject terms of singular mental sentences were not ficta but 
rather things. See Elizabeth Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” 
Vivarium 34 (1996): 210–28. Absent their disagreement about the reality of extra-mental universals, 
then, Burley and the early Ockham appear to have endorsed similar accounts of the proposition.  
26 The distinction between philosophy and theology here, while real, isn’t nearly as clean-cut as the 
structure of this section might suggest. And this is because the theologians of the medieval period were 
also philosophers, having received an education in the arts before they would take up theological studies. 
Consequently, philosophical and theological reflection often intersected with one another. But this makes 
the distinct treatments of the semantics of sentences, on the one hand, and the objects of belief, on the 
other, all the more puzzling.  
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believe that Christ was born.27
 That background gave rise to two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, replies to 
the question of the nature of the objects of religious belief. First, some argued that the 
object of religious belief was a thing, res. Among res-theorists, some held that that thing 
is simple, for example God or Christ. Others (e.g. Prevostin of Cremona) argued that that 
thing was not simple but rather complex – an event (eventus), such as Christ’s birth or 
death.
 Debates about the nature of the object of religious belief in 
the medieval period are articulated against this background. A compelling theory of the 
object of religious belief had to articulate, on the one hand, how the faith of believers 
remained the same, and, on the other, how one’s faith was effected by the temporal 
position she finds herself in. This lead to a general distinction between, on the one hand, 
what one’s faith is about, and, on the other, how that faith is expressed.  
28
                                                            
27 Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, vol. 35, Patrologia Latina 
(Garnier Frères, 1864), XLV, 9, pp. 1722–3. 
 Pure res-theories were often rejected on grounds that such things could not be 
bearers of alethic properties, and so cannot be the sorts of things that are believed. In 
response to the difficulties of a res-theory, then, other theologians argued that the object 
of religious belief is a certain linguistic entity which itself signifies a particular thing or 
event, such as the birth of Christ. In other words, theologians of this sort argued that the 
object of one’s religious belief was a complexum. Debates among theologians who held 
an account of this sort, however, often centered around the precise character of this 
linguistic entity, and in particular whether it was tensed or tenseless, and what one’s 
views on that account meant for shared faith among believers. Moreover, many tried to 
28 On Prevostin of Cremona, see M.-D. Chenu, “Contribution À L’histoire Du Traité de La Foi,” in 
Mélanges Thomistes, Bibliothèque Thomiste III (Paris: Vrin, 1934), 130. 
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combine the res-theory, on the one hand, with a complexum-theory, on the other, to 
ameliorate the perceived deficiencies of each.  
 A puzzle similar to the object of religious belief concerned the immutability of 
God’s knowledge. On the standard medieval conception of divine nature, God is a simple 
being, and so not capable of change. At the same time, God is omniscient; he knows 
everything that can be known. Peter Lombard, a twelfth-century theologian, notes that 
these doctrines seem to be intension with one another.29
 While medieval interest in the nature of the objects of one’s attitudes began in 
theological circles, it became a topic of philosophical interest in the early thirteenth 
century, with the re-introduction of and interest in Aristotle’s remaining logical works 
(the so-called “new” logic), and in particular with the introduction of his Posterior 
Analytics. That work concerns the nature of a particular kind of attitude: scientific 
knowledge (scientia), which is explanatory knowledge produced by a demonstration.
 If, before he created the world, 
God knows that he will create the world, immutability appears to require that he knows 
even now that he will create the world. But God cannot know now that he will create the 
world, since all he can know now is that he has created the world. In response, many 
theologians argued that the immutability of God’s knowledge requires the immutability 
of the object of his knowledge, with significant debates about the nature of the object. 
The various positions in that debate match nicely with the positions articulated in the 
debates over the object of religious belief.  
30
                                                            
29 See Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 185–6. 
 
The overriding debate for much of the thirteenth century concerned which subjects of 
30 For a fuller discussion of scientific knowledge, see ch. 4, §5, pp. 221–30. 
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inquiry could be scientific.31
2.3. Propositions in the Fourteenth Century 
 Was theology a science, for example? At some point around 
the turn of the fourteenth century, however, philosophers seem to have shifted their focus 
from the proper domains of science to the objects of scientia, probing what, exactly, is 
known. It is, unfortunately, not at all clear what provokes this turn, nor even with whom 
serious consideration of the object of scientific knowledge first begins. Burley, in fact, 
might be a key player in that transition, since the overriding  concern in his questions 
commentary on the Posterior Analytics, written c. 1307, revolves around the nature of the 
objects of scientific knowledge. That concern recurs in his later works as well. In any 
case, the rise of that focus on the objects of scientific knowledge sparks a rigorous debate 
in the fourteenth century about the objects of propositional attitudes generally. 
 Throughout the fourteenth century, the concerns about the semantics of sentences, 
on the one hand, and about the objects of propositional attitudes, on the other, that arose 
independently in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries begin to be treated as elements of a 
unified and systematic theory of meaning and cognition. A central figure of the story of 
that unification is certainly Ockham. Ockham’s sophisticated theory of mental language, 
and his explicit use of the mental language to address concerns about the nature of the 
objects of one’s attitudes, motivates an interest in propositional attitudes – and 
consequently propositions – for other central thinkers at Oxford, and, through them, 
transforms the philosophical interests and projects of philosophers on the continent. 
                                                            
31 On Aquinas on scientific knowledge, see Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of 
Aristotle, trans. F.R. Larcher (Albany, N.Y.: Magi Books, 1970). On Aquinas on whether theology is a 
science, see Thomas Aquinas, Faith, Reason and Theology: Questions I-IV of the Commentary on 
Boethius’ De Trinitate, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1987), 
q. 2, a. 2 (pp. 40–4). 
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Moreover, that account of mental language (and the subordination of natural language to 
it) allows Ockham to connect issues of semantics, on the one hand, with propositional 
attitudes, on the other.  
 In fact, Ockham’s own view is that a sentence (and its nominalization) does not 
signify anything – that is, a sentence is not a referring expression – because there is not 
any one thing (res) that it could signify.32 At best, Ockham argues, the referents of a 
sentence are merely the referents of its subject and predicate terms. However, though 
sentences in natural language have no signification, Ockham maintains that they have a 
semantics, and that that semantics connects to debates about the objects of propositional 
attitudes. Ockham argues that natural language broadly is meaningful by being 
appropriately connected to a mental language, composed of concepts. The expression 
‘cow’ has the meaning that it does by being subordinated to the concept COW, for 
example. Sentences in natural language too have this subordination relation. ‘Socrates is 
a human’, for example, has the meaning that it does because it is subordinated to the 
mental sentence SOCRATES IS A HUMAN, composed of the concept SOCRATES, the 
copula concept, and the concept HUMAN. It is these mental sentences, moreover, which 
Ockham argues are the objects of one attitudes.33
 Ockham’s treatment of the objects of propositional attitudes garnered significant 
attention, first at Oxford and then at Paris and other centers of learning on continental 
  
                                                            
32 See Claude Panaccio, “Semantics and Mental Language,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 61. 
33 “[C]omplexes which are known through natural science are not composed out of sensible things nor out 
of substances, but are composed out of intentions or concepts of the soul which are common to things of 
that sort” (William Ockham, Expositio in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Prologus et Libri I-III, ed. 
Vladmir Richter and Gerhard Leibold, vol. 4, Opera Philosophica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan 
Institute, 1985), prologus, p. 11). 
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Europe. The immediate influence is seen in the circle of intellectuals at Oxford that 
formed around Ockham’s thought in the 1310s and 1320s, so that, as Susan Brower-
Toland notes, what we find is a “multi-faceted, “in-house” debate that develops around 
issues raised by [Ockham’s] discussion.”34 Many of those intellectuals took issue with 
Ockham’s position, the lines of those reactions largely mapping many of the lines seen in 
the theological and philosophical debates in the twefth and thirteenth centuries. Robert 
Holcot (d. 1349), for example, approaches questions about the objects of one’s attitudes 
from the perspective of divine knowledge. Walter Chatton (d. 1343), in contrast, 
approach the issue from the question of the objects of religious belief. Finally, William 
Crathorn (fl. 1330s) and Adam Wodeham (d. 1358), Ockham’s secretary, engage the 
issue from the perspective of scientific knowledge. Moreover, just as the angles of 
approach differ among those intellectuals, so too do their responses to Ockham’s account. 
Holcot, for example, agrees with Ockham that linguistic entities serve as the objects of 
one’s attitudes. Both Ockham and Holcot, then, are complexum theorists. But he argues 
that the objects of one’s attitudes are not necessarily mental sentences but rather 
sentences in natural language. Chatton, in contrast, is a res theorist; he argues that it is 
not linguistic entities but rather things – substances and accidents – that are the objects of 
one’s attitudes.35 Finally, Wodeham (and maybe Crathorn as well) argues that the object 
of one’s attitudes is neither a linguistic entity nor a thing, but something sui generis.36
                                                            
34 Brower-Toland, “Late-Medieval Theories of Propositions,” 19. 
 In 
35 On Chatton’s reist account, see Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 210–2. See also Dominik 
Perler, “Late Medieval Ontologies of Facts,” The Monist 77 (1994): 149. 
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fact, in contrast to the others, Wodeham connects the discussion of the objects of one’s 
attitudes to a positive proposal about signification, arguing that those sui generis entities 
are in fact the significata of sentences in natural and mental language. 
 At least by the 1330s, Ockham’s metaphysical and semantic program more 
generally had spread to the continent, with the discussion having been especially fervent 
at the University of Paris. John Buridan (d. 1360), for example, adopts the nominalist 
semantics that Ockham develops, and in many ways improves on it. Along with that 
philosophical system, however, many of the larger debates from which it developed 
spread to Europe as well – including interest in the nature and function of propositions. 
And unlike at Oxford, where the question of the signification of sentences in natural 
language received a negative reply (Wodeham excepted), debates about the signification 
of sentences in natural language were a key part of the discussion at Paris and elsewhere. 
In fact, it seems that it was Wodeham himself who indirectly gave rise to that interest, 
since Wodeham’s views clearly influenced the thought of Parisian thinker Gregory of 
Rimini (d. 1358), who argued that sentences in natural language signified a sui generis 
object which, following Wodeham, he calls a complexe significabile, that is, a certain 
object signified by a statement taken as a whole.37 Rimini’s views, in turn, were the focus 
on heated debate at Paris and elsewhere.38
                                                                                                                                                                                 
36 On Wodeham and Crathorn’s contributions to the development of the theory of the complexe 
significabile, see Katherine Tachau, “Wodeham, Crathorn, and Holkot: The Development of the 
Complexe Significabile,” in Logos and Pragma : Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of 
Professor Gabriël Nuchelmans, ed. Lambertus Rijk (Nijmegen  Netherlands: Ingenium Publishers, 
1987), 161–88. On Crathorn’s views, see H Schepers, “Holcot Contra Dicta Crathorn,” Philosophises 
Jahrbuch 79 (1972): 106–36. 
 
37 On the relation of Wodeham and Rimini, and Wodeham’s influence at Paris more generally, see Jack 
Zupko, “How It Played in the Rue de Fouarre: Reception of Adam Wodeham’s Theory of the Complexe 
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3. THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT 
 As I trust my brief historical sketch illustrates, reflection on issues having to do 
with the proposition is both serious and entrenched in the medieval period, both before 
and after Burley. Burley’s particular account of the proposition represents, then, but one 
contribution to a long and boisterous philosophical conversation. However, that 
contribution seems to me to be especially sophisticated and original (perhaps, in some 
ways, too original), one which ties together in a systematic fashion concerns that 
originate from different philosophical domains: semantic, cognitive and alethic. In this 
section, then, I will briefly recount the contents of my dissertation, with the intention of 
highlighting the ways in which Burley’s account of the proposition is both motivated by 
and serves as a response to various philosophical concerns. 
 The dissertation contains two parts, the second larger than the first. The first part 
of the dissertation (ch. 2) focuses on the ways in which Burley’s project has been 
portrayed in the secondary literature. The immediate goal of the first part of the 
dissertation is to evaluate those interpretations (or at least the most developed) relative to 
both exegetical and philosophical constraints, that is, to constraints of textual fit and 
philosophical coherence and plausibility. The broader goal of the first half, however, is to 
argue that most of the accounts in the secondary literature are motivated by incorrect 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Significabile in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the Mid-Fourteenth Century,” Franciscan Studies 54 (1994): 
211–25. 
38 For the development of debates about the proposition, see Gabriel Nuchelmans, Late-Scholastic and 
Humanist Theories of the Proposition (New York: North Holland Publishing Co., 1980). See also E.J. 
Ashworth, “Theories of the Proposition: Some Early Sixteenth Century Discussions,” Franciscan Studies 
38 (1978): 81–121; Paul Vincent Spade, “Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late 
Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory, Version 1.2,” December 27, 2007, chap. 6, 
http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Thoughts,%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf. 
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background assumptions about Burley’s philosophical commitments and goals, and in 
particular about his general semantic and cognitive commitments. Consequently, they fail 
to correctly grasp Burley’s central project: to provide a coherent and attractive account of 
the proposition, meant both to address concerns about meaning and truth, and to cohere 
with his more general semantic and cognitive commitments. The second half of the 
dissertation (chs. 3-5) develops that account along three lines: the metaphysics of the 
proposition, the truth-conditionality of the proposition, and the nature of the truth-
conditions that the proposition determines. By developing that account along those lines, 
I hope to show how Burley’s account meets the three desiderata for the proposition that I 
set out earlier in this introduction, namely, that propositions are the semantic contents of 
sentences in natural and mental language, that they are the “objects” of propositional 
attitudes, and that they are the primary bearers of truth and falsity. Moreover, I argue that 
that account does so in a way that is motivated and philosophically compelling. 
 Part I. The interpretation of Burley’s project that I defend breaks with much of 
the prevailing scholarship at a fairly fundamental level. Before I articulate my own 
interpretation, therefore, I conduct a detailed analysis in chapter 2 of the main approaches 
to the relevant texts that one finds in the literature. Given how small the community of 
Burley scholars is, the number and variety of interpretations that one finds in the 
literature is surprising. However, despite their differences with each other, I believe the 
various interpretations one finds in the literature can be divided into two broad camps. 
Scholars of the first camp – which comprises most of the community of Burley scholars –
believe that Burley’s central concern is the metaphysics of states of affairs (a concern 
expressed, many argue, in Burley’s phrase ‘propositio in re’), which these scholars take 
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to be the significates of sentences in natural and mental language. This sort of approach 
faces a number of serious difficulties, however. In particular, the semantic account they 
favor seems unable to explain the meaning of false sentences. If the meaning of an 
expression is the thing which it signifies, but if false sentences do not signify any thing 
(their falsity consisting precisely in the fact that there is no state of affairs in the world to 
which they correspond), then it seems that false sentences are not meaningful.  
 Some scholars are fully aware of this difficulty. Alessandro Conti, for example, 
argues that it is precisely this difficulty which leads Burley to develop a more complex 
semantic account at the end of his career.39
 The interpretation that Conti favors is an especially exciting and provocative 
attempt to interpret the development of Burley’s account of the semantics of sentential 
expressions as a response to concerns about the semantic contents of false sentences. 
 On this interpretation, in the second half of 
his career, Burley distinguishes between two sorts of concepts – one which exists 
subjectively in the soul, the other objectively – reflecting the distinction between vehicle 
and content that Scotus had introduced. That distinction allows Burley to develop a 
semantic account where the semantic divisions are not threefold but rather fourfold: 
utterance, subjective concept, objective concept, thing. It also allows Burley to account 
for the meaning of false sentences in natural language, because it allows Burley to 
distinguish between the sense, or meaning, of an expression and its referent. False 
sentences signify certain mental sentences that exist objectively in the mind (and so are 
meaningful) but those sentences fail to correspond to any fact in the world (and so are 
false).  
                                                            
39 Conti, “Walter Burley.” 
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However, that kind of interpretation founders at a more fundamental level. That 
interpretation requires a particular understanding of Burley’s more general account of 
signification, according to which expressions in natural and mental language signify 
things in only an indirect manner.40
 In contrast, a minority of Burley scholars argue that Burley’s central concern is 
not so much the metaphysics of states of affairs as it is what we might call propositional 
content. However, among these scholars, that is some debate about the nature of that 
content. Laurent Cesalli argues that what sentences in natural and mental language 
signify are certain sorts of complex, truth-evaluable entities which exist merely 
 On this account, expressions in natural language only 
signify things by signifying objects which have merely objective existence in the mind, 
which objects (in some cases, at least) signify things. But Burley, in no uncertain terms, 
rejects accounts of that sort at every stage of his career. In contrast to those sorts of 
accounts, Burley argues that expressions in natural language signify things primarily 
(primo) and directly (directe). Expressions in natural language might well have the 
significata that they do on account of a more fundamental relationship that they have to 
mental representations, but what an expression establishes in the understanding – that is, 
what it makes one think about, and so means – is the thing that it signifies. Even if, then, 
Burley were committed to a sort of merely objective mental entity in the second half of 
his career, that would not seem to resolve puzzles about the meaning of false sentences in 
natural language, because, on the interpretation that Conti and others favor, those 
sentences would still fail to have anything as their contents, there being nothing for false 
sentences to signify. 
                                                            
40 It also fails on additional exegetical grounds. See ch. 2, §2.1. 
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objectively in the mind, and which are composed out of entities which exist merely 
objectively in the mind. As to why Burley says that the mind combines things (res) with 
one another, Cesalli argues that “thing” in this context is meant to emphasize Burley’s 
“constant theoretical intuition: the objective foundation of logical truth in extramental 
reality.”41 However, Cesalli’s account faces some of the same challenges as Conti’s. In 
particular, it requires that expressions in natural and mental language signify things 
outside the mind in only an indirect manner, by signifying entities which exist merely 
objectively in the mind, which entities Cesalli argues are “the presence in the mind of 
extramental objects (this substance, that accident) as cognitive and objective contents.”42
 In contrast to Cesalli’s interpretation, Elizabeth Karger argues that Burley’s claim 
that the mind can predicate one thing of another represents a coherent account of what 
(drawing from Burley’s early works) she calls a mental sentence (propositio in mente), 
according to which the mind fashions propositional contents out of extramental things.
  
43
                                                            
41 Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” 123. 
 
Karger’s approach is refreshingly simple and straightforward: take Burley at his word 
when he says that the mind can predicate one thing of another, and attempt to construct 
an account from what he says without any negative starting assumptions about its 
philosophical plausibility. What results is an exciting description of the metaphysical and 
semantic features of the proposition. For example, Karger notes that mental sentences can 
be composed of extramental things, which are put together by the mind when the mind 
asserts their identity or non-identity; indeed, for the mind to assert the identity or non-
42 Ibid., 131. 
43 See Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” 194–6. 
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identity of two things is, on Burley’s view, just to combine those things with one another, 
in an affirmative or negative fashion. Moreover, Karger argues that, at least in the later 
works and likely in the earlier works as well, those extramental things which compose a 
mental sentence, insofar as they compose a proposition, have a certain semantic property: 
supposition, in virtue of which even general mental sentences can be about particular 
substances in the world. Consequently, a mental sentence is something which has both 
syntactic and semantic properties. 
 I believe that Karger is on to something here. When appropriate philosophical 
attention is brought to bear upon it, Burley’s repeated claim that the mind can predicate 
one thing of another proves to be at least tractable. But Karger’s approach is at best a first 
step. What she does not do is situate that theory within Burley’s larger philosophical 
project, explaining the commitments that Burley has which motivate an account of that 
sort, or how that account fits with his semantic, cognitive and alethic theories generally. 
My dissertation, then, picks up where Karger’s article leaves off. My goal in the second 
part of the dissertation is to explain why Burley would possibly defend that account of 
the proposition, and thereby explain how that account fits within the theories of meaning, 
cognition and truth to which Burley is committed. The result, I argue, is a sophisticated 
and philosophically exciting account of the proposition. 
 Part II. The second part of the dissertation is divided into three distinct but related 
projects. First, I examine (ch. 3) Burley’s account of the nature of the proposition, and its 
metaphysics. I argue that three key commitments – referentialism, compositionality and 
intellectualism – motivate Burley’s claim that a proposition is composed of things by the 
mind’s predicating one of the other. Referentialism is the thesis that the semantic content 
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of a categorematic expression in natural language is the thing to which that expression 
refers. For Burley, this commitment is cashed out in terms of the notion of signification. 
According to Burley, categorematic expressions in natural language primarily (primo) 
and directly (directe) signify things outside of the mind (res extra animam). That 
commitment to referentialism is motivated in part by a more fundamental cognitive 
thesis, about the intentional contents of cognitive acts. According to that cognitive thesis, 
the immediate objects of mental acts are things, rather than any sort of objects internal to 
the mind.  
 Burley combines his commitment to referentialism with a commitment to 
compositionality: the thesis that the semantic content of a complex linguistic expression 
is built up from the semantic contents of the categorematic expressions which compose it 
relative to the syntax of that expression. ‘Socrates is pale’, for example, signifies 
something composed of what ‘Socrates’ signifies and ‘pale’ signifies. Referentialism and 
compositionality together constitute an exciting and at present prominent account of 
semantic content, according to which the semantic content of a complex expression is 
composed of things – objects, properties, etc. – and whose complexity mirrors the 
syntactic complexity of that complex expression itself. On this account, for example, 
‘Socrates is a human’ signifies a complex composed of Socrates and the property of 
humanity arranged in some particular way. 
 While they motivate an exciting account of semantic content, referentialism and 
compositionality alone do not seem to be able to explain a key feature of the semantic 
contents of statements: their representationality, or truth-conditionality. That is, while 
referentialism and compositionality might determine what sorts of things make up the 
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semantic content of a complex expression, and even how those things are arranged 
relative to one another, they do not seem to be able to explain why certain sorts of 
complex structures which are composed of things – namely, propositions – have truth-
conditions but other structures containing things do not. Burley’s commitment to a third 
thesis, intellectualism, addresses this issue. Intellectualism is the thesis that representing 
the world’s being a certain way – that is, representing that so-and-so is the case – is 
fundamentally something that the mind does. In other words, that sort of representation is 
explained fundamentally in terms of a certain sort of activity of the mind. According to 
Burley, that activity is predicative; the mind represents that Socrates is a human, for 
example, when predicating humanity of Socrates, so that Socrates and the property of 
humanity are structured in some truth-conditional way.  
 Motivated by his commitment to referentialism, compositionality and 
intellectualism, then, Burley argues that a proposition is a structured entity composed of 
things arranged in a truth-conditional way by the mind. However, Burley’s account of the 
metaphysics of that entity evolves over the course of his career. In the first half of his 
career, Burley argues that the proposition just is the mental act of predicating one thing of 
another. That account has some virtues: it explains the unity of the proposition by appeal 
to the mind’s predicative act itself, whose unity is guaranteed, on the one hand, by its 
status as an accident in the category of action, and, on the other, by its representational 
character. Because propositions are composed of things, however, Burley is forced to 
argue that the mind’s complex acts contain as parts things which exist wholly outside of 
the mind. The central disadvantage to that account, then, is mereological: the claim that 
wholes can be spatially disjoint from their parts.  
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 Perhaps partly because of problems about mereology, Burley develops a different 
account of the metaphysics of the proposition later in his career. According to that 
account, propositions are analogous to hylomorphic (or “matter-form”) compounds. The 
“terms” of the proposition – that is, the things which compose it – are its matter, while 
the mental act of predication is now the “form” of the proposition, and so merely a proper 
part of the proposition rather than identical to it. That account avoids the sort of 
mereological worries that plagued the early account. However, it also entails that 
questions of unity can’t be resolved by appeal to representationality, since that account 
requires some further explanation of what unifies the mental act of predication to the 
things which it predicates. Burley addresses questions of unity by appeal to the 
Augustinian notion of intentio, and in the process makes an interesting suggestion about 
the nature of thought and its relationship to the mind’s volitional activity. 
 After I complete my examination of the metaphysics of the proposition, I turn (ch. 
4) to issues of the proposition’s representational, or truth-conditional, character. Burley 
argues that the mind’s predicating one thing of another is the exercise of a certain 
representational activity of the mind. I explore whether Burley provides any explanation 
of the representational character of that activity. I argue that, according to Burley, the 
ability of the mind to represent is explained in terms of his commitment to a mental 
language, and a language of thought more generally. For Burley, the semantic contents of 
expressions in natural language is explained by a more fundamental relation that those 
expressions have to expressions in a mental language. That mental language has, first, a 
vocabulary, populated by concepts. That vocabulary is generated in two stages. In the 
first stage, concepts are generated via one’s causal interaction with the world. Then, in a 
35 
 
second stage, these basic concepts can then be combined to form more complex concepts. 
Once the mind has a suitably large vocabulary, the mind can then make use of those 
concepts, in two ways. First, the mind can engage in a kind of minimal use, which use 
just is the act of thinking about what that concept represents. Burley calls such use simple 
mental activity. Second, and far more interesting, the mind can make predicative use of 
its concepts, predicating one of the other. Such use just is, for Burley, the mind’s 
assertion that what one of those concepts represents is identical to (or different from) 
what the other concept represents – which is nothing except the mind’s predicating one 
thing of another. Consequently, the mind’s predicating one thing of another is the very 
same act as the mind’s predicating one concept of another, where which concepts it uses 
explains the predicative use that it makes of things. And so the mind’s “rational” activity 
of predicating  one thing of another is explained by its real activity of predicating one 
concept of another to produce a mental sentence. 
 In addition to providing an explanation of the representational character of the 
mind’s predicating one thing of another, Burley’s commitment to mental language and 
the language of thought hypothesis more generally allows Burley to reconcile his account 
of the proposition (and the related account of thinking that it entails) with a certain 
position he adopts in the philosophy of science. For Burley, philosophy of science is 
principally a matter of demonstrative science, as developed by Aristotle in his Posterior 
Analytics. Scientific knowledge, on this view, is arrived at syllogistically, so that one 
comes to recognize the relationship of an attribute in a subject via a middle term. A 
central debate in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century about demonstrative science 
concerned the nature of what medieval philosophers calls a demonstratio potissima, or a 
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demonstration of the highest sort: whether the middle term in a demonstration of that sort 
was the definition of the subject, or of the predicate. A central criticism, developed by 
Giles of Rome in the late thirteenth century, of the view that the middle term in a 
demonstratio potissima was the definition of a subject argues that, if the middle term 
were the definition of the subject, then the conclusion of that demonstration would not be 
different from its major premise. For a name and a definition of the subject refer to the 
very same thing. It is a criticism that concerns, broadly speaking, the substitutability of 
co-referring terms in opaque contexts, such as knowledge contexts. Since, for example, 
‘human’ and ‘rational animal’ (the name and definition of some subject, respectively) 
refer to the same thing – on Burley’s account, the property of humanity – it seems that ‘A 
human is capable of laughter’ and ‘A rational animal is capable of laugher’ have the same 
content. But if demonstrative science is a matter of knowledge production, and assuming 
that one’s attitudes are individuated by their contents, then it seems that knowledge that a 
human is capable of laughter is no different than knowledge that a rational animal is 
capable of laughter. 
 Burley rejects Giles’ argument because he rejects the assumption that one’s 
attitudes are individuated merely by their contents. Moreover, Burley’s argument for a 
language of thought, and the relationship of that language to cognitive activity, provides 
him with a justification for that rejection. Because complex mental activity involves the 
use not just of things but also of concepts that represent those things, complex mental 
acts, which constitute one’s attitudes, are individuated not just by the things towards 
which they are directed by also by the concepts upon which they operate. The belief that 
Socrates is a human, for example, is individuated not just by Socrates and humanity, but 
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also by the concepts SOCRATES and HUMAN, whose predication accounts for the 
mind’s predicating humanity of Socrates. Since mental acts are individuated not just by 
things but also by concepts, Burley is able to defend an account of attitudes that is fine-
grained enough to meet Giles’ challenge. 
 For a proposition to be representational, or truth-conditional, is nothing other than 
for it to have, or determine, truth-conditions. The last project (ch. 5) of the second part of 
my dissertation involves, then, an examination of the truth-conditions that a proposition 
determines. Burley is committed generally to a correspondence account of truth, and 
more specifically takes correspondence to be an asymmetric relation he calls adequation. 
Propositions are true, on this account, so long as they are adequated to features of reality, 
which I label facts. However, Burley’s analysis of correspondence, and his concomitant 
account of facts, evolves significantly over the course of his career, largely in response to 
criticisms William Ockham raises for Burley’s commitment to extra-mental universals, or 
what I call properties. In the first half of his career, Burley defends what I call a near-
identity account of correspondence, wherein true propositions and the facts which make 
them true share the same “material” parts – the same things which compose a true 
proposition also compose the fact which makes it true – but differ in their structure, or 
“formal” parts. Propositions are structured by a mental act of predication, an act which 
asserts that one thing is identical to (or different from) another, whereas facts are 
structured by the very identity (or diversity) relations represented by true mental acts of 
predication. The challenge for Burley’s early account is thus mainly metaphysical: to 
explain how the things which are components of propositions that we intuit to be true can 
be identical (or diverse) in fact, even when it might seem, prima facie, that they are not. 
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For example, Burley’s account requires that the truth of the proposition that Socrates is a 
human consists in its correspondence to the fact of Socrates’ being identical to humanity, 
even though Socrates and humanity differ in important ways – for example, one is 
concrete, and the other is abstract. Burley, unfortunately, never provides a detailed 
analysis of the metaphysics of facts, but I construct an analysis which I argue fits with 
Burley’s early ontology and metaphysics of identity.  
 Roughly midway through Burley’s career, however, Ockham offers a number of 
criticisms of moderate realism (of which Burley’s early metaphysics was one variety), 
criticisms which also touch on the account of identity that Burley defends in the first half 
of his career. Two consequences follow from those criticisms. First, Burley abandons his 
early, metaphysically complex account of identity in favor of a simpler account of 
identity promoted by Ockham. Second, and in partial consequence of the first, Burley 
develops what has come to be called “exaggerated” realism, where properties and the 
concrete particulars that possess them are really distinct from one another. That account 
brings with it a number of fascinating metaphysical and epistemic consequences. For the 
purposes of Burley’s account of correspondence, however, the immediate effect is that 
the account of facts which seems to be required by his early account of correspondence is 
untenable, since properties such as humanity can never be identical to concrete 
particulars such as Socrates. And, because that account of facts is untenable, the near-
identity account of correspondence is as well.  
 As we should expect, then, the second half of Burley’s career is marked by a very 
different account of correspondence, on the one hand, and the metaphysics of facts, on 
the other. With respect to correspondence, Burley argues that the truth of a proposition 
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consists, not in the identity (or diversity) of its terms, but rather the identity (or diversity) 
of the things for which those terms supposit. The theory of supposition began to be 
formalized in the early thirteenth century. However, significant advancements were made 
in the fourteenth century, advancements to which Burley was a primary contributor. An 
original intent of the theory of supposition was to provide medieval philosophers a way to 
codify and explain how sentential context allows one to use a term to talk about, or refer 
to, different things, and in what way we can refer to those things.44
 Perhaps partly on account of Ockham’s extension of supposition theory to 
expressions in mental language, Burley suggests in his last commentary on the 
Categories that the things which are components in a proposition have supposition as 
well, since they (like the terms in natural and mental language) are terms in a statement 
(propositio). That claim is extremely radical, because it requires that supposition can be a 
property not just of signs but of things as well. But it is also ingenious, since it coheres 
 For example, it 
allowed medieval philosophers to explain how general statements (e.g., ‘A human is an 
animal’) could be about particular humans and particular animals. One central 
advancement not for the theory so much as for its application comes in the late 1310s, 
when Ockham argues that supposition is a property not just of expressions in natural 
language but of expressions in mental language as well, since supposition is supposed to 
be a property of subject and predicate terms generally.  
                                                            
44 Note that this is a different notion of reference than the one I employ when I talk about Burley’s 
commitment to referentialism, according to which signification is a reference relation. Both are kinds of 
reference, on my account, because both involve talking about things. In fact, for linguistic items (but 
only for linguistic items), reference qua signification is required for reference qua supposition, since (in 
cases of formal supposition at least) a term has the supposition that it does in virtue of having the 
signification that it does.    
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with Burley’s more general thesis that his account of the proposition is an account of a 
certain sort of semantic entity, and it provides him with a way to resolve questions of 
correspondence that respects his general metaphysical commitments. In particular, Burley 
argues that the truth of a proposition is a matter of correspondence to the identity (or 
diversity) of the things for which its terms supposit. For example, the proposition that 
Socrates is a human is composed of Socrates and the property of humanity – two really 
distinct things. But it asserts the identity not of those things, but of the things for which 
they supposit. Its truth, then, consists in the identity of what Socrates supposits for to 
something for which the property of humanity supposits. Socrates supposits for Socrates. 
The property of humanity supposits for each and every particular human, including 
Socrates himself. Even on the account of identity Burley favors in the second half of his 
career, however, Socrates is identical to Socrates. And so the proposition that Socrates is 
a human is true, just as we might expect. 
 
4. ISSUES OF TERMINOLOGY 
The introduction to my dissertation is nearly complete. But before I turn to the 
meat and potatoes of the project itself, I want to touch on issues of terminology: both my 
own, and Burley’s. 
4.1.  Central Terminology in this Dissertation 
 With respect to my own terminology, two expressions deserve special attention. 
First, I use the English expression ‘proposition’ extensively in this dissertation. By 
‘proposition’, I typically mean something which is (a) the primary bearer of truth value, 
(b) the object of one’s propositional attitudes, and (c) the semantic content of statements 
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in natural and mental language. Indeed, a central aim of my dissertation is to justify the 
claim that Burley has an account of the proposition in that sense. However, the use of 
‘proposition’ is complicated by the fact that its Latin cognate ‘propositio’ is used 
extensively in medieval semantic discussions, and so we will confront that expression a 
great deal in this dissertation. Moreover, by ‘propositio’, medieval philosophers mean 
something slightly different than what I do by ‘proposition’. By ‘propositio’, medieval 
philosophers (typically) mean a token statement. Token statements are propositiones 
because they state (proponere) something.45
 I recognize that this practice has disadvantages. The main disadvantage is that this 
dissertation is a dissertation in medieval philosophy, and, as such, detailed discussions of 
 Token statements can be written, spoken, 
mental or (in the case of Burley) in re. Indeed, what I call a proposition in this 
dissertation is, according to Burley, a type of propositio. It is a propositio, according to 
Burley, precisely because, like all propositiones, it is a complex, syntactically well-
formed object that states or (as Burley says) asserts something. Unlike other sorts of 
propositiones, however, which can state something only via signs, a proposition states 
what it does using the very things that it is about. In other words, unlike other sorts of 
propositiones, a proposition does not make or express a claim but rather just is that claim. 
I argue that it is precisely this fact that accounts for the proposition’s being the primary 
bearer of truth value, the object of one’s attitudes, and the contents of statements in 
natural or mental language. In any case, I will continue to use ‘proposition’ throughout 
this dissertation in the way I have been using it so far.  
                                                            
45 In fact, the use of ‘proposition’ in this way was standard until the early 20th century. On this point, see 
Brower-Toland, “Late-Medieval Theories of Propositions,” 35, n. 49. 
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the principal texts might be best served by staying as close to the Latin as one can. 
However, that disadvantage seems to me outweighed by the central aim of this 
dissertation: to justify the claim that the mind’s predicating one thing of another is for 
Burley (a) the primary bearer of truth and falsity, (b) the object of one’s propositional 
attitudes, and (c) the semantic content of statements in natural and mental language. We 
need an expression to label that sort of object, and given contemporary usage, 
‘proposition’ seems best. 
 Second, I also use the English expression ‘concept’ a fair amount in this 
dissertation. Like ‘proposition’, however, ‘concept’ has a cognate in Latin: ‘conceptus’. 
And, unlike ‘proposition’, whose Latin cognate ‘propositio’ is at least well-behaved in 
the primary literature, ‘conceptus’ is not. Indeed, as I will discuss shortly, ‘conceptus’ is 
not well-behaved even with Burley’s own corpus. So I want to stipulate now how I will 
use ‘concept’ in this dissertation. By ‘concept’, I mean a subjective mental representation 
of a thing (res).46
4.2. Burley’s Terminology 
 Concepts, on this use, are mental vehicles of content – real, subjective, 
representational features of the mind.  
Beyond the way in which I intend to use certain key expressions, I need to say a 
word about how Burley employs his own vocabulary, for two reasons. First, my project 
draws from texts that cover the whole of Burley’s career, and, during that career, Burley 
will use key expressions to mean radically different things in different works. By 
cataloguing the various uses he makes of his semantic, cognitive and metaphysical 
vocabularies, we will be able to make better sense of larger philosophical themes and 
                                                            
46 On Burley’s view, mental representations are qualities of the mind. 
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commitments in Burley’s corpus, and to trace their evolution over the course of his 
career. Second, I believe that there has been a significant failure in the secondary 
literature to recognize that Burley’s use of his vocabulary does not remain consistent over 
the course of his career, and that failure of recognition has either encouraged or 
reinforced incorrect assumptions about Burley’s semantic and cognitive projects and their 
evolution. 
4.2.1. ‘Propositio’ 
 Perhaps the most important set of expressions to consider at various expressions 
in Burley’s corpus involving ‘propositio’: ‘propositio in prolatione’, ‘propositio in 
mente’, ‘propositio subiective in intellectu’, ‘propositio obiective in intellectu’ and 
‘propositio in re’. Many Burley scholars argue that the expression ‘propositio in re’ in 
particular tracks a fundamental notion in Burley’s semantics and cognitive psychology. 
Much of the disagreement in the secondary literature is thus framed in part in terms of 
whether the notion that ‘propositio in re’ expresses evolves over the course of Burley’s 
career, or whether it remains consistent. Driving that debate is the fact that Burley uses 
‘propositio in re’ in both an early work (Comm.Perih) and a late work (Art.Vet). A full 
analysis of the secondary literature, including the ways in which various expressions have 
been used and understood, must wait until the next chapter. But what I at least suggest 
here is that some of these expressions express very different notions in the early and late 
works. So in this section I simply take each expression in turn, focusing on the use of 
these expressions (if any) in four key works: Quaes.Perih, Comm.Perih, Quaes.Post, and 
Art.Vet (which includes both the Exp.Praed and Exp.Perih).  
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 Propositio in prolatione. This expression appears in the Quaes.Perih, 
Comm.Perih, and  Art.Vet. It refers primarily to spoken sentences, but it often appears to 
be used by Burley to refer to sentences in natural language generally.47
 Propositio in mente. That expression appears in three works: Quaes.Perih, 
Comm.Perih and Art.Vet. It is used in the same manner in the Quaes.Perih and 
Comm.Perih. In those works, it denotes an entity composed of things (res) and structured 
by a mental act of predication. In other words, in the Quaes.Perih and Comm.Perih, it 
refers to a proposition. Things are very different in the Art.Vet. In the Exp.Praed, in 
commenting on chapter 12 of the Categories, Burley argues that propositiones in mente 
are of two kinds: one kind which “has subjective being in the mind, and a propositio of 
this sort is composed out of concept,” another kind which  
 Burley also uses 
‘propositio in scripto’ to refer to written sentences in particular (though his mention of 
sentences of that sort is perfunctory; he quickly narrows his discussions to spoken 
language), and he uses ‘propositio in voce’ to refer to spoken sentences. 
has objective being in the intellect, and a propositio of this sort is composed only 
by the consideration of the intellect and from parts having only objective being in 
the intellect, whether they are past utterances, or future utterances, and so on 
concerning the rest.48
 
 
                                                            
47 Either Burley uses the expression to refer to sentences in natural language generally, or he simply ignores 
written language as an important object of study. There is historical reasons to think the latter is the case.  
48 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), 
Exp.Praed, g7rb: “Propositio in mente est duplex, quia quaedam habet esse subiective in mente, et talis 
propositio componitur ex conceptibus, et quaedam est propositio habens esse obiective in intellectu, et 
huiusmodi propositio componitur solum secundum considerationem intellectus, et ex partibus habentibus 
solum esse obiective in intellectu, sive voces praeteritae sive futurae, et sic de aliis.” 
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Burley mentions propositiones in mente briefly in the Exp.Perih as well, contrasting them 
with propositiones in natural language and propositiones “composed out of things.”49 In 
the Art.Vet, then, Burley uses ‘propositio in mente’ to refer to very different sorts of 
objects than he does in the earlier works. In the Art.Vet, ‘propositio in mente’ does not 
refer to a proposition. Rather, it refers either to (1) a sentence in a mental language (that 
which is “composed out of concepts”); Burley mentions this sort of entity in his prologue 
to the Exp.Praed as well, calling it a propositio in conceptu. Or it refers to (2) a sentence 
composed of utterances that have either already been spoken or will be spoken. In fact, 
slightly earlier in his commentary on chapter 12 of the Categories, Burley suggests that a 
propositio in mente of this sort is an utterance-type, that is, “one common thing 
abstracted by the intellect from that and similar [token spoken] propositiones.”50
 Propositio subiective in intellectu. This expression appears in both the 
Comm.Perih. and (in a slightly altered form) in the Exp.Praed. In the Comm.Perih, it 
tracks the same notion as the expression ‘propositio in mente’ does in that work, namely, 
the notion of a proposition. In the Exp.Praed, in contrast (where the expression is 
‘propositio subiective in mente’), it tracks the same notion as the expression ‘propositio 
 The 
purpose of this second variety of propositio in mente, I suggest, is to explain the ability of 
participants in metalinguistic conversational contexts to be talking about the same 
sentences in natural language – such as in the exercise of obligatio, where respondents 
need to affirm or deny what an opponent has uttered.  
                                                            
49 Ibid., Exp.Perih, k4rb. 
50 Ibid., Exp.Praed, g7rb. 
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in conceptu’ does in the work – namely, a mental sentence in a language of thought. 
Consequently, it is the first sort of what Burley calls a ‘propositio in mente’ in that work.   
 Propositio obiective in intellectu. This expression is used in both the Comm.Perih. 
and the Exp.Praed. In the Comm.Perih, that expression refers to an odd object in Burley’s 
metaphysics: a thing which is necessarily true, such that it is signified only by true 
propositions (and, derivatively, true statements in natural and mental language). My own 
view is that the notion which this expression is meant to track is the product of a 
confusion on Burley’s part of two different alethic concerns. On the one hand, Burley is 
motivated by the thought that truth is abstract. But his own account of the proposition, 
according to which the primary bearers of truth and falsity are concrete products of 
cognitive activity, cannot accommodate this fact. On the other hand, Burley is committed 
to a correspondence theory of truth. Burley attempts to address both issues at once, by 
analyzing correspondence in terms of signification to some entity that is both necessarily 
true and can exist objectively in several minds simultaneously. But the result of 
attempting to address both concerns in this way is in a significantly confused semantic 
theory, one which trades on an ambiguity in the notion of truth and which fits poorly with 
Burley’s more general semantic commitments. It is no surprise, then, that, while many of 
the alethic concerns which motivate it are developed in later works as well, the theory 
itself is entirely absent in those works. 
 In the Exp.Praed, the expression refers to a sentence-type of natural language. On 
this usage, see the explanation of ‘propositio in mente’ above. 
 Propositio in re. This expression appears in the Comm.Perih and the Art.Vet. In 
the Comm.Perih, it denotes the same thing that ‘propositio obiective in intellectu’ denotes 
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in that work, namely, an object that is necessarily true, in virtue of whose signification 
other statement-structured objects are true. In the Art.Vet, in contrast, it denotes an entity 
composed of things structured by a mental act of predication – that is, a proposition. 
Consequently, what Burley refers to as a propositio in re in the Art.Vet is what he refers 
to as a propositio in mente in the earlier works, and, in the Art.Vet, the expression 
‘propositio in mente’ is repurposed primarily for talking about mental language.  
 Adding further confusion to an already confusing terminological landscape is the 
Quaes.Post, where Burley appears to adopt a somewhat different vocabulary for talking 
about the same issues. In that work, Burley distinguishes between a propositio proponens 
tantum, and a propositio proponens and proposita, and a propositio proposita tantum. 
The first is made out of expressions (in particular, spoken expressions) in natural 
language, the second is made out of concepts, and the third is made out of things. I do 
think there is some reason to worry that both the semantic theory and the metaphysics of 
the proposition that Burley develops in that work does not precisely cohere with the 
general trajectory of philosophical development that we find in Burley’s various 
commentaries on the Categories and the Perihermeneias. But, as a general matter at least, 
those three notions track the three sorts of predicatively-structured objects in Burley’s 
account now familiar to us: statements in natural language, statements in mental 
language, and propositions. In fact, it is in the Quaes.Post (composed around 1307) that 
we find the first hint that Burley is committed to a mental language, since it is the first 
work in which he argues that there are statements (propositiones) composed out of 
concepts. 
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 The vocabulary Burley uses to talk about the semantics and metaphysics of 
statements, then, is a real mess. It is in part because it a mess, I believe, that we find so 
little consensus in the secondary literature about some of the most basic features of 
Burley’s semantics. My own first few years engaging with Burley’s semantic and 
cognitive works, at least, were hindered rather than helped by his vocabulary. It is also a 
further reason why I have attempted to avoid framing my dissertation around the 
vocabulary that Burley himself uses. What I try to do instead in my dissertation is look 
beyond his vocabulary to the ways – both functional and metaphysical – that Burley 
describes various semantic and cognitive entities, with the belief that those descriptions 
prove more fruitful than his vocabulary in revealing a compelling and coherent 
philosophical narrative.  
4.2.2. ‘Conceptus’ 
 Just as the vocabulary Burley uses to talk about statements and their contents is 
muddled, so too is his vocabulary of the more fundamental features of his cognitive and 
semantic account. Fortunately, it is less of a muddle, and the development of the ways in 
which Burley uses that vocabulary at least makes more sense, philosophically. Four terms 
are central here: ‘species’, ‘similitudo rei’, ‘passio animae’, and ‘conceptus’. As before, I 
take each in turn. 
 Species. Burley’s use of ‘species’ remains consistent throughout his career. A 
species is a mental representation that exists subjectively in the mind. Burley’s 
expression ‘species’, then, is always synonymous with my expression ‘concept’. 
 Similitudo rei. Absent in the Quaes.Perih, the expression appears in the 
Comm.Perih and the Art.Vet. In those works, it refers to a species qua that which 
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mediates an act of thinking. In other words, it refers to a species in its role as the mental 
mediator of cognition. Consequently, it is an expression primarily of cognitive 
psychology. 
 Passio animae/passio rei. This expression appears in the Quaes.Perih, 
Comm.Perih, and Art.Vet. In the Quaes.Perih, a passio animae refers to a thing (res) 
insofar as it is understood by the mind. In other words, ‘passio animae’ refers to a thing 
that exists outside the mind, and connotes that that thing is an object of cognition. In the 
Comm.Perih and the Art.Vet, in contrast, ‘passio animae’ (and, occasionally, ‘passio rei’) 
refers to a species qua that which mediates signification. In other words, in those works, 
‘passio animae’ refers to a species in its role as the mediator of semantic content. 
Because both ‘similitudo rei’ and ‘passio animae’ refer to the same thing, but connote 
different roles of that thing, Burley will sometimes gloss one with the other in the Art.Vet. 
 Conceptus. This expression does not appear in the Comm.Perih, but it does occur 
in the earlier Quaes.Perih and in the later Quaes.Post and Art.Vet. In the Quaes.Perih, 
‘conceptus’ refers to a product, or fictum, of simple mental activity. Burley denies that 
simple mental activity is productive, and so he denies in the Quaes.Perih that there are 
concepts. In the Quaes.Post and Art.Vet, however, Burley uses ‘conceptus’ to refer to a 
species, typically in its role as mediator of signification. In those two works, then, Burley 
freely admits that there are concepts. But this is merely a difference in the use of his 
vocabulary; the underlying theory remains consistent throughout his career. 
 By mid-career, all four of those expressions refer to the same kind of thing: a 
representation that exists subjectively in the mind. In my dissertation, then, I adopt a 
single expression – ‘concept’ – to refer to that kind of thing.  
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 To help the reader make sense of Burley’s vocabulary and its evolution over the 
course of his career, I have appended a chart to this dissertation (see appendix A) which 
maps the ways in which Burley uses many of the expressions mentioned in §4.2.1 above. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE SCHOLARSHIP 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 In the introductory chapter to this dissertation, I argued that Burley defends a 
sophisticated and philosophically interesting account of propositional content, according 
to which a proposition is a complex entity composed of things by a mental act of 
predication. But this claim is for the most part a novel one in the scholarship. In this 
chapter, then, I intend to explore that scholarship in a bit more depth, with the goal of 
situating my project relative to it.  
 One of the chief difficulties that one has in engaging with the secondary literature 
on the topic of Burley’s semantic theory is that, for as small as the community of Burley 
scholars is, there are in that literature a significant number of quite different 
interpretations of Burley’s semantics generally, and of the semantics of sentences in 
particular. They are different enough that it can be hard to find a small number of 
exceptionless categories into which they can be divided. However, I suggest that we 
divide approaches in the literature roughly, based on their reactions to a seemingly central 
claim in Burley’s philosophical project: that the mind can combine things with one 
another by asserting that those things are the same or are not the same. Two broad 
philosophical reactions emerge to this claim. The dominant reaction in the literature is 
that this claim represents a theory of obtaining states of affairs (hereafter ‘states of 
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affairs’). 1 Alessandro Conti, for example, defends an interpretation of this sort, as does 
Christian Rode. Less prominent is the view that the claim represents a theory of 
propositional content, that is, a theory of truthbearers rather than truthmakers.2 Notable 
defenders of this view in the scholarship are Laurent Cesalli and Elizabeth Karger.3
                                                      
1 On this sort of conception of the project, see: Alessandro Conti, “Ontology in Walter Burley’s Last 
Commentary on the Ars Vetus,” Franciscan Studies 50 (1990): 125–36; Alessandro Conti, “Walter 
Burley,” Fall 2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/burley/; Alain de Libera, La 
Référence Vide : Théories de La Proposition, 1re éd. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2002), 130–
55; Peter Kunze, “Satzwahrheit Und Sprachliche Verweisung  : Walter Burleighs Lehre von Der 
Suppositio Termini in Auseinandersetzung Mit Der Mittelalterlichen Tradition Und Der Logik William’s 
of Ockham” (Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen, 1980), 336–40; Stephan Meier-Oeser, “Walter 
Burley’s Propositio in Re and the Systematization of the Ordo Significationis,” in Philosophical Debates 
at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, by Stephen Brown (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 483–506; Gabriel 
Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and 
Falsity (North-Holland Pub. Co, 1973), 219–25; Dominik Perler, Der Propositionale Wahreitsbegriff Im 
14. Jahrundert (New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1992), 93–6; Christian Rode, “Sätze Und Dinge. Die 
Propositio in Re Bei Walter Burley Und Anderen,” Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Für Antike Und 
Mittelalter 10 (2005): 67–90.   
  
2 On this sort of conception of the project, see: Joël Biard, “Le Statut des Enonces dans les Commentaires 
du Peri Hermeneias de Gautier Burley,” in Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages: Essays 
on the Commentary Tradition, ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis and C.H. Kneepkens, Artistarium supplementa 10 
(Groningen: Ingenium Publishers, 2003), 303–18; Laurent Cesalli, Le Réalisme Propositionnel : 
Sémantique et Ontologie Des Propositions Chez Jean Duns Scot, Gauthier Burley, Richard Brinkley et 
Jean Wyclif (Paris: Vrin, 2007), 167–240; Laurent Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” in A Companion to 
Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician and Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 
119–31; Elizabeth Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” Vivarium 
34 (1996): 192–230.  
3 Cross-cutting these reactions, however, are two further disputes. First, there is an exegetical dispute, over 
whether Burley intends for his claim to be taken literally. Conti and Cesalli, for example, argue that (at 
least in the case of some iteration of the theory) Burley means for his claim to be interpreted non-
literally; Rode and Karger, in contrast, argue for a literal interpretation of the claim. Second, there is a 
philosophical dispute, over whether a literalist reading of Burley’s claim would represent a coherent and 
plausible theory. Beyond Karger, the only other scholar of Burley who seems to me to take the view that 
a literalist reading of the claim represents a plausible theory is Martin Lenz. (See Martin Lenz, “Between 
Things and Propositions: The Realism of Walter Burley and Walter Chatton,” n.d., 
https://www.academia.edu/3808506/Between_Things_and_Propositions_The_Realism_of_Walter_Burle
y_and_Walter_Chatton.) Lenz argues that Burley’s account offers a novel and insightful theory about 
actual states of affairs – that they enjoy a reciprocal dependence with mental activity. However, I must 
admit that I find Lenz’s position inscrutable. It seems to me to vacillate between a theory of content and a 
theory of states of affairs. My sense is that, if fully fleshed-out, the theory Lenz attributes to Burley 
would be deeply flawed, in just the ways  that scholars such as Conti, Cesalli and Rode articulate. 
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 While most Burley scholars understand Burley’s central project to be one of the 
metaphysics of states of affairs, substantial disagreement remains among these scholars 
over that metaphysics and its place within Burley’s wider semantic and cognitive theory. 
That disagreement typically centers around whether Burley’s understands states of affairs 
to in some way depend on mental activity. Alessandro Conti, for example, argues that 
Burley’s account of the metaphysics of states of affairs can be divided into two periods – 
an early and a late – and that that account evolves from one according to which states of 
affairs depend on the mind’s combining things in the world with one another, to one 
according to which states of affairs are wholly independent of mental activity. In contrast, 
Christian Rode argues that the role of mental activity in composing states of affairs, far 
from something that is dropped in the later account, is rather  a development in the late 
account.  
 Though dominant, I argue that a state-of-affairs style interpretation of Burley’s 
project face a number of problems. At its most basic, it finds little textual support. It is at 
odds, for example, with Burley’s repeated claims that the products of the mind’s 
combining things with one another are bearers of falsity as well as truth. Moreover, it 
results in a theory that fits ill with Burley’s more general semantic and cognitive 
commitments. 
 In contrast to a states-of-affairs interpretation of the project, a few scholars of 
Burley have understood the theory to be centrally concerned with the nature of 
propositional content. But here too there is a great deal of disagreement. The central issue 
of disagreement is how the notion of a thing (res) in Burley’s theory ought to be 
understood. Some scholars – for example, Laurent Cesalli – argue that, appearances 
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aside, what the mind actually combines on Burley’s theory are not things which exist 
extramentally; rather they are things which only exist objectively in the mind, as the 
“objective presence” of particular things outside the mind within it. However, this kind of 
interpretation of the project faces a number of significant objections. Most significant of 
all, perhaps, is that the notion of objective being that is central to Cesalli’s interpretation 
finds little support in the texts themselves, and is at odds with Burley’s more general 
theories of meaning and cognition.  
 Cesalli’s interpretation is at least partly motivated by a worry that little sense can 
be made of Burley’s claim, if that claim requires that what the mind combines can exist 
extramentally. But at least one scholar – Elizabeth Karger – argues that we should pursue 
just the sort of interpretation that Cesalli finds philosophically problematic. And what 
results from that pursuit, she claims, is an exciting description of the metaphysical and 
semantic features of “the ultimate significate” of sentences in natural and mental 
language4
                                                      
4 It is important to distinguish mental language – which involves mental sentences composed of concepts – 
from Karger’s expression ‘mental sentence’, which is composed of the (usually extramental) things 
signified by those concepts. 
 – something that is signified but does not itself signify anything further. For 
example, Karger notes that mental sentences can be composed of extramental things, and 
that those things are arranged predicatively, that is as subject and predicate terms relative 
to one another. Moreover, Karger argues that mental sentences are bearers of truth and 
falsity, and that an analysis of their alethic values comes by way of the supposition of the 
their terms, which are extramental things. Consequently, a mental sentence is something 
which has both syntactic and semantic properties. 
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 In many ways, this dissertation picks up where Karger’s brief article leaves off. 
Karger offers us just a sketch of the metaphysics of the mental sentence. But that 
metaphysics needs to be fleshed out in various ways: with respect to what (if any) more 
general semantic and cognitive commitments motivate it, with respect to its evolution (if 
any) over the course of Burley’s career, and so on. Moreover, Karger does not try (or, at 
least, does not try very hard) to situate that theory within Burley’s larger philosophical 
project, explaining how that account fits with his semantic, cognitive and alethic theories 
generally. In other words, Karger does not do much more than hint at what mental 
sentences are for. By filling out the metaphysical and functional picture of what Karger 
calls a mental sentence, I argue that we find a sophisticated account of the proposition, 
one which is central to Burley’s exciting theories of meaning and cognition.  
 In this chapter, I will proceed in three stages. First, I will examine two 
interpretations – those of Alessandro Conti and Christian Rode – which exemplify the 
view that Burley’s central concern in the relevant texts is an account of the metaphysics 
of states of affairs. While sophisticated, both face serious exegetical challenges. I will 
articulate those challenges, and provide diagnoses for why Conti and Rode, respectively, 
would make the sort of errors in exegesis that they do. Second, I will examine Laurent 
Cesalli’s interpretation, according to which Burley’s theory is a theory of propositional 
content. While the theory is broadly correct – Burley’s theory is a theory of propositional 
content – I argue that the specifics of Cesalli’s interpretation faces some serious 
challenges. Finally, I will turn to Elizabeth Karger’s analysis of that claim, an analysis 
according to which the mind can make “mental sentences” out of things, including things 
which exist outside the mind. Far from problematic, her analysis suggests that that claim 
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represents Burley’s commitment to a compelling theory of propositional content, and I 
argue that it provides a promising starting-point for a fuller investigation of that theory. 
 
2. THE REAL PROPOSITION AS A STATE OF AFFAIRS 
 Every scholar of Burley’s semantic theory faces a difficult puzzle: what does 
Burley mean when he says that the mind can combine things outside the mind (res extra 
animam) with one another. Almost all Burley scholars, it seems to me, find this claim 
baffling. But, for the most part, scholars have come to see that claim as representative 
(some, perhaps, as somewhat misrepresentative) of a central concern about the nature and 
function of states of affairs. I examine two different versions of that kind of interpretation 
in this section. 
2.1. Alessandro Conti 
 One of the more sophisticated and comprehensive analyses of Burley’s semantic 
and cognitive theories available has been developed by Alessandro Conti. Conti’s 
argument about the development of Burley’s views on meaning and cognition is 
complex, and has been developed over a number of decades. Among other things, Conti 
argues that, in Burley’s account, there is in general a symmetry between the relations of 
signification that obtain at the sub-sentential and sentential levels, but that Burley’s 
account of the signification evolves over the course of his career to accommodate certain 
concerns about meaning and truth.  
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 According to Conti, throughout his career, Burley defends what Conti calls “real 
propositions,” which are signified by true sentences in natural and mental language.5 
However, Conti argues that one finds two distinct accounts of the real proposition in 
Burley’s corpus, the latter of which is meant to address problems in the former. In the 
first half of his career, according to Conti, Burley admits of four kinds of propositiones: 
written, spoken, mental and real. Real propositions, Conti tells us, “are the significata of 
true sentences [...]. Real propositions do not properly exist in the extramental world, 
although they exist in our minds as intentional objects.”6
we can say that some certain thing is a propositio in re [...] by calling that 
propositio which has only objective being in the intellect a propositio in re [...]. 
That which has only objective being in the intellect is not able to not be, nor not to 
be true.
 Conti here is articulating an 
account of the propositio in re (from which Conti derives his expression ‘real 
proposition’) that Burley develops and defends in the Comm.Perih. In that work, Burley 
writes that  
7
 
 
Real propositions, then, (1) have merely objective existence in the mind, (2) cannot fail to 
exist, and (3) cannot fail to be true. Moreover, Burley argues that written, spoken and 
mental sentences are true because they signify real propositions. “Hence I say that truth 
                                                      
5 See Conti, “Walter Burley.”  Conti suggests that Burley is committed to an account of mental language 
throughout his career. But that commitment, I argue, is only explicit in the Quaes.Post, likely written 
around 1305. So there may have been a brief period early in his career where Burley was not committed 
to a theory of mental language. 
6 See Ibid. 
7 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen 
Brown, Franciscan Studies 33 (1973): para. 1.26, pp. 61: “Possumus dicere quod quaedam est propositio 
in re et quaedam in intellectu, appellando illam propositionem quae solum habet esse obiectivum in 
intellectu propositionem in re et aliam quae habet esse subiectivum in intellectu propositionem in 
intellectu.” 
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which is subjectively in the intellect is nothing except a certain adequation of the intellect 
to a true propositio which has only objective being in the intellect.”8
 In the first half of his career, Burley limits the use of the expression ‘propositio in 
re’ to the Comm.Perih. But Conti argues that the notion which that expression picks out 
is central to a number of the early logical works – in particular, to the earlier 
Quaes.Perih. To defend that claim, Conti needs to flesh out the metaphysics of the real 
proposition a bit more. In particular, Conti argues that  
 Conti argues from 
this that real propositions are at least truthmakers in Burley’s early semantics.  
[r]eal propositions are complex entities formed by the things to which [the terms 
of sentences] refer, together with an identity relation (if the proposition is 
positive) or a non-identity relation (if the proposition is negative). The things exist 
in the extramental world, but the identity relation is produced by our minds and 
exists only in them. This identity relation is a sort of intellectual composition by 
which we understand the thing (res) signified by the subject term and the thing 
signified by the predicate term of a proposition belong to the same substance(s).9
 
 
On Conti’s reading, then, real propositions have an “indeterminate ontological status, 
since they exist partly inside the mind, partly outside, and are yet entirely independent of 
it.”10
                                                      
8 Ibid., para. 1.27, pp. 61–2. 
 Real propositions exist partly inside of the mind on account of the fact that the 
identity relations that constitute them are products of cognitive activity, they exist outside 
of the mind on account of fact that the things which those relations relate are extramental, 
and they are still independent of the mind on account of the fact that they are truthmakers 
for, among other things, complex mental acts.  
9 Conti, “Walter Burley.” 
10 Ibid.  
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 What sort of textual evidence does Conti provide for this fuller description of the 
metaphysics of the real proposition? While not entirely clear, Conti seems to be relying in 
part on Burley’s comments in the prologue of the Comm.Perih, where he argues that “a 
sentence in the mind (oratio in mente) is composed out of things which the intellect 
combines with one another or divides from one another, whether those are utterances or 
things signified through utterances.”11 It seems, then, that Conti takes what Burley calls a 
sentence in the mind in the prologue of the Comm.Perih to be what Burley calls a 
propositio in re later in that work. At least this seems to me to be the only way Conti 
could justify the sorts of metaphysical features he attributes to the real proposition. The 
expression ‘sentence in the mind’ (as well as the notion that expression is meant to pick 
out) is present not just in the Comm.Perih, however, but in the Quaes.Perih as well. In 
that work, Burley argues that “a sentence in the mind (enunciatio in mente) is composed 
out of those which the intellect thinks to be the same, whether they are utterances or 
things,” and that a sentence in the mind “is composed out of things which the intellect 
asserts to be the same or [to be] diverse.”12
 Conti argues that two sorts of problems plague the early theory of the real 
proposition. First, there is the “indeterminate ontological status” of the real proposition. 
 On Conti’s view, then, one finds a consistent 
theory running throughout the earlier logical commentaries, according to which 
truthmakers are hybrid entities, composed of extramental things and a mental act by 
which they are combined.  
                                                      
11 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.02, p. 45. 
He might also be relying on the Quaes.Post. See §3, pp. 95–100. 
12 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen Brown, 
Franciscan Studies 34 (1974): para. 3.55, p. 248, and 3.552, p. 50. 
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The real proposition is “a state of affairs only in relation to its structure and semantic 
value, but not ontologically.”13
 Conti argues, then, that the early theory of the real proposition is interesting but 
ultimately flawed, a theory which Burley corrects in later works. But how faithful is 
Conti’s exegesis of those early logical commentaries? Not very, I argue. I will turn to 
particular problems of exegesis in a moment. First, however, as a more general matter, I 
suggest that Conti confuses two very distinct theories that are developed in the 
Comm.Perih – a theory about propositional content, on the one hand, and a theory about 
truthmakers, on the other. His confusion on this score is what leads him to many of his 
suspect exegetical moves. But the details of those theories, their development, and their 
relation to one another are complex. It may be helpful, therefore, to examine how those 
 Real propositions, as Conti conceives of them, are 
structured entities and the truthmakers of true written, spoken and mental sentences, but 
they do not have the kind of ontological independence that genuine truthmakers must 
have, since they are partly constituted by a certain sort of mental act (or, at least, 
constituted by products of that act). Second, there is the problem of the meaning, or 
content, of false written, spoken and mental sentences. The problem, Conti explains, is 
that the real proposition of the earlier theory has to do double duty. It is at once a 
truthmaker for sentences in natural and mental language, and also their content. Since 
false sentences in natural and mental language do not signify real propositions (their 
falsity consisting precisely in this fact), there is nothing that can be readily identified as 
the contents of those sentences. Consequently, false sentences in natural and mental 
language are not just false, but meaningless.  
                                                      
13 Conti, “Walter Burley.” 
61 
 
two theories develop in the early works, highlighting as we go how Conti’s analysis fails 
to appreciate that distinction.  
 In contrast to Conti’s own view, what Conti calls the theory of the real 
proposition is wholly absent in Burley’s earliest commentary on the Perihermeneias, the 
Quaes.Perih. In that work, Burley argues that there are three sorts of propositiones. The 
first two are generally recognized: written and spoken. The third – which Burley calls an 
enunciatio in mente, a sentence in the mind – is philosophically quite novel. The sentence 
in the mind is composed of whatever the mind combines with one another or divides 
from one another. Those might be inscriptions or utterances, but in the usual case they are 
things outside the soul (res extra animam), which are signified by meaningful 
inscriptions and utterances.14 These sentences in the mind are the significata of sentences 
in natural language, regardless of their truth-value. In fact, the truth-values that sentences 
in natural language have are due to the truth-values of the sentences in the mind that they 
signify. Burley writes, for example, that “a spoken sentence is true because of this, that it 
significative of something true, that is, because of this, that it is suited to signify 
something true.”15 But – and this is critical – Burley makes clear slightly later in the 
passage that a sentence in the mind is a bearer of falsity as well.16
                                                      
14 See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.55, p. 248. 
 The sentence in the 
mind, then, is the primary bearer of truth and falsity; sentences in natural language have 
the alethic values that they do by signifying sentences in the mind with those values. 
15 Ibid., para. 3.62, p. 251. 
16 See Ibid., para. 3.622, p. 251: “I concede that a propositio is an accident in the way that an accident is 
distinguished from a substance, and has subjective being in the soul [...]. Hence Aristotle says, in 
Metaphysics 6, that the true and the false are in the soul, and the good and the bad are in things outside 
[the soul]; that would not be unless the true and the false have subjective being in the soul.”   
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Burley’s theory of the sentence in the mind, in other words, is a theory of propositional 
content, an explanation (among other things) of what the contents of sentences in natural  
language are, and so an account of why they have the truth values that they do.  
 The Comm.Perih begins by articulating the same theory of the sentence in the 
mind that Burley develops in the Quaes.Perih.17
in the intellect there are two kinds of propositiones: one which is produced by the 
intellect and has subjective being in the intellect, and that sort of propositio 
Aristotle calls true being. Another is a propositio which has only objective being 
in the intellect [...]. We are able to say that a certain one is a propositio in re and a 
certain one is a propositio in intellectu, by calling that propositio which has only 
objective being in the intellect a propositio in re, and the other, which has 
subjective being in the intellect, a propositio in intellectu.
 In the prologue to the Comm.Perih, for 
example, Burley argues once again that there are three sorts of propositiones: written, 
spoken, and mental; and that mental propositiones can be composed of whatever the 
mind can combine or divide, regardless of whether those are signs or things signified by 
signs. Later in the work, however, Burley makes a curious claim. He writes that  
18
 
 
How should we understand this claim, in light of the theory of the sentence in the mind 
articulated both in the Quaes.Perih and in the prologue to the Comm.Perih? Conti 
apparently sees it as a clarification. Whereas the theory articulated in the Quaes.Perih 
and in the prologue to the Comm.Perih washes over fine divisions between sentences 
                                                      
17 I suspect that the Comm.Perih was written within a few years of the Quaes.Perih, though its precise date 
of publication has not been conclusively established. More importantly, perhaps, is my view that the 
Comm.Perih was written before the Quaes.Post, such that one cannot rely on the Quaes.Post (as Conti 
and Cesalli appear to do) as a bridge between the theories developed in the Quaes.Perih and the 
Comm.Perih. 
18 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.26, p. 61: 
“Ad istud dicendum quod in intellectu est duplex propositio: una quae efficitur ab intellectu et habet esse 
subiectivum in intellectu, et talem propositionem vocat Philosophus ens verum. Alia est propositio quae 
solum habet esse obiectivum in intellectu [...].Possumus dicere quod quaedam est propositio in re et 
quaedam in intellectu, appellando illam propositionem quae solum habet esse obiectivum in intellectu 
propositionem in re et aliam quae habet esse subiectivum in intellectu propositionem in intellectu.”  
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composed of concepts, on the one hand, and what Conti calls real propositions, composed 
of things, on the other, Burley clarifies that division here. Mental sentences, composed of 
concepts, exist subjectively in the mind, whereas real propositions, composed of things, 
exist in the mind merely objectively. Moreover, the confusions implicit in Burley’s 
earliest terminology – in particular, the expression ‘sentence in the mind’ – are resolved. 
How could a sentence (propositio) composed of things outside the mind be subjectively 
in the mind? On Conti’s interpretation, it can’t. What can be subjectively in the mind, 
rather, are concepts, the combination of which represents something that exists in the 
mind only as an object. 
 But I argue that a closer reading of the passage reveals a very different 
interpretation. First, Burley states in this passage that a propositio in intellectu – which 
Conti suggests is composed of concepts – is what Aristotle calls “true being.” In the 
passage immediately prior, Burley sets out the metaphysics of a true being.  
I say that the intellect makes true beings by putting together those with one 
another which are united in reality, or by dividing from one another those which 
are diverse in reality. For if the intellect asserts some to be the same, then it 
combines those which one another, but if it asserts some to be diverse, then it 
divides them from one another.19
 
 
A true being, then, is the product of the mind’s combining one thing of another which are 
united (or divided) in fact. But implicit in that claim is just the theory of the sentence in 
the mind Burley set out in the Quaes.Perih and earlier in the Comm.Perih: sentences in 
the mind are complexes of things produced by the mind’s combination of them, which 
are true just in case those complexes of things mirror the combination of those things in 
                                                      
19 Ibid., para. 1.24, p. 60: “Unde dico quod intellectus facit entia vera componendo ea ad invicem quae in re 
sunt unita aut dividendo ea ab invicem quae in re sunt diversa. Si enim intellectus asserit aliqua esse 
eadem, tunc componit illa ad invicem, sed si asserit aliqua esse diversa, tund dividit ea ab invicem.” 
64 
 
reality. Consequently, there is no textual evidence to support Conti’s suggestion that 
propositiones in intellectu are composed of concepts, that is, of subjective mental 
representations. Indeed, we now have a strong reason to reject it. Rather, given Burley’s 
comments about the nature of true being, it is clear that propositiones in intellectu are 
composed of things – a restatement of the theory of the sentence in the mind, rather than 
a clarification of it.20 Second, that a propositio composed of things would exist 
subjectively in the mind, while perhaps an odd claim, is perfectly consistent with what 
Burley says in the Quaes.Perih about sentences in the mind: “I concede that a propositio 
is an accident, in the way that an accident is distinguished from substance, and has 
subjective being in the soul.”21
 On this reading, then, the distinction that Burley makes between a propositio in 
intellectu and a propositio in re, far from a clarification to the account of the sentence in 
the mind that he had articulated earlier, is meant rather to introduce a further bit of theory 
on top of that account. That is, in addition to the claim that the mind can combine one 
thing with another, Burley is now also committing himself to another sort of propositio – 
a propositio in re, or real proposition – which exists merely objectively in the mind, 
exists necessarily, and is necessarily true.  
  
 What motivates the introduction of this extra bit of theory? It is motivated, I 
suggest, by alethic concerns that are largely absent in the Quaes.Perih. It is important to 
                                                      
20 In fact, the expression ‘concept’ is completely absent in the Comm.Perih. Conti is likely importing 
terminology from the Quaes.Post here.  
21 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.622, p. 251. Burley 
tempers his position by claiming that they are only accidents of reason, rather than real accidents. On this 
claim, see ch. 3, §3. 
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note that, unlike the Quaes.Perih, which is a questions commentary on the 
Perihermeneias, the Comm.Perih is a literal commentary. That is, it works slowly 
through Aristotle’s Perihermeneias, and deals with important philosophical issues that 
various chapters and verses give rise to. Consequently, Burley is forced to address 
concerns in the Comm.Perih that he could avoid in the Quaes.Perih. Burley is forced to 
address certain alethic concerns in particular when he comes to comment on Aristotle’s 
claim in the prologue to the Perihermeneias that “falsity and truth have to do with 
combination and separation.”22
 Burley had very briefly addressed questions about truthmaking in the 
Quaes.Perih, arguing that a sentence in the mind is true if “those denoted to be the same 
are the same, or those are diverse which are denoted to be diverse.”
 Moreover, Burley’s discussion of that text makes clear 
that he is interested in two main issues: the nature of truthmaking, on the one hand, and a 
certain metalinguistic concern about truth, on the other. The theory of the real proposition 
that Burley develops in the Comm.Perih, I argue, is intended to address both concerns at 
once.  
23
I say that truth which is subjectively in the intellect is nothing except a certain 
adequation of the intellect to a true propositio which has only objective being in 
the intellect. Hence I say that every propositio which has subjective being in the 
 But the treatment of 
truthmaking in the Comm.Perih is far more extensive. In that work, Burley argues that a 
real proposition is a truthmaker for other sorts of propositiones. Burley writes: 
                                                      
22 Aristotle, “De Interpretatione,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. J.L. 
Ackrill, vol. 1, Bollingen Series 71 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 16a13, p. 25. 
23 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.62, pp. 250–1. 
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human intellect can fail to be and can fail to be true [...], yet that which has only 
objective being in the intellect cannot fail to be or fail to be true.24
 
 
Truthmakers, on this account, have a somewhat odd ontological status: they have merely 
objective existence, that is, they exist merely as objects of cognition. What might be 
partly behind their odd metaphysics, however, is just a general metaphysical problem for 
philosophers in the medieval period: that states of affairs do not appear to fit well within 
an Aristotelian metaphysical framework.25 The fact of Socrates’ being wise, for example, 
does not seem to fit into, or to be reducible to, one or more of the Aristotelian 
categories.26 In this work, at least, Burley appears to believe that attributing objective 
being to facts, which by their nature are extracategorical, helps address that worry.27
 Beyond the ontological status of truthmakers, however, Burley is also concerned 
with a further, metalinguistic worry. That worry is expressed in the form of a question 
from an interlocutor.   
  
 [I]f the truth of a propositio were in the intellect, since the same truth numerically 
speaking is not in diverse intellects numerically speaking, is it not necessary to 
say that the same propositio has as much truth as there are intellects thinking that 
propositio to be true?28
                                                      
24 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.27, pp. 61–
2. 
 
25 One difficulty, however, is that Burley’s later account of truthmakers does not have anything to say about 
their ontological status.  So it is not clear how central the issue of irreducibility is for Burley.  
26 One possible response is that Socrates’ being wise is somehow equivalent to wise Socrates. Conti 
suggests something of this sort in his appeal to macro-objects, which are “aggregates made up of primary 
substances together with a host of substantial and accidental forms existing in them and through them” 
(Conti, “Walter Burley”). At least on the mature account, Conti argues that real propositions just are 
macro-objects of that sort, or at least that they are “aspects” of macro-objects. 
27 However, Burley seems to regard objective being as somewhat different in the Quaes.Post, a slightly 
later work. See infra. 
28 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.25, p. 61: 
“Tu dicis: si veritatis propositionis esset in intellectu, cum eadem veritas numero non sit in diversis 
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The interlocutor’s concern appears to be this: Assume that a certain token sentence, p, is 
spoken. And assume that at least some of those who hear it think (correctly) that p is true. 
So each predicates truth of p. But what is the nature of truth that each predicates? Well, 
on Burley’s theory of the sentence in the mind, truth is fundamentally a property of 
sentences in the mind. So predicating truth of p involves “borrowing,” we might say, the 
truth that primarily applies to the sentence in the mind that p signifies, and predicating it 
of p, derivatively. However, sentences in the mind (and so their properties) are particular 
to the minds that form them. My predicating humanity of Socrates positively and your 
predicating humanity of Socrates positively involve the same things arranged in the same 
way, but they numerically distinct arrangements – if true, numerically distinct truths. The 
interlocutor’s worry, then, seems to be that the quantity of truth that a spoken sentence in 
natural language has – how truthful it is, we might say – depends on the number of 
individuals who consider its alethic value: the more individuals who hear it and 
subsequently predicate truth of it, the more truth that spoken sentence has.29
 In response, Burley turns to his own account of truth, which is more expansive 
than mere propositional truth. In brief, beyond a notion of propositional truth, Burley 
 But, the 
interlocutor suggests, surely the alethic properties of p are not quantitative in this way.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
intellectibus numero, non oportet dicere quod eadem propositio habet tot veritates quot sunt intellectus 
intelligentes istam propositionem esse veram?” 
29 It is not clear to me why Burley develops this objection as a metalinguistic concern. Surely a similar sort 
of concern applies in unreflective contexts: if the truth of a sentence in natural language is derived from 
the sentence in the mind that it signifies, then the more people who hear it, and so form the sentence in 
the mind that it signifies, the more truth that sentence in natural language will have. There is no need, it 
seems to me, to require that cognitive agents predicate truth of that sentence in natural language to 
motivate the objection; indeed, it seems to me to make the objection needlessly complicated. However, it 
may be that he has a certain philosophical exercise called obligatio in mind specifically. See pp. 81–2 
infra.  
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argues that there is also a notion of truth which everything has just in virtue of its being. 
Consequently, he suggests that his account of truthmakers provide him a way to deny that 
the truth of a sentence in natural language can be quantified in the way the interlocutor 
assumes. Since truthmakers are things of a sort, they too have this kind of truth. In 
response, then, Burley distinguishes between the sort of truth that sentences in the mind 
have and the sort of truth that truthmakers have. 
[To] the truth ‘A human is an animal’ which has being outside the intellect [that 
is, to the real proposition] there correspond many truths having subjective being 
in the intellect, for many intellects can to be adequated to the same thing.30
 
 
With respect to sentences in the mind, the quantity of truth does depend on how many 
minds there are engaged in certain acts of predication. But that truth is now itself seen as 
borrowed from the truth that real propositions themselves have. With respect to real 
propositions, however, truth is never anything except one, since real propositions are not 
individuated by the minds that conceive of them.31
                                                      
30 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.27, p. 62. 
“Et dico ulterius quod veritati, ‘Homo est animal’, secundum esse extra intellectum correspondent multae 
veritates habentes esse subiectivum in intellectu, nam multi intellectus possunt adaequari eidem rei.” 
 And so the truth that is predicated of a 
sentence in natural language, Burley suggests, is borrowed not ultimately from that truth 
that exists in the mind (since it, too, is now seen as derivative), but rather that truth which 
real propositions have, as truthmakers. 
31 Though it is not entirely clear to me what the larger philosophical issue is, it likely is related to the 
disputes about the nature of the objects of knowledge that dominated Oxford in the early fourteenth 
century. See especially Robert Holcot’s quodlibetal question about whether God can know more than he 
knows: Robert Holcot, “Can God Know More Than He Knows?,” in The Cambridge Translations of 
Medieval Philosophical Texts: Volume 3, Mind and Knowledge, ed. Robert Pasnau, 1st ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 302–17. In that question, Holcot rejects Walter Chatton’s view that 
the objects of cognition are things in one or more of the Aristotelian categories, in favor of the position 
that the objects of cognition are token-sentences in natural and mental language. Burley’s response to the 
question above seems to attempt a middle path, according to which states of affairs are sentence-like in 
some crucial sense. That conclusion is problematic, however. See infra.  
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 As inventive as Burley’s response might be, however, it is ultimately unsatisfying. 
That response trades off of an ambiguity in the notion of truth at issue. The interlocutor’s 
concern, I suggest, deals in a propositional notion of truth. This is clear from the fact that 
we can form a question analogous to the interlocutor’s, concerning falsity: is it not 
necessary to say that the same propositio has as much falsity as there are intellects 
thinking that propositio to be false? But, of course, truthmakers won’t provide any sort of 
response to this falsity problem, because they are necessarily true. The response Burley 
provides thus equivocates on the sort of alethic notion at issue. The success of Burley’s 
response requires that the truth that sentences in natural language have is borrowed or 
inherited from the truth of the things which they ultimately signify, so that true sentences 
in natural language have the same alethic properties as the real propositions that they 
signify. But, because the sort of truth that truthmakers have fundamentally differs from 
the sort of truth that sentences in natural language have, the truth of a sentence in the 
mind isn’t borrowed from a real sentence. Rather, it has the alethic properties that it does 
primarily, in virtue of its correspondence (or lack thereof) to a real proposition. 
Consequently, sentences in natural language “borrow” their alethic values not from real 
propositions, but rather from sentences in the mind. 
 It is not clear to me whether Burley himself is aware of the ambiguity in his 
response. Whether he is aware of it or not, however, his response includes two features 
which serve to mask that ambiguity. First, Burley argues that real propositions are 
signified by true sentences in natural language, and by sentences in the mind. As I 
discussed in chapter 1, how best to understand the signification of sentences was a issue 
of constant dispute in medieval philosophy. Some philosophers understood sentences to 
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signify things – whether those things are simple objects or complex states of affairs. 
Others understood sentences to signify something truth-evaluable, that is, something 
capable of bearing truth or falsity. Burley’s response to the interlocutor suggests that he is 
adopting the former approach. But his more general comments on signification suggests 
he is committed to the latter.  
 This feature of the response is problematic for another reason as well: it wreaks 
havoc for Burley’s semantics generally. The theory of signification that Burley develops 
both in the Quaes.Perih and the Comm.Perih holds that sentences in natural language 
signify sentences in the mind, that is, complex objects composed of things and structured 
by a mental act. In brief, they do this because their subject and predicate terms bring 
extramental things to mind, and their copulae bring about the mind’s predicating one of 
those things of the other. In what sense, then, can sentences in natural language be said to 
also signify real propositions? Perhaps they do so in virtue of signifying sentences in the 
mind, which (if true) in turn signify real propositions. But it is hard to see how sentences 
in the mind could be said to signify anything. The terms of a sentence in the mind are 
(typically) things, and so do not signify anything. The mind’s predicating one thing of 
another joins those things together by asserting that they are the same or different, but 
nowhere in Burley’s corpus is it suggested that asserting involves representing as a sign. 
So it is not at all clear how a sentence in the mind could signify a real proposition, at least 
with respect to the notion of signification that Burley commonly uses. That real 
propositions are somehow the significata of other sorts of propositiones, then, seems both 
ad hoc and inexplicable. 
71 
 
 Second, the ambiguity in the notion of truth at issue is masked by the fact that 
Burley takes real propositions to be propositiones. On the standard medieval view, a 
propositio is a bearer of truth and falsity – a certain semantic object. The suggestion, 
then, is that real propositions are objects of that sort, and thus have the same sorts of 
semantic and (more importantly) alethic properties as other propositiones – most notably, 
the same sort as sentences in the mind. But truthmakers are obviously not bearers of truth 
and falsity. On the contrary, they are that, a relation to which (or lack thereof) 
truthbearers have the truth values that they do. Burley’s use of ‘propositio’ in this 
context, then, seems to have no other purposes than to reinforce the idea that notion of 
truth at issue in his response is propositional – even while his account of the metaphysics 
and function of the real proposition entail otherwise.32
 I agree with Conti, then, that in the Comm.Perih Burley defends a theory of the 
real proposition, according to which real propositions (1) have merely objective existence 
in the mind, (2) cannot fail to exist, and (3) cannot fail to be true. Moreover, I agree with 
him that these real propositions are truthmakers for other true propositiones, and that 
truthmaking in the Comm.Perih is fundamentally analyzed in terms of signification. But 
Conti errs when he begins to import features into his account of the real proposition from 
an entirely distinct account of what Burley calls in early commentaries the sentence in the 
mind. In particular, Conti errs when he claims that the mind’s combining one thing with 
another is a feature of the real proposition. It is not; rather, it is a feature of a wholly 
different theory of propositional content. 
  
                                                      
32 As far as I know, the claim that a state of affairs could be a called a propositio has no precedent before 
Burley. Nor does it appear to be a claim any other philosopher makes until John Wyclif near the end of 
the fourteenth century.  
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 Conti’s difficulties with the earlier works can be attributed to his insistence that 
one finds the same general account running throughout all of the early logical 
commentaries – though more articulated in some than in others. Those difficulties also 
affect his interpretation of the later works, moreover, since he regards the theory 
articulated in the later works as in part corrective of Burley’s earlier, problematic theory 
of the real proposition. Conti  argues that Burley responds to the problems of his earlier 
account (as Conti sees them) by adding a further epicycle to his semantics. On Conti’s 
interpretation, a written sentence signifies a spoken sentence, which in turn signifies a 
mental sentence, composed of concepts; in this regard, according to Conti, the late theory 
is identical to the early theory. However, Conti argues that, in the late theory, a sentence 
composed of concepts signifies a propositio whose terms are not things but rather mental 
entities which exist merely objectively. These sorts of propositiones are, Conti argues, 
the meanings of the sentences which directly or indirectly signify them. Moreover, if true, 
an objectively existing propositio signifies, in turn, a real proposition - which is now 
taken to be the referent and truthmaker of other sorts of propositiones. And so, Conti 
writes,  
[t]he problems connected with his first theory of the semantics of propositions are 
thereby solved. The real proposition of his first theory is split into the mental 
proposition habens esse obiectivum in intellectu and the (new) propositio in re, 
both of which have a well-defined semantic and ontological status. In addition, 
false propositions have meaning (i.e., the mental proposition habens esse 
obiectivum in intellectu), but no reference, as no real proposition matches them.33
 
  
Consequently, Burley’s late semantics admits of two different sorts of mental 
propositiones, the old mental sentence, which is composed of concepts, and a new mental 
                                                      
33 Conti, “Walter Burley.” See also Conti, “Ontology in Walter Burley’s Last Commentary on the Ars 
Vetus,” 134–6. 
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propositio, composed of entities that exist merely objectively in the mind. The latter 
constitutes the meaning of sentences in natural and mental language. The real 
proposition, in turn, is no longer constituted by a mental act of combining or separating, 
but rather exists wholly independently of mental activity, so that its semantic and 
ontological status is no longer “indeterminate.” Rather, just as a certain sort of mental 
proposition accounts for questions about meaning, the new theory of the real proposition 
is now entirely devoted to issues of truthmaking. Consequently, then, while Burley’s 
account in the earlier works included four sorts of propositiones – written, spoken, 
mental and real – the theory of the late works include five, because Burley separates out 
in his ontology two different features of the earlier real proposition: its role as content, 
and its role as truthmaker. 
 Conti sees the theory Burley articulates in the Art.Vet as an evolution of a theory 
developed in earlier works. To the extent that Conti has misunderstood the earlier theory, 
then, the account of what he regards as the late theory is also suspect. However, there are 
also independent textual reasons to question his interpretation of the Art.Vet. First, while 
Conti sees the use of the phrase ‘propositio in re’ in the Art.Vet as recalling, broadly, the 
theory of the real proposition developed in the Comm.Perih, he thinks that the theory of 
the real proposition developed in the Art.Vet is unique at least to this extent, that it does 
not depend in any way on mental activity.34
                                                      
34 Conti does state, in an early work, that “the state of affairs (or real proposition), which is the ultimate 
significatum of a true affirmative sentence, is a complex object (ens copulatum) composed of an 
individual substance, and inherent accidental (or substantial) form, and an identity-relation. Such a 
relation (which is the formal part of the compound) does not exist outside of our minds, but only in 
them” (Conti, “Ontology in Walter Burley’s Last Commentary on the Ars Vetus,” 134). This suggests 
that, earlier in his career, Conti interprets Burley’s later theory of the real proposition to still involve 
mental activity in its composition. However, other remarks in that work seem to suggest that, ultimately, 
Burley does not think that real propositions depend on mental activity. (I admit that Conti’s account in 
 He writes, for example, that  
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in this case [i.e. the case of the real proposition that Socrates is a human], the two 
forms involved are the forma perficiens materiam of Socrates (i.e. his soul) and 
the related but distinct forma declarans quidditatem (i.e., the species man). What 
unites them is Socrates himself, since he has the forma perficiens materiam as an 
essential element and instantiates the forma declarans quidditatem.35
The real proposition, on this account, in no way involves mental activity. Rather, what 
combines the things which compose a real proposition is rather some primary substance 
in which the relevant forms both inhere.
 
36
 But Burley’s own discussion of the propositio in re in the Art.Vet calls that 
reading into question. He writes: 
 The sentence ‘Socrates is a human’, for 
example, is made true by the fact that Socrates’s soul and the property of humanity both 
inhere in the same primary substance, namely Socrates himself. 
I believe that it is undoubtedly the case that in some propositio a thing is 
predicated of a thing, and in some propositio a concept is predicated of a concept, 
and in some propositio an utterance is predicated of an utterance [...]. Hence since 
a propositio is of three sorts – a certain spoken one, a certain conceptual one, and 
a certain one signified through a conceptual propositio which can be called a 
propositio in re – [i] a propositio spoken of in the first way, namely, a spoken 
propositio, is totally outside the soul, and propositio of this sort is composed out 
of utterances which have being outside the soul, [ii] a propositio composed out of 
concepts is totally in the intellect, and [iii] a propositio composed out of things 
is partly in the intellect, and partly outside the intellect. With regard to its 
                                                                                                                                                                 
that work is not entirely clear to me). In any case, in more recent works, Conti clearly holds that real 
propositions, on the later theory, exist independently of mental activity.  
35 Conti, “Walter Burley.” On Burley’s late account of identity, two numerically distinct forms – such as 
Socrates’s soul and the species man – can never be identical to one another, since something can be truly 
predicated of one that cannot be truly predicated of the other. I fail to see, then, how inherence of two 
(broadly speaking) numerically distinct forms in the same primary substance would entail anything about 
the truth of a sentence that asserts their identity. On Burley’s later account of identity, see ch. 5, §4.1, pp. 
287–9. 
36 It is not clear to me how the semantics of true negative sentences – for example, the sentence ‘A human 
is not a cat’ – ought to be analyzed, given Conti’s analysis, since there is no primary substance in which 
both forms inhere.  
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form, it is in the intellect, and with regard to its matter it is outside the 
intellect.37
 
 
In this passage, Burley notes that a propositio in re, or real proposition, depends on the 
mind, since the form of that propositio – which Burley explains elsewhere is the mind’s 
“combining the subject with the predicate” – is something inside the mind.38
 Conti’s account also relies on a suspect account of Burley’s semantics generally. 
His account relies on Burley’s commitment to the thesis that expressions in natural and 
mental language signify things in only an indirect fashion, by directly signifying mental 
representations which in turn signify those things.
 A real 
proposition, then, is composed of things which are arranged by the mind. In fact, given 
the interpretation of the Comm.Perih I articulated earlier, Conti appears to get things 
exactly the wrong way around! In the Comm.Perih, the real proposition is completely 
independent of mental activity, since it is what the mind’s predicating one thing of 
another might correspond to. In the Exp.Praed, in contrast, the real proposition does 
depend on the mind, since its structure is explained in terms of a certain complex mental 
act. 
39
                                                      
37 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), 
Exp.Praed, c4rb: “Et credo quod illud indubitanter sit verum quod in aliqua propositione praedicatur res 
de re, et in aliqua propositione conceptus de conceptu praedicatur, et in aliqua vox de voce praedicatur 
[...].Unde cum propositio sit triplex, quaedam in platione, quaedam in conceptu, et quaedam significata 
per propositionem in conceptu qui potest dici propositio in re.  Propositio primo modo dicta, scilicet 
propositio in platione, est totaliter extra animam, et talis propositio totaliter componitur ex vocibus qui 
habent esse extra animam.  Propositio vero composita ex conceptibus est totaliter in intellectu.  Et 
compositio composita ex rebus partim est in intellectu et partim extra intellectu, quantum ad suum 
formale est in intellectu sed quantum ad materialia est totaliter extra intellectum.”  
 Only if expressions in language 
38 Ibid. 
39 Conti attempts to make a weaker claim, that Burley is committed to the transitivity of signification, 
according to which whatever is a sign of a sign, is a sign of the thing signified by that sign. But Conti’s 
interpretation requires more than mere transitivity, since transitivity alone is compatible with the direct 
signification of things by expressions in natural language. Regardless, I think Burley rejects transitivity. 
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signify things in that way can a true sentence in mental language, for example, both 
directly signify some propositio which has merely objective being in the soul, in virtue of 
which that sentence is meaningful, and also indirectly signify some real proposition, in 
virtue of which it is true. If signification didn’t operate in this way, given Conti’s account 
of the semantics, Burley’s account of sentential signification would either fail to provide 
a compelling account of truth (because all that a sentence in mental language would 
signify, for example, would be some objectively existing mental propositio) or it would 
fail to provide a compelling account of meaning (because all a true sentence in mental 
language would signify would be some real proposition).  
 However, we have good grounds to reject the claim that, in Burley’s account, 
things outside the mind are signified by expressions in natural and mental language in 
only an indirect manner.40 For Burley holds explicitly and consistently throughout his 
career that expressions in natural language signify things directly, rather than indirectly 
signifying them by directly signifying concepts which themselves signify those things. In 
the Quaes.Perih, for example, Burley writes that “some utterance immediately signifies a 
thing outside the soul.”41
                                                                                                                                                                 
He argues, for example, that transitivity would entail ‘Socrates is a concept of Socrates’ is true, since 
both ‘Socrates’ and ‘concept of Socrates’ signify Socrates – the one more remotely, the other less so. 
See, e.g., Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 
1.14, p. 55.  
 Similar claims are made in his late commentary on the 
40 Conti cites as evidence for his position the apparent endorsement of indirect signification in the prologue 
to the Exp.Praed. But, in that passage, Burley explicitly references the theory of signification set out in 
the first chapter of the Perihermeneias, and in his commentary on that chapter he explicitly rejects that 
expressions in natural language signify things indirectly. 
41 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.7, p. 212. See also 
Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.16, pp. 55–
6. 
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Perihermeneias.42
 Where has Conti gone wrong in his reading of the later works? Well, already in 
his exegesis of the earlier works, of course. But, beyond that, I believe he has 
misunderstood, on the one hand, a number of projects – both old and new – that Burley 
deals with in the Art.Vet and, on the other, simply how Burley has repurposed the 
vocabulary from his earlier logical commentaries in the Art.Vet. With respect to Burley’s 
 Moreover, as Burley affirms repeatedly throughout his career, mental 
acts are directly (directe) about things (res), rather than about mental representations 
(regardless of whether those representations exist subjectively or objectively in the mind). 
One consequence of this account of cognition, then, is that, regardless of what sort of 
mental items Burley may or may not posit in his cognitive theory, the immediate objects 
of cognition are things. But signification, according to Burley, is parasitic on cognition. 
Expressions in natural language are imposed on the objects of cognitive acts, and thereby 
come to directly signify those objects. Consequently, regardless of what sort of mental 
items Burley may or may not posit in his semantic theory, the immediate significata of 
expressions in natural and mental language are, in standard cases, things which exist 
outside the mind. But if that is the case, then Conti’s account of the theory of content 
developed in the late works seems to be seriously undermined, because sentences in 
natural and mental language will directly signify composites of things – which, on 
Conti’s account, are real propositions, states of affairs. At best, the original deficiencies 
of the early theory would remain: only true sentences in natural and mental language 
have meaning, because only true sentences in natural and mental language signify 
something, namely a real proposition. 
                                                      
42 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k3va. 
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repurposed vocabulary, the description of the real proposition that Burley gives in the 
Art.Vet seems remarkably similar to the description of the sentence in the mind of the 
earlier works – so similar, in fact, that I think there can be little doubt but that Burley is 
articulating the very same theory: a theory of propositional content, according to which 
the mind can predicating one thing (res) of another. Part of Conti’s confusion, then, lies 
in the fact that, in the Art.Vet, Burley repurposes much of his earlier vocabulary – in 
particular, his expression ‘propositio in re’ – to discuss theories, many of which appeared 
in his earlier works under different names.43
 Beyond a justifiable confusion with the way in which Burley is using his own 
terms, however, Conti also goes wrong in his interpretation of the theories that stand 
behind that repurposed vocabulary, and that because he has misunderstood the problems 
that motivate the theories developed in the Art.Vet in the first place. In the most obvious 
case, he takes the theory of the real proposition developed in the Art.Vet to principally 
 What is called a sentence in the mind 
(enunciatio in mente) in the early works, for example, is called a real proposition 
(propositio in re) in the later works. What is called a real proposition (propositio in re) in 
the earlier works, moreover, is absent in the later works (a consequence, I suspect, of 
Burley’s recognition that that theory was fundamentally confused). And, for good 
measure, Burley re-appropriates the term ‘propositio in mente’ in the later works to talk 
about (among other things) sentences in a language of thought – that is, mental sentences, 
composed of concepts, a commitment which is wholly absent in the early commentaries 
on the Perihermeneias. 
                                                      
43 Conti is not unique in this regard; most scholars don’t recognize that Burley has radically shifted his 
vocabulary. A notable exception here is Elizabeth Karger. See §4. 
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concern truthmaking. That assumption is plausible, given the theory of the real 
proposition developed in the Comm.Perih. But the theory of the real proposition 
developed in the Art.Vet is not at all directly concerned with issues of truthmaking. On 
the contrary, it is meant to address concerns about the nature of propositional content – 
the very same concerns that motivated the theory of the sentence in the mind (propositio 
in mente) in the earlier works. Indeed, it is that very theory, under a new and yet familiar 
name.  
 Conti also misunderstands the concerns that motivate Burley’s commitment in the 
Art.Vet to a certain sort of mental propositio which has only objective existence. Conti 
argues that that commitment reflects a concern about propositional content, and a 
recognition of the problems that plagued an early theory of the real proposition. But, 
rather than a concern about propositional content, I argue that Burley’s introduction of 
that notion in the Art.Vet is motivated by highly specific concerns, about the ability of 
speakers to refer to the same linguistic item in meta-linguistic contexts.44
                                                      
44 Even if Conti were to reject that this is the project which actually motivates Burley’s commitment to 
propositiones which exist merely objectively in the mind, Conti’s interpretation faces a further, purely 
exegetical problem: that Burley states that propositiones of this sort can signify something false, as well 
as something true. On Conti’s interpretation, recall, propositiones that exist merely objectively only 
signify when they are true, that is, they can only signify some truthmaker, their truth consisting precisely 
in the fact that they signify something further. But Burley writes that “a propositio which does not exist 
in the nature of things, but which exists in the intellect objectively, can signify something true or 
something false, and consequently can signify something to the intellect” (Walter Burley, Super artem 
veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, g7rb). Burley repeats this claim at other points in the 
passage.  
 The 
introduction of that notion in the late chapters of the Exp.Praed is framed by Burley’s 
desire to explain how a respondent in a certain dialogical exercise called obligatio can 
agree or disagree with the spoken utterance of an opponent. The respondent, Burley 
notes, can only agree or disagree with the spoken utterance of the opponent after the 
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opponent has spoken that utterance. But what, then, is the respondent agreeing or 
disagreeing with? Burley argues that the object of the respondent’s agreement or 
disagreement is the utterance spoken by the opponent himself, an utterance which does 
not exist at the time when the respondent responds to it.  
In a disputation, if the opponent utters this, ‘God exists’, then the respondent has 
to concede that if he is not obligated to its opposite. But he does not concede that 
when it is offered, because then the opponent and the respondent had to speak at 
the same time, which is not true. And when it is not uttered, then it does not exist. 
Therefore he has to concede that when it does not exist.”45
 
 
‘Exist’ here is technical; a thing exists if and only if it has subjective being. Things which 
do not exist, however, can still have another mode of being namely, as mere objects of 
thought.  
After that [i.e. the utterance of the opponent] is spoken, it is an object of memory 
[...]. A respondent judges correctly about the utterances of an opponent after they 
are spoken whether they are true or false, and depending on how he judges, so he 
responds. Therefore a propositio which does not exist except objectively in the 
intellect is judged to be true or false by the faculty of judgment, and so it is true or 
false [because the respondent judges correctly].”46
 
 
In fact, Burley goes on to argue that propositiones of this sort are sentence-types of 
natural language.  
                                                      
45 Ibid., Exp.Praed, g7ra. “Quod patet, quia si in disputatione opponens proponat istam, ‘deus est’, 
respondens habet istam concedere, tunc non obligetur ad oppositum. Sed non concedit istam quando 
profertur, quia si opponens et respondens similiter habent loqui, quod non est verum. Et quando non 
profertur, tunc non est. Ergo habet concedere illam quando non est.” Burley’s target here are certain 
“moderni” who deny that the following argument is sound: ‘ p, therefore ‘p’ is true’, because the 
antecedent could be true and the consequent not true, if ‘p’ does ceases to exist. Burley rejects that claim 
partly on grounds that it would “destroy all disputation,” since it would require two opponents in a 
dispute to talk at the same time. And, “although [the moderni] conduct their own arguments in this way, 
because they are always arguing over one another at the same time,” that kind of conduct in an argument 
is “exceedingly unfitting” (Ibid., Exp.Praed, g6va). 
46 Idem, Exp.Praed, g7ra: “Et confirmatur. Nam postquam ipsa est prolata, est obiecta memoriae, quia alias 
oppositiones non haberet nec habere posset memoriae de prolatis a respondente, quod est inconveniens, 
quia tunc nunquam bene posset respondere. Ergo quando propositio non est, potest esse obiecta 
memoriae, et per consequens ipsi intellectui, et per consequens quando propositio non est, significat 
aliquid intellectui a quo intelligitur. Ergo significat verum aut falsum.” 
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I believe that in a disputation the opponent and the respondent direct their 
intellects to certain things common to all of the spoken sentences about which 
they dispute, and so they direct their intellects to the same thing, and so it is clear 
that a respondent is able to offer a refutation, because he is able to concede or 
deny one thing common to many individual, similar sentences. The intellect, 
however, is not able to concede or deny the same individual sentence, because it 
cannot utter the same individual sentence twice.47
The account Burley defends in this passage is fascinating for a number of reasons. First, 
it gives us some more insight into the practice of obligatio, a philosophical exercise about 
whose purpose scholars are still unclear. Second, it clearly echoes (though does not 
merely repeat) the metalinguistic concerns that drove the earlier theory of the real 
proposition.
 
48
                                                      
47 Idem, Exp.Praed, g7rb: “Credo quod in disputatione opponens et respondens fuereunt intellectus suos ad 
talia communia omnibus propositionibus prolatis de quibus disputant, et fuereunt intellectus suos ad 
idem, et sic patet quod respondens potest redargui, quia  potest idem concedere et negare unum commune 
multis individuis propositionibus omnino similibus. Eadem tamen propositionem individuam non potest 
intellectus concedere et negare, quia idem individuum propositionis non potest bis proferri.” 
 Third, it at least hints at the complex cognitive processes that underlie 
linguistic comprehension, and in the process fits well with Burley’s more general 
semantic picture. On the account of linguistic comprehension Burley suggests here, 
recognition of a particular utterance as an utterance of a particular meaningful type does 
not involve any significative relation between tokens and types. Rather, and in contrast to 
Conti’s account, the signification of an expression in natural language, which is 
fundamentally an epistemological relationship whereby an expression calls something to 
mind, depends on (but is not reducible to) complex cognitive processes involving in part 
the categorization of a token utterance under some particular utterance type, the pre-
48 It also reflects a position Burley sets out in the Quaes.Perih, that a propositio can have truth values even 
when it does not exist. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” 
para. 3.62, p. 250–1: “It must be said that some propositiones are always true and [some] are always 
false, but no propositio always has being. Hence, to the objection [that the necessary truth of a propositio 
requires the necessity of its being], that a propositio is true does not require that the propositio exists in 
fact (sit actualiter).”  
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established subordination of utterances of that type to a particular concept with a certain 
content, and the activation of that concept in the mind upon the recognition of that token 
as a token of that type, which activation calls the thing the concept represents to mind.  
 In the end, then, Conti’s interpretation of Burley’s views on meaning and truth 
seems to me to leave a great deal to be desired. However, Conti’s interpretation is not the 
only example of a scholar who takes Burley’s project to be primarily about the nature of 
states of affairs. Perhaps an alternative defense might fare better. 
2.2. Christian Rode 
 Like Conti before him, Christian Rode is primarily interested in Burley’s account 
of the propositio in re, or real proposition. Also like Conti, Rode argues that we find two 
different accounts of the real proposition in Burley’s logical works – an early account, 
and a late. However, unlike Conti, who argues that the early theory is dominated by the 
idea that a real proposition is composed by the mind and the late theory by the mind-
independence of the real proposition, Rode argues that the opposite seems to be the case. 
In the early theory, Rode notes, the real proposition is “completely uncoupled” (völlig 
losgekoppelt) from intellectual activity.49
                                                      
49 Rode, “Sätze Und Dinge. Die Propositio in Re Bei Walter Burley Und Anderen,” 71. 
 It is not formed by the mind, but rather exists 
merely objectively in the mind, as that to which true mental combinations can 
correspond. Rode argues that things are significantly different in the Art.Vet, however. In 
that work, real propositions have both material and formal components. The material 
components are typically extramental things, but the formal component – the copula of 
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the real proposition – exists in the mind as an act of it, so that the real proposition is a 
hybrid entity, composed of both mental and extramental components.50
 Exegetically, Rode appears to better appreciate the development of Burley’s 
thought than Conti. Rode rightly notes that, in the Comm.Perih, while the real proposition 
exists merely objectively in the mind, it is independent of thought or thinking, whereas, 
in the Art.Vet, the real proposition includes an act of cognition as a formal component. 
Moreover, Rode agrees with Conti’s general interpretation of the theory as one of states 
of affairs. But, in contrast to Conti, Rode argues that, even on the later theory, Burley’s 
account faces serious philosophical challenges. Consequently, Rode argues, Burley’s 
account, while interesting, is not philosophically compelling. For a more compelling 
medieval account of states of affairs, we need to turn our attention to the theory of the 
complexe significabile, a theory of states of affairs developed by Adam Wodeham and 
Gregory Rimini in the middle of the fourteenth century.  
 
 While not ultimately satisfying, Rode argues that the theory is still deserving of 
scholarly attention, for a number of reasons. First, Rode sees Burley’s late theory of the 
real proposition as a development of the earlier theory. In fact, Rode sees that 
development as positive; the later theory constitutes an important philosophical 
advancement over the earlier theory, because the later theory involves a less 
objectionable intermingling of language and mind, on the one hand, and reality, on the 
other. Second, Rode argues that the central concern driving the development of Burley’s 
account of the real proposition is to provide an account according to which the things that 
sentences in natural and mental language represent are suitably complex. On this point, 
                                                      
50 See Ibid., 74–5. 
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Rode argues that the development of Burley’s account tracks an attempt to develop an 
“intensional” interpretation of signification, as opposed to a merely extensional 
interpretation.51
 On Rode’s interpretation, then, the central problem of the early theory of the real 
proposition is that it cannot provide the sort of complexity required of an account of 
states of affairs. It cannot provide the requisite complexity because, given that the truth of 
a sentence in natural or mental language requires that the “terms” of the real proposition 
it signifies are identical or non-identical to one another, those “terms” must in fact be the 
same thing – in particular, the very same particular substance. Burley attempts to avoid 
this result in various ways in the early theory – by appeal, for example, to the merely 
objective nature of the real proposition. But Rode argues that this is (in the minds of 
contemporary philosophers, at least) “an impermissible mixing” (eine unzulässige 
Vermengung) of language and mind, on the one hand, and the reality they represent, on 
 That is, Rode argues that Burley’s aim is to move beyond the particular 
thing(s) that a sentence may be about (Socrates, for example) to a complex which 
includes not just particular thing(s) but also their arrangement. Third, then, Rode argues 
that the theory of the real proposition is, at root, a theory of states of affairs, which are 
what sentences in natural and mental language signify. States of affairs differ from mere 
substances or accidents in that they have a complexity that mere substances and accidents 
lack. In this respect, Burley’s work represents both a growing philosophical concern in 
the fourteenth century over the need for an ontological kind – the fact, or state of affairs – 
and attempts to square that need with a metaphysical commitment to the Aristotelian 
categorical framework. 
                                                      
51 See Ibid., 78. 
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the other.52
 In his later account of the real proposition, in contrast, Burley no longer attempts 
to achieve the complexity required of states of affairs by appeal to a suspect “objective 
being” that the terms of the real proposition possess. Rather, on the later theory, the terms 
of the real proposition are entirely extramental things, so that the real proposition (with 
respect to its material components, at least) falls entirely on the side of reality. This 
position, Rode notes, requires that an affirmative real proposition has as its terms the very 
same thing, because the real propositions signified by true, affirmative sentences in 
natural and mental language involve the identity of their terms, and only the very same 
thing is identical to itself.
 That is, Burley achieves the requisite complexity in what sentences in natural 
and mental language signify only by admitting a kind of being to real propositions (and 
their terms) that straddles the language-reality divide.  
53 In other words, Rode suggests, all affirmative real 
propositions must ultimately be tautologies.54
                                                      
52 Ibid., 72. 
 With the respect to its “terms,” then, the 
real proposition on the later theory explicitly receives an extensional interpretation, since 
affirmative real propositions are constituted by some one particular thing, and negative 
real propositions by two non-identical particular things.  
53 Consequently, Rode argues that the signification of sentences in natural and mental language is 
fundamentally articulated in terms of supposition, because the subject and predicate terms of sentences in 
natural and mental language – including true sentences – differ not just orthographically and phonetically 
but semantically as well, and it is only via an account of supposition that a sentence containing 
semantically diverse subject and predicate terms can signify a real proposition whose “terms” are 
identical with one another. Rode assumes that he is simply following Conti on this point, and there is at 
least some reason to think that Rode is correct in this assumption. 
54 Rode, “Sätze Und Dinge. Die Propositio in Re Bei Walter Burley Und Anderen,” 78–9. 
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 At the same time, Rode argues, Burley attempts to provide an “intensional” 
interpretation of the real proposition, by arguing that a real proposition is composed not 
just of things but also of a mental act of predication. Because real propositions are, on the 
later theory, composed by mental acts of predication, Burley argues that real propositions 
are intellectual, rather than real, composites. And Burley’s appeal to their status as 
intellectual composites, Rode argues, is meant to indicate that while the “terms” of the 
real proposition may in fact be the very same particular thing, the mind, in combining 
them, is sensitive not just to that particular thing but to a state of affairs of which it is a 
part. 
 Rode argues that the later theory improves on the earlier theory because it betters 
respects the divisions between language, mind, and reality, but that it is still deeply 
flawed, because (among other problems) it is unable to provide an account of the 
complexity of states of affairs which is divorced from cognitive activity. In this respect, 
Burley’s project is not compelling. However, Rode argues, that project is motivated by 
concerns shared by many other philosophers in the period – concerns about the need for 
facts in one’s ontology, for example – and those concerns come to be addressed, in a 
more satisfying fashion, by other philosophers in the middle of the fourteenth century – 
namely, Adam Wodeham and Gregory Rimini, with the theory of the complexe 
significabile.55
                                                      
55 See Ibid., 88–9. 
 Burley’s fundamental philosophical limitation, Rode suggests, is that he is 
too wedded to an Aristotelian metaphysics, according to which everything that exists is 
apt for an analysis in terms of substances and accidents. It is only when Wodeham and 
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Rimini reject this account that they are able to develop an account of signification which 
provides a compelling account of sentential signification in particular. 
   Rode’s analysis of Burley’s project is interesting, and especially noteworthy for 
its attempt to situate Burley’s interests and commitments within a wider historical 
context. He argues, for example, that, in Francis de Mayronis’s (d. 1328) work, there 
appears to be a commitment to the view that what true, affirmative sentences ultimately 
signify is something whose terms are identical to one another – something tautological, as 
Rode sees it. Rode also draws comparisons to the views of John Duns Scotus and Francis 
de Prato (c. 1330s), who argue that sentences ultimately signify something whose terms 
have only objective being. However, the way in which Rode sees Burley’s account and 
its place within the philosophy of language and mind at the turn of the fourteenth century 
is motivated by two underlying assumptions – an exegetical assumption, and a 
philosophical assumption. First, Rode assumes that the theory of the real proposition 
articulated in the Art.Vet is a development of the account of the real proposition 
developed in the earlier logical treatises, and especially in the Comm.Perih. Second, Rode 
assumes that that development represents a philosophical concern – shared by many in 
the fourteenth century – about the nature of states of affairs.  
 Both are problematic assumptions. The former assumption is problematic 
because, as I argued above, the theory of the real proposition developed in the Art.Vet 
seems to be a development not of the theory of the propositio in re of the Comm.Perih 
but rather of the theory of the propositio in intellectu, that is, the theory of the sentence in 
the mind. But, as we have seen, the account of the propositio in intellectu in the 
Comm.Perih is not anything like a theory of states of affairs. Moreover – and this is the 
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second way in which Rode’s account is deficient – if one doesn’t assume that the theory 
of the real proposition in the Art.Vet constitutes a development of the theory of the real 
proposition articulated in the Comm.Perih, then there seems to be far less motivation to 
assume that the theory of the real proposition developed in the Art.Vet is a deficient 
account of states of affairs. Rather, and especially if one recognizes that it constitutes a 
development of the propositio in intellectu developed in the Comm.Perih, it appears to be 
an engaging account of propositional content. 
 While there are other examples of a state-of-affairs interpretation in the literature, 
none are as sophisticated, it seems to me, as Conti’s and Rode’s. But, as we have seen, 
both of those interpretations face serious challenges. I do not believe that any other 
interpretation of this sort in the literature fares any better under close scrutiny. Moreover, 
the more general challenge for any interpretation according to which Burley’s central aim 
throughout his career is to articulate the nature and function of states of affairs is that 
Burley’s seems far more interested in the nature of truthbearers than in truthmakers – and 
especially interested in the nature of the primary bearers of truth value. This strongly 
suggests that Burley’s main concern is not the nature of states of affairs but rather the 
nature of propositional content.  
 
3. THE METAPHYSICS OF THE PROPOSITION I: LAURENT CESALLI  
 Unlike both Conti and Rode, who see a significant theoretical evolution in 
Burley’s thought, Laurent Cesalli argues that any evolution that one finds in Burley’s 
corpus is merely verbal, and is meant simply to make more apparent Burley’s 
“fundamental and constant theoretical intuition: the objective foundation of logical truth 
89 
 
in extramental reality.”56
 Like Conti, Cesalli argues that the signification of expressions in natural language 
is indirect. Cesalli argues that Burley highlights this commitment in various works in 
order to draw attention to the need for a certain kind of propositio which is signified but 
does not in turn signify anything else.
According to Cesalli, then, what might appear to be two distinct 
semantic theories in Burley’s corpus – an early and a late – is rather an equivocation in 
service of a heuristic purpose: to reinforce Burley’s commitment to the objectivity of 
truth.  
57
[T]he ordo significationis is clear: a written proposition signifies a vocal one, a 
vocal proposition signifies a mental one which is itself a sign [...]. The crucial 
theoretical move will be to distinguish between two types of mental propositions 
– one of them being at the same time a sign and a significate, the other being 
merely a [significate].
 In contrast to Conti, however, for whom that final 
kind of “propositio” is in fact not literally a propositio (that is, a bearer of truth and 
falsity) but rather a fact which makes the propositiones that signify it true, Cesalli argues 
that the propositio which is signified and does not itself signify anything further is a 
certain sort of mental truthbearer.  
58
 
 
The former sort of mental propositio – which Cesalli argues both is signified by a spoken 
sentence and signifies the second sort of mental propositio – is a sentence in mental 
language, composed of concepts. What those propositiones represent, Cesalli suggests, 
                                                      
56 Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” 123. By ‘logical truth’, Cesalli does not mean a certain sort of analytic 
truth. Rather, he means the sort of truth that statements generally can have, in contrast to the sort of truth 
that things (res) can possess. In this respect, Cesalli is following Burley’s account of truth. On Burley on 
truth and its kinds, see ch. 5, §§2, 7. 
57 See Ibid., 124. See also Cesalli, Le Réalisme Propositionnel, 227. 
58 Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” 124. 
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are entities which have merely objective existence in the mind. Objects of this sort are 
“the presence in the mind of extramental objects (that substance, this accident) as 
cognitive and objective contents.”59
 Cesalli’s account differs from Conti’s in another, more significant way, however. 
According to Conti, a mental propositio composed of entities which have merely 
objective existence in the mind might itself signify a real proposition (that is, some actual 
state of affairs, or truthmaker), and it is in virtue of its signification of that real 
proposition that it is true. According to Conti, then, entities which have mere objective 
existence are signs of things in extramental reality, and truth involves combining them in 
a way that reflects the actual combinations of the things they represent. In contrast, 
Cesalli denies that entities which have mere objective existence in the mind are signs; 
rather, they are simply the presence of extramental objects in the mind. Consequently, he 
denies that mental propositiones composed of objective contents serve to signify 
anything further. According to Cesalli, then, truth and falsity are not articulated in terms 
of signification, but rather in terms of what Cesalli calls a relation of foundation. A 
mental propositio is true, on Cesalli’s reading, if each of its parts – subject term, 
predicate term, and copula – corresponds to or is founded in a feature of reality. With 
 The latter mental propositio is composed of those 
objective mental contents, and structured by the mind’s combining them with one 
another. Consequently, what Conti takes to be a feature of the account developed only at 
the end of Burley’s career – according to which sentences in mental language signify 
propositiones composed of objective contents – Cesalli argues is a persistent feature of 
the account from its very beginning.  
                                                      
59 Ibid., 131. 
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respect to the subject and predicate term, it is founded in the two extramental realities 
themselves, and, with respect to the copula, it is founded in an extramental relation of 
identity or non-identity between those two realities.  
 Why, then, does Burley say repeatedly throughout his career that the mind can 
combine things (res) with one another? Because, Cesalli argues, Burley wants to drive 
home the foundation of truth in extramental reality. Objective mental contents are 
founded in extramental reality, because they are the objective presence of those things in 
the mind. It is that foundation that explains, for example, why my thought of a cat is 
about a cat. It also serves to explain the truth of my thought that a human is an animal: 
because all three parts of that thought – the content of a thought about humanity, about 
animality, and their combination – are reflected in the world by actual humans, actual 
animals, and an actual relation of identity that obtains between particular humans and 
particular animals.60
 Cesalli’s interpretation seems to me to have one large advantage over Conti’s: 
consistency in interpretation. According to Conti, Burley’s account evolves over the 
course of his career, from one according to which the mind combines things with one 
another to one according to which the mind combines entities that exist merely 
 
                                                      
60 There is a further, metaphysical  problem for Cesalli’s (and, potentially, Conti’s) view as well – at least 
with respect to the second half of Burley’s career. As I understand Burley’s later metaphysics, 
extramental universals, or properties, do not do any metaphysical work. That is, they do not provide the 
natures of particulars. But Burley remains an ardent defender to the reality of properties in the second 
half of his career, a defense which only makes sense if those properties serve some philosophical use. 
That use, I suggest, must be semantic (see ch. 5, §5). However, on Cesalli’s interpretation, properties do 
not play a role in Burley’s account of meaning, since the only universals relevant to signification are 
universal contents, which exist objectively in the mind. Those contents are founded in reality, but a 
reality of concrete particulars (“this substance, that accident”), rather than in any extramental universals. 
If I am right about Burley’s later account of properties, then Cesall’s interpretation Burley’s continued 
commitment to realism seems inexplicable. Moreover, Cesalli’s interpretation makes Burley’s account of 
meaning almost indistinguishable from the early Ockham’s. 
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objectively in the mind. But Burley claims not just in the early works but also in the late 
works that the mind can combine things with one another. He writes in the prologue to 
the Exp.Praed, for example, that  
[w]hatever the intellect can combine with one another, or divide from one another 
can be parts of a sentence (oratio), and consequently can be a subject and 
predicate. But the intellect can combine things (res) with one another, by asserting 
that that those things are the same, and it can divide things from one another by 
asserting that those are not the same.61
On Conti’s interpretation, then, when Burley says in the late logical commentaries that 
the mind can combine things with one another, Burley must be speaking in some non-
literal way. But Burley makes exactly the same claim in the early logical commentaries. 
Parity of reasoning would suggest that Burley either meant his claim non-literally in the 
earlier logical commentaries as well, or means to speak literally in the later logical 
commentaries. But neither position fits with the narrative of development that Conti 
defends. Cesalli, in contrast, can respect the fact that Burley seems to be committing 
himself in the late works to the same theory defended in the earlier works, by arguing for 
a non-literal reading throughout. 
 
 Unfortunately, however, Cesalli’s interpretation faces some serious exegetical 
challenges. Most serious of all is that the central thesis of Cesalli’s interpretation – that 
expressions in natural language ultimately signify the mere objective presence, or 
existence, of extramental things in the mind – finds little textual support, and a substantial 
                                                      
61 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c3vb: “Ad illud dubium recolo 
me dixisse et in scriptis reliquisse quod intellectus potest facere propositionem ex quibuscumque, quia 
intellectus potest asserere illa esse eadem vel diversam, quia propositio non est aliud quam copulatio 
aliquorum per intellectum adinvicem, ut propositio affirmativa, aut divisio aliquorum abinvicem, ut 
propositio negativa.  Quecumque ergo intellectus potest componere adinvicem aut dividere abinvicem 
ponent esse partes orationis, et per consequens esse subiecta vel praedicamenta.  Sed intellectus potest 
adinvicem componere res asserendo illas esse easdem, et potest dividere res abinvicem asserendo illas 
non esse easdem.” 
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amount of textual opposition. That thesis is central to Cesalli’s account because Cesalli 
argues that those objective contents are what the mind combines with one another to form 
complex objective contents – which are, on Cesalli’s view, the primary bearers of truth 
and falsity, the objects of the mind’s attitudes, and the significata of sentences in natural 
and mental language. However, the only textual evidence Cesalli cites in favor of 
Burley’s supposedly lifelong commitment to the objective nature of semantic and 
cognitive content comes in the earliest logical commentary, the Quaes.Perih.62 In that 
work, commenting on Boethius claim that an expression in natural language signifies an 
affection of the soul (passio animae), Burley writes that “to signify an affection in this 
way is nothing other than to signify a thing as it is proportioned to the intellect (ut est 
proportionatum intellectui).”63
 But that reading is undermined by what else Burley says elsewhere in the same 
passage. First, Burley claims that “some utterance immedaitely signifies a thing outside 
[the soul] (res extra animam).”
 The notion of a thing “as it is proportioned to the 
intellect,” Cesalli argues, suggests the merely objective presence of that thing in the 
mind. 
64
                                                      
62 Cesalli seems to make to also make a mistake on this point as well, by assuming that if something has 
objective being, then its parts as well must have objective being. But Burley clearly denies this, given his 
claim in the Quaes.Post (see supra) that a propositio composed of extramental (and so subjectively 
existing) things is itself an objective being.  
 That phrase – “thing outside the soul” – shows up 
63 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.7, p. 212. It is 
important to note that this phrase is completely absent from the Comm.Perih, a work I believe was 
written just a few years after the Quaes.Perih. That might suggest that Burley either recognized the 
confusion that expression could cause, or simply became more confident in his commitment to a direct 
realist account. 
64 Ibid., para. 1.71, p. 212. ‘Res extra’ in this passage is clearly elliptical for ‘res extra animam’. See, e.g., 
Burley’s use of ‘res extra animam’ in Ibid., para. 1.82, p. 213. 
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repeatedly in Burley’s corpus, and it seems implausible that that expression is not meant 
to drive home the claim that expressions in natural language – quite literally – signify 
extramental things.65 The thesis that expressions in natural language immediately, or 
directly, signify things outside the soul, moreover, plays an integral part in Burley’s 
account of the sentence in the mind. He argues, for example, that sentences in natural 
language immediately signify sentences in the mind, composed of extramental things, 
because “a spoken utterance immediately signifies a thing outside [the soul].”66
 Second, Burley considers a theory of signification in the Quaes.Perih very similar 
to the one Cesalli attributes to him, and Burley emphatically rejects that theory. With 
respect to Boethius’s claim that an expression in natural language signifies an “affection 
of the soul,” Burley notes that “some say that an affection [of the soul] is not a species 
received in the intellect, nor even an act of thinking itself, but is a term of that act, that is, 
something produced by the mind just as a kind of image, in which the intellect sees the 
thing outside [the soul].”
 So what 
sentences in natural language signify (indeed, directly signify) is a sentence in the mind, 
composed of things outside the soul.  
67
                                                      
65 On Cesalli’s account, then, ‘thing outside the soul’ refers to something that only exists within the soul! 
His account seems even more improbable relative to the later works, where Burley argues that the mind 
can combine things which are “totally (totaliter) outside of the soul” (Walter Burley, Super Artem 
Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb). 
 Presumably, these quasi-images in the soul are similar to the 
sorts of objective beings that Cesalli sees as central to Burley’s account of meaning and 
cognition. But, for a number of reasons, Burley expressly rejects that account of 
66 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.55, p. 248. 
67 Ibid., para. 1.5, p. 210. 
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cognition, and the concomitant account of signification, in his early commentaries on the 
Perihermeneias.68
 Beyond a suspect assumption about Burley’s fundamental semantic and cognitive 
commitments, Cesalli also falls into many of the same exegetical errors as Conti, by 
confusing Burley’s theory of propositional content with the theory of truthmaking he 
articulates in the Comm.Perih. Like Conti, Cesalli writes that Burley is committed to 
mental sentences (that is, sentences composed of concepts) in the early logical treatises, 
and takes the distinction Burley makes in the Comm.Perih between propositiones in 
intellectu and propositiones in re to be a clarification between mental sentences, on the 
one hand, and what he takes to be propositiones composed of objective contents, on the 
other. However, the distinction between propositiones in intellectu and propositiones in 
re that Burley makes in the Comm.Perih is quite different – a difference between contents 
composed of things and their truthmakers.  
 
 Cesalli does have a textual retort here.69
                                                      
68 See Ibid., para. 1.6–1.65, p. 210–1; Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Perihermeneias,” para. 1.14–1.15, p. 55. For more on Burley’s rejection of this account, see ch. 3, §2.1, 
pp. 122–31. 
 In another early logical commentary – his 
Quaes.Post – Burley distinguishes between three sorts of propositiones: those composed 
of significative utterances, those composed of concepts, and those composed of things. 
The former two are signs; the latter is signified by those signs. Moreover, unlike 
propositiones composed of signs, Burley argues that a propositio composed out of things 
“has neither subjective being in the mind, nor subjective being outside the mind, but it is 
69 This is a retort that Conti could employ against my reading as well.  
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only an objective being.”70
 Of course, Burley also draws the distinction between propositiones which exist 
subjectively in the mind and those that exist objectively in the mind in the Comm.Perih – 
namely, the distinction between propositiones in intellectu and propositiones in re. So 
can’t we then use the metaphysics of the various sorts of propositiones articulated in the 
Quaes.Post – and crucially the distinction between a propositio composed of concepts 
and a propositio composed of things – to better understand the metaphysical positions 
developed in the Comm.Perih? Cesalli, at least, suggests that we can.  
 The distinction in being that Burley draws here, it seems, is 
intended to map onto those three sorts of propositiones. Sentences in natural language 
exist subjectively outside the mind, whereas mental sentences, composed of concepts, 
exist subjectively in the mind. Propositiones composed of things, in contrast, do not have 
subjective existence either inside or outside of the mind, but rather merely objective 
existence in the mind.  
 However, I argue that we cannot, for two reasons. First, as we have already seen, 
Burley is already fairly explicit in Comm.Perih about the metaphysics of the propositio in 
intellectu, and it is a very different metaphysical picture than the picture of mental 
sentences that we find in the Quaes.Post. In particular, Burley argues in the Comm.Perih 
that a propositio in intellectu is composed out of things (res), rather than concepts. While 
perhaps superficially similar, then, the metaphysical accounts that we find in the 
Comm.Perih and the Quaes.Post of those propositiones which have subjective being in 
the mind differ in important respects from one another. 
                                                      
70 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 2.53, p. 63. 
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 In fact, what we find in the Quaes.Post is, in some ways, a well-motivated 
regression to (and then development of) the theory developed in the Quaes.Perih. In the 
Quaes.Perih, recall, the only sort of propositiones are those composed of expressions in 
natural language and those composed by the mind of the things signified by those 
expressions. More generally, however, Burley is committed to the view that the 
signification of things by expressions in natural language is mediated by concepts in the 
mind. In the Quaes.Post, Burley finally generalizes that claim, by arguing that, just as 
sub-sentential expressions in natural language signify things by the mediation of 
concepts, so too sentences in natural language signify propositions composed of things by 
the mediation of mental sentences, that is, sentences composed of concepts. Moreover, 
unlike the theory developed in the Comm.Perih, which runs contrary to Burley’s more 
general semantic commitments, this development of the view is well motivated. 
Unsurprisingly, then, Burley remains committed to mental language for the rest of his 
career.  
 Second, we cannot employ the Quaes.Post to better understand the metaphysical 
positions developed in the Comm.Perih because the relevant notion of objective being at 
issue in the Comm.Perih, and the larger ontology of being in which it is situated, differs 
from the notion at issue in the Quaes.Post. In the Comm.Perih, the relevant notion of 
objective being concerns the unusual ontological status of truthmakers. They neither exist 
subjectively in the mind, as accidents of it, nor as subjective features of extramental 
reality. This is in contrast to sentences in the mind, which, while composed of things, are 
subjective features of the mind, in virtue of the complex act by which they are formed.71
                                                      
71 Ibid., para. 3.622, p. 251. 
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The notion of objective being in the Comm.Perih, in other words, seems motivated by the 
inability to reduce a truthmaker to some substance and/or an accident of it. 
 Compare that account of objective being to what we find in the Quaes.Post. 
I deny this argument – “It [i.e. a propositio composed of things] is composed out 
of things, therefore it is a thing outside the soul” – because that composition is not 
a real composition, but an intelligible or intellectual composition. Hence a 
syllogism [composed out of propositiones] is neither a being per se nor a being 
per accidens, but it is contained under a middle term of that division of being, 
namely under true being. Hence a demonstrative syllogism composed out of 
things has neither subjective being in the mind, nor subjective being outside the 
mind, but it is only an objective being.72
 
 
According to the Quaes.Post, then, the reason that a propositio composed out of things 
has objective being is because (a) it has true being, which being it has because (b) it is an 
intellectual composition. Now the notion of true being is developed in the Quaes.Perih 
and the Comm.Perih as well.73
                                                      
72 Walter Burley, Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum (PIMS, 2000), para. 2.53, p. 63: “Ad ultimum 
dicitur negando istam consequentiam 'componitur ex rebus, ergo est res extra animam', quia ista 
compositio non est compositio realis, sed intelligibilis sive intellectualis. Unde syllogismus nee est ens 
per se nec ens per accidens, sed continetur sub termino medio divisionis ipsius entis, videlicet sub ente 
vero. Unde syllogismus demonstrativus compositus ex rebus nec habet esse in anima subiective nec esse 
extra animam subiective, sed solum esse obiective. An ista responsio valeat, patebit alias.” 
 And in both works, true being is the sort of being that a 
true sentence in the mind has, that is a propositio composed of things by the mind’s act of 
combining them. So the notion of objective being in the Quaes.Post does not seem to 
concern the irreducibility of something to one or more of the Aristotelian categories, but 
rather a certain unusual feature peculiar to sentences in the mind – namely, that they are, 
or can be, true beings.  
73 On the notion of true being in the Comm.Perih, see Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, pp. 60–61. On the notion of true being in the 
Quaes.Perih, see Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.554, 
p. 250. 
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 Of course, it is certainly possible that Burley means something different by ‘true 
being’ in the Quaes.Post that he did in earlier works; given Burley’s track-record, one 
might even expect it. However, it is important to note that, in the Quaes.Post, Burley 
explicitly links the notion of true being to the notion of an intellectual composition. This 
contrast between real and intellectual composition is in fact a persistent feature of 
Burley’s account of propositional content, a distinction Burley clearly sees as critical to 
the plausibility and success of that account. In the Quaes.Perih, for example, Burley 
writes that 
[w]e need to understand that a sentence in the mind (propositio in mente) is not 
composed out of things by a real composition just as a house is composed out of 
wood and stones, but it is only an intellectual composition, which comes about 
due to the fact that the intellect thinks some things to be the same or [thinks them 
to be] diverse.74
 
 
The same claim is repeated at the end of Burley’s career. In his Exp.Praed, speaking 
about what in that work he calls the propositio in re he writes that 
we need to know that a composition is of two kinds, namely, real and intellectual. 
An intellectual composition is a composition in which the intellect combines a 
subject with a predicate. A real composition is as a composition of a soul with a 
body, or as a house out of stones and wood.75
 
 
                                                      
74 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.554, p. 250: “Ulterius 
est intelligendum quod propositio in mente non componitur ex rebus compositione reali sicut domus 
componitur ex lignis et lapidibus, sed solum est ibi compositio intellectualis quae fit ex hoc quod 
intellectus intelligit aliqua esse eadem et diversa. Unde Commentator IV Metaphysicae, commento 
ultimo: “Entia vera, cuiusmodi sunt propositiones, facta sunt ab intellectu quando divisit ea ab invicem 
aut composuit ea ad invicem." Ex quo patet quod in propositione secundum esse in mente non est nisi 
intellectualis compositio.” 
75 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb: “Secundo sciendum est 
quod compositio est duplex, scilicet realis et intellectualis.  Compositio intellectualis est compositio qua 
intellectus componit subiectum cum praedicato.  Compositio realis est ut compositio animae cum 
corpore, et ut compositio domus ex lapidibus vel lignis.” 
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An intellectual composition, in other words, is the product of the mind’s combining one 
thing with another. But this, of course, is a feature central to the Comm.Perih’s propositio 
in intellectu, rather than to its propositio in re! And, in both the Quaes.Perih and 
Comm.Perih, a propositio of that sort is said to have subjective, rather than objective, 
being. 
 All this suggests that the notion of objective being at issue in the Quaes.Perih is 
very different from the one at issue in the Comm.Perih. In the Comm.Perih, Burley is 
using the expression to get at certain feature(s) of a truthmaker – its irreducibility to some 
subject thing, and its mind-independence, perhaps. In the Quaes.Post, in contrast, 
Burley’s concern isn’t truthmaking but rather the essentially representational or truth-
conditional, nature of propositional content.76 His use of ‘objective being’ in the 
Quaes.Post, then, is meant to capture the fact that propositional content, while typically 
composed of things that have subjective, extramental existence, is itself unique – a 
mental creation whose very essence is to represent the world.77
 
  
4. THE METAPHYSICS OF THE PROPOSITION II: ELIZABETH KARGER 
 We have good reason to believe that, on Burley’s theory, things outside the mind 
constitute the contents of expressions in natural and mental language and the objects of 
                                                      
76 In the Exp.Perih, Burley appears to have reverted back to using ‘objective being’ in the way he did in the 
Comm.Perih – to denote entities which, while mind-independent, are not reducible to presently existing 
primary substances, their tropes, or their properties. For example, he argues that objective beings 
constitute the contents of empty names, such as ‘golden mountain’, and names of people who do not 
presently exist, such as ‘Cicero’.  
77 In the Quaes.Perih, Burley identified this unique metaphysical aspect of propositional content by saying 
that it exists in a subject (i.e., the mind), but not as a real accident. Rather, it exists subjectively in the 
mind as a rational accident (accidens secundum rationem). See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s 
Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.622, p. 251.  
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non-propositional cognitive activity, and that, because of this, the mind combines those 
very extramental things with one another, such that those extramental things compose 
propositional content, something capable of bearing truth and falsity. But the claim that 
the mind can combine extramental things with one another to form some truthbearing 
entity out of them sounds philosophically suspect to many scholars; in fact, it is in part 
because it sounds suspect that Cesalli felt the need to interpret that claim in the way he 
did in the first place. Is there a way to make sense of this claim in a way that both fits 
with Burley’s larger philosophical commitments and can itself be made to seem 
philosophically plausible, even if only prima facie? I argue that there is a way, and that 
the groundwork for it has been laid by Elizabeth Karger.  
 Karger’s brief article, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early 
Ockham,” compares, unsurprisingly, the commitments of Burley and the early Ockham to 
what Karger calls a mental sentence. With respect to Burley in particular, Karger is quick 
to point out that a mental sentence is not composed of concepts.78 On the contrary, 
mental sentences are “the “ultimate” sentences, those which can be signified by others, 
but which do not themselves signify anything.”79 As such, “mental sentences are 
composed, not of words, nor of concepts, but of “things.”80
                                                      
78 The early Ockham’s theory differs from Burley’s in that only concrete particulars can be the extramental 
terms of mental sentences. General terms of mental sentences, in contrast, are merely ficta, which exist 
objectively in the mind. But this difference simply reflects a more general metaphysical disagreement 
that Burley and Ockham have over the existence of extramental universals, or properties. 
 And, Karger notes, “things” 
are the objects of cognition, most of which have extramental existence. “Reverting to 
79 Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” 195. 
80 Ibid., 196. 
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Burley’s claim that the terms of mental sentences [...] are “things,” and not words or 
concepts, we must, then, interpret him as saying that the terms of mental sentences are 
individuals or common natures and that they most likely exist extramentally.”81
 However, though mental sentences are composed of things, mental sentences are 
sentences precisely because their structure is derived from a mental act of predication. 
The mind uses things, in other words, to form a mental sentence out of them, by 
predicating one of the other in various ways. The mind does this, Karger argues, by 
asserting the identity (in the case of an affirmative mental sentence) or non-identity (in 
the case of a negative mental sentence) of those things. Consequently, mental sentences 
are composed of “heterogeneous entities:” the terms of a mental sentence are things, 
which often extramental, but the copula – the mind’s combining or dividing those things 
– exists in the mind as an accident of it.  
 
 Karger argues that the theory of the mental sentence is found in both early and 
late logical commentaries, and is something to which Burley is committed throughout his 
long philosophical career. However, mental sentences are referred to by different 
expressions in the early and late works. Karger notes (almost in passing!) that “Burley 
himself referred to [mental sentences] in two different ways: in [Quaes.Perih] and 
[Comm.Perih], he called them “in mente” whereas in [Exp.Praed], he called them “in 
re.””82
                                                      
81 Ibid., 198–9. 
 Karger’s insight on this issue of terminology is extremely important. Unlike 
almost everyone else in the secondary literature, who attempts to connect, in some way, 
the accounts of the propositio in re set out in the Comm.Perih and the Art.Vet, Karger 
82 Ibid., 195. 
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argues that the theory of the propositio in re articulated in the Art.Vet is in fact just the 
theory of the propositio in mente, or sentence in the mind, developed in the Quaes.Perih 
and Comm.Perih. In fact, in a footnote, Karger dismisses the claim that the theory of the 
real proposition developed in the Comm.Perih has anything to do with the theory of the 
real proposition developed in the Art.Vet.  
It should be noted that Burley did not consistently use the expression “propositio 
in re”  to denote the sentences he had originally called “in mente.” He sometimes 
used it to denote entities of a wholly different sort, which are not sentences in the 
ordinary sense, but rather actual states of affairs which happen to be apprehended 
by the intellect. He does so in the [Comm.Perih...].”83
 
  
What reason does Karger have for taking this line of interpretation? While she is never 
explicit, the reason is clear: the metaphysics and function of the real proposition in the 
Art.Vet map onto the account of the sentence in the mind (propositio in mente) set out by 
Burley in the Quaes.Perih and Comm.Perih, namely a complex entity composed of things 
by a certain complex mental act, which serves as the significatum of sentences in natural 
and mental language. The names have changed, in a perhaps unhelpful way, by the 
underlying theory is largely the same – a theory of what Karger calls the mental sentence.  
 Mental sentences play a central role in Burley’s semantic and cognitive accounts, 
according to Karger. They are the significata of sentences in natural and mental language. 
In fact, their structure mirrors the structure of the sentences that signify them. Just as 
sentences in natural and mental language contain two terms joined together by a copula, 
so too mental sentences contain the significata of those terms joined together by a mental 
act. Mental sentences are also products of complex cognitive activity, and so serve as the 
contents of belief and other attitudes. Indeed, as Karger points out, Burley does not 
                                                      
83 Ibid., 193, n. 8. 
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recognize a force-content distinction. The mind’s combining or dividing – the copula of a 
mental sentence – always carries with it assertive force, so that belief, for example, just is 
the mind’s combining one thing with another in such a way that the mind asserts that they 
are identical or non-identical. Consequently, on Burley’s view, there can be no forceless 
content. 
 Karger’s analysis is an exciting and extremely promising account of a project 
central to Burley’s philosophy – the metaphysics of the proposition. It is surprising, then, 
that more scholars have not taken note of the interpretation that Karger develops. That 
Karger’s interpretation has been largely ignored in much of the rest of the literature, 
however, seems to me to be due to three main reasons. First, I think there has been a 
tendency in the literature to stick close to Burley’s use of his own vocabulary, and to see 
his use of that vocabulary in various works as a guide to the underlying theory. This 
seems to be the case, for example, with Conti, Cesalli and Rode; and those scholars are 
representative of the larger scholarship.  
 Second, at least some scholars have expressed doubt about Karger’s analysis 
because of what those scholars take to be unacceptable consequences of the position. In 
particular, scholars have rejected Karger’s claim that the “terms” of mental sentences – 
things – can have a certain semantic property: supposition. Rode, for example, explicitly 
cites this as a problem for Karger’s analysis when developing his own account of 
Burley’s project.84
                                                      
84 Conti has expressed concerns about this consequence of the theory to me in personal communication as 
well. 
 This reaction in the scholarship is understandable. There are historical 
reasons to doubt that Burley would commit himself to the claim that things can supposit. 
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The standard assumption in late medieval thought is that supposition is a property of 
signs. Even Ockham, who extends the theory of supposition beyond its usual application 
to natural language, still restricts supposition to signs. The claim, then, that things – the 
significata of signs – can supposit is extremely radical. 
 There are also textual reasons to doubt that Burley would endorse such a view. 
Burley explicitly treats the theory of supposition in two works: an early treatise titled On 
Supposition and a later work called On the Purity of the Art of Logic. In both works, 
Burley restricts his focus merely to the supposition of the terms of sentences in natural 
language. Moreover, Burley’s analysis of certain kinds of supposition – namely, simple 
and personal supposition – is articulated in terms of signification. Simple supposition is 
the kind of supposition a term has when it supposits for what it signifies. Personal 
supposition, in contrast, is the kind of supposition a term has when it supposits for its 
supposita, but the supposita of a term are analyzed in that work in terms of the 
signification of that term. If Burley were committed to the claim that things can supposit, 
however, one would expect that claim to receive at least some mention somewhere in the 
works that Burley writes about supposition. 
  This is a difficult feature of Karger’s interpretation – and, since I largely agree 
with Karger, of my own as well. However, two things can be said in response. First, 
while historical context can often be a helpful guide in figuring out the views of a 
particular philosopher, I would caution that relying too heavily on historical context can 
also become an obstacle to one’s scholarship. This seems to me one of those times, where 
too great a concern with historical context – specifically, too great a concern with what 
the theory of supposition has to be, given its usual treatment – has served to blind many 
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scholars to Burley’s actual project. Nor must Burley’s claim that things can supposit be 
seen as a complete rejection of the tradition. While I treat this issue fully in another 
chapter85
 Second – and this is one way
, it is important to note that Burley, following the tradition, thinks that 
supposition is a property of a term in a propositio. Also following the tradition, Burley 
argues that supposition is the taking of something for something. That is, supposition is 
the use of something to represent something. The novelty of Burley’s position, then, is 
simply that he thinks that the taking of something for something needn’t be analyzed in 
terms of signification. That the supposition of terms in natural and mental language is 
analyzed in terms of signification, then, is not constitutive of supposition per se, but 
merely a consequences of the sorts of things that terms in natural and mental language are 
– namely, signs of things, rather than those things themselves.  
86
                                                      
85 See ch. 5, §5. 
 in which my interpretation differs from Karger’s – 
I suggest that the reason that Burley does not mention that things can supposit in either 
On Supposition or On the Purity of the Art of Logic is that his claim that things as well as 
signs can supposit is a late development in his philosophy, one that occurs only after the 
composition of those works. It is a development brought on not just by his account of the 
proposition but also by a radical change in his metaphysics – in particular, his 
metaphysics of identity – and the consequences that that change has for his account of 
86 Another way in which Karger misinterprets Burley’s project is that – like Conti, Cesalli, and others – she 
claims that sentences in natural language signify things in only an indirect fashion, by first signifying 
sentences composed of concepts. In fact, the only scholar who seems to me to correctly understand 
Burley’s more general semantic view is Paul Spade, who argues that, for Burley (as for Ockham) the 
signification of things by expressions in natural language is direct. See Paul Vincent Spade, “Thoughts, 
Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory, Version 1.2,” 
December 27, 2007, 77–84, 142–46, 
http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Thoughts,%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf. 
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correspondence. In earlier works, Burley had no need for supposition theory in his 
analysis of the truth conditions of the proposition, because he held a complex account of 
identity, according to which, for example, particulars and common natures could be 
identical in some respect. Consequently, the mind’s predicating humanity of Socrates, for 
example, would be true just in case Socrates and the property of humanity were identical 
in some respect. Later in his career, however, perhaps in part because of criticisms 
developed by Ockham, Burley adopts a far simpler account of identity, one which entails 
that particulars such as Socrates and common natures such as the property of humanity 
are not identical in any respect. Consequently, Burley needs to explain how the mind’s 
asserting that Socrates is identical to the property of humanity can be true. And the 
solution Burley adopts is to claim that Socrates and the property of humanity are identical 
in their supposits, that is, that the things for which they supposit are identical, since both 
supposit in that proposition for Socrates, and Socrates is identical to himself.  
 Karger, in contrast, argues that Burley was likely committed to the supposition of 
things as far back as the earliest articulation of his theory of the mental sentence, in the 
Quaes.Perih, even if he was not explicit about it until the Art.Vet nearly forty years later. 
Karger’s claim relies on a generalization from another claim that Burley makes in the 
Quaes.Perih, that the terms of a mental sentence can be distributed. She writes that the 
Quaes.Perih 
is a very remarkable text, revealing that, already in his early career, Burley was 
fully prepared to extend the property of distribution, originally assigned to terms 
of spoken or written sentences, to the terms of mental sentences [i.e. to things]. 
Distribution and supposition are properties of the same type, however, namely 
logical properties which terms have in sentences. It would be surprising, then, if 
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Burley had not been just as prepared to extend the property of supposition to 
terms of mental sentences [in that work].87
 
 
But the property of distribution is essential to Burley’s early account of propositional 
content in a way that supposition it not, because Burley’s theory needs to account for 
truth-conditions of propositional contents in which subject terms are quantified relative to 
their predicates. It is because the property of humanity can be distributed, for instance, 
that truth of the proposition that every human is an animal is “saved” in its supposita, that 
is, “saved” in particular humans. The supposition of those terms, however, doesn’t play a 
central role – indeed any role, as far as I can tell - in Burley’s early account of 
propositional content and truth.  
 If supposition does not have an essential role to play in that account, however, it 
would not be surprising if Burley were not yet committed to the claim that things can 
supposit – it is, after all, a pretty radical claim. And that might explain, then, why Burley 
explicitly mentions that the terms of mental sentences have the property of distribution in 
the Quaes.Perih, but is silent when it comes to supposition – because he is committed to 
the former but not the latter. However, near the end of his career, when Burley comes to 
adopt a very different metaphysics of identity, his hand is forced. He needs the terms of 
mental sentences to supposit, because it is only in that way that he can make full sense of 
the truth conditions of propositions, given his view that what the mind asserts is a certain 
kind of identity (or difference) of its terms. And so, unsurprisingly, its only then, in the 
Art.Vet, that Burley acknowledges that things, the terms of what Karger calls a mental 
sentence, can supposit. 
                                                      
87 Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” 207. 
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 Third, I think many scholars have not paid sufficient attention to Karger’s 
analysis because they find the very notion that the mind can combine things with one 
another utterly bizarre, committing Burley to something like psychokinesis.88
                                                      
88 Cesalli, for example, has expressed confusion to me about what it could possibly mean for the mind to 
combine extramental things together. I suspect that that reaction is representative of the larger scholarly 
community. 
 Karger 
does not say much to disabuse fellow scholars of this notion, unfortunately. But I believe 
that these concerns are largely unfounded. In fact, I argue that Burley himself was aware 
of the concern that his account committed one to psychokinesis (or something like it), 
and that he went to great lengths to disabuse his contemporaries of this notion. He 
stresses, for example, that mental sentences are not real but merely intellectual 
compositions. Burley’s point, I argue, is that the mind’s combining things together is just 
a more complex way of thinking about things. Just as the mind can think about Socrates, 
so too it can think about Socrates and humanity as related to each other in some way, 
namely, as being identical to one another, or identical in their supposits. Throughout this 
dissertation, I argue that we can understand cognitive activity generally in terms of a sui 
generis use the mind makes of the world, of which there are two sorts. Simple mental 
acts, where the mind thinks of some simple thing, involve a bare use – the use of that 
simple thing as an object of cognition. Complex mental acts, in contrast, involve more 
complexes uses of things – combining things in various ways such that the mind 
conceives that they are identical, or non-identical. This is not to dismiss the charge that 
the notion of use here is, in some way, mysterious. But that mystery has less to do 
specifically with the mind’s combining things with one another than it does more 
generally with the nature of the mental itself. Fortunately, however, I think Burley has 
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some important insights into the nature of the mental, insights which I explore in chapter 
4. 
 Karger’s analysis of the relevant texts sketches an account of the metaphysics of 
the mental sentence, and it gives some indication of what mental sentences are for – the 
contents of sentences in natural and mental language, for example. But it is just a sketch – 
and a preliminary one at that. Far more work needs to be done to motivate that analysis – 
and, indeed, the metaphysical account of which it is an analysis. In the remainder of this 
dissertation, then, I intend to pick up the investigation where Karger left off. First (ch. 3), 
I situate the metaphysics of the proposition – the “sentence in the mind” of the early 
works, and the “real proposition” of the late – within Burley’s more general semantic and 
cognitive framework, arguing that that metaphysics is motivated by three deeper 
philosophical theses to which Burley is committed. Second, I argue that, contra Karger, 
Burley’s account of the proposition does in fact evolve over the course of his career.  
 Third (ch. 4), I examine the relationship between propositions, on the one hand, 
and sentences in a language of thought, on the other. Very little attention has been paid in 
the literature to Burley’s account of mental language, but it is important for three reasons. 
First, it constitutes an interesting account in its own right, a unique example – and 
perhaps one of the first – of the proliferation of theories of mental language in the first 
half of the fourteenth century. Second, it is central to Burley’s account of belief, among 
other attitudes, providing him tools to respond to potential problems that arise given his 
account of propositional content, on the one hand, and scientific knowledge, on the other. 
Third, it sheds some important light on Burley’s account of the nature of the mental itself. 
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 Finally (ch. 5), I turn to Burley’s account of truth, and argue that that account 
evolves over the course of his career, due to philosophical pressures put on his early 
metaphysics. Because of that pressure, I argue, Burley adopts a radical thesis – that things 
as well as signs can have a certain semantic property: supposition. I examine what those 
pressures are, and how his use of the notion of supposition is meant to respond to them. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
  Scholars of Burley have long been at odds about what theory, exactly, Burley’s 
claim that the mind can combine things with one another represents, and moreover how 
successful that theory is. Most Burley scholars, such as Alessandro Conti and Christian 
Rode, understand Burley to be primarily concerned with the nature of states of affairs. 
But accounts of that sort face a number of difficulties: they are forced to make claims that 
contradict the plain reading of many texts, for example, and they seem to fit poorly with 
many of Burley’s more general philosophical commitments. Other scholars – rightly, in 
my view – conceive of that project not as primarily concerned with the metaphysics of 
states of affairs, but rather as primarily concerned with the nature of propositional 
content. But even given this general conception of the project, scholars disagree about the 
account of propositional content that Burley articulates. Laurent Cesalli, for example, 
argues that propositional contents are fundamentally a matter of the mind combining 
certain sorts of merely intentional objects with one another. Elizabeth Karger, in contrast, 
argues that Burley’s picture of propositional content is far more radically. On her reading, 
propositional contents, while constructed by the mind, are composed of things, most of 
which exist extramentally. 
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 Of all the various interpretations that one finds of Burley’s project in the 
literature, I argue that Karger’s best fits with the particular claims that Burley makes, and 
the more general theories of meaning and mind that he develops over the course of his 
long philosophical career. But Karger’s analysis is brief, providing just a sketch of the 
metaphysics, and leaving the role of that project in Burley’s larger philosophical account 
relatively unarticulated. With that in mind, then, I turn to a deeper investigation into the 
metaphysics and function of the proposition in Burley’s larger semantic and cognitive 
theories in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE PROPOSITION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I examine the development of Burley’s account of the metaphysics 
of the proposition. I argue that, for Burley, propositions are structured entities composed 
of things – for example, particulars such as Socrates and properties such as wisdom. They 
are intrinsically truth-conditional, the primary bearers of truth and falsity, and they serve 
as the intentional content of one’s thoughts and the semantic content of declarative 
sentences in natural and mental language. The truth-conditional nature of the proposition 
is explained by a mental act of predicating one thing of another, since that act is the 
exercise of a certain representational capacity of the mind.1
Burley’s view of the proposition is motivated by three deeper philosophical theses 
to which he is committed. Burley is committed to a pair of semantic theses: (i) 
referentialism, the thesis that the semantic content (hereafter simply ‘content’) of a 
  
                                                        
1 Burley discusses the metaphysics of the proposition in five works. His earliest work on the topic, a 
questions commentary on the De Interpretatione (Quaes.Perih), was composed in 1301. There is some 
question about the precise date of his second work, a literal commentary on the De Interpretatione 
(Comm.Perih). The received view has been that it was composed between 1308–1310. But recent 
scholarship (with which I agree) has suggested that it was composed shortly after the questions 
commentary, likely in 1302. For the recent scholarship, see Marta Vittorini, “Life and Works,” in A 
Companion to Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician and Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: 
Brill, 2013), 31–2. The third work, a questions commentary on the Posterior Analytics, was written 
sometime between 1301 and 1307; I believe the date of composition must be near the end of that range, 
since the works develops a theory of mental language that is absent in the questions and first literal 
commentaries on the De Interpretatione. The last two works – a literal commentary on the Categories 
(Exp.Praed) and a literal commentary on the De Interpretatione (Exp.Perih) – are part of a larger 
commentary project (Art.Vet) on the old logic, that is, on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categories and 
De Interpretatione, and a work by Gilbert of Poitiers, a 12th century logician, on the last six Aristotelian 
categories.  
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linguistic expression is the thing to which that expression refers,2 and (ii) 
compositionality, the thesis that the content of a statement is composed of the content of 
the terms of that statement relative to the syntax of the language.3,4
                                                        
2 I use ‘semantic content’ as a translation of Burley’s expression ‘significatum’. I assume a notion of 
semantic content in this dissertation according to which the semantic content of an expression is the 
denotation a hearer assigns to that expression, relative to any contextual factors salient to fixing that 
denotation (though, as it happens, the semantic content of most expressions, on Burley’s account, will be 
context-invariant). (On this notion of semantic content, see Jason Stanley, “Context and Logical Form,” 
Linguistics and Philosophy 23, no. 4 (June 1, 2000): 393–5). There is some scholarly debate about 
whether the notion of a significatum has any contemporary correlate. (That debate usually concerns 
whether there is any relationship between the notion of a significatum and the contemporary notion of 
meaning. But neither ‘meaning’ nor ‘significatum’ seem to me to enjoy the kind of technical precision in 
the respective philosophical communities in which they are used to allow that debate to be very fruitful. 
At best, one needs to go by cases). For Burley, at least, I do think we can treat the notion of a 
significatum of an expression and the semantic content of that expression as equivalent, since (for 
Burley) significata and semantic contents play similar roles and bear similar relations to expressions in 
natural and mental language. 
 For example, given 
compositionality, ‘Socrates is a human’ has as its content a structured entity. That entity 
will be composed of whatever are the contents of ‘Socrates’ and ‘human’, its structure 
mirroring the grammatical form of the statement ‘Socrates is a human’. But, given 
referentialism, the contents of those two expressions will be Socrates and the property of 
humanity, respectively. In addition to these semantic commitments, Burley also endorses 
a third, alethic thesis: intellectualism. According to intellectualism, representing the 
world’s being some way or other is fundamentally something that the mind does. 
3 The notion of compositionality I have in mind here is perhaps stronger than the standard notion, according 
to which compositionality requires only that the content of a complex, meaningful expression is a 
function of the parts of that expression. The notion I employ does seem to reflect an approach to content 
that has been and remains philosophically commonplace – for example, among those who are committed 
to structured propositions. In any case, I’ll use ‘compositionality’ and its cognates in that stronger sense 
throughout this dissertation.  
4 ‘Statement’ is the closest English equivalent to Burley’s Latin expressions ‘propositio’ and ‘enunciatio’, 
which Burley uses as synonyms. ‘Statement’ is an appropriate translation in this context, for two reasons. 
First, a propositio is a particular kind of sentence or content - namely, one which is truth-evaluable. An 
interrogative sentence, for example, is not a propositio. So, rather than some more general term, like 
‘sentence’, the specific expression ‘statement’ reflects this feature of a propositio. Second, ‘propositio’ is 
(for Burley and others in the fourteenth century) ambiguous between a declarative sentence in natural 
language and the semantic content of that sentence. ‘Statement’ has the same kind of ambiguity. 
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Consequently, anything that is intrinsically truth-conditional – such as, on Burley’s view, 
a proposition – has to be explained in terms of a certain activity of the mind. 
  Intellectualism, on the one hand, and referentialism and compositionality jointly, 
on the other, might seem to pull in opposite directions, since intellectualism requires that 
representing is fundamentally explained in terms of the exercise of certain 
representational capacities of the mind, while referentialism and compositionality require 
that a proposition can be composed of things outside of the mind. Burley’s early 
metaphysics of the proposition reflects this seeming difficulty. On that early account, 
propositions are taken to be features of the mind, really identical to the mind’s act of 
predicating things, such that propositions inhere in the mind as accidents of it but are yet 
composed of things outside of the mind.  
 Perhaps motivated in part by the metaphysical difficulties of that view, Burley 
modifies his account of the metaphysics of the proposition at the end of his career. 
According to that later account, propositions are treated as structurally similar to 
hylomorphic (or “matter-form”) compounds. Consequently, Burley no longer regards 
propositions as features of the mind, really identical to mental acts of predicating. Rather, 
he takes propositions to be compounds of the mind’s act of predicating (the proposition’s 
“form”) and those things the mind uses in that act of predicating (its “matter”). However, 
unlike actual hylomorphic compounds, whose unity is accounted for by the inherence of a 
form in matter, Burley argues that propositions are united by intentio, a primitive kind of 
awareness that the mind possesses which unites mental acts with their objects. 
 I will proceed in two stages: first, I will examine Burley’s commitment to 
referentialism, compositionality and intellectualism, and the ways in which those 
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commitments bear on the kinds of features Burley suggests a proposition must have. I 
will then discuss how, constrained by those commitments, Burley’s account of the 
proposition develops over his career.  
 
2. PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENTS 
2.1. Referentialism 
Referentialism is explicitly a thesis about the contents of categorematic 
expressions in natural (and mental) language – that is, the contents of nouns, verbs, and 
adjectives.5 According to referentialism, the contents of these sorts of expressions are the 
things to which they refer.6                                                        
5 I am inclined to think that Burley’s account also entails that sentences refer, since he argues that 
statements in natural language signify propositions. There are potential complications, however, since 
what Burley calls in the later theory the “formal” element of a proposition is not an object of mental 
activity, but rather is that very mental act itself, and so is not something that is signified by (the copula 
of) a sentence. (On Burley on sentential signification, see §7.) Burley could have followed the later 
Ockham, who argues that, strictly speaking, statements in natural language have no signification (though 
they are meaningful). On this account, sentences have what Susan Brower-Toland calls referential 
objects (i.e. the things signified by the terms of a sentence), but do not have any content-objects. See 
Susan. Brower-Toland, “Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and The Problem of Intentionality,” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 37, no. 1 (2007): 98–9. See also ch. 4, §3, on the related issue of Burley’s non-
relational analysis of propositional attitudes, a position related to Ockham’s later views on the nature of 
propositional content. Alternatively, we might see in Burley the early stages of what’s sometimes called 
the adverbial theory of signification, developed by (among others) Thomas Bradwardine, who was 
Burley’s junior colleague – though Burley himself appears to reject an adverbialist account proper in the 
prologue to the Exp.Praed. On an adverbial theory, a sentence’s signification is a matter not just of what 
is signified (the referents of the terms) but also how they are signified. On the adverbial theory, see Paul 
Vincent Spade, “Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic 
Theory, Version 1.2,” December 27, 2007, 180–2, 
http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Thoughts,%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf. 
 ‘Socrates’, for example, has Socrates as its content, because 
6 I assume (in this chapter, at least) that reference is a relation between an expression and the thing which 
that expression is about. I am inclined to think that Burley’s semantics incorporates not one but two 
reference relations. The first, discussed in this chapter, is dyadic and statement-independent; this is 
Burley’s notion of signification. It is a kind of reference that principally belongs to an expression (and so 
concerns linguistic meaning). The second, which we will discuss in chapter 3, is variably polyadic and 
statement- (or proposition-) sensitive, and is what Burley calls supposition. It is a kind of reference that 
principally belongs to the use of an expression (and so concerns speaker meaning). On reference, see 
Marga Reimer, “Reference,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta, Spring 
2010, 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/reference/. 
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‘Socrates’ refers to Socrates. Likewise, ‘human’ has the property of humanity as its 
content, because it refers to that property. That a predicate expression like ‘human’ refers 
to the property of humanity is a consequence of Burley’s realism not only about 
particulars but also about properties. Burley maintains that the property of humanity has, 
like Socrates, real, extra-mental existence.7
 Burley’s referentialism is developed within discussions of signification, a notion 
central to medieval semantics. The notion of signification has its roots in Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione, a work known to medieval philosophers via Boethius’ Latin translation. 
The central passage on the nature of signification from that work is found in a chapter on 
verbs, where Aristotle writes that a verb does indeed signify, because “the one who 
speaks it [i.e. a verb] establishes an understanding (constituit intellectum).”
   
8
                                                        
7 Earlier in his career, Burley defends a view according to which substantial properties (that is, certain 
kinds of universal features of reality) are real features of the world, but are only intentionally distinct 
from the particulars in which they inhere. By ‘intentionally distinct’, I take Burley to mean that 
particulars and their substantial properties are fully described in different ways. Really, however, 
particulars and their natures are the same, since neither is, on Burley’s view, existentially separable from 
the other. On the notions of real and intentional difference, see Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s 
Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen Brown, Franciscan Studies 34 (1974): para. 4.47, p. 
273. Later in his career (following a devastating critique of his earlier view by William Ockham), Burley 
argues that properties - including substantial properties - are really distinct from the particulars upon 
which they depend. On this view, particulars are hylomorphic compounds of concrete matter and 
concrete form - in the case of Socrates, his body and intellective soul. While, then, concrete particulars 
possess various properties (e.g., Socrates possesses the property of humanity), none of those properties in 
any way constitute Socrates; Socrates would be who and what he is even if he did not possess the 
property of humanity. However, on Burley’s view, we would have no way to cognize or express what he 
is. See Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), 
Exp.Praed, d2vb–d3va.  
 This notion 
of signification – that to signify is to establish an understanding – becomes the primary 
8 For the Greek, see Aristotle, Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione, ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello, 
Oxford Classical Texts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), 16b19–20, p. 50. Boethius’ Latin 
translation reads as follows: Ipsa quidem secundum se dicta verba nomina sunt et significant aliquid 
(constituit enim qui dicit intellectum et qui audit quiescit) sed si est vel non est nondum significat 
(Boethius, Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione  : Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii commentarii in 
librum Peri Hermeneias (New York: Garland, 1987), 7). 
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notion of signification in medieval philosophy. 9 To take just a small sample, we find it in 
the thought of the twelfth-century philosopher Peter Abelard, who argues that predicates, 
such as ‘human’, do not signify anything because “they establish no understanding of any 
thing.”10 We also find it in the writings of the mid-fourteenth century philosopher John 
Buridan, who notes that to signify “is described as being to establish an understanding of 
a thing. Therefore a word is said to signify that understanding which it establishes in 
us.”11
 Like most other medieval philosophers, the Aristotelian notion of signification is 
the primary notion of signification that Burley adopts.
  
12
                                                        
9 Just like content and meaning for philosophers today, how best to analyze signification was a central issue 
for medieval philosophers. The standard analysis was taken from Aristotle. But, first, this was not the 
only notion of signification live in the medieval period. Second, even those who adopted Aristotle’s 
analysis as their primary notion of signification allowed that ‘signification’ is an ambiguous term, and 
that its other meanings are central notions in semantic theory as well; Burley, for example, writes in his 
later works that categorematic expressions in natural language primarily signify things, but secondarily 
signify the concepts in virtue of which they have the primary signification that they do (see Walter 
Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k3va). And, third, the notion of the 
establishment of an understanding was analyzed differently by different philosophers; while some 
understood it to be a causal notion, for example, Burley does not define it in causal terms. In fact, 
beginning with William Ockham in the early fourteenth century, the notion of signification began to be 
incorporated into a larger semantic theory which minimized the psychological character of signification 
in favor a referential role of a term relative to its sentential context. 
 In his De puritate, for example, 
when distinguishing between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions, Burley 
argues that “every word that does not by itself establish an understanding is a 
10 See Peter Abelard, “Peter Abelard, from the ‘Glosses on Porphyry’ in His Logica ‘Ingredientibus,’” in 
Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham, 
ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Hackett Pub Co Inc, 1994), 40.  On these two texts, see Spade, “Thoughts, 
Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory, Version 1.2,” 63. 
11 John Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, ed. Theodore Scott (New York: Appleton Century 
Crofts, 1966), 67. 
12 This is not to say it is the only use of ‘signification’ he employs.  See ch. 4, p. 242–3, n. 89,  on other 
uses of ‘significatio’. 
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syncategorematic expression.”13 The distinction between categorematic and 
syncategorematic expressions plays an important role in medieval semantics. The 
distinction is, roughly, between words which signify by themselves and those which do 
not.14 In this passage, then, Burley appears to endorse the Aristotelian notion of 
signification, since he glosses that difference in terms of an expression’s ability, or lack 
thereof, to “establish an understanding.” Burley also makes the point more directly in the 
Exp.Perih. In that work, arguing that verbs, like nouns, are significative, Burley notes 
that verbs signify because to signify is to establish an understanding of something, and 
verbs establish an understanding of something.15
 The Aristotelian roots of the notion of signification provide an answer to what I 
will call the conceptual (or, in a more medieval vein, the formal) question about 
signification.
 And, as we will see, it figures centrally 
in Burley’s response to another issue concerning signification. 
16
                                                        
13 Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic: The Shorter and the Longer Treatises, trans. Paul 
Vincent Spade (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 139.  See §7, pp. 164–71 on the 
distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic terms.   
 But, besides the conceptual question, three other important sorts of 
questions remain. First, there is a question of origin: how do expressions come to have 
14 This still leaves undetermined, however, whether syncategorematic terms have no signification or 
whether they have a signification, but only determinately when joined with categorematic terms.  Burley 
argues that all terms have signification, though the signification of syncategorematic terms is determinate 
only when paired with an appropriate categorematic term.  See Ibid., 27. 
15 See Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, l1va. 
16 Note that these sorts of questions, and the answered supplied to them, are most convincing in the case of 
the signification of expressions in natural language.  But Burley, like many philosophers in the late 13th 
and 14th century, also held that mental representations were signs.  And it is not clear whether the 
standard responses to the typical questions raised about signification are adequate when mental 
representations themselves are considered signs.  E.g., it does not seem that mental representations 
signify as they do in order to express one’s thoughts to others in her linguistic community.  At best, then, 
the force of the answers to questions of this sort need to be restricted to signs of natural language.  
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the signification that they do? Burley’s account here relies on the notion of imposition. 
Expressions come to signify what things they do because someone imposes them onto 
those things, such that those things become the significates of those expressions.17
 In addition to the question of origin, there is, second, the purposive question: for 
what purpose do expressions signify? Burley answers this question in both the 
Comm.Perih and the Exp.Perih. In both of those works, he claims that “utterances made 
to signify [something] are formed for expressing one’s thoughts,” writing that 
“conceptions of the mind are causes for the formation and imposition of an utterance.”
 In fact, 
as we will see, Burley’s analysis of imposition involves an even deeper account, 
according to which expressions in natural language are imposed onto things by being 
subordinated to concepts in the mind, which concepts necessarily signify those things. 
Consequently, linguistic competence with an expression involves, on Burley’s view, the 
possession of the concept to which that expression is subordinated, and the use of that 
concept in the comprehension of that expression. 
18
                                                        
17 Burley does not tell us what he thinks the nature of an impositor must be.  Is it an Adam figure, who sets 
out a language and the meaning of the words in it?  Or is it any individual in a linguistic community who 
is fluent with the language?  Or is it not any one individual in a given linguistic community but the 
community as a whole which sets and adjusts the signification of expressions in that language?  All of 
these are live possibilities for Burley, but he does not provide enough evidence of his own position.  See 
Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen Brown, 
Franciscan Studies 34 (1974): 207; Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen Brown, Franciscan Studies 33 (1973): 46–7. 
 
The purpose of natural language, then, is inter-personal. Language develops within a 
community so that members of that community can share their thoughts with one another.  
18 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii Et Aristotelis (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), 
Exp.Perih, k4ra: “voces impositae ad significandum formatur ad exprimendum conceptum mentis [...] 
conceptiones intellectus sunt causae formationis et impositionis vocis” See also Walter Burley, “Walter 
Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen Brown, Franciscan Studies 33 
(1973): 57. 
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 Burley’s answers to the conceptual question, the purposive question, and the 
question of origin are fairly traditional, and he does not have much else to say about them 
besides providing those traditional responses. This rather cursory treatment of those 
issues of signification has led some to argue that Burley’s semantic theory does not 
contain any explicit theory of signification.19
 That this should be Burley’s principal concern about signification ought not to be 
at all surprising. At the end of the 13th century, medieval philosophers of language were 
concerned precisely with this issue. Duns Scotus, active a half generation before Burley, 
writes that there was during his time a “great altercation” about what an utterance 
primarily signifies.
 While it is true that Burley does not treat in 
a very explicit and thorough-going fashion his answer to, among others, the conceptual 
question, claiming that he does not have any explicit theory of signification seems to me 
to be somewhat misleading, since it might suggest that issues of signification weren’t a 
concern for Burley. But Burley is, on the contrary, extremely interested in signification, 
and that interest is expressed, even if obliquely, at various places in his corpus. However, 
Burley’s primary interest in signification is almost wholly focused on a fourth question, 
which I call the content question: what is the nature of the content of an expression?    
20 This altercation spread well into the fourteenth century.21                                                        
19 See, e.g., Laurent Cesalli, Le Réalisme Propositionnel : Sémantique et Ontologie Des Propositions Chez 
Jean Duns Scot, Gauthier Burley, Richard Brinkley et Jean Wyclif (Paris: Vrin, 2007), 231. Cesalli has 
since tempered his views. See Laurent Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” in A Companion to Walter Burley: 
Late Medieval Logician and Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 93–4.  
 In one 
20 On the “great altercation,” see Giorgio Pini, “Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His 
Contemporaries,” Vivarium 39 (April 1, 2001): 20–51. I am taking some slight liberties with the relevant 
notions. In particular, different medieval philosophers often meant different things by ‘signification’ and 
its cognates (just as different philosophers today mean different things by ‘meaning’). But, as a general 
matter, I think it is helpful (especially for those unfamiliar with medieval philosophy of language) to 
conceive of the dispute as I have suggested, as one over the relationship between semantic content and 
reference. 
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camp, philosophers argued that expressions of natural language directly or primarily 
signify concepts. According to this position, things outside the mind are indeed signified 
by expressions of natural language, but only in an indirect or secondary fashion, because 
they primarily signify concepts, which signify those things in turn.22 Signification is, in 
other words, transitive, and that transitivity is essential to the signification of expressions 
in natural language. Philosophers in the opposing camp denied that expressions in natural 
language had to primarily signify concepts, arguing instead that those expressions can 
signify in a primary or direct fashion the very things that those concepts signify.23
                                                                                                                                                                     
21 For example, Ockham agrees with Burley that non-sentential expressions in natural language primarily 
signify the things represented by the mental representations to which they are subordinated. See William 
Ockham, Summa Logicae, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gal, and Stephan Brown (St. Bonaventure, 
1997), 124. See also Claude Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 165–79. Buridan, on the other hand, argues that expressions in natural 
language primarily signify mental states. See John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001), 11–2. 
 What’s 
centrally at issue between these two sides is the role of concepts in semantic content. 
Those of the first camp believes that concepts are at least part (though not necessarily the 
only part) of the semantic content of an expression, serving as the primary objects of 
signification; the other camp rejects this, maintaining that concepts, while perhaps 
essential to an account of content determination, do not themselves figure into that 
content. 
22 Or at least the view as we find it in the thirteenth century and onwards. It was during the thirteenth 
century that mental items, such as species, began to be thought of as signs themselves, signifying the 
extra-mental things of which they are species. Prior to that, a distinction was typically made between 
sumbola (notae in Boethius’ translation), which are signs, such as conventional language, and semeia 
(similitudines in Boethius’ translation), which are likeness of things and are affections of the soul. See 
Aristotle, Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione, 16a3–8, p. 49. 
23 Roger Bacon is a well-known defender of such a view. Likewise, this is the view of the mature Aquinas, 
at least on one interpretation. 
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 Burley himself was an active contributor to this debate; it is raised in all three of 
his commentaries on the Perihermeneias, which collectively span the whole of his 
intellectual career.24 In each of these commentaries, Burley defends the same position: 
expressions in natural language must be able to signify, in a direct or primary fashion, 
things outside the mind.25 Burley defends his position mainly by attacking the difficulties 
and, as he sees it, outright incoherence of the alternative. He begins with an argument 
concerning the conventionality of natural language.26 The contents of expressions of 
natural language are, as Aristotle himself recognizes, instituted ad placitum, 
conventionally.27
                                                        
24 See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.1, p. 202; Walter 
Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen Brown, 
Franciscan Studies 33 (1973): para. 1.1, p. 52; Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et 
Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k3rb–va. 
 Yet, Burley argues, to hold that expressions of natural language must 
25 Scholars disagree about whether Burley holds that expressions in natural language signify things. 
Alessandro Conti, for example, argues that Burley holds this view. See Conti, “Walter Burley”. But 
Laurent Cesalli argues that, on Burley’s account, expressions in natural language immediately signify 
concepts, and only signify things in a transitive fashion, on account of the representational content of 
those concepts. See Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” 98–9. Cesalli stresses Burley’s claim in his questions 
commentary on the De Interpretatione that an expression in natural language signifies a thing “as it is 
proportioned to the intellect,” arguing that this suggests his interpretation of the account (Walter Burley, 
“Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.7, p. 212). But (1) that phrase appears 
nowhere else in Burley’s corpus, even in works that we written within a few years of that questions 
commentary, (2) what Burley intends by that phrase is unclear and (3) Burley considers and rejects in 
that very work the sort of view Cesalli attributes to Burley. 
26 Burley makes an additional argument in the Quaes.Perih and Comm.Perih as well, that signification 
cannot be transitive, as his interlocutors require. He argues that otherwise ‘Socrates’ and ‘image of 
Socrates’ would signify the same thing – namely, Socrates – since ‘Socrates’ signifies’ Socrates and 
‘image of Socrates’ signifies an image, which itself signifies Socrates. See Walter Burley, “Walter 
Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.4, p. 208–9; Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s 
Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.15, p. 55.  
27 There is some debate whether the claim that the signification of expressions is ad placitum amounts to 
the claim that such signification is conventional, strictly speaking.  Jennifer Ashworth, for example, has 
argued that ‘ad placitum’ ought not to be interpreted as ‘conventional’.  Ad placitum literally means “at 
pleasure,” that is, at the pleasure of an impositor.  So imposition appears to be a private or personal act - 
at least insofar as it is the impositor who unilaterally determines some semantic properties of an 
expression - with the result that expressions have the meanings that they do independent of their 
relationship either to other expressions in the language or the communicative intentions of the speakers 
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primarily signify one’s concepts threatens the conventionality of natural language itself. 
For the conventionality of natural language requires that one is able to make an 
expression signify whatever she wishes, no matter if that is a concept or the thing 
represented by that concept. 
Similarly, this [i.e. the theory that expressions of natural language directly signify 
things] is confirmed, because if an utterance necessarily were to signify an 
affection of the soul [that is, a concept], as they say, <then> if I would want to 
impose some utterance to signify [something], it would be necessary for me to 
impose that utterance to signify an affection, whether I would want to or not.  
That is an absurd thing to say.28
 
   
One’s use of natural language is thus free in a way that Burley’s interlocutors are unable 
to respect. On his interlocutors’ view, the freedom of natural language consists in a 
person’s ability to make an expression signify whatever concept of hers she might wish. 
Burley objects that such a view fails to adequately construe how free natural language 
really is; one’s freedom to make an expression signify is total, in that she can impose that 
expression onto anything she wishes whatsoever, regardless of whether it is a concept or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
who use them. Conventionality, on the other hand, would seem to require conventions of trust and 
cooperation normative for a linguistic community as a whole which serve to determine the meaning of 
expressions in that language.  But two things can be said here.  First, Burley’s response to the purposive 
question - that signification is meant to express one’s thoughts to others - suggests that natural languages 
must be conventional, at least insofar as an impositor must intend her imposition and use of that 
expression to communicate her thoughts to others, and to understand others in turn. Second, it is not clear 
what notion of conventionality is operative in this discussion.  There are weak notions of conventionality 
that seem to be consistent with the notion of ad placitum signification.  For example, Stephen Laurence 
argues that the conventionality of natural language is weaker than the one employed in standard Gricean 
accounts of meaning, such that the platitude that language is conventional can be accommodated by 
theories according to which language acquisition and use is “a more or less automatic and autonomous 
process,” not dependent upon speaker and hearer intentions (Stephen Laurence, “A Chomskian 
Alternative to Convention-Based Semantics,” Mind, New Series, 105, no. 418 (April 1, 1996): 296). 
28 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” 209: “Similiter, hoc 
confirmatur, quia si vox necessario significaret passionem animae, ut ipsi dicunt, si vellem aliquam 
vocem imponere ad significandum oporteret me illam imponere ad significandum passionem sive vellem 
sive non; quod est absurdum dicere.”   
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a thing signified by a concept. Burley explicitly connects this notion of the freedom of 
natural language to its conventionality a little later in the text of the Quaes.Perih.   
Furthermore, names are conventional. Therefore a name can be imposed to 
anything cognized, and this merely by the will of the one imposing [it].  Since 
therefore a thing outside [the soul] is cognized, a name is able to signify 
immediately a thing outside.29
 
 
According to Burley, then, the conventionality of natural language requires that 
expressions can be made to signify whatever one wishes; conventionality requires 
freedom on the part of a user of a language to make a term signify not just concepts but 
also the things that those concepts naturally signify.     
 Yet, as his argument makes clear, Burley does not think that expressions can be 
imposed on anything whatsoever. Rather, expressions can only be imposed by somebody 
onto something which is cognized by that individual. Burley’s views on signification, 
then, are at least circumscribed in this way. But Burley does not regard this as a 
restriction on the conventionality of natural language. And that Burley does not regard it 
as a restriction should not be surprising, if signification is analyzed along Aristotelian 
lines, that is, in terms of the establishment of an understanding. Imposition requires that 
an individual is aware both of the expression and of that onto which the expression is 
imposed, so that she can actually impose the former on the latter, and thereby establish a 
semantic connection between the two.  
 Burley’s interlocutors, of course, will respond that their position does in fact 
respect the conventionality of natural language. What they will reject, however, is that the                                                         
29 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” 209: “Praeterea, nomina sunt 
ad placitum; igitur nomen potest imponi cuilibet cognito et hoc in voluntate imponentis.  Cum igitur res 
extra sit cognita potest nomen immediate significare rem extra.” 
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immediate object of one’s thought is something external to the mind. Since, on their 
view, what is “established in the understanding” is a concept, rather than a thing, and 
given the epistemic restriction on signification (and so imposition), freedom of 
imposition can only extend to the concepts that one has. Thus the disagreement over the 
conventionality of natural language – whether conventionality consists only in one’s 
ability to make an expression signify any concept of hers that she wishes, or in her ability 
to signify as well things outside the soul – is, at root, a disagreement about cognitive 
psychology. For one’s views on certain issues in cognitive psychology, according to the 
theory of signification under consideration here, must have a direct bearing on the theory 
of signification that one adopts. The disagreement, in effect, is a disagreement over what 
it means to “establish an understanding,” and in particular what is the nature of the thing 
understood. 
 To support his argument about the conventionality of language, therefore, Burley 
turns his attention exclusively to issues of cognitive psychology. Those who argue that 
the immediate contents of expressions in natural language must be concepts hold such a 
view, argues Burley, because they have an incorrect view about the nature of cognition 
generally, and the role and nature of concepts in cognition in particular. Burley’s targets 
in his early and late works are different, however. In the Quaes.Perih, Burley prefaces 
arguments on behalf of his interlocutors by noting that they 
say that an affection is not a species received in the intellect nor even an act of 
thinking, but it is the term of an act [...] it is something fabricated by the intellect, 
as it were a certain image in which the intellect sees the thing outside [the 
mind].30                                                        
30 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” 210: “Circa dissolutionem 
istius quaestionis oportet primo videre quid nomine passionis significatur.  Ad quod dicunt aliqui quod 
passio non est species recepta in intellectu nec etiam actus intelligendi ipsius intellectus, sed est terminus 
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Those who think that expressions primarily signify concepts are led astray, Burley 
argues, in part because they take concepts to be neither species inhering in the soul (i.e. 
subjective features of the mind that are the mental vehicles of content) nor even to be acts 
of thinking (i.e. actualizations of the capacity to think, where the contents of those 
thoughts are determined by species), but rather products of acts of thinking, something 
like an image of the thing thought, fashioned wholly by the intellect in the act of thinking, 
to which that act is directed.31 It is via this constructed image that the intellect is able to 
“see,” as it were, the thing itself represented by that image. This view closely resembles 
what many in the literature have labeled the “fictum theory” of concepts, variations of 
which were defended by a number of philosophers in the late thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries.32                                                                                                                                                                     
actus.  Sed est aliquid fabricatum ab intellectu veluti quoddam idolum in quo intellectus speculatur rem 
extra.” See also Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” 
53–4.  In that work, however, Burley makes an even stronger claim. For the claim is not even qualified 
with an “as if”, veluti.  Rather, such products are simply identified with images.    
 According to such a theory, concepts are neither species nor acts 
31 Granting that Burley’s interlocutors accept that to signify is to establish an understanding, it should not 
be surprising that they would go on to endorse the thesis that whatever is a sign is a sign of the thing 
signified.  For everyone agrees that our written and spoken language are in some way about the world 
and not merely about one’s mental makeup.  Once one regards some mental entity signified by speech as 
a sign of the world, it would appear natural to think that the relationship between mind and world is one 
of signification.  But given this, only by endorsing the transitivity of signification will conventional 
language be about not just objects in our minds but the things that those objects represent. 
32 It is not clear to me whom Burley has in mind here. Giorgio Pini has suggested that the view rests on a 
particular interpretation of Aquinas according to which the verbum mentis is neither the act of thinking 
nor the thing which the thought is about but an intermediary through which that the object of cognition is 
seen. See Giorgio Pini, “Species, Concept, and Thing: Theories of Signification in the Second Half of the 
Thirteenth Century,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8, no. 1 (September 1, 1999): 49–50. Aquinas 
does at points identify the verbum mentis as a conceptus, which Burley elsewhere in Quaes.Perih regards 
as analogous to idolum.  But I have not found Aquinas using ‘idolum’ synonymously with ‘verbum’ or 
‘verbum mentis’.  Furthermore, Aquinas himself does not seem to make any of the sorts of arguments 
Burley considers here.  However, that these arguments have some historical antecedent cannot be 
dismissed, for we find the same arguments (in the same order, in fact) being given by Peter Auriol in his 
commentary on the Sentences.  It seems likely, then, that someone has made arguments at least similar in 
kind to those Burley and Auriol offer on behalf of their interlocutors.  See Peter Auriol, “Scriptum Super 
Primum Sententiarum,” The Peter Auriol Homepage, July 25, 2011, d.9, a.1; d. 27, pars 2, a. 1 , 
http://www.peterauriol.net/editions/electronicscriptum/contents/.  The arguments may stem from an early 
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of the mind, but rather the products of mental acts, which exist merely objectively in the 
intellect. That is, they are not real, or subjective, features of the mind; rather, they are 
merely the contents of a feature of that sort.33
 The main line of objection that Burley takes against this sort of view concerns the 
nature of immanent action. In particular, Burley argues that cognitive processes, such as 
an act of thinking, are actions “remaining in the agent,” that is, they are acts whose 
putative effects would not be outside and independent of the agent herself. On this, 
Burley and his opponents agree, since his opponents argue that the concepts involved in 
cognition exist only objectively in the mind, that is, in it as mere contents. But, Burley 
argues, this account of cognition is rejected both by philosophical authority and by 
reason. First, Burley argues that “no philosopher claims that something is produced in an 
agent, through an action remaining in the agent, which is really different from that 
action,” and he goes on to cite texts in support of that claim both from Aristotle and from 
Averroes.
 It is just this notion of a concept, and the 
larger cognitive psychology it presupposes, that Burley will go on to reject. 
34
                                                                                                                                                                     
follower of Thomas.  Thomas Sutton, a late 13th century follower of Aquinas, explicitly claims that the 
verbum mentis is distinct from the act of thinking.  See Quodlibet 1.17 in Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibeta, 
(Munchen: Verlag der Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1969), 115–23.  Hervaeus Natalis is a 
likewise a possible source, though I have so far not found the arguments in Hervaeus work, and most 
scholars think his works post-date 1301. 
 In other words, philosophical tradition teaches us that immanent actions are 
not the sort of actions that have products, or at least not products really different from 
them.  
33 However, for Ockham at least, it is important to note that he rejects the view that spoken nouns and verbs 
signify these concepts.  Rather, he argues that what they signify are the things represented by such 
concepts. 
34 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.61, p. 211. 
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 In addition to philosophical authority, Burley also argues that we have rational 
grounds to reject that picture of cognition. In the first place, he argues that we have no 
reason to postulate cognitive contents of this sort when the things which they represent 
could just as well be the immediate objects of our cognition.35 There is no explanatory 
point, then, in introducing such representational intermediaries. Moreover, Burley argues 
that the view in question misconstrues the processes of cognition. The view of his 
interlocutors, Burley notes, requires that one have immediate epistemic access only to 
some representational mental content, and access to what it represents only via that 
content. But “the intellect does not think about something existing in it except through 
reflection. [But] direct intellection precedes reflexive intellection.”36
                                                        
35 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.14, p. 55. 
 On Burley’s view, 
reflexive, or second-order, mental activity psychologically depends on non-reflexive, or 
first-order, mental activity. And what distinguishes first- and second-order mental activity 
is the nature of their objects. Assume, then, that first-order mental activity does indeed 
produce a concept (of the sort his interlocutors endorse). Even if that were so, that 
concept could not be what one thinks about in that act, because one thinks about what 
exists within the mind only reflexively. Rather, something else must be the object of the 
mental act in which that concept is formed, namely something that exists outside of the 
mind. But then, Burley argues, that concept is otiose. First, it is not itself the content of 
first-order thought. Second, it is not necessary for content-determination, since the mind’s 
possession of a species, that is, a mental representation that in the mind as a quality of it, 
can already account for the content of thought.    
36 Ibid. 
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 The works in which Burley attacks a fictum-style account of concepts were 
written in the first decade of the fourteenth century, at a time when those views were 
philosophically popular. At the end of Burley’s rather long career, however, views of that 
sort had fallen out of philosophical fashion. So it is unsurprising that Burley’s 
philosophical target with respect to these sorts of issues shifts in the later works. Instead 
of an account of concepts according to which concepts exist objectively in the mind as 
products of mental activity, Burley considers an account according to which concepts are 
“species,” that is, accidental features of the mind by which mental acts have the content 
that they do. And, unlike the earlier fictum theory of cognition, which he rejects entirely, 
Burley agrees with his interlocutors that such accidents play a crucial role in the process 
of cognition.37 Moreover, because Burley recognizes that the signification of an 
expression, just like thinking itself, is mediated by cognitive processes (even if the 
content of that expression is something outside the mind), Burley argues that those 
accidents play a central role in the process of signification as well.38
 Because Burley agrees with his interlocutors that concepts of this sort are 
involved in cognition, and so signification, Burley’s approach to his interlocutors in the 
  
                                                        
37 It is important to note that, while Burley rejects the view that ficta are the significata of non-sentential 
expressions, he holds in his earlier commentaries on the Perihermenerias at least that the significata of 
sentential expressions are ficta.  See, e.g., Ibid., 60. While it is unclear why Burley would hold this 
position (given his forceful rejection of ficta elsewhere), it seems to me likely that it has something to do 
with the truth-conditional nature of the proposition, a nature which the referents of sub-sentential 
expressions lack. 
38 In the Quaes.Perih, Burley denies that there are concepts. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s 
Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.8, p. 259. But by ‘concept’ he means a fictum in that 
work. Moreover, he accepts in that work that the mind possesses species, that is, subjective mental 
representations – which he calls concepts in the Art.Vet. Consequently, the psychological account is the 
same both works, even if the vocabulary is slight different. 
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Ars Vetus is more nuanced than his approach to his earlier interlocutors. He writes that 
Aristotle’s claim that nouns and verbs signify “affections of the soul,” that is, concepts,  
can be understood in two ways. In the first way, nouns and verbs signify 
affections of the soul such that they are the things which nouns and verbs are 
primarily imposed to signify. In the second way, it can be understood that they 
[i.e. nouns and verbs] signify affections of the soul such that they are the things 
by whose mediation they [i.e. nouns and verbs] are imposed to signify.39
 
 
Burley’s interlocutor argues that expressions in natural language signify concepts in the 
first way, namely, as the thing onto which expression are imposed.40 But Burley argues 
that “it is not necessary that nouns and verbs signify affections of the soul in the first 
way.”41 Burley’s argument on this score follows a similar trajectory of his criticisms of 
the previous view. Just like the fictum-style view, Burley argues that an account of this 
sort unduly restricts the conventionality of language, and that because it relies on a 
implausible account of cognition, according to which concepts are the immediate objects 
of thought.42
 However, Burley is willing to concede that expressions in natural language 
signify concepts in the second way. That Burley is willing to concede this much reflects 
the picture of cognition that he wants to endorse. Burley writes that   
 
                                                        
39 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k3va. 
40 It is not clear who, if anyone, Burley has in mind here. However, a possible target might be John 
Buridan. While Buridan rejects the doctrine of intelligible species, he does argue that expressions in 
natural language primarily signify concepts, and things only secondarily. See John Buridan, Summulae 
de Dialectica, 11.  
41 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k3va. 
42 It seems that Burley assumes that what an expression signifies, that is, what it “establishes in the 
understanding” is what an expression makes one think of. But it seems to me perfectly reasonable to 
regard these as separate relations, so that what we think of it not what the expression signifies, but what 
its significate signifies. Buridan might be someone who holds this position  
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[i]n an act of thinking we must consider three things, namely, the thing thought 
and the thinking intellect itself, and the species by whose mediation the thing is 
understood, so that that species is not that which primarily is thought but the thing 
primarily is thought by the mediation of the species.43
 
 
Every act of thinking involves three things: a thing which is thought, a thinking intellect, 
and a concept. But the role of that concept is not to be the immediate content of the act of 
thinking and something in which the intellect “sees” that which the concept represents. 
Rather, a concept is that by whose mediation a thought has the particular content that it 
does. In other words, concepts are vehicles for content; they are content-determiners, 
rather than contents themselves. And since they are not the contents of thought, they are 
also not the contents of expressions of natural language.44
 Because signification is articulated in terms of epistemic notions, it is 
unsurprising that Burley draws close parallels between signification and cognition.  
 
 [I]n an act of signifying we find again three things: an utterance signifying, a 
thing signified and a species of the thing by whose mediation the thing is 
signified. And just as a species is not that which primarily is thought, so a species 
is not that which primarily is signified but [rather] the thing [is signified] by the 
mediation of the species.45
                                                        
43 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” 212: “Sed in actu intelligendi 
est considerare tria, scilicet rem intellect am et ipsum intellectum intelIigentem, et speciem mediante qua 
res intelligitur, sic quod illa species non est illud quod primo intelligitur sed res primo intelligitur 
mediante specie.” 
  
44 I argue in chapter 4 that concepts mediate cognition by constituting acts of thinking themselves. See ch. 
4, §§3, 5. On this picture, cognitive activity just is the occurrence of a particular concept in the mind. A 
thought of Socrates, for example, just is the occurrence of the concept SOCRATES in the mind, and that 
thought has Socrates as its content precisely because SOCRATES represents (indeed, on Burley’s view, 
signifies) Socrates. But however that mediation is articulated, it is clear why Burley would want to deny 
that concepts need to constitute the contents of thought: because concepts are merely vehicles of content, 
not (typically) contents themselves. On medieval theories of mental representation, see Peter King, 
“Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Mediaeval Theories of Mental 
Representation,” in Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy (Ashgate: Aldershot, 
2007), 81–100.   
45 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” 212: “Sic in actu significandi 
est reperire tria: vocem significatam, rem significatam et speciem rei mediante qua res significatur. Et 
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Since expressions in natural language can be made to signify whatever we can think, but 
since what we are able to think is determined by the concepts we possess, those concepts 
mediate for us not only thought but signification as well.46 This is due, in the first 
instance, to the act of imposition, since, whenever an expression is imposed on 
something, it is imposed on it by an individual, an individual who has that thing in mind. 
But she only has that thing in mind when she uses a concept which represents that thing. 
Imposition, then, establishes a certain semantic relationship between expression and thing 
only by establishing a more fundamental connection between that expression and a 
concept, in which the expression is paired with, or subordinated to, that concept.47
                                                                                                                                                                     
sicut species non est illud quod primo intelligitur sic speices non est illud quod primo significatur sed res 
mediante specie.” 
 
Because imposition works in this way, moreover, linguistic comprehension itself involves 
that connection between expression and concept. ‘Socrates’ successfully signifies 
Socrates for somebody when it makes that individual think of Socrates. But ‘Socrates’ 
makes him think of Socrates only because, when hearing or seeing ‘Socrates’, that 
individual makes use of the concept SOCRATES, and so has a thought of Socrates. 
46 Burley claims in both the Comm.Perih and the Exp.Perih that, whereas spoken language signifies 
conventionally, affections of the soul signify naturally.  His argument for this claim rests on the premise 
that what signifies the same for all signifies naturally.  But he never offers an argument for why 
affections of the soul should be said to signify, naturally or otherwise.  A likely explanation of this claim, 
however, rests on the definition of signification itself, since affections in the soul do establish an 
understanding.  See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Perihermeneias,” 53. 
47 We can think of the relationships between concepts and expressions as causal, upon which the semantic 
relations that expressions have to things depend. Burley himself suggests that the relationship between 
concepts and expressions established in imposition is causal, writing that “conceptions of the intellect are 
the causes for the formation and imposition of expressions” onto things ( Super artem veterem Porphyrii 
et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k4ra). 
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 The way in which expressions signify concepts, then, is not semantic. That is, 
concepts do not figure into the semantic content of an expression. Rather, the way in 
which Burley understands expressions to signify concepts is best understood along the 
lines of what Paul Grice calls natural meaning.48 Natural meaning is factive. Something’s 
naturally meaning so-and-so entails that so-and-so is the case. And the signification of 
concepts by expressions does seem to be factive. One’s competent use of ‘Socrates’, for 
example, requires that one uses (and so possess) the concept SOCRATES. It cannot be 
the case that one’s use of ‘Socrates’ signifies that one possesses that concept, but in fact 
she does not possess it. Natural meaning is also involuntary. Considering a case in which 
spots mean that one has measles, Grice argues that one “cannot argue from ‘These spots 
mean (meant) measles’ to any conclusion about ‘what it is (was) meant by those 
measles’.”49
2.2. Compositionality 
 Similarly, it would be incorrect to say that what someone meant by her use 
of ‘Socrates’ was that she possessed the concept SOCRATES. With respect to a sense of 
signification something like Grice’s natural meaning, then, Burley is perfectly willing to 
admit that expressions signify concepts. The key mistake of his interlocutors, however, is 
to confuse this notion of signification with the notion of signification that is at issue in 
semantics, and communication more broadly. 
The contents of simple cognitive acts, therefore, are things in the world, things 
which can exist independently of the mind. Consequently, linguistic expressions will 
have those things as their semantic contents, because of the nature of signification itself.                                                         
48 See H. P. Grice, “Meaning,” The Philosophical Review 66, no. 3 (July 1, 1957): 377–80. 
49 Ibid., 377. 
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Thus the content of an expression will be a thing outside the mind. Burley combines this 
commitment to referentialism with a commitment to a principle of compositionality. 
Writing about the nature of the content of statements in natural and mental language, for 
example, Burley argues that “through a statement in speech and even one in concept, 
some complex thing is signified which is not properly something signified precisely 
through the subject, nor a thing signified through the predicate, but it is an aggregate of 
these.”50 The content of a statement in natural or mental language, then, will be a 
structured entity composed of the content of the subject and predicate terms of that 
statement, respectively. ‘Socrates is a human’, for example, has as its content a structured 
entity composed of Socrates and the property of humanity. In other words, Burley 
endorses a principle of compositionality, according to which the content of a complex 
expression in natural language is built up from the contents of the expressions which 
compose it given the syntactic structure of that complex expression.51
                                                        
50 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, g6rb: “Et ex hoc patet quod per 
propositionem in voce et etiam in conceptu significatur aliqua res complexa quae non est proprie aliqua 
res precise significata per subiectum, nec res significata per praedicatum, sed aggregatum ex his, et illa 
res quae est ultimum et adequatum significatum propositionis in voce et in conceptu est quaedam ens 
copulatum, et propter hoc potest dici propositio in re, sicut declaratum est in principio huius libri.” 
‘Aggregate’ here should not be understood to mean that these entities lack structure, but as a quasi-
technical term denoting a complex entity (which, in this case, at least, has structure).  
 The content of a 
statement, for example, will be built up from the content of the subject and predicate 
terms of that statement relative to its predicate structure, such that the content of that 
statement contains the contents of the terms of that statement as components.   
51 In point of fact, it seems to me that Burley has not three fundamental commitments here but two: 
referentialism and intellectualism. Compositionality is rather a consequence of Burley’s commitment to 
intellectualism, since intellectualism explains how complex semantic contents are built up from more 
basic contents. However, compositionality is still a commitment (just not a fundamental one), and 
together with referentialism provides for one common view of the nature of propositional content. 
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Referentialism and compositionality together provide a powerful analysis of the 
content of statements in natural language, one which philosophers have found and 
continue to find attractive.52 On such an analysis, the syntactic structure of language 
reflects the metaphysical structure of content itself.53
2.3. Intellectualism 
 Because of this symmetry, complex, 
meaningful expressions can be built up from just a few basic, meaningful symbols in that 
language. Given his commitment to referentialism and compositionality, then, it should 
not be surprising that Burley’s defends a theory according to which propositions are 
structured entities composed of things – indeed, we should expect it. 
While referentialism and compositionality motivate a neat analysis of the 
proposition, it is only a partial analysis, since propositions are the sorts of things that 
have truth conditions. Indeed, many take propositions to be the primary bearers of truth 
and falsity. Statements in natural language, for example, have truth values, but those truth 
values are derived from the propositions that they express. Burley himself endorses this 
view, writing that “a spoken statement is said to be true for this reason, that it is 
significative of something true, i.e., for this reason, that it is suited by its nature to signify                                                         
52 In terms of the contemporary landscape, I have in mind here neo-Russellians such as Scott Soames, 
Jeffrey King, and Nathan Salmon. 
53 A bit more has to be said here, of course, about how exactly grammatical structure should be conceived, 
such that it reflects logical structure. Burley’s account on this point depends centrally on the role of the 
copula. Burley argues that the copula does not itself cause the mind to conceive of some distinct thing but 
rather “conveys” (importat) to the mind that the significates of its subject and predicate terms ought to be 
conceived as subject and predicate, respectively. But such conception is, on Burley’s account, just the 
mind’s predicating one of the other. The role of the copula, then, is not to signify some distinct thing but 
to convey a certain truth-conditional structure composed of things; its function is to express structure 
rather than to have content (at least insofar as we have understood content in this paper). On Burley’s 
analysis of the copula, see Walter Burley, De puritate artis logicae, 1st Edition (Louvain: The Franciscan 
Institute, 1951), 54–55; 218–20. See also Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, 
Exp.Perih, k6rb–vb. 
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something true.”54
One possibility is that the truth-conditional character of the proposition is a 
primitive feature of it. On an account of this sort, we simply cannot offer an explanation 
for why propositions have truth conditions. They simply do, and consequently the things 
which express them (i.e. statements in natural and mental language) do so as well. Burley 
rejects entreaties to primitivism, however. Rather, he analyzes the truth-conditional 
character of the proposition in terms of the more fundamental capacity of cognitive 
agents to represent, that is, to conceive of ways in which the world might be structured. 
On Burley’s account, the proposition’s ability to represent is explained in terms of the 
mind’s predicating one thing of another – where such predicating activity is the exercise 
of a capacity to represent. That predicating activity produces a structured entity, 
composed of the things towards which that activity is directed and having the truth 
conditions that it does because of the representational character of that act itself. The act 
of predicating humanity of Socrates, for example, produces a proposition composed of 
Socrates and the property of humanity, structured in a truth-conditional way. The mental 
act of predicating, then, accounts for the proposition’s having truth-conditions, because 
 Statements in natural language have alethic properties, then, but only 
because they express propositions which have those alethic properties primarily. Of 
course, referentialism and compositionality might provide us with an account of why 
statements in natural and mental language express structured entities of a sort. But they 
fail to account for why such structured entities themselves have truth conditions.   
                                                        
54 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.62, p. 251: “Oratio 
prolata dicitur vera ex hoc, quod est significativum veri, id est, ex hoc, quod est aptum natum significare 
verum.” 
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that proposition is formed by a cognitive agent, i.e., by an agent exercising some capacity 
to represent. 
That analysis of the truth-conditional character of the proposition is motivated by 
a certain alethic thesis: intellectualism. Intellectualism is the view that representing the 
world’s being a certain way is fundamentally something that the mind does, so that things 
which have truth conditions do so only on account of their relationship to such activity – 
either partly on account of that activity, if their truth conditions are extrinsic to them 
(such as statements in natural and mental language) or wholly on account of it, if their 
truth conditions are intrinsic to them (such as propositions).55
 Burley’s commitment to intellectualism is most apparent in his discussions of the 
nature of truth. Those discussions can be found at various points in his career, but one of 
his lengthier discussions of the nature of truth comes in the Comm.Perih, written near the 
beginning of his career.
  
56 In the work, Burley argues that there are two species of truth. 
“Truth is taken up in two ways: in one way it is the correspondence of a thing to an 
intellect and in another way it is the correspondence of an intellect to a thing, and in just 
the same ways the false is spoken of opposed to it.”57                                                        
55 One could argue (as Jeffrey King does) that the truth conditions of a proposition (or, at least, what is a 
candidate to fulfill the role of proposition) are extrinsic to it. However, Burley’s view entails that 
propositions are intrinsically truth-conditional, precisely because their existence is explained in terms of 
a mental act of conceiving the world as being some way or other. On King’s view of propositions and 
their truth-conditions, see Jeffrey C. King, The Nature and Structure of Content (Oxford University 
Press, Incorporated, 2009), 25–64, and esp. 59–64.   
 The first kind of truth that Burley 
56 He provides a similar account in his late commentary on the De Interpretatione. See Walter Burley, 
Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k4ra–b. In that work, however, Burley argues 
that truth involves the correspondence of the thinking power (virtutis cognoscentis) to the cognized thing. 
That is, correspondence is a matter of the correspondence of the mind’s activity (such as predication) to 
the world.  
57 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.22, pp. 58–
9. See also Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k4rb. 
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mentions, in which a thing corresponds to the mind, is causal, and we can set aside causal 
notions of truth for our purposes here.58
 According to Burley, truth can be realized in two ways: “either [i] because the 
intellect has complete knowledge of a thing or [ii] because the intellect asserts things to 
be the same which are the same or asserts things to be different which are different.”
 The other kind of truth – a representational rather 
than a causal notion – involves the correspondence of a mind to a thing in the world. It is 
in his articulation of this representational notion of truth (hereafter ‘truth’) that we find 
Burley’s commitment to intellectualism.   
59 
Our purposes concern the second sort of truth that Burley mentions here. But, in brief, the 
first sort concerns having what Burley calls complete knowledge (completam notitiam) of 
a thing, that is, it concerns the mind’s ability to have deeper or more superficial insight 
into the metaphysical structure of a thing.60
                                                        
58 Causal notions of truth concern the dispositions of things to produce mental states which more or less 
accurately represent those things. Burley’s example here is counterfeit, or false, currency, which is false 
precisely because it tends to make one conceive of it as something other than what it really is (i.e. as 
actual currency). See ch. 5, §§2, 7. The notion of truth relevant to cognitive activity, like the mental act 
of predication, is not a causal but rather a representational notion. Like representational notions of truth, 
Burley explains causal notions in terms of correspondence, though in these cases the direction of fit runs 
in the opposite direction: from the world to a mind.  
 For example, the thought of a human qua 
human and the thought of a human qua rational animal (on a traditional conception of the 
59 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, p. 60. 
See also Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k4rb. 
60 Burley articulates the notion of complete knowledge in terms of concept possession. As was noted in 
§2a, on Burley’s account of cognition, cognitive activity depends on one’s possession of a concept which 
represents the thing to which that cognitive activity is directed. But one’s conceptual structure can be 
more or less articulated.  The concepts HUMAN and RATIONAL ANIMAL both represent, on Burley’s 
view, the property of humanity. But only the latter articulates in any respect the metaphysical structure of 
that property. Consequently, on Burley’s view, a thought of the property of humanity which is mediated 
by the possession of the concept RATIONAL ANIMAL will more truly grasp the world as it is than one 
which depends on the possession of the concept HUMAN. That analysis does seem to entail that the role 
of a concept in cognition is not merely cognitive but has some epistemic significance. It is not clear to me 
how to reconcile this analysis with Burley’s rather forceful anti-epistemic account of the role of concepts 
in his discussion of signification.   
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nature of humanity) are both about the same thing. But, Burley argues, the latter involves 
deeper insight into the metaphysical structure of that thing than the former, and so 
involves having more complete knowledge of it. That first sort of truth, then, concerns 
simple cognitive activity – thinking-of rather than thinking-that.  
 The second sort of truth that Burley mentions, in contrast, concerns complex 
mental activity – what Burley calls the activity of “composition and division.”61 The 
activity of composition and division, Burley tells us elsewhere, is a certain predicative 
activity that the mind can perform. In the Exp.Praed, for example, Burley writes that “I 
believe that this is undoubtedly true, that in some statement a thing is predicated of a 
thing […]. Hence the intellect can combine with one another every simple thing which 
has been apprehended through the intellect.”62 What the mind can predicate, and 
predicate of, therefore, is anything which the intellect has cognized in an act of simple 
cognition – which, given Burley’s commitment to direct realism, will be things. 63
 On Burley’s analysis, then, the mind represents the world’s being a certain way 
by predicating one thing of another. The mind represents that Socrates is a human, for 
example, by predicating humanity of Socrates. 
  
64
                                                        
61 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, p. 60. 
The notion of truth involving composition and division is found in Aristotle. See Aristotle, Categoriae et 
Liber de Interpretatione, 16a12–13, p. 49. 
 Burley argues that the mind’s 
62 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb.   
63 Those exceptions are what Burley calls entia copulata, such as the proposition. On the notion of an ens 
copulatum, see §4. 
64 As we will see in chapter 5, Burley’s theory of truth is a correspondence one, but intellectualism needn’t, 
I think, commit one to a correspondence theory; Ockham, for example, seems to me to defend an 
intellectualist theory of truth which doesn’t involve correspondence. Burley’s theory of correspondence 
evolves significantly over his career. In his early career, Burley favored an account of correspondence 
according to which a proposition is true just in case the things represented to be the same or represented 
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representing in this way is to be understood in terms of its asserting either the identity or 
the non-identity (depending on the quality of the assertion) of the things used in the act of 
predication.65 “[I]f the intellect asserts some things to be the same, then it combines them 
with one another, but if it asserts things to be different, then it divides them from one 
another.”66
Burley’s account of truth, then, supplemented by his other, semantic 
commitments, entails that propositions are structured wholes, composed of things 
 Consequently, by predicating (in a positive fashion) humanity of Socrates, the 
mind thereby asserts that Socrates is a human. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to be different are the same or are different in fact. But that account required a metaphysics which Burley 
was forced to abandon, in light of criticism from William Ockham. Pressed to adopt a metaphysics not at 
all amenable to his earlier account, Burley developed a new account of correspondence, one which is 
articulated primarily in semantic rather than metaphysical notions. On the evolution of Burley’s account 
of correspondence, see Nathaniel Bulthuis, “Properties in Walter Burley’s Later Metaphysics,” in 
Responses to Ockham, ed. Christian Rode (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). See also ch. 5.    
65 Burley does not appear to recognize a distinction between force and content. I do not think this was an 
oversight on Burley’s part, since the distinction between force and content was widely recognized at this 
point in philosophical history (See, e.g., Giorgio Pini, “Scotus on Assertion and the Copula: A 
Comparison with Aquinas,” in Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-assertive Language : Acts of the 
14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, June 11-15, 2002, ed. Alfonso 
Maierù (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 2004), 324–31). Rather, I take his position to be motivated by the view 
that cognition involves not two stages (content production, and then force, or attitude) but one stage, in 
which one’s force is embedded within the structure of the proposition produced. It also suggests that 
Burley details only a part of his theory of the proposition. Burley’s concern in his logical texts is 
primarily belief contexts. Consequently, it is not surprising that theory would be developed in terms of 
assertion. But it seems that, in other contexts, complex mental activity might not involve assertion but 
rather denial, for example, or mere entertainment. These propositions would still have a predicative 
structure, but their force would not be assertive. Moreover, it seems to me the theory could be expanded 
to include imperatival, jussive, and interrogative contexts. (Alternatively, then, perhaps mere 
entertainment involves predicating things in an interrogative fashion, and denial in a negative – though 
still assertive – fashion.) In these contexts, the propositions produced would not have truth conditions, 
but rather other sorts of satisfaction conditions. On that picture, differences in mood, like differences in 
force, would involve differences in propositional structure. 
66 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, p. 60–
1. See also Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.553, p. 249; 
Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c3vb. 
142  
 
 
arranged in a certain truth-conditional structure by the predicative activity of the mind.67 
One consequence of that view is that propositions alone are intrinsically truth-
conditional. Houses and humans, for example, are structured, but they do not by their 
very nature represent the world as being some way or other. Rather, they are “real” 
objects in the world, existing independently of cognitive activity, in virtue of which the 
world is some way or other in fact. The truth conditions, if any, of a “real “object (such as 
a particular vocal utterance, like ‘Socrates is a human’) won’t be completely explained by 
anything intrinsic to that object itself but rather will be explained at least in part by the 
mind’s use of that object as truth-conditional.68
                                                        
67 More precisely, things arranged into a certain kind of token structure by the predicative activity of the 
mind. This speaks to what I take to be the most important difference between medieval and contemporary 
accounts of propositional content: with few exceptions, medieval philosophers took propositions to be 
concrete particulars, whereas it is almost a platitude in contemporary analytic philosophy that 
propositions are abstract. Burley is not unaware of the motivations for a conception of propositional 
content as abstract. In his first literal commentary on the Perihermeneias, for example, he considers an 
objection which assumes a unity constraint on truth, according to which the alethic values of 
propositional contents (and, consequently, propositional contents themselves) are abstract entities, so that 
different cognitive agents can have the same propositional content in mind.  See Walter Burley, “Walter 
Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.25–27, pp. 61–2. Burley’s response 
to the objection in that work involves (in my view) a confusion of two different notions of truth (one 
representational, the other metaphysical). In his later works, Burley seems to simply deny the unity 
constraint entirely (though his position still entails that, e.g., the content of your belief that Socrates is a 
human will be type-similar to the content of my belief that Socrates is a human, since each will be 
composed of the same things according to token representational structures of the same type).   
 By contrast, propositions by their very 
nature represent the world’s being some way or other, in virtue of the fact that they are 
68 That is, utterances and written marks may have truth conditions, and those truth conditions are certainly 
due in part to the syntactic structure of those utterances or marks. But that that structure is truth-
conditional will be explained ultimately in terms of the representational capacities of cognitive agents. 
The structure per se cannot explain the truth conditions of the utterance or written marks that it informs. 
Burley himself notes that all truth-conditional utterances ultimately have their meaning because of the 
representational capacities of a cognitive agent. In his last commentary on the Categories, for example, 
Burley argues that “in every statement there is something material and something formal [...]. The formal 
thing in a statement is the copula joining the subject to the predicate, and that copula is in the intellect” 
(Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb). Statements in natural 
language, Burley here suggests, are ultimately meaningful because of the way in which cognitive agents 
use them. 
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produced by the exercise of the mind’s ability to conceive of the world’s being arranged 
in those ways. 
Because propositions are intrinsically truth-conditional, and since truth-
conditionality has to be explained in terms of the exercise of a certain representational 
capacity, propositions exist as the representational content of complex cognitive activity. 
Burley marks the peculiar kind of existence that propositions have by calling them beings 
of reason (and, elsewhere, diminished or fictive being), in contrast to real beings.69 Real 
beings exist in the world, independently of human cognitive activity. A house, for 
example, exists independently of human cognitive activity, even if its production depends 
on human intention.70
                                                        
69 On diminished being, see Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, p. 60. In the same passage, Burley notes that propositions are fictive beings, 
writing that diminished being “which is distinguished from real being, about which Aristotle speaks in 
Metaphysics VI, is something produced (aliquid fictum) by the soul.” The existence of ficta was 
controversial at this period in philosophical history. Ockham, for example, is famous for abandoning a 
fictum-theory of concepts. See Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 23–27. Burley seems to me to have an 
account of the notion of a fictum which is, in some respects, more sophisticated than that of his peers. 
Many accounts treat the notions of fictum and obiectum as equivalent. But Burley distinguishes between 
them. Ficta, on Burley’s account, are representational, whereas obiecta are non-existent beings. On 
Burley’s early account of the proposition, then, a proposition is a fictum but not an obiectum, since it 
exists subjectively in the mind but has a merely representational mode of being. On Burley’s claim that 
propositions are ficta and subiecta (rather than obiecta), see Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, p. 60. 
 Propositions, however, as mere beings of reason, depend on 
complex cognitive activity for their existence. Consequently, while propositions can have 
for their components real things which exist independently of mental activity, 
propositions themselves – as complexes of those things structured by the representational 
powers of the mind – exist merely as contents of thought. 
70 Burley holds that artifacts, like natural products, really exist in the world. On this point, see Hans-Ulrich 
Wöhler, “Universals and Individuals,” in A Companion to Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician and 
Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 187, n. 74. 
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Pace some in the literature, then, Burley’s project does not involve a confusion of 
two distinct philosophical issues – the nature of propositional content, existing wholly 
within the mind, on the one hand, and the nature of truthmakers, or facts, existing wholly 
outside of the mind, on the other.71
 
 Rather, on Burley’s view, propositions are structured 
entities composed of things by the exercise of a capacity to conceive of the world’s being 
various ways. And that view makes sense, given Burley’s deeper philosophical 
commitments – namely, his commitment to referentialism, compositionality and 
intellectualism. 
3. THE METAPHYSICS OF THE PROPOSITION 
While referentialism, compositionality and intellectualism motivate a general 
picture of the proposition, they do not by themselves (even taken jointly) constitute an 
account of the metaphysics of the proposition. Rather, they put some constraints on any 
account of the metaphysics of the proposition that Burley might defend. First, 
referentialism and compositionality together require that propositions are structured 
entities composed of things, such as Socrates or the property of humanity. Second, 
intellectualism requires that the truth-conditional character of the proposition is explained 
by appeal to a mental act of predication, by which act a proposition is formed.  
Even while sensitive to those constraints, however, the account of the proposition 
that Burley defends evolves significantly over the course of his career. In particular, I 
believe we can distinguish two very different formulations of the account – an early 
formulation and a late. According to the early formulation, propositions are really                                                         
71 See ch. 2, §§3.1, pp. 60–2.  
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identical to the acts of predicating by which they are formed. That is, on the early 
account, a proposition just is a mental act of predication. Burley argues, for example, that 
“no philosopher finds that through an action remaining in an agent is there something 
produced in the agent really distinct from that action.”72 According to Burley, then, any 
products of cognitive activity, such as (on his view) propositions, are not really different 
from mental acts, that is, acts “remaining in the agent.” At the level of propositional 
content, then, the act/content distinction is not a real distinction but merely a distinction 
of some lesser kind.73 That is, the distinction between the act of predicating and the 
propositional content produced is not a difference between things, but rather differences 
between correct characterizations of the same thing.74 On this view, considered in one 
way (i.e. as a mental act), a proposition exists subjectively within the mind (i.e. exists in 
the mind as in a subject), as an accidental feature of it. Burley writes, for example, that 
“[a] statement [i.e. a proposition] is an accident, in the way in which an accident is 
distinguished from a substance, and has subjective being in the soul [...].”75
                                                        
72 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.61, p. 211.  
 Considered in 
that way, then, it is a property instance in the Aristotelian category of action. At the same 
73 At the level of non-propositional activity, on the other hand, acts do really differ from their contents. 
74 According to the metaphysical picture Burley defends in the first half of his career, two objects can differ 
“intentionally,” where there is an intentional difference “when some differ more greatly than according to 
reason (i.e. merely conceptually) but less than really” (Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in 
librum Perihermeneias,” para. 4.47, p. 273). On that picture, two entities differ merely intentionally if 
they are the same thing, res, but where a complete understanding of one does not involve a complete 
understanding of the other. (On the notion of a complete understanding, see pp. 139–40 and n. 60). I take 
it that acts of predication and contents differ in this way, since they are really identical but an act of 
predication is correctly thought of as something real, whereas the relevant content is not real but merely 
representational, that is, merely a product of conceiving of the world’s being some way or other. On the 
Burley’s early account of identity, see ch. 5, section §3.1.  
75 Ibid., para. 3.622, p. 251. 
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time, considered in another way, a proposition is intrinsically truth-conditional, 
representing the world’s being some way. “Yet it [i.e. the proposition] is not a real 
accident, but only an accident of reason, because it is produced by the intellect.”76
Burley’s claim that propositions are really the same as mental acts of predicating 
is due at least in part, I think, to a tension Burley perceives between his commitment to 
intellectualism, on the one hand, and his commitment to referentialism, on the other. 
Intellectualism requires that representing is something that the mind does, so that a 
mental act is what accounts for the truth-conditions of a proposition. However, that act is 
essentially dependent upon the things that it uses. And referentialism (and, more 
fundamentally, direct realism) requires that what the mind uses must be things, such as 
Socrates. That is, propositions need to be structured entities, composed of things by the 
mind’s act of predicating one thing of another. This appears to require that the 
representational character of a mental act is not explained by appeal to that act alone, but 
also by appeal to things which can exist outside the mind. 
 
Considered in this way, then, it has representational structure, being composed of things 
such as Socrates and the property of humanity by the exercise of a representational 
capacity.  
In an attempt to accommodate both of those commitments, Burley’s early account 
of the proposition holds that mental acts of predication/propositions are at once wholly 
within the mind, as truth-conditional accidents of it, and yet are composed of things 
which exist outside the mind. Burley himself acknowledges this fact. He writes, for 
example, that “a statement [i.e. a proposition] has subjective being in the soul and yet its                                                         
76 Ibid. 
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parts do not. Hence, a thing composed by an intellectual composition has being in some 
place where its parts do not have being.”77
But, while that view may be motivated by certain deeper commitments, it raises a 
number of metaphysical worries, chief among them a worry about the co-location of 
wholes and their parts. Propositions appear to be the singular exception to the rule that 
wholes are co-located with their parts. Socrates, for example, is co-located with his limbs, 
torso and head. Likewise, the mind is co-located with its various capacities and powers. 
Even spatially disjointed wholes, if there are such things, appear to be co-located with 
their parts. The aggregate of Big Ben, the whole of Australia and my left shoe is located 
in exactly the places in which those disparate parts exist.  
 Such a solution, Burley suggests, balances the 
tension between intellectualism and referentialism, by making things themselves part of 
the mental act. Mental acts, then, are dependent, but dependent merely as wholes on their 
parts, and dependence of that sort, Burley suggests, is innocuous. On that account, the 
representation is explained merely by appeal to a mental act of predication, since that act 
contains within itself the very things which it predicates, and predicates of.  
Burley’s response to these kinds of concerns is to claim that the absence of co-
location between propositions and their parts is plausible because propositions are 
structured entities “composed by an intellectual composition.”78
                                                        
77 Ibid., para. 3.623, p. 252. 
 That is, Burley claims 
that the sui generis nature of propositional content – that it is a kind of composite entity 
different from all other composite entities – allows for its exceptional metaphysical 
characteristics. But Burley never provides any reason for this claim. Indeed, it seems that 
78 Ibid., para. 3.623, p. 252. 
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the sui geneity of the proposition is itself due in large part to its odd metaphysical 
characteristics!79
That early account of the metaphysics of the proposition is developed in the first 
decade (likely the first half of the first decade) of the fourteenth century. Burley does not 
return to issues of the metaphysics of the proposition until near the end of his career, over 
thirty years later. When he does return, however, he develops a very different account. 
That account is fundamentally driven by a distinction that Burley makes between the 
proposition, a certain structured entity, and the structure of that entity, namely, the mental 
act of predication. On that account, a mental act of predication is not identical to a 
proposition; rather, it is that in virtue of which the proposition has the (truth-conditional) 
structure that it does, such that that act is merely a part of the proposition. By 
distinguishing between the proposition and the mental act of predication in that way, 
Burley is able to provide some insight into the metaphysics of the proposition via analogy 
with hylomorphic compounds.  
 
In every statement [e.g. a proposition] there is something formal and something 
material.  What is formal in a statement is the copula joining together the subject 
with the predicate, and that copula is in the intellect, because it is a composition 
or division by the intellect.  Moreover, the materials [i.e. material parts] in a 
proposition are the subject and predicate.80                                                        
79 In general, I think Burley’s early account of the metaphysics of the proposition, while motivated, is 
simply unworkable. However, I do think Burley can at least attempt to respond in two ways. First, he can 
press the fact that mental acts of predication and propositions, while really the same, are still 
intentionally different, and that that difference has some metaphysical ground. On Burley’s early account 
of identity, see ch. 5, §3.1, pp. 261–71. Second, he can employ the notion of intentio, which he 
introduces at the end of his career, to argue that propositions can be dislocated from their parts because 
they are mental compounds rather than real compounds. On intentio, see §4. I am not convinced either of 
these responses would be ultimately successful, however. 
 
80 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb: “Intelligenda sunt hic tria. 
Primo quod in omni propositione est aliquod materiale et aliquod formale. Formale in propositione est 
copula copulans praedicatum cum subiecto, et illa copula est in intellectu, quia est compositio vel divisio 
intellectus. Materiale vero in propositione sunt subiectum et praedicatum.” 
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A hylomorphic compound is a compound of a form, or structure, and matter which is so 
formed, or structured. My desk, for example, can be understood as a hylomorphic 
compound, composed of bits of wood and glass arranged deskwise. Like my desk, on 
Burley’s view, propositions are compounds of “form” and “matter,” since they are 
composed of things arranged by the mind’s predicative activity. The “form” of the 
proposition is the mental act of predication, since that is what gives (truth-conditional) 
structure to the proposition. The proposition’s “matter,” in contrast, are those things 
which the mind structures, the subject and predicate components of the proposition. The 
proposition itself is a compound of that “form” and that “matter.” 
 By conceiving of the relationship of the mental act of predication to the 
proposition in this way, Burley avoids many of the metaphysical worries that plagued the 
earlier view. In particular, his later view accommodates the position that wholes are co-
located with their parts. The mental act of predication, the “form” of the proposition, is in 
the mind, whereas the “material” parts of the proposition often exist outside it. But, since 
the proposition is a compound of both, it will be located in where both its “form” and 
“matter” are located. Burley himself sees this advantage. 
[A] composite thing, composed out of things [by the mind’s predicative activity] 
exists partly within the intellect and partly outside of it.  In regard to its formal 
part, it is in the intellect, and in regard to its material parts, it is totally outside the 
intellect.81
 
 
It may, of course, seem odd that there can be a thing which exists partly in the mind and 
partly outside of it. But, first, if that worry simply concerns the fact that the proposition is                                                         
81 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb: “Et compositio composita 
ex rebus partim est in intellectu et partim extra intellectum; quantum ad suum formale est in intellectu, 
sed quantum ad materialia est totaliter extra intellectum.” 
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poly-located, then that worry is not a worry about propositions per se, but is rather a 
general worry about the nature of composition. Consequently, it would be a problem in 
general metaphysics, rather than in the metaphysics of meaning. And, second, if the 
worry is more particularly about the precise nature of its bi-location – namely, that it is 
both inside and outside of the mind – Burley has a motivated response to that sort of 
worry, having to do with the peculiar nature of cognitive activity more generally (see §4). 
In any case, the sorts of worries that this view might engender seem to be far less stinging 
than those of the previous account.   
 Driving this account, however, is a fundamentally different view of how to 
balance the tension between intellectualism and referentialism. On this view, that the 
things which the mind employs in an act of predication exist outside of that act is not 
threat to the representational character of that act itself. This is due to the essentially 
asymmetric relationship that acts have to the things that they shape. Acts serve to form, 
or structure, matter. And structures need matter, as it is only within matter that structures 
are realized. A mental act, then, as a kind of act, must itself have a kind of dependency on 
things. That dependency is not a deficiency of the mental act, however, but rather a 
necessary consequence given the kind of thing that it is. Nor does that dependency mean 
that mental acts cannot alone determine the truth-conditions of a proposition. For those 
truth-conditions are determined wholly by the fact that that act is a predication of one 
thing of another – its being such an act because of its necessary dependence on things. 
Consequently, propositions have the truth conditions that they do because they are 
constituted by mental acts of predication, which determine some truth conditions or other. 
However, those truth conditions are still intrinsic to propositions. For complex mental 
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acts themselves are essentially parts of propositions, since it is essential to complex 
mental acts that they are related to things as “form” to “matter,” and a proposition, on the 
later view, just is a complex mental act’s being related to things as “form” to “matter.” 
 That representing is fundamentally a matter of the mental act itself is in fact 
reflected in the correspondence theory of truth that Burley defends throughout his career, 
where truth is a matter of the correspondence of a mental act to the world. In the 
Exp.Praed, for example, Burley argues that truth is fundamentally a matter of 
correspondence between structures.  
To the copula existing in the intellect joining together the extremes of the 
statement with one another truly there corresponds something in reality, namely, 
the identity of the extremes, or the identity of those things for which the extremes 
supposit. Moreover to a division or negative copula in a true negative statement 
something corresponds in reality, namely, the diversity of the extremes, or the 
diversity of those things for which the extreme supposit.82
Setting aside the notion of supposition that Burley invokes in this passage, Burley’s claim 
is that correspondence principally involves correspondence of form, or structure – in 
particular, correspondence of the mind’s predicating one thing of another (and thereby 
asserting their identity and diversity) to identity or diversity relations in fact.
 
83 Burley 
provides a similar account in his Exp.Perih. 84                                                        
82 Ibid., Exp.Praed, c4va: “Sed dubium est an ipsi copulae existenti in intellectu correspondeat aliquid in re 
aut non. Dicendum quod copulae existenti in intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis vere adinvicem 
correspondet aliquid in re, scilicet, identitas extremorum, vel identitas eorum pro quibus extrema 
supponunt, divisioni vero vel negationi copulae in propositione negativa vera correspondet aliquid in re, 
scilicet, diversitas extremorum vel illorum pro quibus extrema supponunt.” For a slight different version 
of Burley’s correspondence theory, see Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, p. 60.  
  
83 Supposition is a semantic property that the terms of meaningful statements have. It is what allows general 
expressions to be about particulars in the world. It also seems to have been motivated by concerns about 
the effects of quantifier expressions on the semantics of sentences. (See, e.g., Terence Parsons, 
“Supposition as Quantification Versus Supposition as Global Quantificational Effect,” Topoi 16, no. 1 
(March 1, 1997): 41–63). By the end of his career, Burley uses supposition theory to articulate the truth 
conditions of a statement.  On Burley’s view, for example, the proposition that every human is an animal 
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While Burley’s mature account of the proposition appears to bring with it a fair 
number of virtues over the early account, it also provides a new, somewhat different part-
whole concern: the problem of the unity of the proposition.85
Notice that these sorts of concerns are not pressing for the earlier account. On the 
earlier account, propositions simply are certain mental acts. As such, their unity consists 
in the kind of unity that acts more generally have, as accidents of some substance. Or, if 
one were to press on the sui generis nature of complex mental acts – namely, that they are 
truth-conditional contents – it would still be the case that the unity of the proposition lay 
 Why think that a mental act 
of predication, on the one hand, and things such as Socrates and paleness, on the other, 
can be unified into some further whole? That is, what accounts for the ability of a mental 
act of predication to structure things outside the mind into some truth-conditional whole?  
                                                                                                                                                                     
is true just in case whatever ‘human’ supposits for is identical to something for which ‘animal’ supposits. 
That is, it is true just in case each particular human is identical to some or other particular animal. 
Moreover, and while I do not argue for it here, Burley’s comments here and elsewhere on the nature of 
supposition and the semantic function of quantifier expressions suggests that quantifier expression do not 
signify properties but rather serve to specify the representational structure of the proposition itself. So, 
for example, ‘Every human is an animal’ and ‘Some human is an animal’ have different content, but that 
difference is not one of constituents, since both contents are constituted by, and only by, the properties of 
humanity and animality. 
84 See Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k4ra–b. 
85 Scholarship on the unity of the proposition usually makes clear that there is not just one unity question, 
but a family of questions.  (See, e.g., Matti Eklund, “Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions,” n.d., 10–
2). Besides questions about what accounts for the proposition’s being some structured whole, for 
example, there is also the question of what accounts for the order of its constituents. Burley’s later theory 
suggests, in fact, that there are two separate questions about order. First, there is the question of what 
accounts for the order of mental act and things relative to each other. That question seems to be answered 
by the same thing which answers unity questions, namely, intentio. Since intentio has a directedness to it, 
it distinguishes between the mental act a quo and the things ad quem. (Likewise, and what seems to me 
to come to the same thing, that order could be explained in terms of the respective roles of mental act and 
things – the mental act functioning as the “form” of the proposition, and the things which constitute it 
functioning as its “matter”). Second, there is the question of how the things which constitute the “matter” 
of the proposition are ordered relative to one another. That question is answered by the particular mental 
act which partly composes the proposition. For example, the proposition that John loves Mary and the 
proposition that Mary loves John (let us assume) differ only in their order. That order itself is determined 
by the mental act of predication – whether it is a predicating loving and Mary of John, or is a predicating 
loving and John of Mary.    
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in entirely in its representationality. That Socrates and paleness, for example, are unified 
into some whole – the proposition that Socrates is pale – is explained on the earlier 
account by the mind’s power to represent Socrates’ being a human, the exercise of which 
just is that proposition. Consequently, the unity of that proposition is explained in terms 
of the power of the mind to conceive of Socrates’ being a human. That sort of response is 
unavailable on the later account, however, precisely because the exercise of a certain 
representational capacity accounts for only one part of the proposition (i.e. its truth-
conditional structure) rather than the whole proposition itself. So, while the 
representational character of the proposition is explained in terms of the exercise of a 
power to conceive of the world’s being some way or other, what accounts for the 
proposition’s unity must come from another quarter entirely.  
We can begin to get some purchase on Burley’s response to concerns about unity 
if we return to his analogy with hylomorphic compounds, since similar sorts of concerns 
can be expressed about hylomorphic compounds themselves. What accounts for the unity 
of a hylomorphic compound? What accounts, for example, for the unity of my desk, a 
compound of the wood and glass which constitute its material and the deskwise form that 
structures it? Hylomorphic analyses answer those questions by positing a primitive 
relation – inherence – which forms have relative to their matter. My desk is some unified 
whole, on this account, because a deskwise structure inheres in the bits of wood and glass 
that make up my desk.86
                                                        
86 It is important to note that inherence is not itself a part of the desk. If it were, we would be set off on 
precisely the kinds of regress worries that Bradley sets out. On Bradley’s regress, see F. H Bradley, 
Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1893), 24–34. 
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It may be tempting to think that inherence can do some work in the case of the 
proposition as well. Why not claim that mental acts of predication inhere in the things to 
which they are aimed? But the relationship between the mental act of predication and the 
things employed in that predication cannot be regarded as one of inherence, for two 
reasons. First, a mental act already inheres in the mind, as an accidental feature of it; its 
(real) role is to structure the mind in a certain (contentful) way. Second, actual 
hylomorphic compounds involve the inherence of a form in some subject matter. Matter 
here can be either uninformed (or prime) matter, or informed matter, i.e., some substance.  
But the subject and predicate of the proposition needn’t be either of these. In fact, it 
seems that very often they are not. The proposition that Socrates is a human, for example, 
is partly composed of the property of humanity, itself a form, and so not itself something 
suited to be informed. So the things of which a mental act of predication is the “form” 
need not be, strictly speaking, material.     
What Burley’s mature account of the proposition requires is something that can 
play the role of inherence in the proposition. However, it must be something which can 
allow him to retain features unique to the proposition (e.g. that it exists merely as mental 
content, that it is a hybrid entity existing partly in the mind and partly outside it, that the 
proposition exists not really but only in a kind of representational way, that a proposition 
possesses “form” and “matter” in merely a metaphorical sense) which cannot be captured 
by the standard hylomophic model. That “something,” Burley tells us, is intentio. 
 
 
 
155  
 
 
4. INTENTIO AND THE UNITY OF THE PROPOSITION 
Throughout his career, Burley distinguishes between intellectual and real 
compounds. Propositions are examples of the former, humans and houses of the latter. In 
the early account, Burley uses this fact to dismiss metaphysical worries. But the 
persistence of that distinction in the latter account reveals that it is not motivated simply 
by ad hoc metaphysical considerations. Writing in his late commentary on the 
Categories, for example, Burley states that “a composition is of two sorts. An intellectual 
composition is a composition by which the intellect composes a subject with a predicate. 
A real composition is like a composition of a soul with a body, or like a composition of a 
house out of stone and wood.”87
What distinguishes intellectual composites from real ones? In his last commentary 
on the Categories, Burley analyzes that difference in terms of a certain mental power – 
intentio – that joins cognitive faculties with their objects. He writes that   
 There is, in other words, something unique to 
propositional content that cannot be captured by typical hylomorphic analyses of 
compound entities. 
there is a doubt here how there can come to be one thing, composed out of a thing 
existing in the intellect and a thing existing outside the soul.  It must be said that 
out of such things there can come about one composite thing, composed by 
the intellect.  However, it is not a real composition, and such a composite thing 
can be called an ens copulatum, and an ens copulatum can come about not only 
through the intellect but also through a sense faculty.  For Blessed Augustine says 
that intentio joins together a sense faculty or an operation of the sense faculty 
with its sensible object.  For oftentimes some visible thing is offered to a sense                                                         
87 Walter Burley, Super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb. See also Walter Burley, 
“Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.554, p. 250: “Hence it must be 
understood that a statement in the mind [i.e. a proposition] is not composed out of things by a real 
composition, just like a house is composed out of stones and wood, but there is only here an intellectual 
composition, which comes about because of this, that the intellect thinks some things to be the same or 
diverse.” 
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faculty which, though present to the sense faculty, is not sensed if the sense 
faculty neither turns towards nor pays attention to (attendat ad) the object.  For 
oftentimes there are colors and visible things in front of one’s vision (ante visum), 
and yet we do not see them, because we do not have an intentio towards them, but 
when we turn our attention to (intendimus) them, then we see them.  Hence 
intentio joins together the act of seeing or sight with an object.88
 
   
Burley claims that intentio is characteristic of, and essential to, all cognitive acts – simple 
and complex, intellective and perceptive. On his account, for example, intentio joins 
together an act of seeing – some internal, perceptual state in the mind – with a rock that 
exists outside of the mind, resulting in what Burley calls an ens copulatum, a coupled 
being. Burley argues that we can signify that ens copulatum with the expression ‘seen 
rock’.89 Just as with simple cognitive activity, then, complex cognitive activity too 
involves the composition by the mind’s intentio of a mental act with the things towards 
which that activity is directed.90
                                                        
88Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb–va: “Sed dubium est hic 
qualiter potest fieri unum compositum ex re existente in intellectu et re existente extra animam. 
Dicendum quod ex talibus potest fieri unum compositum compositione intellectuali, non autem 
compositione reali et tale compositum potest dici ens copulatum, et non solum per intellectu sed etiam 
per sensum vel per operationem sensus. Dicit enim Beatus Augustinus quod intentio copulat sensum vel 
operationem sensus cum sensibili obiecto. Multotiens nam visibile offertur sensui quod tamen praesens 
sensui non sentitur si sensus non advertat nec attendat ad obiectum. Multotiens enim sunt colores et 
visibilia ante visum, et tamen non videmus ea, quia non habemus intentionem ad illa. Sed cum 
intendimus ea, videmus ea. Unde intentio copulat actum visus vel visum cum obiecto. Unde hic vox, 
‘lapis visus’ significat quoddam ens copulatum ex lapide qui est extra animam et actu videndi qui est in 
oculo, nec est inconveniens quod ex talibus sic loco et situ separatis fiat vere unum ens copulatum.” 
 Likewise, just as we can denote the compounds formed 
89 Notice that ‘seen rock’ does not refer both to the rock and to the activity of seeing. Rather, it refers to that 
rock, but conveys or connotes that that rock is being perceived by the faculty of sight. Likewise, 
sentences in natural language refer only to the things which are the contents of their subject and predicate 
expressions, but also convey how those things are being used by the mind, i.e. as subjects and predicates. 
On the signification of sentences in natural language, see §6. 
90 With regard to the case of complex mental activity, one should not confuse intentio with a propositional 
attitude, or even (if there are such things, though Burley denies this) a more basic cognitive relation to a 
proposition. In complex mental activity, intentio is the mind’s intentional awareness of things in the 
world, but an awareness of them as structured relative to one another in some way. For example, the 
thought that Socrates is a human involves an awareness of Socrates and of the property of humanity, but 
as identical (in some respect, at least) to one another.   
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in simple activity with expressions like ‘seen rock’, we can denote the compounds 
formed in complex mental activity with expressions like that- or, in the Latin, quod-
clauses.91
 Though Burley’s comments on intentio are brief, his remarks make clear that 
intentio is the intentional awareness of the mind, characteristic of its cognitive and 
volitional activities. It is what accounts for our active engagement in perception and 
intellection, our directing our cognitive attention to various intentional objects. Moreover, 
in the case of one’s propositional attitudes at least, Burley associates awareness of this 
sort with cognitive agency.
   
92
And if someone were to ask by what is the intellect moved to make a copula of 
this sort, or a divisive or negative copula, it must be said that it is not moved 
except by those extremes in the statement, and by the will commanding the 
intellect to join together the extremes of the statement with one another or to 
divide the extremes from one another.
 
93                                                        
91 While Burley seems to favor quod-clauses, one can also denote a proposition in Latin with an infinitive 
plus accusative construction. 
  
92 I seems to me likely that Burley takes cognitive agency to be a necessary feature of all cognitive and 
volitional acts, not just complex cognitive activity, for two reasons. First, the claim that cognitive agency 
is a necessary feature of intentio is central to the Augustinian account from which Burley takes the notion 
of intentio. Second, Burley’s introduction of intentio  and his discussion of the role of the will in forming 
propositional content are introduced within a few paragraphs of one another. If cognitive agency is a 
necessary feature of all cognitive and volitional acts, however, it seems that cognitive agency has to be 
understood in a weaker way. That is, it seems cognitive agency need not be robustly volitional but rather, 
in the case of some mental acts at least, such as perceptual acts, can understood in merely functional or 
goal-directed terms. On issues of cognitive agency in Augustine’s account of intentio, see Scott 
MacDonald, “Augustine’s Cognitive Voluntarism in De Trinitate 11,” in Le De Trinitate de Saint 
Augustin : Exégèse, Logique et Noétique, ed. Emmanuel Bermon (Paris: Institut d’Etudes 
Augustiniennes, 2012), 235–50. 
93 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4va, text amended in light of 
ms Canon. Misc. 180, 13v; MS Canon. Misc 480, 13v; MS Bodleian 643, 18v: “Et si queratur a quo ergo 
movetur intellectus ad fabricandum huiusmodi copulam vel divisionem vel negationem copulae, 
dicendum quod non movetur nisi ab extremis ipsis in propositione et a voluntate imperante intellectui ad 
copulandum extrema adinvicem vel ad dividendum extrema abinvicem.” As the citation makes clear, 
Burley borrows the notion of intentio from Augustine. Augustine uses that notion to touch on issues of 
mental awareness and of cognitive agency, among others – just the sorts of features that are central to 
Burley own account of intentio. Augustine, for example, argues that intellection and perception both 
require three elements: an object, an informed perceptive or intellective faculty, and the intentio animi, 
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The impression of light onto our retinas, the production of a common perceptual 
experience from our various senses, even the production of our concepts – all of that is 
the effect of a passive causal process, something that happens to us rather than something 
that we do, in virtue of which our minds represent things in the world. But the formation 
of one’s beliefs and doubts (among other attitudes) – that is, the formation of various 
sorts of propositional content – is the result of one’s decision to so believe or doubt.94
 The notion of intentio provides a solution to the problems of the unity for the later 
account. Just as inherence, an irreducible feature of a form which binds that form to its 
matter, accounts for the unity of a hylomorphic compound, so too intentio is an 
irreducible feature that actualized mental powers have to their objects which binds acts of 
that sort to their objects, and so accounts for the unity of the proposition. On the later 
account, propositions are compounds of mental acts of predication and things, but what 
binds those acts to things is intentio, an intentional awareness characteristic of mental 
activity more broadly. Conceiving of the metaphysics of the proposition in this way also 
 To 
believe that Socrates is a human, for example, or that pop (or “soda”) is unhealthy, or that 
grading can wait until tomorrow finds its genesis in the decisions of the agent herself. On 
this picture, thinking-that is not passive but rather is the result of the exercise of one’s 
cognitive agency in a particular way, by training one’s attention on some things in such a 
way that it joins them together in a positive or negative fashion.    
                                                                                                                                                                     
the directedness of the soul, which he elsewhere describes as the soul’s will or desire. On Augustine on 
intentio, see Augustine, De trinitate, Opera 16 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1954), bk. 11, and esp. 11.2.2). 
94 I take the passage quoted above to suggest that the cognitive agency characteristic of propositional 
thought is robustly volitional, because of the robustly volitional vocabulary Burley himself employs. One 
might worry, however, that this sets the requirements for belief and other propositional attitudes too high, 
since that position requires that every single instance of propositional thought is explained, in part, by 
appeal to an agent’s decisions and choices. 
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allows Burley to clearly distinguish between questions of unity on the one hand and 
questions about representationality on the other. Recall that in his early account of the 
proposition the proposition’s unity was tied to its ability to represent, since propositions 
were understood to be accidents of the mind, whose being was wholly tied up in their 
representing the world’s being some way. In the later account, however, questions of 
representationality are addressed by the “form,” or structure, of the proposition – that is, 
the mental act of predicating. Propositions represent, on this conception, because their 
structure – the mental act of predication – is an exercise of a capacity to represent. But 
what accounts for the unity of the proposition – a structured whole composed of the 
exercise of that power and the things to which it is directed – is intentio, the power of the 
mind to be intentionally aware of things in the world.95
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 I have argued that, for Burley, a proposition is a structured entity, composed of 
things outside the mind by the mind’s predicating those things, where that predicating 
activity is the exercise of a capacity to conceive of the world’s being arranged in various 
ways. That general conception of the proposition is encouraged by three more basic                                                         
95 I am inclined to think that Burley’s later view is similar to an account of the proposition recently 
proposed by Scott Soames. On Soames’ view, propositions are event-types of the mind’s predicating one 
thing of another. (On Soames’ account, see Scott Soames, What Is Meaning? (Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 99–107). Intentio itself, I take it, constitutes the various and sundry events of mental life. 
While, then, a mental act of predicating and the things which it predicates might both be static (e.g. a 
state of the mind on the one hand and various substances on the other), what forms them into some 
unified thing is a dynamic process, namely, a certain awareness of the mind which can unite them, such 
that one perceives or thinks. However, Soames argues that questions of unity are fundamentally 
questions of representationality, suggesting that he views the relationship between the relevant event and 
act of predicating differently than does Burley. In that regard, Soames’ account seems more similar to 
Burley’s earlier account. Moreover, Burley’s account differs more generally from Soames’ because 
Burley takes propositions to be not types but rather tokens.  
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commitments. Burley’s commitment to compositionality and his commitment to 
referentialism jointly entail that propositions must be structured, and composed of things. 
Moreover, Burley’s commitment to intellectualism requires that propositions themselves 
are explained in terms of the exercise of a certain mental capacity to represent. 
  In trying to accommodate all three of those commitments in a way that 
withstands philosophical scrutiny, moreover, Burley’s account of the proposition evolves 
over the course of his career. In its first articulation, the proposition is taken to be an 
accidental feature of the mind, really identical to the act of predication by which it is 
formed. While composed of things outside the mind, the proposition itself inheres in the 
mind as a truth-conditional accident of it. That metaphysically suspect account is 
replaced later in Burley’s career with one which draws a comparison to hylomorphic 
compounds. On that later account, propositions are compounds of acts of predicating, on 
the one hand, and things towards which that activity is directed, on the other. But, unlike 
hylomorphic compounds, what accounts for the unity of the proposition is that intentional 
awareness characteristic of cognitive agency, which can unite the mind’s perceptive and 
intellective faculties with their objects, so that (in the case of complex mental activity) 
the mind forms compounds which represent the world’s being some way or other – that 
is, it forms propositions. 
 
6. APPENDIX: SENTENTIAL CONTENT AND THE COPULA 
 Burley’s explicit discussion of referentialism is restricted to sub-sentential 
categorematic expressions of natural language. However, Burley does believe that 
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statements, and sentences more generally, signify.96 In this appendix, then, I want to 
examine how sentences signify, on Burley’s account.97
 It is clear that the story of signification for sentences cannot be the same as the 
one Burley provides about sub-sentential expressions. Sub-sentential expressions have 
the contents they do by being freely imposed on things. Sentences, in contrast, don’t 
receive their contents by being freely imposed upon propositions. Rather, the content of a 
sentence is determined in some way by the expressions which make it up. We already 
have a little insight into that process, given Burley’s commitment to referentialism. 
‘Socrates is pale’ signifies the proposition that Socrates is pale, for example, in part 
because ‘Socrates’ and ‘pale’ signify Socrates and the property of paleness, 
respectively.
  
98
                                                        
96 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, g6rb: “A sentence is not true 
unless because it is significative of a true thing.” 
 Beyond that, however, we haven’t had much to say about how sentences 
signify propositions. And yet it is an extremely important issue, since Burley’s account of 
the proposition and the larger semantic theory of which it is a part are meant to provide, 
among other things, a sophisticated account of how communication works – how our uses 
of linguistic symbols and their combination serve to communicate our thoughts to one 
another. 
97 Burley argues that sentences, like nouns and verbs, signify ad placitum, or conventionally. But Burley 
rejects the view that one can make a sentence qua sentence signify whatever she wishes. In the 
Exp.Perih, for example, Burley argues that if one makes a sentence signify something through 
imposition, then that sentence will signify as a dictio, not as an oratio.  That is, that sentence will signify 
a simple thing, not a complex which bears sentential truth or falsity.  See  Super artem veterem Porphyrii 
et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, l2rb. 
98 Or, rather, ‘pale’ signifies a being per accidens, a complex object composed of the property of paleness 
and the property of substance. On beings per accidens, see ch. 5, §3.3, p. 275ff. 
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 Unfortunately, neither Burley’s commitment to referentialism and 
compositionality alone (nor even in combination with his commitment to intellectualism) 
explains how, for example, ‘Socrates is pale’ signifies the proposition that Socrates is 
pale. Referentialism and compositionality merely commit Burley to the claim that 
‘Socrates is pale’ signifies something which is an aggregate of paleness and Socrates. But 
pale Socrates, just as much as the proposition that Socrates is pale, fits that bill. 
Moreover, intellectualism is articulated wholly in terms of mental activity; it doesn’t 
address issues of the semantics of natural language at all. What we require is a bridge 
principle of sorts, that can connect Burley’s semantic commitments of referentialism and 
compositionality with his alethic commitment of intellectualism.  
 For Burley, every sentence fundamentally has a three-part, subject-copula-
predicate structure.99
                                                        
99 Burley suggests that a sentence will contain one of three copulae – past, present or future. Aspect, then, 
must be a part of the predicate, rather than a part of the copula.   
 Since every sentence contains that tripartite structure, and especially 
given the tripartite structure that the proposition has on the later theory, perhaps the most 
obvious response to those difficulties involves appeal to the role of the copula plays in a 
sentence. On this account, for example, ‘Socrates is pale’ signifies the proposition that 
Socrates is pale, rather than pale Socrates, because it contains a copula. This is, in fact, 
precisely the move that Burley will make; he argues that the copula makes an important 
contribution to determining the semantic content of a sentence that contains it, in virtue 
of which that sentence has a proposition, rather than something else, for its content. But a 
remaining – and perhaps far more interesting – issue concerns the nature of the 
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contribution that the copula makes to determining the semantic content of its sentence. It 
is the nature of that contribution that I turn to now. 
 An initially plausible suggestion is that the copula contributes to determining the 
content of its sentence in just the way that the subject and predicate do. So, just as the 
subject and predicate of some sentence each signify something, and what each signifies is 
constitutive of the proposition that that sentence signifies, so too the copula signifies 
something, which likewise is constitutive of the proposition. And, we might think, this 
picture fits especially well with Burley’s later account of the proposition, since that 
account says that propositions contain three parts: two things, and a mental act of 
predication which joins them together. Perhaps, then, the copula signifies the mental act 
of predication, in just the way that the subject and predicate expressions of a sentence 
signify the things which are the objects of that mental act.  
 However, this suggestion becomes far less plausible under more serious scrutiny. 
First, recall that, even on the later account of the proposition, the mental act of 
predication does not have the same relationship to the proposition as do the things which 
it predicates. At the most superficial level, mental acts of predication are “formal” parts 
of a proposition, whereas things are “material” parts. But that terminological difference 
reflects the very different roles that mental acts and things play in a proposition. Things 
are the objects of intentio; they are what the mind is directed at when it predicates one 
thing of another. Mental acts, on the other hand, are the sources of intentio. Rather than 
objects of cognition, they are the cognitive acts themselves. So it would be surprising if 
the copula determined the content of its sentence in just the way that subject and 
predicate terms do.  
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 Likewise, and a point deeply related to the last, signification is in part an 
epistemic notion. For an expression to signify something for someone is for that 
expression to “establish an understanding” of something, which for Burley means that 
that expression makes one think of it. But mental acts are not objects of cognition but 
rather sources of it. Burley’s account of the proposition would appear to entail, then, that, 
unlike the relationship between the terms of a sentence and the things of a proposition, 
the relationship of a copula to a mental act of predication, whatever it is, cannot be one of 
signification. 
 It should come as no surprise, then, that Burley denies that the copula helps 
determine the content of its sentence in just the way that its subject and predicate terms 
do. Instead, Burley argues that the copula is a completely different kind of expression 
than the subject and predicates terms of a sentence. The subject and predicate terms of a 
sentence are categorematic expressions (or at least expressions used categorematically). 
In contrast, Burley argues, the copula is a syncategorematic expression. In De puritate, 
for example, he writes that when ‘is’ “is predicated as a third component [i.e. as a 
copula], it is a syncategorematic expression.”100
                                                        
100 Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic, 139.  Note that Burley elsewhere distinguishes between 
two senses of predication, an immediate sense and a mediate sense.  The copula is immediately 
predicated of a predicate, since it is a syncategorematic term disposing the predicate relative to the 
subject, whereas a predicate is mediately predicated of a subject, namely, by the mediation of the copula.  
It is only this second sense of predication which Burley regards as proper predication.  See Ibid., 141; 
Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k6va. 
 The same view is expressed in the 
Exp.Perih, where Burley distinguishes between ‘is’ as a secundum adiaciens and as a 
tertium adiaciens, that is, between ‘is’ used existentially and ‘is’ used predicatively or, 
more generally, copulatively. He writes that “when [‘is’] is a secundum adiaciens, then it 
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is a categorematic expression, because then is signifies per se some nature, namely, the 
being of existence [esse existere], and when it is a tertium adiaciens, then it is a 
syncategorematic expression, signifying per se no nature determinately.”101
 We have already encountered the distinction between categorematic and 
syncategorematic expressions briefly, when we were explicating the notion of 
signification. The basic distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic 
expressions, recall, is that the former but not the latter establishes an understanding of 
something by itself.  For example, the term ‘human’ establishes by itself an 
understanding of humanity, because it is a categorematic expression. But since the copula 
is, according to Burley, a syncategorematic expression, it is unable to signify in that way.   
  
 While Burley’s claim that the copula is a syncategorematic expression is not 
novel, it was by no means the received view.102
                                                        
101 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, l1va.  Burley also expresses this 
view in the early part of his career.  See, e.g., Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” 75–6. 
 William of Sherwood, for example, 
rejects the view that the spoken copula is a syncategorematic term. He maintains instead 
that ‘is’ is always a categorematic term, which signifies being. When used predicatively, 
Sherwood claims that the significate of ‘is’ - that is, being itself - is “specified” by the 
significate of the term to which it is joined. For example, Sherwood writes that “when I 
say ‘A human is an animal’, the thing belonging to the verb ‘is’ is specified by 
102 This dispute over the nature of the spoken copula extended well into the 14th century. Ockham sides 
with Burley, claiming that the spoken copula is a syncategorematic term. John Buridan takes a position 
similar to Scotus, arguing that it signifies a mental concept (though Scotus’ own position is disputed in 
the literature; see n. 106).    
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‘animal’.”103
 Positions like Sherwood’s are at least partly motivated by a desire to maintain that 
the various uses of ‘is’ are univocal with one another. Sherwood argues that, just as the 
existential ‘is’ signifies being, so too the predicative ‘is’ signifies being, even if 
ultimately specified in a particular way. That motivation was not peculiar to Sherwood. 
Peter Abelard, for example, argues that “there is always an existential import in its [i.e. 
the copula’s] linkage.”
  Since ‘is’ is specified in this way, we understand being not qua being but 
rather qua animal. Sherwood justifies the claim that the significate of ‘is’ “passes into,” 
e.g., the significate of ‘animal’ because he regards ‘is’ as an essential part of the predicate 
itself. According to Sherwood, then, all sentences are analyzable into a two-part 
structure: a subject and a predicate, the latter perhaps a grammatically complex aggregate 
of the copula and a substantival or adjectival expression.   
104
‘is’ [esse] is equivocal to a thing of first intention and [a thing] of second 
intention, because when ‘is’ signifies a thing of first intention, then it is able to be 
 But even those medieval philosophers who were willing to 
allow that the various uses of ‘is’ might be equivocal with one another did not necessarily 
go on to adopt the position that the copula is a syncategorematic expression. For example, 
in his theory of the copula, John Duns Scotus concedes that the significate of the copula 
is distinct from that of the existential ‘is’. But Scotus does not thereby conclude that the 
copula is a syncategorematic expression. On the contrary, Scotus argues that ‘is’ is 
equivocal between two sorts of significates. He writes that  
                                                        
103 William of Sherwood, William of Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic Words, ed. Norman 
Kretzmann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1968), 91–2. 
104 Peter Abelard, Glossae Magistri Petri Abaelardi Super Librum Perihermenerias, ed. Klaus Jacobi and 
Strub Christian, vol. 206, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 
360:15–8. 
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predicated by saying ‘A human is’, [...] but ‘is’ as something uniting is not 
predicated.105
 
   
According to Scotus, then, the existential ‘is’ is a term of first intention, signifying being 
itself or the being of existence.106
                                                        
105 John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Metaphysica, Ed. minor, vol. Vol. 1, Opera Philosophica, Opera 
Omnia (Alberobello (Bari): AGA, 1998), lib. 5, q. 1 (pp. 58–9).   
 As Scotus remarks in the same passage, to say ‘A 
human is’ is to say ‘A human is existing’.  (He neglects to discuss whether the ‘is’ of this 
analyzed sentence is part of the predicate or whether, independent of the predicate, it is 
used predicatively.) Scotus argues that the predicative ‘is’, in contrast, is a term of second 
intention. Unlike things signified by terms of first intention, which are things in the world 
that are conceived by an intellect, things signified by terms of second intention are, 
according to Scotus, entirely mental creations, relational concepts that relate one thing of 
first or second intention to another thing of first or second intention.  ‘Genus’, for 
example, signifies a relational concept that holds of some common essence, a thing of 
first intention, relative to another common essence. Thus ‘genus’ is a term of second 
intention, and it signifies a mental concept. In the same way, the ‘is’ of predication is a 
relational concept, representing the identity or diversity of two things, whether those 
things are inside or outside of the mind. For Scotus, then, the copula is a term of second 
intention, which signifies that relational concept. Consequently, the signification of a 
sentence of natural language is simply a matter of adding together the significates of its 
three parts.  
106 Scotus’ own view of signification is controversial.  Some have argued that Scotus maintains that spoken 
words immediately signify concepts, and things only mediately.  See Stephan Meier-Oeser, “Walter 
Burley’s Propositio in Re and the Systematization of the Ordo Significationis,” in Philosophical Debates 
at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, by Stephen Brown (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 491–2.  But Giorgio 
Pini has argued that Scotus never takes a position, merely illustrating reasons for and against each of the 
two main views.  See Pini, “Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries.” 
168  
 
 
 Scotus’s theory is clearly quite different from Sherwood’s. Whereas Sherwood 
argues that there are two parts to every sentence, Scotus recognizes three. In fact, it is 
precisely because Scotus argues that there are three parts in every sentence, rather than 
two, that he is able to allow for an equivocation between the ‘is’ of existence and the ‘is’ 
of predication. The former is a predicate (or, at least, includes the predicate), and so must 
be a term of first intention, whereas the latter is not the predicate, and so needn’t signify 
the same things as the ‘is’ of existence. However, despite their differences, both 
Sherwood and Scotus believe that the copula is a categorematic expression, which 
“establishes an understanding” of something. For Sherwood, it signifies being specified 
in some way; for Scotus, it signifies a particular second intention. Burley, however, 
denies that the copula is a categorematic expression, and so denies that the copula itself 
signifies some particular thing. But, then, what does the copula do, on Burley’s account? 
 To answer that question, we need to examine the semantic role of 
syncategorematic expressions generally. Giving a precise definition of a 
syncategorematic term is difficult, especially when the notion is analyzed logically rather 
than grammatically.107
                                                        
107 Norman Kretzmann argues that the logician’s interest in syncategorematic terms stems from an earlier 
interest in linguistic fallacies, many of them due to the presence of terms lacking any clear significatum 
of their own.  While many of these were classified by the grammarians as syncategorematic terms, other 
were not.  Thus, while the logician borrowed the term ‘syncategorema’ from the grammarian, and the 
class of syncategoremata for the logician was largely extensional with that for the grammarian, the 
logician’s interest in syncategorematic terms and classification of those terms as syncategorematic was 
largely pragmatic.   Kretzmann writes that “the [logical] notion [of syncategoremata] persisted and 
evolved because of its usefulness and not because it picked out a clearly recognisable category of 
linguistic or logical entities” (Norman Kretzmann, “Syncategoremata, Exponibilia, Sophismata,” in The 
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 213.   
 Sherwood defines syncategorematic terms as “determinations of 
169  
 
 
principle parts insofar as they are subjects or predicates.”108 Thus Sherwood distinguishes 
syncategorematic expressions from those words which determine categorematic 
expressions but not as a subject or as a predicate, such as prepositions. Burley largely 
agrees with Sherwood on this point; syncategorematic expressions modify subject and/or 
predicate terms. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, logicians in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries include in the list of syncategorematic expressions the standard quantifiers, 
negation and the logical connectives, as well as modal expressions. They also typically 
include exceptive and exclusive expressions, such as ‘besides’, ‘only’, and ‘alone’. The 
function of these syncategorematic expressions is to modify the semantic properties of 
the categorematic expressions to which they are joined. Gyula Klima, a contemporary 
scholar of medieval philosophy, for example, notes that “syncategorematic terms, when 
they are taken significatively, are imposed to exercise the logical functions of modifying 
the semantic functions of categorematic terms with which they are construed [...].”109
                                                        
108 William of Sherwood, William of Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic Words, 15.  Peter of Spain 
provides a similar definition, stating that a syncategorematic term signifies a “disposition that belongs to 
a subject insofar as it is a subject or a predicate insofar as it is a predicate” (Peter of Spain, 
Syncategoreumata, ed. L.M. De Rijk and Joke Spruyt (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), 38–9.).  While Burley 
thinks some syncategorematic terms dispose the composition, and not merely one of its terms, his view 
of syncategorematic terms is in general agreement with Sherwood and Peter’s.   
 
Categorematic expressions, on this account, provide content. ‘Socrates’, for example, 
brings Socrates to mind, and ‘pale Socrates’ brings pale Socrates to mind. 
Syncategorematic expressions, in contrast, don’t bring along additional content; rather, 
they modify how that content is used. 
109 Gyula Klima, “Syncategoremata,” October 3, 2004, 6, 
http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/Elsevier/Syncategoremata.pdf. 
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 Because syncategorematic expressions modify, rather than provide, semantic 
content, Burley suggests that syncategorematic expressions do not signify anything in 
addition to the things signified by the categorematic expressions to which they are 
joined.110 In particular, they do not signify how something ought to be used.111 Rather,  
Burley writes that they convey [importat] those uses.112  While the notion of ‘convey’ 
that Burley uses seems to me to be at best quasi-technical, Burley’s use of that notion in 
this text suggests that to convey is to bring about the relevant kind of use on the part of 
the mind of the things which it thinks about.113 This reading of ‘convey’ fits with what 
Burley has to say about the function of syncategorematic expressions in language. 
According to Burley, “syncategorematic words exercise acts and adjectival verbs signify 
such acts.”114
                                                        
110 See Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic, 27. 
 In other words, the primary function of a categorematic expression (such as 
adjectival verbs) is to have a certain content, whereas the primary function of a 
111 This is a difference between Burley and Sherwood as well. Sherwood and his pupil Peter of Spain, for 
example, held that syncategorematic terms signify certain ways that the categorematic terms to which it 
is joined are. “[W]hen I say ‘every man is running’, the word ‘every’, which is a universal sign, does not 
signify that something belonging to ‘man’ is universal, but rather than ‘man’ is a universal subject [i.e. is 
universally a subject]” (William of Sherwood, William of Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic 
Words, 15). 
112 Peter does think that syncategorematic terms signify in a way different than categorematic terms, since 
syncategorematic terms do not signify a thing, but rather signify a mode.  Perhaps, then, Peter’s sense of 
‘signification’ in this context is roughly equivalent to that of Burley’s sense of ‘convey’.  See Peter of 
Spain, Syncategoreumata, 38–41. 
113 For places in which Burley uses the term ‘convey’, see Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in 
Librum Perihermeneias,” 273; Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Perihermeneias,” 75; Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic, 26. 
114 Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic, 25–6. On the history of the distinction between 
signifying and exercising, see Gabriel Nuchelmans, “The Distinction Actus Exercitus / Actus 
Significatus in Mediaeval Semantics,” in Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in 
Memory of Jan Pinborg, ed. Norman Kretzmann, 1st ed. (Springer, 1988), esp. 66–70. 
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syncategorematic expression is to exercise a particular use of that content. For example, 
Burley writes that “the quantifier ‘every’ exercises distribution; the verb ‘distribute’ 
signifies distribution.”115 In ‘every human is an animal’, then, ‘every’ does not signify 
some modification of ‘human’ but rather modifies the way ‘human’ functions, such that 
that ‘human’ signifies humanity as universally distributed.116
 In addition to quantifiers, the logical connectives, and modal expressions, Burley 
argues that the copula is a syncategorematic expression as well. That he includes the 
copula on this list is motivated, in part, by the fact that it pertains to expressions only 
insofar as they are subject or predicate terms. Burley writes in De puritate that the copula 
is “the mere putting together of the subject with the predicate.”
  
117 As a syncategorematic 
expression, however, the copula does not signify that act of putting together. Rather, “the 
verb ‘is’ exercises predication, and the verb ‘is predicated’ signifies predication.”118  
Unlike Scotus’s mature view, then, according to which the copula signifies the putting 
together of a subject with a predicate, Burley argues that the copula serves to perform that 
very function itself.119
                                                        
115 Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic, 26. 
  That difference is due precisely to their different views of the kind 
116 This point of view seems more strongly held later in his career.  In the Quaes.Perih, for example, Burley 
remarks that syncategorematic words signify in the way of a mode, whereas categorematic words signify 
in the way of a thing.  This claim is absent in his De puritate. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s 
Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” 212–3. 
117 Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic, 139–40. 
118 Ibid., 25–6.  
119 Cesalli argues that, for Burley, the spoken copula signifies the composition of the subject with the 
predicate. See Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” 101. However, Cesalli gives no evidence for this claim, and 
the point is made when discussing the passage from De puritate on the property of copulatio that we 
have just considered, which seems to militate against such a position. 
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of word the copula is. Since the copula is a categorematic term for Scotus, it must signify 
something, and that is, according to Scotus, some relational concept which joins together 
subjects and predicates. For Burley, in contrast, the copula does not signify some mental 
concept but rather brings about the predicative use of various things.      
 But how, exactly, does the spoken copula carry out that function?  Burley 
addresses that question most fully in the Exp.Perih.  Quoting Aristotle, who writes that a 
verb is “a mark [nota] of something said of another,” Burley argues that, once we analyze 
a given sentence into its deeper, three-part syntactic structure, it becomes clear that the 
verb Aristotle references in this passage is the copula itself, and that this verb is what 
serves to mark out the predicate term.120  Furthermore, Burley claims, the copula is not 
only a mark of the predicate but likewise a mark of the subject.121
When it is said that Aristotle says that a verb is a mark of a predicate and not a 
subject, I say that since Aristotle says that a verb is a mark of those which are said 
of another, the subject is touched upon just as much as the predicate, because if 
something is said to be said of another, two [things] are touched upon - on 
   
                                                        
120 De Interpretatione 16b24-5.  See Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, 
Exp.Perih, k6va.  We find the same claim in the Comm.Perih.  See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s 
Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” 71.  It is also important to note that Burley justifies 
in both passages his claim that the verb is not part of the predicate because it is a mark of the predicate, 
arguing that “nothing is a mark of itself [...] Given that a verb is a mark of a predicate, it follows that a 
verb is not the predicate.”  But it is clear that Burley operates with a different account of ‘mark’ than, e.g. 
William of Sherwood, who argues that a mark is nothing other than a sign.  See William of Sherwood, 
William of Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic Words, 91. 
121 In this regard, Burley’s views change quite radically from the Comm.Perih to the Exp.Perih.  In the 
Comm.Perih, Burley claims that the copula holds more greatly on the part of the predicate than on the 
part of the subject, because “a verb is that which inheres in another [i.e., as a predicate] and it not that to 
which something inheres [i.e., as a subject]” (Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” 71.  In the Exp.Perih, Burley completely rejects his former view that the 
verb is something which inheres in another, and with that rejection comes a rejection of the view that the 
verb holds itself on the part of the predicate more so than on the part of the subject.  Another issue 
deserving of more study is Burley’s relationship to what are regarded in the literature as the two theories 
of the copula live in the medieval period: the inherence theory and the identity theory.  Burley is typically 
identified as an identity theorist, but his comments in Comm.Perih at least suggest that, at best, the issue 
is more complex and nuanced than the literature recognizes. 
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account of that which is said, namely the predicate, and that about which is it is 
said, namely, the subject.122
 
   
Because a verb is a mark of something which is said of another, that verb needs to mark 
that thing of which it is said as well, if it is to mark what is itself said of another. In other 
words, ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ are relative terms, such that to indicate in some way that 
something is to be a predicate requires that one indicate as well that thing of which it is a 
predicate to be a subject.123
 How the copula carries out that function is due to the effect it has on the intellect 
itself. In the Exp.Perih, Burley argues that “when it is said that a verb is a mark of those 
things which are said of another, it is denoted [denotatur] that a verb is the principle 
[principium] of thinking something of another, namely, the predicate of a subject.”
 It is the copula’s role of marking the subject as subject and 
predicate as predicate in which the copula carries out its function of joining the subject to 
the predicate.     
124 As 
a mark of the subject as subject and the predicate as predicate, the copula conveys to the 
intellect that what each term signifies must be understood as a subject and as a predicate, 
respectively.125
                                                        
122 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k6va: “Et cum dicitur quod 
philosophus dicit quod verbum est nota predicati et non subiecti, dico quod cum philosophus dicit 
verbum esse nota eorum qu[a]e de altero dicitur, tangitur tam subiectum quam predicatum, quia si dicitur 
aliquid dici de alio, tanguntur duo, secundum illud quod dicit, scilicet, predicatum, et illud de quo dicitur, 
scilicet, subiectum.” 
 But to conceive of the significata of these terms in this way is nothing 
123 Peter of Spain notes explicitly that these terms are relatives.  See Peter of Spain, Syncategoreumata, 39–
40. 
124 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k6va. 
125 In the Exp.Perih, Burley does not use the term ‘convey’, importat, but rather the term ‘notify’, notificat.  
See  Ibid., Exp.Perih, k6va.  In either case, it is not a relationship of signification, in the Aristotelian 
sense. 
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other than to carry out a mental act in which the latter is joined as a predicate to the 
former as a subject, because of the relative nature of subjects and predicates. The 
presence of the copula, therefore, affects how the other expressions of its sentence are 
understood, that is, in what way their contents are to be cognized. Thus, on account of the 
copula, the mind predicates the thing signified by the predicate term of the thing signified 
by the subject term, thereby producing a proposition. For example, ‘Socrates is a human’ 
conveys to the mind that humanity is to be predicated of Socrates, and humanity being 
predicated of Socrates just is the proposition that Socrates is a human.      
 In classifying the copula as a syncategorematic expression, then, Burley provides 
himself with a way to bridge his semantic commitments, on the one hand, with his 
commitment to intellectualism and the larger account of the proposition that that 
motivates, on the other. As a syncategorematic expression, the copula has no semantic 
content, that is, it does not refer to anything. In particular, it does not refer to a mental act 
of predication. Rather, it marks out for someone competent in the language that various 
expressions are to be understood as subjects and predicates relative to one another. But to 
understand various expressions to be subjects and predicates relative to one another is, on 
Burley’s account, nothing other than to actually predicate what the predicate refers to of 
what the subject refers to – which is to say, to form a proposition. It is, I think, a 
sophisticated and fascinating move, one perfectly suited to the account of propositional 
content he wants to defend.   
 One final note on the metaphysical implications that that account has for the 
semantics of syncategorematic expressions generally, implications which I think have 
some relevance for contemporary debates. Standard contemporary approaches to 
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quantifier expressions, for example, hold that quantifier expressions have as their content 
second-order properties.126
I concede that a universal statement has being in the mind [i.e. that there are 
universal propositions], because even if there was no spoken utterance, a human 
could syllogize, and a syllogism requires universal statements, and therefore there 
is something universal which is not spoken. And I concede that a true thing 
outside the soul is distributed, because to be distributed is nothing other than to be 
divided into [its] supposits, so that it is resolved into diverse supposits.
 But Burley’s account suggests that there aren’t any such 
second-order properties. ‘Every’, for example, carries with it no commitment to a second-
order property of distribution, because ‘every’ has no such property as its content. Indeed, 
it does not refer to anything at all. However, this is not to say that syncategorematic 
expressions are meaningless. On the contrary, they are essential to the meaning of a 
sentence which contains them. But what they do is express formal features of the 
proposition, by conveying how the referents of the sentence are to be used, rather than 
what the referents of that sentence are. For example, Burley argues that universal 
propositions involve the distribution of a term of that proposition.  
127
 
  
Distribution, then, is something that is done to a term in a proposition. But what does the 
distributing just is the mind, in the same way that it is the mind which predicates one term 
of another. 
                                                        
126 In his What is Meaning?, Scott Soames calls this the Frege-Russell view. See Soames, What Is 
Meaning?, 122–9. He also mentions, but never fully explores, the account of quantification that Burley 
adopts. 
127 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.643, p. 254: “Tu 
quaeres: Si enunciatio sic habeat esse in mente talis enunciatio est alicuius quantitatis, ita quod aliqua est 
universalis; igitur pars illius enunciationis distinguitur et ita vera res extra animam distinguitur; d 
icendum est: Concedo quod propositio universalis habet esse in mente quia etsi nulla vox esset prolata 
adhuc posset homo syllogizare et syllogismus non fit sine propositione universali, et ideo aliqua est 
universalis quae non est prolata. Et concedo quod vera res extra animam distinguitur, quia distingui non 
est aliud quam in supposita dividi ita quod salvetur in diversis suppositis; sed nulla universalis quae habet 
esse extra animam habet esse in diversis suppositis ita quod salvatur in quolibet.” 
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 This is a kind of ontological parsimony only made possible by the particular 
account of the proposition that he develops. For Burley, the proposition that a human is 
an animal and the proposition that every human is an animal are about exactly the same 
things, namely the properties of humanity and animality. Consequently, the contain the 
very same terms. They differ, rather, in their formal aspects, that is, in the mental acts 
involved in the production of each. The latter act universally distributes the property of 
humanity, whereas the former does not. However, both acts are still the same kind of 
thing: a mental act of predication. And if one concedes that we need folk-theoretic 
entities like acts of thinking and belief anyway, then that view seems to have a distinct 
ontological advantage, since it is does not require second-order properties of 
quantification and the like. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROPOSITIONS AS MENTAL CONTENTS: 
MENTAL LANGUAGE AND THE NATURE OF THOUGHT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 In chapter 3, I examined the metaphysics of the proposition. But that examination 
is, in at least one key respect, incomplete. As we saw, Burley is committed to 
intellectualism, the thesis that representing the world’s being some way or other is 
fundamentally something that the mind does. It does this, Burley argues, by predicating 
one thing of another. But what explains the ability of the mind to predicate one thing of 
another? Is this merely some primitive capacity of the mind, or can some explanation of 
that capacity be given? 
 Since the mind’s predicating one thing of another is some complex act that the 
mind undertakes, resolving those questions requires a thorough investigation of the 
metaphysics of complex mental activity itself. It is that project that I pursue in this 
chapter. Unsurprisingly, many of the most interesting and difficult features of Burley’s 
account of the proposition find their genesis in that act. In his earlier theory of the 
proposition, for example, a proposition just is a mental act of predication. Because that 
act represents things are related to one another as subject and predicate terms, however, 
Burley argues that that act contains as parts those things, even thought those things exist 
outside the mind. Likewise, in the mature theory, even though Burley argues that that act 
is merely one part of a proposition, and so not itself composed of the things that it 
employs, it is in virtue of that act, and that act’s necessarily having a certain intentio 
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towards things, that the proposition has the structure, the unity, and indeed the meaning 
that it does.1
 In this chapter, therefore, I intend to examine why mental acts of predication are 
necessarily representational, in virtue of which the propositions they necessarily compose 
constitute contents. To understand why mental acts are acts of predicating one thing of 
another, and why such activity represents, we need to introduce a new notion: mental 
language. A mental language, just as a language generally, contains symbols that have 
both semantic and syntactic properties. Given that syntax, more complex symbols can be 
generated from the basic symbols of the language, and likewise from symbols which 
themselves were generated in that language. Moreover, language requires that certain 
symbols can be combined in a law-like way to produce clauses, whose content is 
propositional. A language is mental, however, if the basic symbols of the language are 
realized by representational features of the mind, and if following the syntactic rules of 
the language is realized in the mind’s producing more complex symbols from less 
complex symbols in a way that is sensitive to the syntactic features of those symbols.  
 
 Burley defends an account of mental language. According to Burley, the mind 
contains concepts, mental qualities with both semantic and syntactic properties. Those 
qualities, consequently, can be combined to form more complex concepts. Both simple 
and complex concepts, on Burley’s account, signify things in the world. Additionally, 
                                                            
1 In fact, in the Exp.Perih, Burley describes truth not as the correspondence of a proposition but rather of a 
virtus cognoscentis, that is, a power of the thinking individual to a relation of identity or non-identity. 
See Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), 
Exp.Perih, k4rb. This later account of correspondence involves the correspondence of the mental act of 
predication to relations of identity or non-identity in the world. See ch. 5, §5, pp. 304–6 and n. 87, and 
appendix D, pp. 407–11. 
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those concepts can be predicated of one another, where the mind’s predicating one 
concept of another constitutes a clause, or sentence, in mental language. Mental sentences 
of those sort signify propositions, the terms of a mental sentence signifying the terms of 
the proposition that it expresses. 
 Moreover, the mental language that Burley defends is motivated by his larger 
defense of a language of thought. The language of thought hypothesis combines a 
commitment to a mental language with the thesis that propositional attitudes are 
explained in terms of more immediate relations that the mind bears to mental sentences, 
whose contents are propositions. Thinking, then, is fundamentally a causal process, in 
which the processes of thought are sensitive to the syntactic structures of the concepts of 
the mind. For Burley, the mind’s predicating one thing of another is explained in terms of 
the mind’s predicating concepts which refer to those things. Thinking – and in particular 
deductive thought – is thus explained computationally, in terms of the mental sentences 
that the mind possesses. As Burley recognizes, deduction is a formal process, so that the 
generation of new sentences from sentences the mind already has requires sensitivity only 
to the syntactic features of those previously-acquired mental sentences. Moreover, since 
computations which are sensitive to syntax preserve relevant semantic features, the 
mind’s process of symbol manipulation and its deductive operations on mental sentences 
explains the semantic coherence of thought. And so the ability of the mind to predicate 
one thing of another is explained in terms of the mind’s ability to predicate one concept 
of another, which concepts represent those things. Burley’s endorsement of the language 
of thought hypothesis thus provides him with an explanation of the representational 
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character of the act of predicating, articulated in terms of the formal features of that act 
and the semantic contents of the concepts upon which it operates.  
 That account allows Burley to address a worry about his account of the 
proposition having to do with the substitutability salva veritate of co-referring terms in 
intentional contexts. Indeed, it is this worry, rather than a desire to explain the 
representational character of complex mental activity, that primarily drives Burley’s 
commitment to the language of thought hypothesis. Burley expresses this worry mainly 
with respect to demonstrative science. Burley’s theory of demonstrative science requires 
that, in certain contexts at least, co-referring terms cannot be substituted salva veritate. 
For example, Burley argues that one can know that a human is capable of laughter 
without knowing that a rational animal is capable of laughter. However, ‘human’ and 
‘rational animal’ are co-referring terms. Given Burley’s commitment to referentialism, 
then, one might expect that they can be substituted salva vertitate, since they are 
equivalent in content.  
 To justify his claim that, in intentional contexts at least, co-referring terms cannot 
always be substituted salva veritate, Burley suggests that propositional attitudes which 
contain the same content can be distinguished more finely than that content. Those 
attitudes can be individuated more finely because acts of predicating one thing of another 
are more fundamentally acts of predicating one concept of another, where those concepts 
represent those things. The belief that Socrates is a human differs from the belief that 
Socrates is a rational animal, on this account, because the former belief is an act of 
predicating HUMAN of SOCRATES, where the latter is a predicating RATIONAL 
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ANIMAL of SOCRATES – though both, as a consequence, have the same content, in 
which humanity is predicated of Socrates.  
 I will proceed in four stages. First, I will introduce the notion of a mental 
language, discussing the what features a language of that sort has, and then argue that 
Burley defends a theory of mental language. Second, I will explain the language of 
thought hypothesis, and argue that Burley defends a non-canonical version of it. 
Canonically, propositional attitudes are regarded as relations to propositional contents. 
According to Burley’s non-canonical version, propositional attitudes are interpreted not 
as relations but as acts, so that the mind’s belief that Socrates is a human, for example, 
just is the mind’s predicating humanity of Socrates assertively. Third, I will introduce 
Burley’s account of demonstrative science, and of a certain kind of demonstration – a 
demonstration of the highest sort – in particular, emphasizing Burley’s recognition of a 
seeming conflict between his account of demonstrative science, on the one hand, and his 
commitment to referentialism, and the larger account of the proposition that it motivates, 
on the other. Finally, I will explain how Burley uses the language of thought hypothesis 
to address the problems that arise, given his account of the proposition, on the one hand, 
and the particular account of demonstrative science he endorses, on the other. 
 
2. MENTAL LANGUAGE 
2.1. The Nature of Mental Language 
 In his book Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham, Clause 
Panaccio suggests that the idea of a mental language originated with William Ockham in 
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the late 1310s and early 1320s.2 Other scholars – notably Peter King – have argued that 
the idea was developed far earlier, by Peter Abelard in the eleventh century.3 I don’t have 
any position on whether Abelard developed a mental language. But I do think there is 
significant evidence that Ockham was beaten to the punch if not by centuries then at least 
by a matter of a few years, since Burley seems to me to have developed a theory of 
mental language (or, a sketch of a theory, at least) as early as the late 1300s.4
                                                            
2 See Claude Panaccio, Le discours intérieur: de Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham (Paris: Seuil, 1999), 17–26. 
See also Claude Panaccio, “From Mental Word to Mental Language,” Philosophical Topics 20, no. 2 
(1992): 125–47. 
 In this 
section, therefore, I argue that Burley himself developed and defended a theory of mental 
language. To do this, I plan to discuss the nature of mental language, and then to argue 
that Burley defends a theory of that sort. I also plan to investigate, at various points, 
whether that theory is philosophically satisfying. 
3 See Peter King, “Abelard on Mental Language,” American Philosophical Quarterly 81, no. 2 (2007): 
169–87. For Panaccio’s response to King’s claim, see Claude Panaccio, “Mental Language and 
Predication: Ockham and Abelard,” Analytica 14, no. 2 (n.d.): 189–93. 
4 Commitment to a mental language seems to me to be a rather minimal affair. All one needs is a 
commitment to two  claims: that the mind contains mental representations, and that those representations 
can be combined in some way rule-governed way to produce mental sentences, that is, representations 
with propositional content, whose content depends in some way on the representations that compose it. It 
does not require, on my view, that one specify how those representations have their content, or the 
principles by which they can be combined so as to produce mental representations with propositional 
content. In this respect, then, I disagree with Clause Panaccio, who argues that a “full-fledged theory” 
theory of mental language requires “the grammaticalization of thought on the one hand, and a 
compositional approach to the truth-conditions of mental propositions, on the other,” where a 
compositional approach requires an explanation of “how to get from the semantical properties of simple 
concepts to the semantical properties of mental propositions” (Panaccio, “Mental Language and 
Predication: Ockham and Abelard,” 186; 189). That said, I think we can still distinguish between those 
accounts of mental language that, qua mental language, are deserving of philosophical interest and 
sustained research, and those which are not. Presumably, those which deserve philosophical interest will 
be those accounts which, among other things, do articulate the grammatical features of concepts and the 
rules by which they can be combined into sentences – which is just to say that philosophically interesting 
accounts of mental language will explain, rather than merely assume, the syntax of that language. They 
would also, I suggest, give some account of the semantics of concepts, and an explanation of how mental 
language fits into a larger account of cognition and (perhaps) language. 
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 To understand what mental language is, I suggest that we begin with 
considerations about language in general. Language requires, first, basic symbols, that is, 
symbols which are not themselves derived from other symbols of the language. As 
symbols, they will have a certain content, or meaning. As symbols of a language, 
however, they require more than mere content possession. Rather, those symbols must 
also have syntactic properties. 
 Why do linguistic symbols need a syntax? Because there are plenty of non-
linguistic symbols in the world; something’s merely being symbolic does not ensure that 
it is linguistic. A picture of Justin Verlander is about Justin Verlander. That is, that 
picture represents Justin Verlander, or has him as its content. It is, in other words, a 
symbol of Justin Verlander. What distinguishes linguistic symbols from non-linguistic 
symbols, however, is that linguistic symbols can be combined in such a way that (1) their 
combination is itself contentful and (2) the content of that combination is explained by 
appeal to the meaning of those symbols themselves, and their syntax. ‘Justin Verlander’ 
and ‘is the best active pitcher in major league baseball’ can be combined to form the 
sentence ‘Justin Verlander is the best active pitcher in major league baseball’, a sentence 
which itself has some (unfortunately false, as of late) content, and where the content that 
it has is itself articulated in terms of the meanings of ‘Justin Verlander’ and ‘is the best 
active pitcher in major league baseball’, and the grammatical rules that allow them to be 
combined given their syntactic properties. The picture of Justin Verlander, in contrast, 
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doesn’t seem able to be combined with other things so as to produce a complex, 
meaningful expression of that sort.5
 As a language, then, mental language requires that there are certain basic symbols 
which (1) have content, and (2) are governed by a combinatorial syntax. But, as a mental 
language, those features must be realized in particular ways. First, the basic symbols of 
mental language must be representational entities or features of the mind, which we can 
call concepts. Those concepts, as basic symbols of a language, must themselves have 
both content and a combinatorial syntax. Consequently, there must be a grammar of 
mental language. That grammar will govern the ways in which the mind can manipulate 
concepts so as to form more complex concepts and mental sentences out of them; that is, 
the operations that the mind can perform on those concepts will be constrained by the 
syntactic properties of those concepts.  
  
 This syntax need not be as complex as the syntax of natural language. In fact, 
Burley suggests that the syntax that governs mental processes is far less complex than 
Latin, for example. In the Quaes.Perih, Burley argues that “grammatical modes of 
signifying are borrowed from the modes of thinking [...], but it does not follow from this 
that the parts of a sentence in the mind have some modes of signifying, such as case.”6
                                                            
5 Of course, there could be languages which are pictorial, such that basic symbols of the language are 
pictures that have semantic properties. As symbols in a language, the combination of those pictures will 
be syntactically constrained, so that the meaning of their combination is articulated in terms of the 
contents of those pictures and the syntax of that combination. 
 
According to Burley, the syntactic rules that natural language (i.e. the “grammatical 
modes of signifying”) are in part derived from the syntax that governs thought. But that 
6 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen Brown, Franciscan 
Studies 34 (1974): para. 3.643, p. 254. 
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does not mean that all the syntactic features of natural language, such as case or gender 
for example, are features of mental language as well. The reason, it seems, is that some of 
the syntax of natural language is not content-determining. 7
 Beyond the way in which mental language realizes the semantic and syntactic 
features of language, however, mental language also distinguishes itself from natural 
language in one key respect. Mental language, unlike natural language, is unlearned.
 One implication for mental 
language, then, is that the syntax needs to be only as robust as meaning demands.  
8 
Natural languages are languages which are learned by users of that language. According 
to Burley, for example, participants in a natural language learn the language by 
associating expressions in that language with things in the world. More fundamentally, 
however, it is a psychological process of pairing those expressions with concepts.9
                                                            
7 Ockham is far more explicit about this, writing that “gender and declension are grammatical features 
peculiar to spoken and written names. These features are not necessary to signification” (William 
Ockham, Summa Logicae, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gal, and Stephen Brown, vol. 1, Opera 
Philosophica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1978), pt. 1, ch. 3, pp. 11–4). On the whole, 
Ockham is far more explicit and detailed about the syntactic features of mental language than Burley. 
Perhaps this should not be surprising, since (a) Ockham’s nominalism requires a more sophisticated 
account of meaning and cognition, and, (b) unlike Burley, Ockham does not have a further account of the 
proposition, in addition to his account of mental language, towards which he puts his philosophical 
resources.  
 
8 Contemporary proponents of the language of thought hypothesis are divided whether concepts – the basic 
symbols of mental language – are innate, with an assumption among some that, if such symbols were not 
innate, they would need to be learned. And mental language cannot be learned, so the story goes, because 
language learning itself has to be articulated in terms of pairing expressions to be learned to symbols in a 
language of thought. For a recent defense of the nativist hypothesis, see Jerry Fodor, LOT 2: The 
Language of Thought Revisited (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010), 129–68. In contrast to nativists, 
however, Burley argues that basic concepts are acquired via one’s causal interaction with the world, 
writing that the intellect is “as if a tabula rasa, in which nothing is depicted, since a tabula rasa in which 
nothing is depicted is ready to receive any picture whatsoever without throwing out another” (Walter 
Burley, “The De potentiis animae of Walter Burley,” ed. M.J. Kitchel, Mediaeval Studies 33 (1971): 
para. 133, p. 111). The crucial issue between nativists such as Fodor and non-nativists such as Burley is 
whether abstraction – the process by which concepts with general content would be formed if they are 
non innate – involves inferential practices. Burley, I take it, would deny that the process of abstraction 
constitutes induction.  
9 See Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k3rb–va. See also Walter 
Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.7, pp. 211–2; Walter Burley, 
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Learning the meaning of ‘cat’, for example, is fundamentally a process of subordinating 
‘cat’ to the concept CAT, so that comprehension of ‘cat’ involves use of the concept 
CAT. Mental language, in contrast, is not acquired via such association. Indeed, as 
Burley’s account of natural language acquisition implies, language learning presupposes 
that one already possesses concepts.  
2.2. Burley on Concepts I: Semantics 
 If Burley defends a theory of mental language, his account will require concepts 
which have both semantic and syntactic properties. In this section, I intend to investigate 
Burley’s account of the semantic properties of concepts; I will consider their syntax in the 
next section. According to Burley, concepts have content. This was clear already in 
chapter 3, where we saw that expressions in natural language have the content that they 
do by being subordinated to concepts, which have their contents necessarily. Indeed, the 
idea that concepts have content permeates Burley’s cognitive program. He argues in the 
Comm.Perih, for example, that concepts “signify naturally. And we can prove this by the 
fact that whatever signifies the same thing for everyone signifies naturally. But a 
[concept] signifies the same thing for everyone.”10
 However, given that concepts have content, it is natural to ask why they have 
content. And, on this point, we can distinguish between two sorts of questions when it 
comes to content: a general one and a specific one. The general question asks why 
 That Burley takes concepts to have 
content, then, is uncontroversial.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
“Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen Brown, Franciscan 
Studies 33 (1973): para. 1.16, pp. 55–6. 
10 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.11, p 53. 
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concepts have content, that is, why they are intentional objects. The specific question, in 
contrast, asks why concepts have the particular, or specific, content that they do. Why 
does a concept of Socrates represent Socrates, for example, rather than Plato? I argue that 
Burley provides at least a prima facie satisfying answer to the specific question of 
content, but that his answer to the general question is unsatisfying. Moreover, the general 
question is explanatorily prior to the specific question. That is, any answer to the specific 
question – why something represents Socrates rather than Plato – will presuppose some 
explanation of why that thing represents. And so, given that Burley fails to provide a 
convincing response to the general question, his response to the specific question has to 
be seen as incomplete as well. However, I end this section with the suggestion that 
Burley has the resources available to him to provide a far more satisfying answer to the 
general question, an account which he, unfortunately, does not seem to give.  
 Let’s take the specific question first, despite its explanatory posteriority, since 
Burley’s answer to it will give us the necessary background for understanding the answer 
Burley might possibly give to the general question. So then: why does a concept 
represent a certain thing? According to Burley, a concept represents a certain thing 
because it has the same form as the form of the thing it represents. He argues that 
‘affection of the soul’ can be understood in two ways, insofar as it is presently 
considered. In one way, by ‘affection’ [one can mean] a desire, and so regret, 
love, lust, anger, and others of this kind are affections. In another way, it can 
mean a disposition of the intellect, namely, a similitude of a thing in the intellect 
representing a thing outside the soul, and we use it in this way in this discussion.11
                                                            
11 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k3va: “Notandum est hic quod 
passio animae potest dupliciter accipi quantum ad praesens spectat. Uno modo pro affectione appetitus, 
et sic desiderum, amor, concupiscentia, ira, et huiusmodi dicuntur passiones animae. Alio modo pro 
dispositione intellectus, scilicet, pro similitudine rei in intellectu representante rem extra animam, et sic 
accipitur in proposito.” 
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Concepts, then, or ‘affections of the soul’, are qualities of the mind which represent 
things outside the mind. And they represent because they are similitudes of those 
things.12
 Burley explains conformality in terms of a sophisticated causal account of form-
transmission and transformation. According to Burley, a person’s sensory and cognitive 
grasp of a thing involves the transmission of a form from an object, through a medium 
such as air or water, to a number of sensory and intellective faculties of the soul, 
successively.
 Why some concept is a similitude of a thing can be articulated in many different 
ways; Ockham, for example, relies on an account of causal covariance. For Burley, 
however, a concept is a similitude of a thing because that concept has the same form as 
the thing it represents. It is, in other words, a conformality of account. 
13
                                                            
12 On the issue of the picturing model of conceptual representation in medieval philosophy, see Peter King, 
“Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Mediaeval Theories of Mental 
Representation,” in Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy (Ashgate: Aldershot, 
2007), 90–4. 
 Moreover, some of those faculties – the inner senses and the intellect – 
are active faculties, not just preserving forms but manipulating them in various ways. For 
example, Burley argues that the faculty of common sense unifies the various forms it 
receives from the five external senses, producing a new form that represents the particular 
thing experienced in those various ways. In other words, the inner sense produces a unity 
of experience from the various senses that we have. Likewise, the intellect, which 
represents not particulars but universals, abstracts from the forms of inner sense to create 
general concepts, that is, concepts that represent properties (or certain forms) which those 
particulars have. While active, however, those faculties are still rule-governed, with the 
13 Burley gives an extremely detailed account of this process in his De potentiis animae, including a 
thorough description of where the various sensitive faculties are located in the brain. See Walter Burley, 
“The De potentiis animae of Walter Burley,” para. 102–22, pp. 104–8. 
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consequence that we can tell a story that traces the form that resides in any given 
particular faculty back to the thing which produced it. 
 Conformality is a symmetric notion. Representation, however, is asymmetric. If a 
concept, or a species more generally, represents something, then we need some account 
of that asymmetry. The general question of content, then, is the question of what that 
account is, and so a satisfying explanation to the general question, then, requires some 
explanation of that asymmetry. But Burley, as far as I can tell, does not provide a 
satisfying explanation of the representational character of concepts. In fact, it is not clear 
to me whether he provides any explanation at all. A common claim in high and late 
medieval philosophy is that concepts (and species more generally) have what medieval 
philosophers call intentional being. Burley himself makes a this sort of claim, arguing 
that species have, as he puts it, “spiritual” being.  
A species in a medium has more spiritual being than it does in an object, and 
more material being than in an organ, and therefore a species in a medium has 
itself in a middle way between spiritual being and material being.14
 
  
The introduction of the notion of intentional, or spiritual, being was meant in part to 
address the worry that, if the concept in the mind were to have the same being as the form 
informing the thing represented, then the mind itself would need to become a thing of that 
sort. If, for example, the concept in the mind were a real form of a sheep, then the mind 
would need to become an actual sheep when it was informed by that concept. There is 
some textual ground in Aristotle that he endorses something like that claim; he claims 
                                                            
14 Ibid., para. 93, p. 102: “Themistius aliam rationem ponit, et est quod natura in opere suo semper procedit 
ab imperfecto ad perfectum. Embryo enim in matrice prius est animal quam homo. Sic in proportio est 
ordo determinatus quod a re corporali et materiali ad spiritualem requiritur quod fiat transitus per 
medium inter utrumque. Unde species in medio spiritualius habet esse quam in objecto, et materialius 
quam in organo, et ideo species in medio se habet medio modo inter esse spirituale et materiale.” 
190 
 
 
 
that the knower becomes the known, for example. But most medieval philosophers took 
this claim to be merely metaphorical.15
 That claim is merely metaphorical in the sense that knowers become the known 
only in the sense of possessing a form that merely represents a thing. And it represents 
precisely because it has intentional – or representational – being, rather than real being. 
Because Burley himself endorses the view that species have intentional, or spiritual, 
being, we might expect that he too would explain representationality in terms of the 
intentional, or spiritual, being that a species has. However, Burley seems to think that the 
spiritual nature of a species makes it less capable of representing, rather than more 
capable. 
  
We must know that for a species to have more spiritual being is for it to have 
more feeble being. Hence to whatever extent a species is more spiritual, to that 
extent it more imperfectly represents that of which it is a species.16
 
 
It is not clear (at least to me) how Burley intends for this claim to be read. I suggest two 
plausible readings. First, Burley might intend to endorse the view that intentional being is 
required for the representationality of species, though immediately qualifying that claim 
by noting that, in virtue of the fact that a species differs from the thing it represents with 
respect to being, that representation will always be imperfect. This does seem to fit better 
with the general medieval account of what intentional being actually is. On that reading, 
                                                            
15 A notable exception here is William Crathorn. Crathorn argues that species must be the very same forms 
as the things which they represent, so that the mind, when it thinks about the color blue, for example, 
must literally be a blue color. “The soul seeing and thinking color is truly colored, not by a color existing 
outside the soul, but by the similitude in it, which is a true color” (William Crathorn, “In primum librum 
Sententiarum,” in Crathorn: Quastionen zum Ersten Sentenzenbuch  : Einfuhrung und Text, ed. Fritz 
Hoffman (Münster: Aschendorff, 1988), q. 1, p. 120:30–4). 
16 Walter Burley, “The De potentiis animae of Walter Burley,” para. 94, p. 102: “Sciendum quod speciem 
habere spritualius esse est ipsam habere esse debilius. Unde quanto est species spiritualior, tanto 
imperfectius representat illud cuius est species.” 
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then, Burley holds an interesting place within late medieval orthodoxy with respect to 
issues of representation. There can be no case of perfect representation, according to this 
reading, since perfect representation would require something like complete similarity 
(that is, similarity with respect to every feature, including its mode of existence). But 
complete similarity would require symmetry, and so the peculiar asymmetric character of 
representation would be lost in such a case.  
 If this is how the passage should be read, however, then Burley faces the same 
problem that everyone else in the medieval period who endorses this response to the 
general question faces, namely that it is really a non-response. It fails to explain why 
species, and concepts in particular, represent. It is analogous to the case in which, when 
asked why Ambien makes a person sleepy, an individual responds that Ambien has a 
dormitive property – which is just to say that it has the property of making a person 
sleepy. It does not explain what it is about Ambien that causes that effect in a person. In 
the same way, to advert to the intentional being of a species is really to say nothing other 
than that a species have a representational property – that is, it is a claim that species 
represent, rather than an explanation of why they represent. 
 If, in contrast, we take the passage above to suggest that Burley rejects that the 
representationality of a concept is to be explained in terms of the peculiar sort of being 
that it has, then Burley would seem to hold a very idiosyncratic view of the nature of 
intentional being. Because of its idiosyncrasies, Burley’s account wouldn’t be prone to 
the sorts of objections that explanations of representation in terms of intentional being 
rightfully receive. Unfortunately, however, since he appears to provide no alterative 
response to the representational character of a species, Burley trades a non-answer for no 
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answer at all. On either reading, then, it does not seem that Burley provides even a prima 
facie satisfying response to the general question of content. 
 It may be tempting to think that the response Burley gives to the specific question 
contains within it at least some of the resources needed to answer the general question as 
well. I am sympathetic to that suggestion. For example, it appears that Burley could 
explain representation in terms of the causal account of form-transmission that his 
conformality account assumes. Moreover, since (as we will see) concepts are words in a 
mental language, we might combine that account of concept production (as well as, 
perhaps, a causal account of the regulation of their subsequent use, an account Burley 
does not explicitly provide but which is compatible with – and seems to me even 
desirable given – the account of concept acquisition he favors) with an account of the 
linguistic role of those concepts. The combination of these two sorts of accounts, Peter 
King notes, “is no less than a mediaeval version of functionalism, the idea that 
determinate content is fully specified by inputs (covariance) and outputs (linguistic 
role).”17 That account would be far more satisfying that Burley’s possible appeal to the 
peculiar being of concepts, and a species more generally. Nor is an account of that sort 
unprecedented in the late medieval period; Ockham, for example, develops an account of 
just this sort.18
 
 Unfortunately, however, I see no evidence that Burley ever intended to 
endorse that sort of account. 
                                                            
17 King, “Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Mediaeval Theories of Mental 
Representation,” 96. 
18 See Ibid., 96–7 for King’s discussion of Ockham’s account. 
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2.3. Burley on Concepts II: Syntax 
 If concepts are linguistic, then they must have not only semantic properties but 
syntactic properties as well. But that concepts have syntactic properties is a thesis to 
which Burley is clearly committed. In various works – but especially in his Physics 
commentaries and in his Quaes.Post – Burley argues that more basic concepts can be 
combined into complex concepts, whose content is articulated in terms of the contents of 
the more basic concepts which compose them.19 Discussing the nature of a middle term 
in a demonstration in a language, for example, Burley argues that a “middle term is 
composed out of many utterances or out of many concepts, which concepts or utterances 
signify expressly the principles of a thing.”20
                                                            
19 See, e.g., Walter Burley, In Physicam Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones (Hildesheim: Georg Olms 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1972), 6ra–va.  
 For example, the concept RATIONAL 
ANIMAL can function as a middle term in a demonstration in mental language. That 
concept is complex, composed of the more basic concepts RATIONAL and ANIMAL, 
which signify rationality and animality, respectively. In combination, then, they signify 
the aggregate of rationality and animality – which just is the property of humanity, with 
each more basic concept itself signifying elements in the structure of that property. 
Moreover, Burley argues that concepts can be combined to form sentences in mental 
language. Again in the Quaes.Post, for example, Burley writes that “a statement can be 
considered materially, from that which it is composed [...]. A statement considered in the 
20 Walter Burley, Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum, ed. Mary Catherine Sommers (Toronto: PIMS, 
2000), 11.52, p. 161: “Et cum dicitur quod medium est causa passionis sive causa quare passio inest 
subiecto, dicendum quod in demonstratione quae signum est medium est causa cognitionis respectu 
conclusionis, quoniam per medium in tali demonstratione importatur natura speciei expresse, quia tale 
medium componitur ex pluribus vocibus et ex conceptibus, qui conceptus vel voces significant expresse 
principia rei.” 
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third way is composed of concepts.”21
 That Burley defends a mental language thus seems to me rather obvious. 
However, this is far cry from defending a satisfying or philosophically interesting theory 
of mental language. In particular, we should ask how the mind is able to produce 
complex expressions of that sort in mental language. In other words, we should demand a 
specific account of the syntax of that language. I suggest that we can cull some general 
syntactic features of mental language from various things Burley has to say about that 
mental language, and about language generally. Moreover, an investigation into some of 
the general syntactic features of mental language yields important results about the nature 
of the vocabulary of that language, and the nature of the mental sentences that can be 
produced from that vocabulary.   
 Just as statements can be composed of utterances 
and of things, then, Burley argues that the mind can combine concepts in such a way as to 
produce mental sentences.  
 Like the later Ockham, Burley defends a parallelism between natural language, 
mental language, and the contents they express.22
                                                            
21 Ibid., para. 2.49, p. 62: “Ad aliud principale, quando quaeritur aut syllogismus demonstrativus 
componitur ex vocibus, aut ex conceptibus, aut ex rebus, dicendum quod sicut propositio ppotest accipi 
materialiter ex quibus componitur, sic eodem modo syllogismus. Nam quaedam est propositio proposita 
tantum, et illa propositio est propositio passive dicta. Et quaedam est propositio propens tantum. Et 
quaedam est propositio propens et proposita. Propositio primo modo dicta componitur ex rebus 
compositione intellectuali, et non compositione reali. Et isto modo propositio accipitur pro signato. 
Propositio secundo modo dicta componitur ex vocibus significativis, et isto modo propositio accipitur pro 
signo. Propositio tertio modo accepta componitur ex conceptibus. Eodem modo syllogismus 
demonstrativus potest accipi pro signato vel pro signo. Si accipiatur pro signato tantum, sic syllogismus 
demonstrativus est syllogismus passive dictus, et isto modo componitur ex rebus compositione 
intellectuali, et non compositione reali. Si accipiatur syllogismus demonstrativus pro signo, sic 
componitur ex vocibus significativis vel ex conceptibus.” 
 He writes, for example, that “in some 
22 On Ockham on the parallelism between natural language and mental language, see William Ockham, 
Summa Logicae, vol. 1, chap. 3, pp. 11–4. Ockham does not have a theory of the proposition like the one 
that Burley has. Instead, Ockham explain content wholly in terms of mental language. (Perhaps, 
however, Burley does much the same, in the end. See §5.) 
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statement a thing is predicated of a thing, and in some statement a concept is predicated 
of a concept, and in some statement an utterance is predicated of an utterance.”23 Unlike 
the later Ockham, however, Burley sharply distinguishes between concepts, on the one 
hand, and mental activity, on the other. For the later Ockham, concepts simply are mental 
acts.24,25 The concept SOCRATES, according to Ockham, is simply the act of thinking of 
Socrates. Moreover, Ockham argues that simple mental acts are concepts; whatever 
simple mental acts that the mind can perform are elements in the vocabulary of mental 
language. But Ockham argues that not all simple mental activity involves representation, 
or signification, since some acts serve to relate other acts to one another, rather than 
represent something(s).26
                                                            
23 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb. 
 For example, an act of predication, when paired with certain 
other sorts of concepts – categorematic concepts – serves to predicate one of those 
concepts of the other. In contrast to the concepts it predicates, however, Ockham argues 
24 On Ockham’s later account, mental acts are qualities. This is different from Burley, for whom mental 
acts are acts, that is, accidents in the category of action. My suspicion is that it is this difference which 
principally motivates their disagreement over the relationship of concepts to mental acts. Since qualities 
are not relational, there is no bar on concepts themselves – only some of which have determinate 
signification per se – from being “acts,” that is, qualities of the mind. For Burley, in contrast, since 
mental acts are indeed acts, on his account, and since concepts which have determinate content (i.e. 
categorematic concepts) are not relational, those concepts could not be acts. 
25 On his earlier theory, Ockham argued that concepts were fictive items, and so were distinct from mental 
acts. Like Burley, then, the early Ockham distinguished between concepts, which were (as a general 
matter) categorematic, and mental acts, which were the mind’s relating those concepts to one another in 
various ways (e.g. predicatively). However, Burley and the early Ockham still disagree about the nature 
of concepts. Burley argues that they are species, that is, subjective features of the mind, whereas Ockham 
argues that they are fictive, so that they have merely objective being. On Ockham’s early account of 
mental language, see Claude Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 146–51. 
26 Ockham distinguishes four different notions of signification, and, on one of them, syncategorematic 
expressions do signify. But that is signification in only its most broad sense, meant to include all 
meaningful expressions, broadly speaking. Typically, Ockham will use ‘signification’ and its cognates in 
a more restricted manner, so that only categorematic expressions signify. On Ockham on signification, 
see William Ockham, Summa Logicae, vol. 1, pt. 1, chs. 1, 33, pp. 7–9; 95–6. 
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that the act of predication itself is a syncategorematic concept, since its function is not to 
represent something but to modify the semantic properties of the categorematic concepts 
to which it is joined. Consequently, Ockham distinguishes between (at least) two sorts of 
concepts: categorematic concepts and syncategorematic concepts.27
  In contrast to Ockham, however, Burley sharply distinguishes concepts, on the 
one hand, and mental acts, on the other. In particular, Burley argues that mental activity 
involves the mind’s use of the concepts that it possesses. In his questions commentary on 
the De Anima, Burley argues that concepts are not sufficient for mental activity. Rather, 
mental activity also requires that the “agent intellect” – that is, that power of the mind 
which can bring about occurrent thought – actually brings about occurrent thought, by 
illuminating, as it were, a concept, making one actually think about that concept’s 
content.  
 And this distinction 
between categorematic and syncategorematic concepts tracks the distinction between 
categorematic and syncategorematic expressions in natural language. Categorematic 
concepts signify thing(s); syncategorematic concepts modify the semantic properties of 
the categorematic concepts to which they are paired.   
[I]t is in our power to think when we want, after we have acquired [a concept], as 
each person experiences in himself. But, however many [concepts] we have, we 
cannot think without the agent intellect, just as an eye, even if visible things are 
present, is not able to see without light.28
                                                            
27 Ockham’s account of mental language might include concepts of a third sort, namely, non-categorematic, 
non-syncategorematic concepts. These concepts would be akin at least to the prepositions of natural 
language. On concepts of this sort in Ockham’s account, see Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 155–58. 
 
28 Walter Burley, “Circa tertium de Anima,” in Questions on the De Anima of Aristotle  : By Magister Adam 
Burley and Dominus Walter Burley, ed. Edward Synan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), para. 2.26, p. 95. See 
also Walter Burley, “The De potentiis animae of Walter Burley,” para. 124, p. 109. The account 
resembles the one given by Giles of Rome, who distinguishes concepts, on the one hand, and acts, on the 
other: “In potestate nostra est intelligere, cum volumus postquam habuimus species intelligibiles, ut 
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Concepts are what explain the content of thought, then, but actual thinking requires the 
“illumination,” or use, of those concepts. When not in use, Burley argues that concepts 
are stored in memory. 
Therefore, memory, with respect to some part of it, namely, in as much as it is a 
storehouse of [concepts], ought to be placed in the intellective part [of the soul...]. It 
is the same power which receives [concepts] [i.e. intellection] and which conserves 
them [i.e. memory].29
 
 
Memory and understanding, then, differ in that the former involves the mere possession 
of a concept, whereas the latter involves its use. On this account, the mind contains a kind 
of storehouse of mental words – that is, it has a vocabulary – and mental speech, or 
thought, involves the mind’s use of those words to form statements.  
 That vocabulary can be built up in various ways. In the first instance, concept 
acquisition occurs via a causal process of species-transmission, originating in a thing and 
terminating in the mind. Second, the mind can increase its stock of concepts by 
combining them with one another in syntactically constrained ways. For example, the 
mind can introduce the concept RATIONAL ANIMAL by combining the concepts 
RATIONAL and ANIMAL with one another. Burley isn’t entirely forthcoming on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
quilibet in seipso experitur. Cum ergo quantumcumque habuerimus apud nos species intelligibiles, non 
possumus actu intelligere, nisi speculemur iterum phantasmata et nisi super ipsa phantasmata fiat 
irradiatio luminis intellectus agentis. Sed si huiusmodi lumen esset a nobis separatum, non esset in 
potestate nostra, quod talis irradiatio fieret, quare habentes apud nos species intelligibiles non esset in 
potestate nostra, quod possemus intelligere, cum vellemus, sicut praesentibus visibilibus, eo quod lumen 
solis sit a nobis separatum, non est in potentia nostra videre, cum volumus, quia non est in potestate 
nostra semper habere praesentiam luminis, eo quod lumen corporale, per quod actu videmus, non est in 
nobis, sed est aliquid separatum” (Giles of Rome, Expositio Edidii Romani super libros de Anima cum 
textu (Venedig, 1496), 71rb). 
29 Walter Burley, “Circa tertium de Anima,” para. 1.27–8, p. 82–3: “Memoria igitur secundum aliquam 
parte sui, in quantum scilicet thesaurus specierum, debet poni in parte intellectiva, et etiam quoad actum 
recordandi, secundum eos qui ponunt cognitionem memorativam in intellectu. Si tamen esset sola 
cognitio abstractiva in intellectu, tam de actu quam de obiecto, non esset ponere in intellectu memoriam. 
Ad primum principale dicendum quod eadem est potentia quae recipit intelligibile species et quae illas 
conservat [...].” 
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nature of that syntactic constraint. But I argue that that syntax must be more permissive 
than the syntax of natural language, for two reasons. First, as we have already seen, 
Burley suggests that, unlike the syntax of natural language, the rules of syntax that 
govern cognition will only be as restricting as the semantics demands. In the 
Quaes.Perih, Burley argues that there are syntactic constraints, or constraints of 
“conguity,” in thought,  
but by another kind of congruity than a spoken sentence. Hence the grammatical 
modes of signifying are taken from the modes of thinking. Therefore, just as a 
grammarian has to consider congruity in the modes of signifying, so too the 
logician has to consider congruity in the modes of thinking. Nor on account of 
this does it follows that the parts of a [proposition] would have some modes of 
signifying, such as case or mode.30
 
 
Burley makes a number of interesting claims in this passage. First, he argues that the 
rules of syntax (or “congruity”) for natural language are in part derived from the rules of 
syntax that govern cognition. Second, while the grammarian’s concern is the syntax of 
natural language, the logician’s concern is the syntax of cognitive activity. Finally, and 
most central for our purposes, while natural language derives some of its syntactic rules 
from the rules governing cognitive activity, natural language contains additional rules of 
syntax, which need not be reflected in mental activity. In particular, natural language 
includes things such as case. The expressions of a mental language, however, won’t 
                                                            
30 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.643, p. 254: “Dicendum 
quod oratio secundum esse in mente est congrua sed alia congruitate quam oratio prolata. Unde modi 
significandi grammaticales sumuntur a modis intelligendi. Sicut igitur grammaticus habet considerare 
congruitatem in modis significandi, sic logicus habet considerare congruitatem in modis intelligendi. Nec 
propter hoc sequitur quod partes orationis in mente habeant aliquod modos significandi, ut casum vel 
modum.” I am not sure what feature of syntax a mode is (gender, perhaps?). Burley’s particular concern 
in the passage above is not mental language, but rather the mind’s formation of a proposition (something 
which, on Burley’s view, still has a kind of linguistic structure). But I suggest that the claims Burley 
develops in that passage apply equally well to mental language, given the tight relationship between the 
two (see §§3, 5). Like the mind’s formation of a proposition, then, I suggest that the syntax of mental 
language will be only as restrictive as the semantics of mental language requires. 
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apparently be governed by a case system – because a case system is not required for 
meaning (even if, in languages with a case system, that system is content-determining).  
 Beyond being simply leaner than the syntax of natural language, however, the 
syntax of mental language can be more permissive than the syntax of natural language 
because, second, the vocabulary of mental language is more restricted that the vocabulary 
of natural language. Unlike the vocabularies of natural languages, which contain not just 
nouns, adjectives, participles and adverbs but verbs as well, the vocabulary of mental 
language lacks any verb concepts.31 Because the vocabulary of mental language contains 
no verb concepts, the rules which govern how concepts can be combined with one 
another have to be rules articulated only with respect to how nominal concepts can be 
combined. In some cases (e.g., cases in which nouns and/or adjectives are combined), the 
syntactic rules can be extremely permissive. For any mere combination of concepts of 
that sort would represent an aggregate of the contents of all the concepts that compose 
it.32
a syntactically complex expression signifies the sum total of what its 
categorematic terms signify. The idea is that, since – on the authority of 
 The complex concept PALE BROWN SOCRATES, for example, would make one 
conceive of paleness+browness+Socrates. This would be an instance of what Paul Spade 
calls the additive principle. The additive principle is that  
                                                            
31 Also excluded from the vocabulary of mental language are prepositions. Just like the copula and other 
syncategorematic elements of natural language, I suggest that prepositions in Burley’s account of mental 
language are best conceived of as operations that the mind can perform on concepts. Unlike 
syncategoremata, however, those operations should not be understood as uses of concepts, that is, as acts 
of cognition, since Burley would seem to allow that, in mental vocabulary, there can be complex 
concepts that have some preposition structure to them, even when one does not think about what they 
represent. 
32 One obvious restriction, even in this limiting case, is that no two concepts which refer to concrete 
substances can be combined with one another in this way. The concepts PETER and PAUL, for example, 
cannot be combined to form the concepts PETER PAUL.  
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Aristotle’s De interpretatione 3, 16b19 – signification is a matter of what you are 
made to think of when you encounter a term, therefore when you hear a string of 
terms, as you do when you hear a complex expression like ‘white Socrates’, you 
will be made to think of – and so the complex expression will signify – what each 
of the members of that string signifies.33
 
  
The additive principle is a semantic principle, one which presupposes that the relevant 
string is already well-formed. But, first, Burley’s metaphysics actually contains things 
which are the aggregates of the contents of noun and adjective concepts: being per 
accidens. And, second, if the syntax of mental language is only as restrictive as semantics 
demands, and since there will always be some aggregate which is composed of the 
referents of an arbitrary collection of noun and adjective concepts, then it seems that any 
combination of them should be a well-formed concept signifying that aggregate. 
 Of course, this initial account of how concepts can be combined still leaves a 
great deal to be desired. First, Burley’s mental vocabulary must contain not only nouns 
and adjectives, but participles and adverbs as well. Once we expand the account to 
include participle and adverb concepts, however, it seems that something like order 
becomes relevant.34
                                                            
33 Paul Vincent Spade, “Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular Terms,” Topoi 16, no. 1 
(March 1, 1997): 9. 
 JOHN LOVING MARY is a different concept than MARY 
LOVING JOHN. Second, Burley will need to provide some account of how prepositional 
phrases of natural language should be translated into mental language. As far as I know, 
Burley provides no such account. However, the account which I think fits best with the 
general picture of mental language that Burley defends conceives of prepositions in 
34 One difficulty here is how to account for order in an immaterial substance such as the intellect. Panaccio 
suggests that one must posit “a special mental syncategorematic term which turns the categorematic 
concept with which it is immediately grouped, into the subject-term of the proposition in which they both 
occur (and maybe another special predicate forming syncategorematic functor as well).” (Panaccio, 
Ockham on Concepts, 153–4). 
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mental language not as elements of the vocabulary of mental language – that is, it denies 
that there are preposition concepts – but rather conceives of them as structural features of 
complex concepts. So, for example, the complex concept JUMPING ON THE BED 
would be composed of the concepts JUMPING and BED, but that complex concept 
would have a structure that would realize its prepositional character. On this suggestion, 
then, the mind contains a number of different innate operations that it can perform on the 
concepts that is possesses, by which operations more complex concepts (among other 
things) are produced. And some of these operations involve the combination of concepts 
where that combination has something like prepositional structure. For complex concepts 
of that sort, then, what they represent is simply the aggregate of the contents of the 
concepts that compose them, but how they represent them (and so the formal import of 
those concepts in a mental language) differs from the mere combination of those 
concepts. 
 Despite these challenges, however, the account of mental language that Burley 
defends will at least not be restricted by rules of syntax that concern verbs. And this is 
because the vocabulary of mental language, according to Burley, simply does not contain 
any verbs. That the vocabulary of mental language does not contain any verbs, however, 
might seem to be fatal for Burley’s account of mental language. In particular, the lack of 
any verb concepts in mental language might seem to suggest that nothing like a sentence 
can be produced in mental language. But language is also – perhaps primarily – a tool to 
express (or, in the case of mental language, form) complete thoughts. Without the ability 
to produce mental sentences, then, Burley’s mental language would be seriously 
compromised. Moreover, Burley’s commitment to the Aristotelian tradition itself might 
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suggest that his mental language ought to have verb concepts. Burley notes, for example, 
that  
Aristotle says that nouns and verbs which are in an utterance (that is, in speech) 
are marks of affections of the soul (that is, concepts, which are similitudes of 
things) [...]. Affections of the soul (that is, similitudes of things, existing in the 
mind) signify things outside the mind.35
 
 
If both nouns and verbs are “marks” of concepts, that is, if both nouns and verbs have the 
contents that they do by being subordinated to concepts which have those contents 
necessarily, then, mutatis mutandis, shouldn’t mental language, like natural language, 
contain both nouns and verbs?  
 To understand why mental language contains no verb concepts, we need to 
examine what Burley has to say about the nature of verbs in natural language. For Burley, 
every sentence of natural language has, at some fundamental level, a three-part structure: 
subject, copula, and predicate.36 In his De Puritate, Burley writes that “in every statement 
the verb ‘is’ or some oblique form of it is the copula, whether an adjectival or a 
substantival verb is expressed in the statement, or whether the proposition is about the 
present or about the past or about the future.”37
                                                            
35 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k3va: “Dicit igitur philosophus 
quod nomina et verba quae sunt in voce est in prolatione sunt notae passionum animae, hoc est, 
conceptuum animae qui sunt similitudines rerum.  Et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce, hoc est 
nomina et verba scripta significant nomina et verba prolata. Tale igitur ordinem signorum assignat hic 
Aristoteles, scilicet, quod passiones animae, hoc est similitudines rerum existentium in animae significant 
res extra, et nomina et verba prolata significant passiones animae, et illud non solum est verum de 
nominibus et verbis quae sunt partes enunciationis, sed etiam est verum de ipsa enunciatione.  Nam 
enunciatio prolata significat orationem in mente quae est quaedam passio mentis et enunciatio scripta 
significat enunciationem prolata.” 
 Burley argues in this passage, in other 
36 See ch. 3, §7. 
37 Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic: The Shorter and the Longer Treatises, trans. Paul 
Vincent Spade (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 141. 
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words, that sentences contain one of two kinds of verbs: substantival verbs or adjectival 
verbs. What kind of verb they contain will dictate the kind of surface structure that they 
have. Those which contain substantival verbs will have a three-part surface structure, 
whereas those which contain adjectival verbs will have a two part structure. Sentences 
containing substantival verbs have a three part structure because a substantival verb is 
simply some version of the copula – past, present, or future. Consequently, in those 
sentences, the surface structure of the sentence will itself mark the distinction between 
the copula, on the one hand, and the predicate, on the other. ‘John is tall’, for example, 
contains ‘John’ ‘is’ and ‘tall’, where ‘John’ and ‘tall’ are the subject and predicate, 
respectively, and ‘is’ is the verb linking the predicate to the subject.  
 In contrast, those sentences which contain adjectival verbs have only a two-part 
surface structure. ‘John runs’, for example, has ‘John’ for its subject, and ‘runs’ both for 
its verb and for its predicate. However, Burley argues that surface structure in those kinds 
of sentences is not the same as deep structure.  
Thus, in ‘Socrates walks’, the verb ‘is’ is the copula. For saying ‘Socrates walks’ 
is the same as saying ‘Socrates is walking’. And in ‘Socrates walked’, the verb 
‘was’ is the copula. For saying ‘Socrates walked’ is the same as saying ‘Socrates 
was walking’.38
 
  
Whereas sentences composed of adjectival verbs superficially have only two parts, then – 
so that the verb acts both as the copula, linking the predicate to the subject, and as (at 
least part of) the predicate, referring to something – in point of fact the copulative 
element in those sentences is wholly distinct from the predicate. Consequently, it is 
possible to “resolve an adjectival verb into this verb, ‘is’, and into a participle of the same 
                                                            
38 Ibid. 
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time and same signification.”39
 Whether Burley’s vocabulary contains any verb concepts, therefore, is ultimately 
a question of whether that vocabulary contains a copula concept. But a copula concept – 
if there is such a thing in the vocabulary of Burley’s mental language – would be a 
syncategorematic concept. And that is because copulae generally are syncategorema.
 That is, we can provide a sentence, equivalent in 
meaning, in which the significative elements of the adjectival verb are nominalized (in 
particular, made into participles, or verbal adjectives), to reveal that the verb in those 
sentences just is the copula.  
40 
The difference between syncategorematic and categorematic expressions, recall, is that 
the function of categorematic expressions is to refer, whereas that is not the function of 
syncategorematic expressions.41 Rather, syncategorematic expressions modify the 
semantic features of one term in a sentence relative to the other. When used 
syncategorematically, for example, ‘every’ distributes the subject term to which it is 
paired relative to the predicate. In the same way, ‘is’ does not signify anything, but rather 
serves to mark (notare) expressions as subjects and predicates relative to one another.42
                                                            
39 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k6va. 
 
We should expect a copula concept to function in a similar way. It would not signify 
40 See ch. 3, §7. 
41 The subject and predicate terms of a proposition, then, will always be categorematic expressions (or, at 
least, expressions used categorematically). That is, they will always refer – just as concepts do in 
Burley’s account of mental language. And so the difference between categorematic and syncategorematic 
expressions at the level of natural language is realized as a difference between concepts and uses of those 
concepts at the level of mental language. 
42 On the claim that a copula marks expressions as subjects and predicates, see Super artem veterem 
Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k6va. 
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anything; rather, it would mark the other concepts to which it is joined as subject and 
predicate terms relative to one another.43
 The vocabulary of Burley’s mental language thus contains, at best, one sort of 
verb concept – the copula concept. That the account of mental language that Burley 
defends involves a copula of some sort is clear. He writes that  
 
[i]n every statement there is some material and something formal. The formal 
thing in a statement is a copula joining together a predicate with a subject, and 
that copula is in the intellect, because is a composition or division of the intellect. 
The material things in a statement, however, are the subject and the predicate.44
 
 
According to Burley, every statement – not just in mental language, but in natural 
language and in the case of propositions as well – contains three parts: two objects of 
predication, and a mental act of predication. In the case of a mental sentences in 
particular, the objects of predication are concepts. But, for Burley, the mind’s predicating 
one concept of another will not itself be a concept, nor will the vocabulary of Burley’s 
mental language contain syncategorematic concepts more generally. First, as I argued 
earlier, Burley quite clearly distinguishes between concepts, on the one hand, and mental 
acts, on the other. Concepts are objects of use, rather than that use itself. Consequently, 
the mind’s predicating one concept of another – a certain sort of use that the mind makes 
of concepts – will not itself be a concept, and so will not be an element in the vocabulary 
of mental language.  
                                                            
43 And, in fact, in Ockham’s mental language, this is exactly how the copula concept functions. 
44 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb: “Intelligenda sunt hic tria. 
Primo quod in omni propositione est aliquid materiale, et aliquod formale. Formale in propositione est 
copula copulans praedicatum cum subiecto, et illa copula est in intellectu, quia est compositio vel divisio 
intellectus. Materialia vero in propositione sunt subiectum et praedicatum.” 
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 Second, Burley argues the mental statements are isomorphic to other kinds of 
statements. In particular, he argues that mental statements are isomorphic to the 
propositions that they express.45 He writes, for example, that “in some statement a thing 
is predicated of a thing, and in some statement a concept is predicated of a concept, and 
in some statement an utterance is predicated of an utterance.”46
 What exactly hangs on distinguishing concepts, on the one hand, and mental acts 
of predication, on the other? Is this is distinction without a difference? I argue that what 
 Propositions, of course, 
have a three-part structure (on the later account, at least). But, among those parts, Burley 
sharply distinguishes between the things which are predicated, on the one hand, and the 
mind’s act of predicating them, on the other. The former are absolute items, words (very 
roughly speaking) in a language of reality; the latter constitutes the mind’s use of those 
words, predicating one of the other and thereby asserting some relation between them. 
Since mental statements are isomorphic to the propositions they express, we find the 
same sort of structure in mental statements as we do in propositions. Like propositions, 
mental statements have a three-part structure. But, also like propositions, only the subject 
and predicate terms of that statement will be words in mental language; the “copula” of a 
mental statement will be instead the mind’s use of those words as subject and predicate 
expressions relative to one another, a certain sort of operation that the mind performs on 
those concepts. 
                                                            
45 Burley also suggests that mental sentences and propositions are isomorphic with sentences in natural 
language. On that isomorphism, see infra. 
46 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb: “Et credo quod illud 
indubitanter sit verum, quod in aliqua propositione praedicatur res de re, et in aliqua propositione 
conceptus de conceptu praedicatur, et in aliqua propositione vox de voce praedicatur.” 
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motivates the distinction – both with statements in mental language in particular, and the 
distinction between the formal and material elements of statements more generally – is a 
recognition on Burley’s part that the mind’s predicating one thing of another is a feature 
of syntax, rather than itself a unit in the vocabulary of mental language. The mental act of 
predication is a rule-governed operation that the mind performs on the concepts it 
possess, and so something the mind realizes only by actually performing that operation. 
As such, it cannot have any sort of existence independent of the concepts in whose 
predicative arrangement that activity is realized.  
 This position differs significantly from the later Ockham, for whom mental acts of 
predication can and do exist independently of the categorematic concepts that they 
structure. To conceive of the mind’s predicating activity as itself a concept is to conceive 
of it as more basic than the statements that it structures. Consequently, on Ockham’s 
view, mental sentences are composed of three mental “words:” a subject term, a predicate 
term, and a copula. On Burley’s account, in contrast, mental sentences – while still three-
part structures – contain only two expressions in the vocabulary of mental language: a 
subject term and a predicate term. The third part of a mental sentence – the copula – is 
simply a structural, or “formal,” element in a mental sentence, an operation on those 
terms by which those terms are related to one another as subject and predicate 
expressions. 
 Ockham’s account might seem to have the advantage that it can better respect an 
isomorphism between natural and mental language. Just as it seems that sentences in 
natural language contain (as some level of structure) three distinct “material” elements – 
a subject, a predicate and a copula – so too mental language contains three distinct 
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“material” elements: a subject-concept, a predicate-concept and a copula-concept. Burley, 
however, appears to be unwilling to concede that his account of the mental sentence 
requires an asymmetry between natural and mental language. According to Burley, 
Ockham is mistaken when he assumes that all sentences in natural language contain three 
“material” elements. In fact, Burley suggests that, in some respect at least, sentences in 
natural language contain only two “material” elements: the subject term and the predicate 
term.47 And this is because, on Burley’s view, we make a sentence in natural language 
only when we use expressions in that language as subject and predicate terms. First, just 
like sentences in mental language and propositions, Burley argues that “in some 
statement an utterance is predicated of an utterance.”48
                                                            
47 Later in the same passage, however, Burley argues that sentences in natural language are completely 
outside of the mind. “A statement spoken of in the first way, namely, a statement in speech, is totally 
[totaliter] outside the mind, and a statement of that sort is totally composed out of utterances which have 
being outside the soul” (Ibid). Moreover, at least one extant manuscript – ms lat. 146 – suggests that 
Burley’s claim that every statement is at least partly in the mind is meant to be restricted to propositions 
alone. “Therefore I say that no statement is composed of things completely outside the soul, because the 
formal element is such a statement is in the mind, that is, in the intellect, yet the material elements are 
outside of the mind. However [verumtamen, instead of unde, ‘hence’, which is present, for example, in 
the 1497 print edition, in ms Canon. Misc. 460 and in ms Gonville & Caius 139/79], since a statement is 
of three sorts – a certain spoken one, a certain conceptual one, and a certain one signified through a 
conceptual statement which can be called a propositio in re –  a statement spoken of in the first way, 
namely a spoken statement, is completely outside the soul [...]” (Burley, Oxford, Magdalen Old Library, 
ms lat. 146, 12v). This manuscript suggests, then, that Burley’s claim that the copulae of all statements 
are mental acts of predication  is not a completely general claim, but one restricted to propositions. On 
such a reading, statements in natural language would not be isomorphic with the propositions they 
express, since statements in natural language will have three “material” elements: a subject, a predicate 
and a copula, whereas as propositions (and mental sentences) will have only two. But it is not clear to me 
whether a lack of isomorphism would be problematic for Burley’s account. Burley can still provide a 
compelling account of how statements in natural language have propositions are their contents (and, 
indeed, he does; see ch. 3, §7), and this seems to me to be what drives the concern with isomorphism in 
the first place – that isomorphism somehow allows for a compelling account of how statements in natural 
language are related to their contents. 
 That is, a sentence in natural 
language involves the predicate expression being actually predicated of the subject 
expression. Second, what does the predicating is, according to Burley, not the copula of 
48 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb. 
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natural language but – just as in the case of a mental sentence or a proposition – it is 
rather the mind. “In every statement there is some material and some form. The formal 
thing in a statement is a copula joining together a predicate with a subject, and that 
copula is in the intellect.”49
 None of this is to deny that the copula of natural language does not play a central 
role in an explanation of the production of sentences in natural language. That copula is 
“a principle of notifying the subject just as the predicate,” and so is “a principle of 
thinking as much about the subject as the predicate.”
 Just as in the case of sentences in mental language and 
propositions, then, sentences in natural language involve the mind’s actually predicating 
one expression of another. It is this actual predication of one expression in natural 
language of another that constitutes a sentence in natural language. But, on that account, 
the copula of natural language in no way constitutes an element – “formal” or “material” 
– of a sentence in natural language.  
50
                                                            
49 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Cat, c4rb. 
 The presence of the copula, and its 
location between two categorematic expressions in natural language, is thus a 
precondition for the existence of a meaningful sentence in natural language; it indicates 
when it is appropriate to predicate one expression of another. But, on Burley’s account, a 
sentence of natural language itself is, strictly speaking, something that the mind forms, by 
predicating one expression of natural language of another. Consequently, for Burley, 
every statement – whether a statement in natural language, or a statement in mental 
language, or a proposition – has the same three-part structure: two terms, joined together 
by a mental act of predication. And so, like Ockham, Burley can account for an 
50 Ibid., Exp.Perih, k8va. 
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isomorphism in the structure of statements; it will just involve a very different sort of 
structure than Ockham had envisioned. 
 The slightly idiosyncratic view that Burley has of sentences in natural language 
also serves to highlight an important feature of sentences in mental language. Sentences 
in natural language, on Burley’s view, exist only when the mind predicates one 
expression of another. As Elizabeth Karger notes, on Burley’s account, there are no 
sentences in a closed book.51
 Moreover, that the mind can possess a mental sentence only occurrently, by 
actually predicating one concept of another, is no idle curiosity in Burley’s account, but 
plays a central role in Burley’s account of the proposition. For, as I will argue in sections 
3 and 5, the mind’s predicating one thing of another just is the mind’s predicating one 
concept of another, which concepts represent those things. Consequently, the reason that 
mind’s predicating one thing of another– that is, thought – is representational, is because 
 Presumably, however, that book still contains a great many 
words, standing at the ready to be put together into meaningful sentences by the mind. In 
a similar way, unlike concepts, which can exist in the “storehouse” of memory, available 
for use to the mind, in Burley’s account, mental sentences exist only when the mind 
actually predicates one concept of another. That is, the mind does not contain in its 
“storehouse” mental sentences along with various basic and complex concepts, so that 
thinking involves simply the “illumination,” or use, of one of those sentences. Rather, a 
mental sentence is itself partly constituted by the mind’s use of concepts as subject and 
predicate terms, and so something that occurs only when the mind actually thinks.  
                                                            
51 See Elizabeth Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” Vivarium 34 
(1996): 196, n. 17. 
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that act is an act of predicating one concept of another, where the content of those 
concepts together with the predicative structure of that act determine a certain 
propositional content.  
 I want to end this section by briefly expanding Burley’s account of mental 
language, to include other sorts of logical operations, or uses, that the mind can perform 
on the concepts that it possesses. I suggest that, for Burley, the distinction between 
categorematic and syncategorematic expressions in natural language is realized in mental 
language generally as a distinction between the vocabulary of mental language, on the 
one hand, and certain rule-governed uses that the mind can make of that vocabulary, on 
the other. That the copula is an operation that the mind can perform, rather than an 
expression in the vocabulary of mental language, is a consequence not of the fact that it is 
a copula but of the fact that it is syncategorematic, that is, that it is a certain sort of use to 
which the mind can put expressions of a language. Consequently, the rest of the 
syncategorematic expressions of natural language should be realized in the same way in 
mental language. So, for example, the syncategorematic expression ‘every’ of English 
can be realized in mental language as an operation in which a subject concept is 
universally distributed relative to a predicate concept. Likewise, modal expressions of 
natural language should be realized as certain operations that the mind can perform on 
concepts, whereby the mental sentences that they structure carry modal import.  
 I suggest that there is two ways in which these various operations can be related 
to one another. One possibility is that they constitute distinct, ordered operations that the 
mind can perform on concepts. On this conception, the mind’s predicating one concept of 
another would be the most basic of these sorts of operations, after which further 
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operations – of quantification or modalization, for example – could be applied to those 
concepts. An alternative possibility, however, is that all of the various uses of concepts 
can be realized in one complex operation of the mind. On this alternative, the mind 
possess a number of different predicative operations that it can perform, some of which 
involve “mere” predication, others of which involve predication which is modalized, and 
so on. This alternative account has the advantage of being more economical; all of the 
various syncategorematic expressions that a sentence in natural language might contain 
are realized as the level of mental language as one single, complex mental operation that 
the mind performs on two of the concepts that it possesses. Moreover, I think we have 
some reason to think that Burley endorses this alternative. Burley already recognizes a 
distinction in quality with respect of the mental act of predicating. That is, Burley 
recognizes that the act of predicating can be either positive or negative. There is not some 
separate operation, then, determining the quality of statement, consequent to the mind’s 
predicative act. Rather, the quality of the predication is built into the act itself; as Burley 
says, the mind either joins expressions together, or divides them. I suggest that a similar 
approach could be made with respect to quantity and mode as well.52
 
   
                                                            
52 This account is an application at the level of mental language of what Karger suggests should be the case 
for Burley at the level of the proposition. See Ibid., 208–10. That application should be expected, given 
that the same act which predicates things, predicates concepts. However, with respect to quantity at least, 
a slightly different account might be preferable. While the suggestion that quantity is best understood as 
a feature of a predicative act works well for categorical propositions, mental sentences such as EVERY 
FARMER IN SOME TOWN OWNS/IS OWNING SOME DONKEY seems to require that 
quantification is an operation that the mind can perform at a sub-sentential level. Ockham adopts a 
position of this sort position, arguing that EVERY FARMER, for example, could be an independent unit 
in mental language. (For the later Ockham, that unit is produced by combining the concepts EVERY and 
FARMER. See Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 32–4; 146–54.) On this articulation, quantifier 
expressions operate in a way similar to the way I suggested prepositions might operate in Burley’s 
mental language, see n. 31.  
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3. THE LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT HYPOTHESIS 
 Presumably, Burley’s commitment to mental language plays some role in his 
larger semantic and cognitive program. That role, I argue, is to explain the nature of 
thought and thinking, with the consequence that Burley is committed to the language of 
thought hypothesis (LOTH). Thought – that is, having a propositional attitude – is a 
matter of the mind’s having a certain sort of content: propositional content, in a certain 
way. LOTH argues that, for a mind to have that sort of content is for the mind to possess 
a mental sentence with that content. Moreover, LOTH argues that the process of thinking 
ought to be explained in terms of the production of new mental sentences in the mind 
from prior mental sentences, where that production is sensitive merely to the syntactic 
features of mental sentences.  
 LOTH is at root a project of naturalizing intentionality.53
                                                            
53 In LOT 2, Jerry Fodor suggests that naturalism must be a reductive project, writing that naturalism 
“declines to leave intensional properties and relations (reference, propositions, and the like) unreduced.”  
That is, Fodor argues that non-natural properties must be explained in terms of natural properties.  See 
Fodor, LOT 2, 18, n. 34.  But naturalism can be a less demanding program, according to which non-
natural properties merely need to be wholly determined by some natural property or properties.  (In that 
same note, Fodor suggests that semantic properties are “primitive,” so suggesting a kind of non-reductive 
naturalism I endorse here.  But he also claims that “propositional attitudes are relational states, taking 
mental representations as relata” (Ibid., 18). It’s a bit of a mess.)  
 LOTH is meant to 
provide an argument for the way in which that the intentionality of propositional 
attitudes, at least, can be naturalized. First, proponents of LOTH at least assume that a 
natural explanation of the content of the basic symbols of mental language can be given. 
As we saw earlier, Burley himself seems to propose a naturalizing account of the content 
of the basic symbols of mental language, articulated in terms of conformality, and of the 
transmission and transformation of forms. Second, proponents of LOTH argues that the 
semantic contents of non-basic symbols – the phrases and sentences built up from the 
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basic vocabulary of the language – are function of the semantic values of the symbols 
which compose them together with their syntax (where that syntax, that is, the ways in 
which those symbols can be combined, is determined by the causal properties of the brain 
states upon which those symbols depend).  
 The representational nature of non-basic symbols in a mental language – that is, 
phrases and sentences – can thus be given a completely natural explanation, in terms of 
the semantics and syntax of the basic symbols which compose them. Consequently, the 
intentional character of one’s propositional attitudes can be explained by the various 
kinds of psychological relations that the mind can bear to sentences in that mental 
language, where the semantic content of that sentence itself will be explained in terms of 
the semantic content of the symbols which compose it and the syntactic rules governing 
its composition. 
 Proponents of LOTH typically argue that it is the thesis that thought and thinking 
“are done in a mental language, i.e., in a symbolic system physically realized in the brain 
of the relevant organism.”54
                                                            
54 Murat Aydede, “The Language of Thought Hypothesis,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward Zalta, Fall 2010, 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/language-thought/.  
  That is, adherents to LOTH are typically committed to 
physicalism, and argue that LOTH provides a sophisticated philosophical program 
according to which non-physical states (such as the propositional attitudes) can be 
explained, either reductively or non-reductively, in terms of a system of representation 
(i.e. a mental language) that is itself realized within a physical system, such as the brain.  
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 Burley, however, is no physicalist. For him, general concepts at least (and, at the 
end of his career, singular concepts as well) exist immaterially.55
 However, though Burley is committed to LOTH, he is committed to a heterodox 
version of it. Canonically, LOTH endorses a relational analysis of propositional attitudes, 
according to which belief and other states of that sort are relations that the mind bears to 
a proposition, or to a mental sentence, or to both. Canonical versions of LOTH then 
attempt to naturalize belief and other states of that sort in one of two ways. According to 
 But I argue that LOTH 
itself does not entail physicalism, contrary to the way many of its advocates articulate it. 
All that LOTH requires is a suitably sophisticated computing device containing symbols 
with representational or semantic properties, the use of which is causally sensitive to the 
syntax of those symbols. And if we understand LOTH to be a program of that sort, 
namely, one of naturalizing thought (rather than one of providing a specifically physical 
explanation for thought), then I argue that Burley himself is committed to LOTH. First, 
with respect to cases of simple cognitive activity – that is, thinking-of – Burley analyzes 
that activity in terms of the mind’s use of a concept which represents that thing. I have a 
thought of Socrates, for example, when I use, in some very minimal sense, the concept 
SOCRATES. Second, complex mental activity – that is, thinking-that – is simply a matter 
of a more sophisticated use of those same concepts. My thinking that Socrates is a 
human, for example, consists in my mind’s using the concepts SOCRATES and HUMAN 
predicatively, that is, it consists in my mind’s predicating HUMAN of SOCRATES.  
                                                            
55 It is important to note that Burley’s immaterial intellect is no Cartesian mind. This is especially clear 
when we consider the sort of being that that intellect and its attributes have.  While propositions 
themselves have a peculiar sort of being, the intellect and its concepts are all real features of the world, 
fitting within its causal structure. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” 60.  
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attempts which attempt to naturalize belief, etc., in the first way, the belief relation is 
treated as a three-place relation, so that belief is a relation of the mind both to a 
proposition and to the mental sentence which has that proposition as its content. In 
Representations, for example, Jerry Fodor argues that “beliefs are relations to 
propositions – viz., they are mediated relations to propositions, with internal 
representations doing the mediating.”56
 According to attempts of the second variety, in contrast, belief is analyzed in 
terms of two two-place relations, where one relation supervenes, or depends, upon the 
other. One relation is between a mind and a proposition, whereas the other is between 
that mind and a mental sentence which expresses that proposition. On that account, for 
example, my belief that Socrates is a human involves a relation to the proposition that 
Socrates is a human, as well as a more fundamental relation to the mental sentence 
SOCRATES IS A HUMAN. This appears to be something like the position Fodor adopts 
 The belief that Socrates is a human, for example, 
is a relation that a mind bears to the proposition that Socrates is a human – but that 
proposition is only the mediate object of that relation, being an object of that relation 
because that relation more immediately relates to a mental sentence which has that 
proposition as its content. On this view, different aspects of that relation resolve different 
philosophical worries. Epistemological questions about the content of knowledge are 
answered by appeal to propositions, whereas psychological worries about what explains 
the behavior of humans, for example, are addressed by appeal to the formal features of 
the mental sentences that one has and the psychological attitudes one bears to them. 
                                                            
56 Jerry A. Fodor, Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science (MIT 
Press, 1981), 200. 
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in LOT 2. In that work, he argues that verbs of attitude ascription are ambiguous between 
two readings.  
‘[T]he belief that...’ is ambiguous; it can be read either as transparent or as opaque 
at the ‘...’ position. Read in the first way, then ‘the belief that F(Paderewski1)’ is 
‘the belief that F(Paderewski2)’; read the second way, it’s not. There is, of course, 
no fact of the matter about which is ‘the right’ way of reading it; it depends on the 
task at hand. By and large, however, psychologists are likely to have the second in 
mind, epistemologists the first.57
 
  
According to Fodor in LOT 2, then, different readings of the ‘belief that...’ pick out 
different kinds of relations, so that which relation gets called “the belief relation” is 
domain- or interest-sensitive. If the interest is an analysis of knowledge, then the belief 
relation is the relation that the mind bears to a proposition. If the project is an analysis of 
explaining and predicting human behavior, in contrast, then it is the mind’s relation to a 
mental sentence that is more correctly labeled the belief relation. 
 In contrast to relational analyses of propositional content, however, Burley is 
committed to a non-relational analysis of propositional attitudes. As Burley’s 
commitment to intellectualism reveals, propositional attitudes are for him a matter of 
content creation, not content relation. Belief, for example, is a matter of predicating one 
thing of another in an assertive manner. My belief that Socrates is a human, on this 
account, just is my predicating humanity of Socrates assertively. On Burley’s account, 
then, the project of naturalizing thought isn’t a matter of describing in what way mental 
sentences figure into a relation that a mind bears to a proposition. Rather, it is a matter of 
describing how the mind’s production of a mental sentence contributes to its production 
of a proposition.  
                                                            
57 Fodor, LOT 2, 74. 
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 Like canonical versions of LOTH, however, it seems that Burley can describe that 
contribution, broadly, in one of two ways. First, he might hold that the mind’s predicating 
one thing of another depends upon, but is distinct from, the mind’s predicating concepts 
which represent those things. On this account, the mind simultaneously undertakes two 
distinct predicative acts: an act of predicating things, and an act of predicating concepts, 
and the former is explained in terms of the latter. Then, like Fodor in LOT 2, which act 
constitutes a propositional attitude will be relative to the domain in which the question is 
raised. Second, however, Burley might hold that the mind’s predicating one thing of 
another just is the mind’s predicating one concept of another, concepts which represent 
those things. The mind’s predicating humanity of Socrates, on this view, is the very same 
act as the mind’s predicating HUMAN of SOCRATES.  
 I argue that Burley adopts the second of these two positions. I argue this, in part, 
on grounds of economy; there is no need for two mental acts when one alone would do 
the trick. But, more than that, identifying acts of predicating things and acts of 
predicating concepts coheres with the broader account of cognition and concept use that 
Burley defends. According to Burley, simple mental acts just are the mind’s use of 
concepts. A thought of Socrates, for example, is a certain sort of simple use of the 
concept SOCRATES, on Burley’s account. In virtue of that use, the mind has a certain 
intentio to Socrates himself. In the same way, the thought that Socrates is a human is the 
mind’s predicative use of the concepts SOCRATES and HUMAN. In virtue of using 
those concepts in that way, the mind has a peculiar kind of intentio to both Socrates and 
humanity, in which the mind arranges them in a predicate fashion.  
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  This position also provides the best response to the sorts of problems that cause 
Burley to develop a mental language in the first place, problems having to do with an 
apparent tension between his account of the proposition, on the one hand, and his 
commitment to the productivity of demonstrative reasoning, on the other. Given those 
two commitments, Burley requires that belief-states which have the same content (i.e. are 
uses of the very same things arranged in the very same way) can be individuated more 
finely than that content. For example, his account requires that the belief that Socrates is 
a human is distinct from the belief that Socrates is a rational animal – even though both 
involve the mind’s predicating humanity of Socrates. But Burley argues the mind’s 
predicating one thing of another just is the mind’s predicating one concept of another. 
Consequently, the belief that Socrates is a human can be distinguished from the belief 
that Socrates is a rational animal, despite the fact that, in both cases, the mind predicates 
humanity of Socrates, because the former is more fundamentally a predicating HUMAN 
of SOCRATES, whereas the latter is more fundamentally a predicating RATIONAL 
ANIMAL of SOCRATES.  
 
4. BURLEY ON DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE 
 Burley’s endorsement of a language of thought helps Burley resolve an apparent 
problem for his account of the metaphysics of the proposition, concerned with co-
reference. It is perhaps best understood by way of example. Assume that Cato believes 
that Marcus runs. But ‘Marcus’ and ‘Tullius’ refer to the same individual, namely, 
Cicero. Therefore, Cato must believe that Tullius runs. But that inference seems 
unintuitive. It is quite easy to contrive cases in which a person asserts that Marcus runs, 
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but genuinely denies that Tullius runs, because (suppose) she mistakenly believes that 
Marcus and Tullius are two different people, and that one only of them is currently 
running. Accounts of propositional content motivated by referentialist commitments, 
then, appear to run contrary to some deeply-held intuitions about the sorts of inferences 
we can or cannot make in intentional contexts. 
 Problems of this sort today go by the name of Frege puzzles, or cases, named after 
Gottlob Frege, who uses cases of that sort to motivate a certain account of the nature of 
meaning and reference-shifting.58 But the problem has more medieval roots. The case of 
Marcus and Tullius, for example, is one that Burley himself discusses.59
                                                            
58 See Gottlob Frege, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,” Mind 65, no. 259 (July 1, 1956): 289–311. See 
also Gottlob Frege, P. T. Geach, and Max Black, “On Concept and Object,” Mind 60, no. 238 (April 1, 
1951): 168–80. 
 Problems of this 
59 Burley uses the Cicero case to draw a distinction between de dicto and de re readings of sentences whose 
verbs are intentional. Burley introduces the distinction in his treatise On Obligations. I translate the 
passage in its entirety; the distinction between de dicto and de re readings for sentences with opacity 
verbs is introduced in the second paragraph: 
Another difficulty is where many names signify the same thing, as happens in the case of 
synonyms. For example, suppose that ‘Marcus’ and ‘Tullius’ are names of the same thing. 
Suppose that you are unsure of this, and suppose that you know [substituting for: ‘do not know’] 
whose name is ‘Marcus’, and suppose you know that he runs, and suppose that you do not know 
[substituting for: ‘know] whose name is ‘Tullius’. Then you know that Marcus runs, but Marcus is 
Tullius, therefore you know that Tullius runs. Additionally, therefore, you know who is called 
‘Tullius’. But the positum was that you are ignorant [of who is named ‘Tullius’]. 
Here is the solution. This is of multiple sorts: ‘You know that Tullius runs’. Because it either 
signifies that you know this dictum, ‘Tullius runs’, and this is false. Or it signifies that you know 
of this person who is Tullius, that he runs, and this can be true, although you do not know what is 
signified through this term, ‘Tullius’, in just the way that a layman knows that a human runs, and 
yet does not know what is signified through this term, ‘human’. 
Through this, the solution to the following difficulty is clear. [The difficulty]: You know that 
Tullius is called ‘Marcus’, therefore you know that Marcus is called ‘Tullius’. For if it is denoted 
that you know this dictum, ‘Tullius is called ‘Marcus’’, then the consequence holds, given that you 
would know these convertible sentences: ‘Marcus is called ‘Tullius’’ and ‘Tullius is called 
‘Marcus’’. [The solution]: But if it is denoted that you know of someone who is called Tullius, 
that he is called ‘Marcus’, it does not follow that, since you know that Tullius is called ‘Marcus’, 
you know that Marcus is called ‘Tullius’. Likewise, this does not follow: since you know that 
Tullius is Tullius, you know that Tullius is called by this name, ‘Tullius’. Likewise, it does not 
follow in all cases that, if a is called ‘b’, then b is called ‘a’. An instance [to show that this is true]: 
some human is called ‘Marcus’, therefore Marcus is called ‘some human’, because the verb 
‘called’ requires a proper name after it. 
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sort appear to arise for anyone committed to an account of propositional content 
according to which that content is structured, and contains things (e.g. concrete 
particulars, properties) as parts. A central assumption, however, is that belief-states are 
only as fine-grained as their contents. 
 Burley’s concern about co-reference is not motivated so much by Frege-style 
cases, however, as it is by certain claims he wants to make about the nature of 
demonstration.60
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Again, suppose that ‘Marcus’ and ‘Tullius’ are names of the same thing, and suppose that you 
are unsure of this, and suppose that it is proposed to you: ‘Either Marcus is called ‘Tullius’, or 
something doubtful is proposed to you.’ If you concede this, and not because of this part, ‘Marcus 
is called ‘Tullius’’, therefore [you concede it] because of this part, ‘something doubtful is 
proposed to you’, therefore you concede something doubtful, which [you are not] obligated [to 
do], therefore [you act] poorly. If you deny it, you have to reject that Marcus is called ‘Tullius’, 
because he who denies a disjunction, has to deny both parts of it, and so you deny something 
which is [merely] doubtful to you, and so [you act] poorly. If you respond with doubt, then this is 
true: ‘something doubtful is proposed to you’. Therefore the disjunction is true, and you know this 
well [i.e. without doubt]. Therefore you respond with doubt to a true thing known to be true, and 
therefore [you act] poorly. The solution: you must respond with doubt to that disjunction, nor does 
this follow: ‘You respond with doubt to that disjunction, therefore you respond with doubt to a 
true thing known to be true’. 
 The theory of demonstration is Aristotelian philosophy of science. It 
sets out the conditions for scientific knowledge – scientia – in any domain of study. 
Aristotle introduces the notion of demonstrative science in his Posterior Analytics. In that 
(Walter Burley, “De obligationibus,” in An Introduction to the Logical Treatise De 
Obligationibus, ed. Romuald Green, vol. 2 (Louvain: Université catholique, Institut Supérieur de 
Philosophie, 1963), 39–40). 
 
Obligation was a form of medieval academic disputation, involving two individuals: an opponent and a 
respondent. The opponent sets out a number of claims, called posita (or a positum, if just one). The 
respondent traditionally concedes that set, at which point the game really commences. The opponent then 
makes a further claim, which the respondent can either concede, deny or take a doubtful position 
towards, depending on whether (1) he takes the claim to follow from the initial posita, or, if the claim is 
merely consistent with the initial posita, believes the claim on independent grounds, (2) he takes the 
claim to contradict the initial posita, or (3) he takes the claim to be consistent with, but not follow from 
the initial posita set out, and does not believe the claim on independent grounds. Any concession is added 
to the initial posita set out. The exchange continues for any number of rounds, until the opponent calls 
time, at which point any contradictions or errors of reason on the part of the respondent are noted. 
Scholars today are still not at all sure about the motivation for Obligation-style disputation. 
60 However, the problems are structurally similar: they assume that belief-states can be only as fine-grained 
as their contents, such that anyone who metaphysics of the proposition is motivated at least in part by 
referentialism will be forced to endorse inferences that run contrary to intuition. 
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work, Aristotle argues that scientific knowledge is gained “through a demonstration. By 
‘demonstration’, I mean a scientific deduction”61 According to Aristotle, then, knowledge 
(or, at any rate, scientific knowledge) comes about through  syllogistic reasoning, with 
the result of that reasoning being knowledge that is scientific. It is no surprise, then, that 
the early thirteenth-century philosopher Robert Grosseteste, in his commentary on the 
Posterior Analytics, argues that the definition of a demonstration is “a syllogism 
producing knowledge.”62
 The formal structure of scientific knowledge, then, is syllogistic. But syllogistic 
reasoning is scientific only when it produces what Aristotle calls understanding. “[A]nd, 
by ‘scientific’, I mean one in virtue of which, by having it, we understand something.”
 
63 
Demonstrative knowledge involves insight not just into how the world is, but into why 
the world is that way. Aristotle writes that “[w]e think we understand a thing simpliciter 
[...] whenever we think we are aware both that the explanation because of which the 
object is, is the explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise.”64
                                                            
61 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 71b17–8, p. 2. 
 
Scientific knowledge of a thing, then, requires (a) recognition of the cause why the thing 
is, (b) recognition of that cause as a cause, and (c) recognition that this causal connection 
is necessary. Consequently, scientific knowledge – as articulated here at least – involves 
having a noetic structure that mirrors the causal structure of the world itself. Just as some 
62 “[D]emonstratio sit syllogismus faciens scire” (Robert Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posteriorum 
Analyticorum libros, ed. Pietro Rossi (Firenze: Olschki, 1981), chap. 1, p. 93). 
63 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71b19, p. 2. 
64 Ibid., 71b10–4, p. 2. 
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(metaphysically or physically) necessary facts depend upon other, more fundamental 
(metaphysically or physically) necessary facts, so too scientific knowledge of these facts 
must be arrived at via knowledge of those more fundamental facts. 
 Because scientific knowledge contains a structure of that sort, Aristotle argues 
that there will be some principles – the “first principles” of a science – which have to be 
known non-demonstratively. These principles, Aristotle tells us, will be “true and 
primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the 
conclusion.”65 They must be true because knowledge is factive. They must be immediate 
because they are not themselves arrived at via deductive inference, that is, by mediation 
of more fundamental principles. That immediacy also reflects their primitiveness in 
noetic structure, as well as their priority in that structure relative to other principles and 
conclusions of the science. Finally, because the priority that those principles have in a 
noetic structure reflects an ontological priority of the facts that they represent, those 
principles will be explanatory of the conclusions that one can derive from them, because 
their relationship to each reflects a causal relationship that the facts which they represent 
have with one another. In particular, the middle term of a demonstration serves as a 
“cause,” or explanation, for why the attribute of a demonstration belongs the subject.66
                                                            
65 Ibid., 71b21–2, pp. 2–3. 
 A 
triangle’s having three angles equal to two right angles, for example, is caused by its 
66 A syllogism is a deductive inference from two premises (i.e. a major premise and a minor premise) to a 
conclusion. Consequently, every syllogism contains a subject, a middle term, and a predicate, or 
attribute. The form of the syllogism depends on the quality and quantity of each premise, as well as the 
relationship of the middle term to both the subject and the predicate. 
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having an extrinsic angle equal to the sum of two angles opposite to it.67
  Both the formal and substantive constraints that Aristotle sets for demonstration 
are extremely high. Consequently, elsewhere in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle appears 
to relax the demands he had initially placed on demonstration, allow syllogisms to be 
demonstrative even if they do not meet all of the criteria set out at the beginning of the 
work. Those syllogisms which fail to meet all of the criteria set out in the beginning are 
what Aristotle calls factual demonstrations (demonstratio quia).
 That is, having 
an extrinsic angle equal to the sum of two angles opposite to it is the explanation of why 
a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. 
68 A demonstration is 
factual, for example, when one proves a cause through an effect – for example, if one 
proves that the planets are near because they do not twinkle.69 Likewise, a demonstration 
is factual when “the middle is set outside,” that is, when the middle term does not belong 
to the subject of the syllogism per se, but rather an attribute peculiar to a more general 
kind.70
                                                            
67 On this example, see Giles of Rome, “Commentary on Posterior Analytics II 9, 93b26–8,” in 
Demonstration and Scientific Knowledge in William of Ockham: A Translation of Summa Logicae III-II: 
De Syllogismo Demonstrativo, and Selections from the Prologue to the Ordinatio, trans. John Longeway 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 288–89. 
 Moreover, a demonstration is merely factual if it isn’t “direct.” That is, it is 
merely factual if the middle term doesn’t immediately explain subject’s having the 
68 On Aristotle on factual demonstration, and its comparison to an explanatory demonstration, see Aristotle, 
Posterior Analytics, 78a23–79a16, pp. 19–21. 
69 The planets do not twinkle because they are near, and so, if one proves that the planets are near by the 
fact that they do not twinkle, one has not yet explained why the planets are near. 
70 Consequently, subalternate sciences are necessarily factual, rather than explanatory, since explanatory 
demonstrations require the demonstrations (if any) from which their principles are derived to be 
explanatory as well. Optics, for example, is merely factual, since some of its first principles are arrived at 
via demonstration in geometry. 
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relevant attribute, but rather only explains it remotely, by more immediately causing 
some effect which itself is a more proximate cause of the subject’s having that attribute.71
 In contrast to factual demonstrations, explanatory demonstrations (demonstratio 
propter quid) do fulfill the criteria that Aristotle sets out at the beginning of the Posterior 
Analytics. However, even among explanatory demonstrations, some are more preferable 
to others. For example, Aristotle argues that universal demonstrations are preferable to 
particular demonstrations, since “the universal is more explanatory.”
 
In all of these cases, one or more of the conditions initially set out for demonstrative 
knowledge is not met – either the demonstration is not explanatory, or the middle is not 
proper to the subject, or the attributes’ relationship to the subject is not an immediate 
effect of the middle term.  
72 Likewise, 
affirmative demonstrations are preferable to negative demonstrations, since a 
demonstration is “better which, other things being equal, depends on fewer postulates, or 
suppositions, or propositions [...].” Aristotle’s argument for this claim, as Jonathan 
Barnes, is “embarrassingly bad [...]. Only surgery can save Aristotle’s reputation.” 73
                                                            
71 The sort of demonstration is factual because it does not serve to explain why the attribute inheres in the 
subject, since the middle term won’t explain its inherence, but rather explains the inherence of some 
intermediate attribute.  
 That 
surgery, Barnes argues, leaves us with the following argument: “D1 is preferable to D2 if 
it “depends on fewer items,” i.e., if it makes fewer conceptual demands than D2. And 
probative deductions make fewer demands than privative ones; for the latter, as Aristotle 
72 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 86a31–32, p. 39. For Aristotle’s arguments for why universal 
demonstrations are more explanatory than particular ones, see Ibid., 85a14–86a30, pp. 35–9. 
73 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 187. 
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points out, require the concept of negation.”74
 Among explanatory demonstrations, then, certain kinds are especially prized. 
Those demonstrations  have a particular syllogistic form: AAA in the first form, or 
Barbara. Barbara syllogisms are syllogisms which contain premises both of which are (1) 
universally quantified and (2) affirmative, and which are so structured so that the middle 
term is predicated of the subject, and the attribute is predicated of the middle term.
 That is, an affirmative (or probative) 
demonstration is preferable to a negative (or privative) demonstration because it is 
conceptually simpler, since it does not require the use of the notion of negation. 
75
 Even with regard to those especially prized explanatory demonstrations, however, 
we can always inquire into why the subject is characterized by the middle term itself. 
That is, we can ask how it is that we know the middle term is true of its subject. Have we 
come to know this demonstratively, or must we have come to know it in another way? 
Assume we know this demonstratively. Consequently, that middle term with be the term 
of an attribute in some more fundamental demonstration, which itself contains a new 
middle term. Of this new middle term, however, we can ask again how we know that it is 
in its subject.   
 
Moreover, as explanatory demonstrations, they fulfill the requirements set out for 
demonstration at the beginning of the Posterior Analytics, and in particular they contain a 
middle term whose inherence in the subject is more fundamental than and an immediate 
explanation of the subject’s having some attribute.  
                                                            
74 Ibid. 
75 Barabara syllogisms have the following form: ‘Every M is A, every S is M, therefore every S is A’. 
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 Aristotle argues that, at some point, we will need to come to the first principles of 
the science, principles which are “true and primitive and immediate.” Explanatory 
demonstrations whose major and minor premises are first principles of a science are what 
medieval philosophers called a demonstration of the highest sort (demonstratio 
potissima).  A demonstration of the highest sort, unlike other sorts of explanatory 
demonstrations, contains premises which cannot themselves be known demonstratively in 
that science. Medieval philosophers in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were 
extremely interested in demonstrations of the highest sort, and that interest was almost 
always motivated by a heated controversy over the nature of the middle term in that sort 
of demonstration. 
 What sort of thing can serve as the middle term in a demonstration which employs 
only the first principles of a science? Is it some attribute of the subject, or are all 
attributes, in the end, known demonstratively of their subjects via some other thing? This 
was a - perhaps the - central question in medieval discussions concerning the highest sort 
of demonstration. Until sometime in the fourteenth century, there was little consensus on 
what could serve as a middle term in a demonstration of the highest sort. Albert the 
Great, for example, writing in the middle of the thirteenth century, argued that a 
demonstration of the highest sort has as its middle term the definition of an attribute, 
because a definition of an attribute provides an explanation why that attribute is in its 
subject. Albert’s student, Thomas Aquinas, would argue instead that it was the definition 
of the subject that served as the middle in a demonstration of the highest sort. And, in 
turn, Giles of Rome, himself a student of Aquinas, defended the view of Aquinas’s 
master Albert, denying that the definition of a subject could ever serve as a middle term 
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in an explanatory demonstration, and affirming instead that it was the definition of an 
attribute that served as the middle term in these kinds of demonstrations.  
 Giles devotes an entire treatise to the question of what the middle term in a 
demonstration of the highest sort is, titled ‘What is the Middle Term in a 
Demonstration?” Giles starts by noting that the proper attributes of a subject can be 
ordered according to their cause, that is, ordered according to the reason why they inhere 
in a subject. This order is relevant for demonstration, because demonstration (or 
explanatory demonstration at least) is a causal ordering of the proper attributes of a 
subject. Giles writes that “it must be known that one nature is determined to one thing, 
because from one nature and one form according to one genus of abstraction there 
immediately proceeds only one property or one attribute.”76
  But what then explains the presence of a primary attribute in some subject? 
Aquinas argues that it is the very fact that the subject is the kind of thing that it is. For 
 In other words, each thing 
can be considered more or less abstractly – for example, we can consider a human qua 
human or a human qua animal. Relative to a human qua human, however, only one 
attribute is true of it primarily, that is, possessed by it on account of no other attributes 
proper to it. For example, medieval philosophers argued that the attribute of being 
capable of laughter is the primary attribute of a human qua human; its inherence in a 
human is to be explained by no other attributes that a human possesses qua human. On 
this point about primary attributes, at least, Albert and Giles, on the one hand, and 
Aquinas, on the other, completely agree.    
                                                            
76 Giles of Rome, “De medio demonstrationis,” ed. Jan Pinborg, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 10 (1976): I.4, p. 
264. 
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example, on this view, given the mere fact that a human is a rational animal, a human is a 
thing capable of laughter. The essence or quiddity of a thing – the what it is – is, on this 
view, the cause of the presence of a primary attribute in it. The subject’s definition, then, 
expresses this essence, making explicit an attribute’s reason for inherence. Giles, denying 
this view, argues that we must distinguish between proper attributes, on the one hand, and 
proper causes, on the other. Giles agrees with Aquinas that a primary attribute is in its 
subject on account of no other attribute proper to the subject qua subject; it is a proper 
attribute of that subject. However, he argues that that attribute can be caused to be in that 
thing by an attribute which is proper to that subject at some higher level of abstraction. 
So, for example, it may be that the attribute of being capable of laughter, through proper 
to a human qua human, inheres in a human being because of attribute that a human has 
qua animal. At some point of abstraction, however, we will come to the principles of a 
science which are known either via immediate sense-perception or a priori intuition. And 
so, Giles writes, “[p]osterior attributes are always resolved into prior attributes, and more 
particular attributes into more common ones, until one arrives at those so common that 
they cannot be demonstrated, although, when the formulae [i.e. the definitions] of these 
most common terms [i.e. those attributes] are known, they are known [non-demonstrably] 
to be in their subjects.”77
  This disagreement over the middle term of a demonstration of the highest sort is, 
at root, a deep disagreement about the nature of science. Aquinas (and later Burley and 
others in the fourteenth century) see science as engaged in an explanation of the 
necessary causal dispositions of a thing, dispositions that can be actualized in the correct 
 
                                                            
77 Giles of Rome, “Commentary on Posterior Analytics II 9, 93b26-28,” 286. 
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environment. Albert and Giles, in contrast, see science as contextualized to the actual 
environment, so that science consists in a causal ordering of actual states of affairs, an 
explanation of why things are the way they are given the metaphysical features of the 
actual world around them. On this account, our scientific knowledge consists in knowing 
things only insofar as we find them in this world, not in knowing those things in and of 
themselves.  
 In whatever way that deeper disagreement about the nature of science are 
ultimately settled, however, Giles argues that the Aquinas’s (and so Burley’s) position 
founders at a more basic level. If the definition of the subject serves as the middle term in 
a demonstration, providing the reason why the primary attribute inheres in its subject, 
then, Giles argues, the conclusion of a demonstration of the highest sort will be nothing 
other than the major premise of that demonstration. For the definition of a subject refers 
to that very subject, and so a subject (or, rather, a name of that subject) and its definition 
do not differ in referent. Giles writes that a primary attribute can never be demonstrated 
by a middle term which is the definition of a subject, because  
then the middle is the same as the minor extreme [i.e. the subject], and then the 
conclusion does not differ from the major premise.  But what is contrary to 
syllogism is contrary to demonstration. Since, then, this is necessary in a 
syllogism, that the conclusion be other than the premises, it will not be a 
demonstration unless the conclusion differs from every premise.78
                                                            
78 Giles of Rome, “De medio demonstrationis,” sec. I.5, p. 263: “Et quia forte haec per dicta non est plene 
clarum, possumus istam veritatem plenius declarare, quod scilicet prima passio non demonstratur [...]. 
Per subiectum non, quia tunc idem esset medium quam minor extremitas, et tunc non differet conclusio a 
maiori propositione. Sed quae repugnant syllogismo, repugnant demonstrationi. Cum igitur hoc in 
syllogismo sit necessarium, quod conclusio sit alia a prasemissis, non erit demonstratio nisi conclusio 
differat a qualibet praemissarum.” It might seem that a tu quoque objection is in order here. After all, 
Giles’s position is that the middle term is a definition of the attribute. It might seem, then, that that 
definition and the attribute (or, rather, a name of the attribute) likewise refer to the same things, leaving 
Giles’s with a similar problem. However, the name of an attribute and its definition (in particular, what 
Giles calls its explanatory definition) are not co-referential. This is because the definition of one attribute 
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In other words, Giles rejects the view of Aquinas because of problems of co-reference. 
To put Giles’s argument in a slightly different way, demonstrative science demands that 
the conclusion of a demonstration is something we come to know through syllogistic 
reasoning from our knowledge of its major and minor premises.79
 Burley himself takes up the issue of the nature of the middle term in a 
demonstration of the highest sort in the 11th question of the Quaes.Post.  Burley begins 
that question with arguments against both the position that the middle term is a definition 
  But, according to 
Giles, on the view that Aquinas advances, the knowledge to be gained through 
demonstrative reasoning (in the most foundational cases, at least) will be something the 
practitioners of that science already possess, in virtue of their knowledge of the first 
principles of that science. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
refers to another attribute – in particular, an immediately prior attribute, which is its cause of inherence in 
the subject. The being of an attribute, unlike the being of a subject, is being-in-a-subject. Consequently, 
to define what an attribute is, is to explain why it is in a subject. And to explanation why an attribute is in 
a subject is to refer its reason for inherence – which is some immediately prior attribute. Of course, on 
Giles’s view, not all attributes will have an explanation for why they are in a subject, that is, they will 
lack a proper cause. We come to know their presence in a subject, then, through immediate experience. 
On Giles’s discussion of this issue, see Ibid., sec. II.2, pp. 266–7. 
79 Giles’s argument relies on a logical claim of Aristotle’s, that syllogistic inference requires the conclusion 
to be distinct from its premises, and so Giles explicitly casts the problem in logical terms. But this 
objection can be understood epistemologically for two reasons. First, recall the definition of 
demonstration that Grosseteste provides. A demonstration is a syllogism producing knowledge.  So even 
if syllogistic were to allow a conclusion to be identical to one of its premises, a demonstrative syllogism 
would still require that knowledge of the conclusion is distinct from knowledge of the premises. But if 
knowledge is to be distinguished according to its contents, then the view which Aquinas espouses 
requires that demonstration of the highest sort produce no new knowledge at all, contrary to the very 
nature of demonstration. 
Second, Giles objection is understood epistemically by subsequent philosophers, including Burley. 
Burley considers the nature of the middle term of demonstration of the highest sort in his questions 
commentary on the Posterior Analytics. And in that work, one of the main objections to his account 
relies on the claim that the premises of a demonstration should be more known than the conclusion. 
Burley’s interlocutor argues, for example, that  
these sentences ‘every human is capable of laughter’ and ‘every rational animal is capable of 
laughter’ signify the same thing. But the thing signified through one is more known than the thing 
signified through the other. Therefore the same thing would be more known than itself (Walter 
Burley, Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum, para. 11.03, p. 151). 
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of the attribute, and the position that the middle term is a definition of the subject. The 
argument lodged against the thesis that the middle is a definition of the subject are clearly 
influenced by Giles’s critique. For example, Burley argues that the expressions  
‘human’ and ‘rational animal’ completely signify the same thing.  Therefore these 
sentences, ‘Every human is capable of laughter’ and ‘Every rational animal is 
capable of laughter’ completely signify the same thing, because sentences do not 
signify unless because [their] terms signify.  And, consequently, if this is 
immediate, ‘Every rational animal is capable of laughter’, the other will be [also].  
But the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent [is false].80
 
   
The conclusion of a demonstration is not something that can be known immediately – 
that is, non-demonstratively – but can only known via a demonstrative syllogism. But, 
since what is known is what is signified, if we know non-demonstratively what is 
expressed by the sentence ‘Every rational animal is capable of laughter’, then it seems 
that we must already non-demonstratively know that every human is capable of laughter, 
an absurd result given that, on Burley’s own theory, this is supposed to be learned via a 
demonstrative syllogism.  
 Burley affirms the view that the middle term in a demonstration of the highest sort 
is a definition of the subject, and so it is incumbent upon him to respond to the problem 
for his account that Giles raises. To respond to Giles’s criticism of that view, therefore, 
Burley utilizes a distinction he makes earlier in the Quaes.Post. In the second question of 
the Quaes.Post, Burley argues that we must be careful to distinguish three types of 
demonstration.   
[W]hen it is asked whether a demonstrative syllogism is composed out of 
utterances, or out of concepts, or out of things, it must be said that just as a 
statement can be taken materially from which it is composed, so too in the same 
way the syllogism [...].  If it is taken to be for the thing signified alone, then the 
                                                            
80 Ibid., para. 2.49, pp. 62–3. 
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demonstrative syllogism is a syllogism passively said, and in this way it is 
composed out of things by an intellectual composition and not by a real 
composition.  If the demonstrative syllogism is taken for a sign [i.e. taken to be 
composed of sentences in natural or mental language], then it is composed out of 
significative utterances or out of concepts.81
 
  
It is this distinction, then – between demonstrations composed of things and 
demonstrations composed of signs – that Burley will employ in his response to Giles’s 
objection. Burley at first concedes that, if we concern ourselves with a demonstrative 
syllogism composed of things, it is certainly the case that the major premise of that 
demonstration will not be more known than the conclusion.  
[It] must be known that because the same thing is completely signified by a 
definition and a name of the thing defined, in a demonstration which is not a sign 
of another demonstration, the major is not more known than the conclusion.  
Hence the thing signified through this sentence ‘Every rational animal is capable 
of laughter’ is not more known than the thing signified through this sentence, 
‘Every human is capable of laughter’.82
 
 
But Burley argues that more than just a demonstration “composed of things” is relevant 
to demonstrative science. Rather, demonstrative science also should be articulated with 
respect to natural language and (more importantly, I suggest) mental language – which 
we can call generally demonstrations composed of signs. With respect to a demonstration 
of that sort, however,  
                                                            
81 Ibid., para. 2.49, p. 62: “Ad aliud principale, quando quaeritur aut syllogismus demonstrativus 
componitur ex vocibus, aut ex conceptibus, aut ex rebus, dicendum quod sicut propositio potest accipi 
materialiter ex quibus componitur, sic eodem modo syllogismus [...]. Si accipiatur pro signato tantum, sic 
syllogismus demonstrativus est syllogismus passive dictus, et isto modo componitur ex rebus 
compositione intellectuali, et non compositione reali. Si accipiatur syllogismus demonstrativus pro signo, 
sic componitur ex vocibus significativis vel ex conceptibus.” 
82 Ibid., para. 11.50, p. 161: “Ulterius sciendum quod ex quo eandem rem totaliter significant definitio et 
nomen definiti, in demonstratione quae non est signum alterius demonstrationis, maior non est notior 
quam conclusio. Unde res significata per hanc propositionem, ‘omne animal rationale est risibile’, non 
est notior quam res significata per istam ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, etsi res significata per unum sit verum 
immediatum et res significata per relictum erit verum mediatum.” 
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that to which the attribute is attributed in the major and that to which the attribute 
is attributed in the conclusion are not the same thing. But those to which the 
attribute in the major premise and [the attribute] in the conclusion are attributed 
are signs of the same thing precisely.83
 
 
That is, the middle term in a demonstration composed of signs will differ from the 
subject term of that demonstration, even if those terms refer to the same things. The 
middle term differs from the subject because 
such a middle is composed out of many utterances or many concepts, which 
concepts or utterances signify expressly the principles of the thing defined.  But 
the name of the thing defined, which is the subject term of the conclusion, does 
not signify the defined thing except implicitly, nor through such a name are 
conveyed expressly the principles of the thing defined.84
 
 
Demonstrations composed of signs are demonstrations in which the premises do 
differ from the conclusion, then, precisely because the middle term of that 
demonstration differs from the subject term. And so 
that which is commonly said, that in a demonstration of the highest sort the 
premises are more known than the conclusion, this is to be understood concerning 
demonstrations which are signs of other demonstrations [...]. And when it is said 
that the middle is the cause of the attribute or the cause by which the attribute 
inheres in the subject, we should say that in a demonstration which is a sign, the 
middle is the cause of cognition with respect to the conclusion, since through a 
middle in a demonstration of that sort is conveyed the nature of the species 
expressly, because a middle of that sort is composed out of many utterances or out 
of many concepts, which concepts or utterances signify expressly the principles of 
the thing defined .85
                                                            
83 Ibid., para. 11.51, p. 161: “Unde per istam viam potest sustineri quod idem nunquam est notius se ipso, 
quia in demonstratione quae est signum non est idem cui attribuitur passio in maiore et cui attribuitur 
passio in conclusione. Sed illa quibus attribuitur passio in conclusione et in maiore sunt signa eiusdem rei 
praecise.” 
 
84 Ibid., para. 11.52, p. 161: “[...] tale medium componitur ex pluribus vocibus vel ex pluribus conceptibus, 
qui conceptus vel voces significant expresse principia rei definitae.” 
85Ibid., para. 11.51–52, p. 161: “Unde quod communiter, quod in demonstratione potissima praemissae sunt 
notiores conclusione, hoc est intelligendum de demonstrationibus quae sunt signa aliarum 
demonstrationum [...]. Et cum dicitur quod medium est causa passionis sive causa quare passio inest 
subiecto, dicendum quod in demonstratione quae signum est medium causa cognitionis respectu 
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The middle term differs from the subject term because they differ in syntactic structure – 
the name being a simple expression and the definition a complex one. In fact, it is 
precisely because they differ in this way that the latter but not the former conveys the 
complex metaphysical structure of the thing to which they both refer.  
 Aristotle’s claim that premises are more known than their conclusions, then, 
tracks, on Burley’s view, a feature peculiar to demonstrations composed of meaningful 
expressions – whether those are utterances in natural language or sentences in a language 
of thought, composed of concepts. With respect to demonstration composed of 
propositions, the major premise is not always more known that the conclusion. With 
respect to a demonstration composed of statements in natural or mental language, in 
contrast, the major premise is always more known than the conclusion. “And so,” Burley 
writes, 
in this way one can maintain that nothing is never more known than itself, 
because in a demonstration which is a sign, that which is predicated of the 
attribute in the major premise and that which is predicated of the attribute in the 
conclusion are not the same.86
 
 
 Burley is certainly correct that statements in natural or mental language can differ 
from each other, even if the referents of their terms are identical. But so what? How does 
that fact help resolve the issues that Giles raises for Burley’s account of demonstrative 
science? The theory of demonstration is an epistemic theory, about scientific knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
conclsuionis, quoniam per medium in tali demonstratione imporatur natura speciei expresse, quia tale 
medium componitur ex pluribus vocibus vel ex pluribus conceptibus, qui conceptus vel voces significant 
expresse principia rei definitae.” 
86 Ibid., para. 11.51, p. 161: “Unde per istam viam potest sustineri quod idem nunquam est notius se ipso, 
quia in demonstratione quae est signum non est idem cui attribuitur passio in maiore et cui attribuitur 
passio in conclusione.” 
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in particular. Giles’s criticism is that, given a commitment to a referentialist semantics (a 
semantics Giles himself appears to endorse), since demonstrations are syllogisms 
producing knowledge, the middle term of a demonstration has to refer to some object 
which is distinct from either the referent of the subject term or the referent of the attribute 
term. For only then will the content of the conclusion be different from the content of the 
major premise. A central assumption of Giles’s criticism, then, is that knowledge-states 
can only be as fine-grained as their content. Now if knowledge-states are only as fine-
grained as their content, then Giles’s objection appears compelling. But, I argue, Burley’s 
distinction between demonstrations composed of things, on the one hand, and 
demonstrations composed of signs, on the other, is meant to deny that assumption. 
Knowledge-states are more fine-grained than their contents, on this picture, because they 
can be individuated by statements composed of concepts in particular, where those 
statements can differ even if they have the same content. In the next section, therefore, I 
return to considerations of mental language and the account of the language of thought of 
which it is a part, and explain how those accounts allow us to understand Burley’s 
response to Giles in that way. 
 
5. MENTAL LANGUAGE AND DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE  
  On a naive, contemporary analysis of propositional attitudes, propositional 
attitudes are relations to contents. Following terminology introduced by Susan Brower-
Toland, we can call those contents, content-objects.87
                                                            
87 See Susan. Brower-Toland, “Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and The Problem of Intentionality,” 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37, no. 1 (2007): 98. 
 On that analysis, for example, the 
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belief that Socrates is a human has as its content-object the proposition that Socrates is a 
human. The analysis is naive because it takes propositional attitudes to be individuated by 
their contents; it is contemporary because it takes attitudes to be relations, strictly 
speaking. When paired with a commitment to referentialism, relational analyses faces 
Frege-style puzzles, precisely because it does not seem to be the case that co-referring 
terms can always be substituted salva veritate when they are within the scope of a verb of 
intention. In response to cases of that sort, LOTH proponents argue that those puzzles can 
be solved by supplementing that naive account of propositional attitudes with a 
commitment to a language of thought. That supplementation, as we saw (see §2), can be 
articulated in various ways.  
 On Burley’s account, however, our propositional attitudes have no content-
objects, precisely because our propositional attitudes are not relations to propositions. 
This is not to say that our attitudes do not have content. Surely they do. The belief that 
Socrates is a human, for example, is contentful. But it has the contentfulness that it does 
because is it an act of predicating humanity of Socrates, thereby representing that 
Socrates is a human. In other words, the mind’s predicating one thing of another creates 
its content, rather than relates it to some content-object – the proposition – in virtue of 
which it would have the meaning and truth-conditions that it does. Moreover, Burley’s 
position does not entail that propositional attitudes lack intentionality, or aboutness. 
Propositional attitudes clearly do have aboutness, on Burley’s account, being about the 
very things which the mind uses in its predicative activity. The belief that Socrates is a 
human, for example, is about Socrates and the property of humanity. Again following 
Brower-Toland, call these things the referential objects of a propositional attitude.  
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 Any solution Burley provides to Giles’s objection to Burley’s account of 
demonstrative science (or to the related puzzle of the non-substitutability of co-referring 
terms in intentional contexts), then, will be a solution provided within a larger, non-
relational framework of propositional attitudes. As I suggested, an adequate solution on 
Burley’s part to Giles’s objection requires that propositional attitudes can be more fine-
grained than the referential objects of those attitudes. For example, Burley’s solution 
must explain how the belief that Socrates is a human can be distinguished from the belief 
that Socrates is a rational animal, despite the fact that those two beliefs have the same 
referential objects, namely Socrates and the property of humanity. However, because 
Burley defends a non-relational analysis of propositional attitudes, Burley can easily 
explain how some beliefs, at least, with the same referential objects can be individuated. 
For beliefs with the same referential objects can still be individuated by their formal 
features. For example, given Burley’s account of the metaphysics of the proposition, the 
belief that all humans are rational animals and the belief that some human is a rational 
animal have the same referential object. They constitute different beliefs, however, 
because those propositions differ with respect to their formal features – in particular, their 
quantity. But differences in the formal features of a proposition, on Burley’s account, are 
differences in the kind of predicative acts that compose them. The belief that all humans 
are rational animals is constituted by an act of predication in which the subject is 
universally distributed relative to the predicate, whereas the belief that a human is a 
rational animal is constituted by an act that does not distribute the subject in this way. 
 Of course, the sorts of cases that Giles is worried about are cases in which the 
relevant beliefs have not just the same “material” features but all the same formal features 
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as well. The belief that a human is a human, for example, and the belief that a human is a 
rational animal, are cases in which the mind predicates humanity of Socrates, and where 
those acts of predication have the same quality, quantity and mode. In other words, 
Giles’s objection is that Burley has to way to distinguish propositional attitudes with the 
same content, where content is more than merely the referential objects of some cognitive 
act. A successful response to Giles’s objection, then, requires that Burley explain how 
mental acts of predication (and so attitudes like belief) can be individuated more finely 
than their contents.  
 Burley’s endorsement of mental language and his endorsement of the language of 
thought hypothesis specifically provide Burley with the resources he needs to individuate 
mental acts to the level of fine-grainedness that his account requires. Mental acts of 
predication are complex acts of thinking. To predicate humanity of Socrates just is to 
have the thought that Socrates is a human. But acts of thinking are, on Burley’s account, 
nothing more than the mind’s use of concepts. We saw this above in the case of simple 
mental acts, where concepts account for what acts of that sort are about, but simple 
cognitive activity itself is the mind’s or use of those concepts. Like simple cognitive 
activity, complex cognitive activity is also a kind of use to which the mind puts the 
concepts that it has – more sophisticated (or “complex”) than simple cognitive activity, 
no doubt, but use nonetheless. To think that Socrates is human, for example, is to use the 
concepts SOCRATES and HUMAN in a predicative way. But if the mind’s predicating 
one thing of another just is the mind’s predicating one concept of another (concepts 
which represent those things), then Burley can individuate those acts according to the 
concepts that those acts employ. The belief that Socrates is a human, for example, is the 
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mind’s predicating humanity of Socrates. But that act just is the act of predicating 
HUMAN of SOCRATES. And that act will be distinct from the act of predicating 
RATIONAL ANIMAL of SOCRATES, which act constitutes the belief that Socrates is a 
rational animal. 
 The success of Burley’s response to Giles depends on a (possibly contentious) 
account of act-individuation.88
 I take Burley’s response to Giles’s objection, then, to be this. It is certainly true 
that certain belief-states in the noetic structure of a science may have the same content. 
The belief that Socrates is a human and the belief that Socrates is a rational animal, for 
 In particular, it requires that mental acts can be 
individuated not just by their formal features, but also by the concepts whose use they 
constitute. But, again, this seems to required by Burley’s account of cognition generally. 
Since concepts are distinct from mental acts, acts of thinking need to be individuated in 
part by concepts whose use they are. The act of thinking about Socrates and the act of 
thinking about Plato, for example, involve the same sort of conceptual use. They differ, 
then, only because those acts involve the use of different concepts. Mutatis mutandis, 
then, complex mental acts as well should be individuated by the concepts whose use they 
constitute.   
                                                            
88 The reason that this account may be contentious is that the medieval notion of an act is a notion of a 
peculiar sort of relation. As such, it is unclear whether acts should be individuated by their objects. The 
relation of identity, for example, does not appear to be individuated by its relata. However, Burley may 
have a response here. Medieval philosophers regarded relations generally as monadic. See Jeffrey 
Brower, “Medieval Theories of Relations,” accessed June 21, 2010, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relations-medieval/. The distinction between properties and relations for 
a medieval philosopher, then, is not that the former is monadic while the latter is many-placed. Rather, 
properties and relations are distinguished from one another in that the former is an absolute entity, while 
the latter necessarily have a kind of directionality towards something – in the case of action, a patient (or 
patients) upon which that act operates. Consequently, Burley might be able to appeal to the thing(s) 
towards which an action is directed to individuate it, and, in the case of mental acts at least, does appear 
to make that appeal. 
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example, are both cases in which the mind predicates humanity of Socrates in an 
affirmative fashion. This is what a sentence in natural language signifies, since linguistic 
comprehension of a sentence in natural language is simply a matter of predicating what 
the predicate expression signifies of what the subject expression signifies in accordance 
with the various syncategorematic expressions in that sentence. Call a demonstration at 
that level of fine-grainedness a demonstration composed of things.  
 However, the mind’s predicating one thing of another – a particular act that the 
mind performs – can be individuated more finely, because those acts are in fact acts 
which predicate one concept of another. Indeed, the mind’s predicating one concept of 
another explains the mind’s predicating one thing of another, since those concepts refer to 
those things. Because two different concepts can refer to the same thing, moreover, the 
acts themselves can be distinguished from one another relative to the differing concepts 
that they predicate, even though those acts have the same referential objects. Since those 
acts of predicating just are acts of belief, however, belief-states will be more fine-grained 
than their contents, because those beliefs-states are, in part, acts of predicating concepts, 
where those concepts are more fine-grained than their contents. It is at the level of mental 
language, then, that belief has the fine-grainedness that Burley’s account of 
demonstrative science requires. 
 Note, crucially, that Burley’s distinction between a demonstration composed of 
concepts and a demonstration composed of things (or, at a more basic level, his 
distinction between mental sentences and propositions) does not amount to the claim that 
mental sentences, on the one hand, and the propositions that are their contents, on the 
other, are radically distinct, or independent, from one another. Rather, mental sentences 
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and the propositions that they express share the same “formal” part, namely, a mental act 
of predication. So, for example, the belief that Socrates is a human is at once an act of 
predicating humanity of Socrates, and of predicating HUMAN of SOCRATES, the 
former depending on the latter. Mental sentences and propositions are, in a sense, two 
sides of the same coin. That relationship between mental language and its content is 
central to the success of Burley’s account, for it is only because mental sentences and 
their contents are structured by the same act that Burley can individuate belief-states as 
finely as he does, given the non-relational analysis of propositional attitudes that he 
endorses.89
                                                            
89 It is also central to what I believe should be Burley’s response to Frege’s Puzzle (though I think Burley 
fails to address that puzzle directly himself). Recall that, for Burley, categorematic expressions in natural 
language refer to things by being subordinated to concepts. Burley argues that, because expressions in 
natural language are subordinated to concepts in this way, they secondarily signify (or are marks, notae, 
of) those concepts. (See Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k3rb–
va). In non-intentional contexts, that marking relation is not semantically relevant, since transparent 
statements merely indicate which thing must be predicated of which. In intentional contexts, however, 
that marking relation is semantically relevant. It is made semantically relevant by falling within the scope 
of a verb of intention. We can think of ‘believes’ and other verbs of intention as shifting the content of 
the categorematic expressions in their complement clause, so that those expression refer not to things but 
rather to the concepts by which those expressions signify. That is, verbs of intention shift the referent of 
an expression of natural language, from its primary significate (a thing) to its secondary significate (a 
concept), when those expressions fall within its scope. (For Burley’s endorsement of the claim generally 
that linguistic context can shift the content of an expression from its primary, or standard, content to a 
secondary, or non-standard, content, see Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic, 91). 
Consequently, with respect to verbs of intention, verb phrases will refer not to propositions but to mental 
sentences, which express the propositions that those complement clauses refer to when outside the scope 
of a verb of intention. ‘The belief that Socrates is human’, for example, would refer to the mind’s 
predicating HUMAN of SOCRATES. Those mental sentences are of course more fine-grained than their 
contents, and so it will not always be possible to substitute terms with the same (primary) referents salva 
veritate. (Alternatively, Burley could respond that one can always substitute co-referring terms salva 
veritate, but that, under the scope of a verb of intention, two expressions are co-referential only if they 
orthographically and phonetically similar). This approach also seems to fit with the “adverbial” theory of 
truth that Thomas Bradwardine (a close associate of Burley’s) and others developed about a half-
generation after Burley. On the adverbial theory, see Paul Vincent Spade, “Thoughts, Words and Things: 
An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory, Version 1.2,” December 27, 2007, 
http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Thoughts,%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf. 
  
Note that this response doesn’t take the view of what’s today often called naive Russellianism, where 
the belief that Socrates is human just is the belief that Socrates is a rational animal, but that inferences 
from one to the other are blocked on merely pragmatic grounds. (On the naive Russellian approach to 
Frege’s Puzzle, see Nathan Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle (Ridgeview, 1986)). Nor does it involve the standard 
contextualist approach, according to which sentences that contain verbs of intention have unarticulated 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I have argued that Burley develops a sophisticated account of 
mental language, according to which the vocabulary of that language is constituted by 
concepts, and the production of a mental sentence involves the mind’s predicating one 
concept of another. Those concepts will be categorematic, that is, they will each have a 
referent. Some of the mind’s concepts – its basic concepts – are acquired through a 
complex causal process. Others – complex concepts – are created by the mind when it 
combines less complex concepts with one another in various rule-governed ways. The 
referents of these complex concepts will themselves be complex, constituted by the 
referents of the basic concepts that ultimately compose that complex concept.  
 Moreover, the concepts that the mind possess are all nominal in character: nouns, 
adjectives, and adverbs, so that that vocabulary lacks verb concepts. This is because all 
verbs of natural language are ultimately resolvable into some form of the copula, but the 
copula is a syncategorematic expression in natural language. Syncategorema are realized 
in mental language not as elements of the vocabulary of that language, but as innate 
operations of the mind – in particular, certain uses to which the mind can put concepts.  
 Those uses, on Burley’s view, just are the activity of thinking. Consequently, 
Burley’s articulation and defense of mental language is in service of his commitment to 
the language of thought hypothesis. According to that hypothesis, thinking is done within 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
constituents, so that ‘believes’ in fact expresses a three-place relation, appearances aside. (On 
contextualist approaches to Frege’s Puzzle, see Mark Crimmins and John Perry, “The Prince and the 
Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs,” Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 12 (1989): 685–711). Indeed, 
on Burley’s account, ‘believes that...’ does not express any relation at all. Rather, the idea is that verbs of 
intention shift the referents of the categorematic expressions in their complement clauses, so that what 
the complement clause (or, rather, the verb along with its complement clause) refers to a certain belief 
that the subject has, which belief just is the mind’s predicating one concept of another. 
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a mental language, where the semantic, or rational, coherence of thinking is realized in 
the syntactic coherence of mental sentences with one another. However, unlike most 
proponents of the language of thought hypothesis today, who analyze propositional 
attitudes relationally, Burley believes that propositional attitudes are activities that the 
mind undertakes, namely, activities of predicating one thing of another. Mental language 
gives a naturalizing account of that activity, moreover, since the act of predicating one 
thing of another is, on Burley’s view, the same as the mind’s predicating one concept of 
another, which concepts represent those things. 
 The ultimate motivation for Burley’s endorsement of a language of thought, 
however, is an apparent tension between his account of the proposition, on the one hand, 
and certain commitments he has in the philosophy of science, on the other.  According to 
Burley, the middle term of a demonstration of the highest sort is the definition of the 
subject of that demonstration. However, given Burley’s commitment to referentialism, 
subjects (or, rather, names of subjects) and their definitions refer to the same thing, 
namely, to the subject itself. Consequently, in any demonstration containing a middle 
term of that sort, the conclusion will refer to the same things as the major premise. But 
demonstrations are supposed to be syllogisms producing knowledge, so that the content 
of the conclusion differs from the content of either of the premises.  
 Burley’s endorsement of the language of thought, then, is meant to provide an 
account of how one’s attitudes can differ from each other even when they have the same 
content. According to Burley’s later account of the proposition, propositions are 
structured entities composed not only of things, but of mental acts of predication as well. 
Those acts of predication, however, can be individuated not just by their formal features, 
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but by appeal to sentences in a language of thought. For acts of predicating things are acts 
of predicating concepts which represent those things. Consequently, those acts can be 
individuated by appeal to the concepts upon which they operate. And since concepts 
themselves are individuated not just by their contents but also by their internal structure, 
the acts which operate on them can be individuated that finely as well. Consequently, 
propositions themselves can be individuated that finely, since propositions contain those 
mental acts of predication as their formal parts. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF THE PROPOSITION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 In chapter 3, I argued that, for Burley, propositions are entities composed of 
things, such as Socrates and the property of humanity, and structured by a mental act of 
predication. I motivated that account by appeal to more basic philosophical commitments 
that Burley holds: referentialism, compositionality and intellectualism. That a proposition 
consists in predicating is a consequence of Burley’s commitment to intellectualism. That 
a proposition consists in predicating things is a consequence of his referentialism, or 
rather of the direct realist account of cognition on which that referentialism depends.  
 A key assumption in chapter 3 was that the mind’s predicating one thing of 
another was representational, or contentful. In chapter 4, I argued for that assumption. 
For Burley, the mind’s predicating one thing of another represents, or is contentful, 
because that act is more fundamentally an act of predicating one concept of another, 
which concepts represent those things. In other words, Burley endorses a language of 
thought, where the content of one’s propositional attitudes (and so, given his non-
relational analysis of propositional attitudes, propositions themselves) is articulated in 
terms of the semantic content of concepts and the syntax governing their combination in a 
sentence in a language of thought.  
 Chapters 3 and 4, then, are chapters intended to provide an explanation of what 
propositions are – of both their metaphysics and semantics. However, perhaps just as 
important as explaining what propositions are is the task of describing what they do. 
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Given the account developed in chapters 3 and 4, the most obvious thing that 
propositions do is serve as the semantic contents of statements in natural and mental 
language. But that propositions constitute the contents of statements in natural and mental 
language immediately gives rise to a further question: why do propositions constitute the 
contents of statements in natural and mental language? Or, to put it another way, why 
should we regard propositions as the semantic content of statements in natural and mental 
language, rather than as being related to statements in natural and mental language in 
some other way? 
 The reason that those propositions are the contents of statements in natural and 
mental language is that they determine truth conditions, which conditions statements in 
language assume when they have those propositions as their contents.1
                                                            
1 David Lewis writes that “in order to say what a meaning is, we may first ask what a meaning does, and 
then find something that does that. A meaning for a sentence is something that determines the conditions 
under which the sentence is true or false. It determines the truth-value of the sentence in various possible 
states of affairs, at various times, at various places, for various speakers, and so on” (David Lewis, 
“General Semantics,” Synthese 22, no. 1/2 (December 1, 1970): 22). It might be suggested, then, that it 
would have been better to begin the project with an examination of how Burley understands the truth 
conditions of a statement, and then consider what, if anything, in Burley’s larger philosophical project 
determines those conditions. However, I am as much interested in this chapter in why statements have 
the truth conditions that they do as what those conditions are. And to understand why statements have the 
truth conditions that they do requires that one have a firm grasp of the metaphysical and semantical 
character of the propositions that they express. 
 In chapter 3, I 
gestured at this fact when I argued that propositions are, on Burley’s view, the primary 
bearers of truth and falsity. They are the primary bearers of truth and falsity in virtue of 
the fact that a mental act of predication – the “form” of a proposition, on the later account 
– is an essentially representational act. Insofar as chapter 4 constituted a defense of the 
representational character of that act, moreover, that chapter provides a philosophical 
justification for the claim that propositions have, or determine, truth conditions. In this 
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chapter, then, I intend to articulate what, exactly, those truth conditions are. And, as we 
will see, Burley’s account of the truth conditions of the proposition evolves significantly 
over the course of his career.   
 As a general matter, Burley is committed to a correspondence theory of truth. 
Consequently, specifying the truth conditions of a proposition will be a matter of 
specifying what reality (or at least some portion of it) must be like for that proposition to 
be true. That is, the truth conditions of a proposition are a matter of specifying what 
fact(s) there must be, if that proposition is true. A fact, for Burley, is fundamentally a 
matter of one thing’s being identical to, or different from, another thing. The fact that 
Socrates is a human, on this account, is simply Socrates’s being identical to humanity. 
But Burley’s account of the metaphysics of facts evolves significantly over the course of 
his career, an evolution in tandem with the evolution of Burley’s account of 
correspondence itself.  
 In the first half of his career, Burley defends a near-identity account of 
correspondence, according to which true propositions and the facts which make them true 
share the same “material” parts – that is, the same things (res) will be components in a 
true proposition and the fact which makes it true – but differ in their “formal” parts. The 
formal part of a true proposition is the mental act of predication which represents the 
identity (or diversity) of those things, whereas the formal part of the fact which makes 
that proposition true will be the actual identity (or diversity) of those things. The central 
challenge for the early account, then, is metaphysical: to explain the kinds of actual 
identity and diversity relations that can obtain between the terms of a proposition, which 
explanation can at once respect intuitions both about the truth of certain propositions (e.g. 
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the proposition that Socrates is a human) and about the seeming differences of the terms 
of those propositions. In other words, Burley needs to develop an account of facts that 
can accommodate his near-identity account of correspondence. 
 Burley never explicitly develops an account of the metaphysics of facts in the first 
half of his career. But I argue that one can be constructed for him, given the broader 
semantic, alethic and metaphysical commitments that he has. In particular, Burley is 
committed to a complex theory of identity and diversity, according to which identity and 
diversity relations are of three sorts: real, intentional, and conceptual. Burley employs 
that theory to settle a number of philosophical disputes – for example, disputes about the 
relationship between existence and essence. I argue that he also uses it to defend a 
particular account of the relationship between concrete particulars and properties. For the 
early Burley,  properties and concrete particulars are really identical to one another. 
Burley maintains that Socrates, for example, is really identical to the property of 
humanity. At the same time, Burley maintains that concrete particulars and properties are 
intentionally different from one another. I use those commitments, as well as his 
commitment to a relation I call sameness, to construct an account of the metaphysics of 
facts for Burley, an account which accommodates his near-identity account of 
correspondence. 
 Beginning in the late 1310s, however, the theory of identity (and the larger 
realism about properties it was meant in part to justify) that Burley defends in the first 
half of his career receives serious criticism from William Ockham. Ockham argues that 
moderate realist positions, according to which properties are really identical to, though 
less-than-really different from, the concrete particulars that possess them, are 
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implausible, because they require an account of identity and diversity that cannot 
withstand philosophical scrutiny. Moreover, Ockham argues that, absent an account of 
identity of that sort, the reality of properties themselves is philosophically suspect.  
 Burley’s response to those criticisms is twofold. In partial agreement with 
Ockham, Burley adopts a simpler account of identity and diversity in the second half of 
his career, according to which all relations of identity and difference are treated in a 
uniform matter, articulated merely in terms of the indiscernibility of identicals. In 
disagreement with Ockham’s nominalist project, however, Burley remains committed to 
the reality of properties. He argues that Ockham’s arguments against realism fail to 
address a form of realism often called “exaggerated realism” in the literature, according 
to which properties are not constitutive of the concrete particulars that possess them. 
Burley’s continued commitment to realism, I argue, is a consequence of Burley’s more 
general semantic commitments. For Burley, signification, or reference, is always a dyadic 
relation. Consequently, every meaningful expression in a language must refer to some 
distinct thing. Proper names and demonstrative expressions refer to concrete particulars. 
Predicate expressions, in contrast, need to refer to something common to many concrete 
particulars, because those expressions can be predicated of those concrete particulars. In 
other words, predicate expressions need to refer to properties. 
 Whatever the success of Burley’s “exaggerated” realism, however, that realism 
undermines the near-identity account of correspondence to which Burley was committed. 
Burley’s later realism, and the simplified account of identity that accompanies it, entail 
that Socrates and humanity, for example, are in no way identical, since Socrates is a 
concrete particular, whereas humanity is not a concrete particular. But, on the near-
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identity account of correspondence, the truth of the proposition that Socrates is a human 
requires that Socrates is identical to humanity. 
 In response to these difficulties, Burley develops a very different account of 
correspondence. That account integrates a semantic notion – supposition – into the truth 
conditions of the proposition itself. On that account, the identity or diversity represented 
by a mental act of predication isn’t the identity or diversity of the things which are 
components in that proposition. Rather, what the mind represents is the identity or 
diversity of the things for which those things supposit. For example, on that account, the 
proposition that Socrates is a human is true just in case whatever thing(s) Socrates 
supposits for is identical to something(s) for which the property of humanity supposits. 
That account, I argue, is both radical and ingenious. It is radical precisely because it 
involves a controversial claim about things – that things essentially represent, in virtue of 
which they can supposit for the things which they represent. But it is ingenious in that it 
employs standard semantic tools of Burley’s day, extending them in natural ways given 
the account of propositional content that Burley defends. 
 I will proceed in four stages. First, I will examine Burley’s commitment to a 
correspondence theory of truth. Second, I will consider Burley’s early metaphysical 
commitments, and how those commitments can motivate an account of the metaphysics 
of facts that fits Burley’s near-identity account of correspondence. Third, I will detail 
Ockham’s criticisms of those early metaphysical commitments, and the changes Burley 
makes in responding to Ockham’s criticisms. Finally, I will examine the consequences 
that those changes have for Burley’s account of correspondence, and the nature of 
propositional content more general.  
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2. BURLEY ON TRUTH 
 To represent the world’s being a certain way requires truth-conditions. To explain 
what the proposition that Socrates is pale represents, for example, is to specify what are 
its conditions for truth. So, to explain what a proposition represents, we need to begin by 
articulating a theory of truth. Contemporary analytic philosophy is populated with a 
number of alternative theories of truth, with the two main camps represented by 
deflationary and correspondence approaches.2 One finds a similarly dense philosophical 
landscape by the end of the fourteenth century. Nominalists such as Ockham, John 
Buridan and Albert of Saxony, for example, developed approaches to truth that (while 
broadly realist) are articulated fundamentally in terms of semantic notions, such as 
supposition and signification.3
 Just like today, however, correspondence approaches to truth were popular in the 
medieval period. Moreover, as we saw in chapter 3, Burley himself endorses a 
correspondence account of truth. In particular, Burley defends what I call an 
“adequation” account of correspondence. He writes that “truth is of two kinds: in one 
way, it is the adequation (adequatio) of a thing to an intellect, and in another, it is the 
  
                                                            
2 There are various deflationary versions of truth defended in the literature today, the most popular of which 
appears to be truth minimalism. Paul Horwich is perhaps the best known defender of truth minimalism. 
See Paul Horwich, Truth (Clarendon Press, 1998). Minimalism has received a fair bit of criticisms as 
well. See, e.g., Frank Jackson, Graham Oppy, and Michael Smith, “Minimalism and Truth Aptness,” 
Mind 103, no. 411 (July 1, 1994): 287–302. 
3 On theories of truth in the medieval period, see Catarina Dutilh Novaes, “Truth, Theories of,” ed. Henrik 
Lagerlund, Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010). For Ockham’s theory in 
particular, see William Ockham, Ockham’s Theory of Propositions: Part II of the Summa Logicae (St. 
Augustine's Press, 1981), II.2, 86. 
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adequation of an intellect to a thing.”4
 As Burley’s more general account of correspondence suggests, alethic properties 
are not restricted to complex mental activity. First, beyond the correspondence that 
complex mental acts might have to the world, Burley argues that simple mental acts can 
correspond to the world as well.  
 Unlike correspondence relations proper, which are 
symmetric relations, adequation relations are asymmetric relations. That a proposition is 
adequated to some fact, for example, does not entail that that fact is adequated to the 
proposition. That his theory of correspondence utilizes asymmetric relations is critical for 
Burley, in part because his theory of truth involves correspondence relations in two 
directions: from world to mind, and from mind to world; and Burley takes those relations 
to be distinct from one another. The world’s correspondence to the mind is a causal 
relationship, articulated in terms of a thing’s natural tendency to produce cognitive states 
in a mind, states which represent that thing as it really is. The mind’s correspondence to 
the world, in contrast, is representational, concerned with the ability of some feature of 
the mind to represent the world as it really is. Consequently, the world’s correspondence 
to a mind shouldn’t be confused with the mind’s correspondence to the world, nor do 
either kind of correspondence relation require symmetry between their relata.  
There can be a kind of truth with respect to simple mental acts. For when a thing 
de se produces perfect knowledge (completam notitiam), then there is truth, 
spoken of in the first way, in the intellect.5
                                                            
4 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen 
Brown, Franciscan Studies 33 (1973): para. 1.22, 58–9. 
  
5 Ibid., para. 1.24, 60: “Veritas primo modo dicta potest esse comprehensionem simplicium. Quando enim 
res de se facit completam notitiam, tunc est veritas primo modo dicta in intellectu.” 
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And, unlike in the case of complex mental acts, where truth is contrary to falsity, in cases 
of simple mental acts, truth is contrary not to falsity but rather to ignorance. Moreover, 
unlike falsity, which does not admit of degrees, Burley allows that one can be more or 
less ignorant of a thing. For example, one might have some level of insight into the nature 
of a human, such that she can, for the most part, adequately distinguish between humans 
and non-humans, but yet lack the kind of deep knowledge that comes with significant 
training in biology.6
 Beyond alethic properties that mental acts possess, moreover, Burley argues that 
things outside the mind can have alethic properties as well, insofar as they have a 
tendency to produce mental states which accurately represent them. With respect to world 
to mind directions of fit, Burley distinguishes between the an object’s fit to the divine 
mind, and its fit to the human mind. He argues that truth is constitutive of the former 
(“just as a being [ens] is related to being [entitas], so too it is related to truth [veritas]”
 In such a case, one is ignorant in this respect, that she could achieve 
further insight into human nature, but her ignorance is not total, in that she has a concept 
of a human, the possession of which allows her to discriminate between humans and non-
humans with a certain degree of success.  
7
                                                            
6 For Burley, we can distinguish between cases of “confused” and “perfect” knowledge of some object by 
looking at the concepts involved in each cognitive act. Perfect knowledge involves the use of a complex 
concept, whose components perfectly map the metaphysical features of that object, while confused 
knowledge involves the use of a concept that, while referring to the object at issue, is composed of one or 
more concepts which themselves could be further articulated. On this distinction, see Walter Burley, In 
Physicam Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1972), 
6v–7r. 
), 
because a thing cannot present itself to the divine mind as anything other than what it is. 
With respect to a thing’s manifesting itself to the human mind, in contrast, Burley argues 
7 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), 
Exp.Perih, k4ra. 
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that falsity can, and sometimes does, occur – as, for example, in the case of counterfeit 
currency, which has the form of money but lacks “due matter”: a certain metallic 
composition in Burley’s case, the full faith and credit of the supposed issuing authority in 
ours.  
 As interesting as Burley’s more general correspondence account of truth might be, 
however, our interests in it in this chapter concern that account insofar as it addresses 
issues of the truth and falsity of propositions (and so, derivatively, statements in natural 
and mental language).8 For Burley, truth and falsity of that sort are fundamentally a 
matter of the mind’s representing the world’s being a certain way, by combining things in 
various ways. In other words, it concerns complex mental activity. In fact, at least a far 
back as Aquinas, medieval philosophers connected that notion of truth with complex 
mental activity. Aquinas writes, for example, that “[j]ust as the true is found primarily in 
the intellect rather than in things, so too it is found primarily in an act of the intellect 
joining and separating.”9
                                                            
8 Or, more generally, to statements. 
 That approach to truth and falsity is motivated by Aristotle, who 
writes in Metaphysics 8 that “that which is in the sense of being true and that which is not 
in the sense of being false depends on combination and division [...]; the combination and 
9 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputate de veritate, vol. 22/1, Opera Omnia (Romae ad Sanctae Sabinae: 
St. Thomas Aquinas Foundation, 1975), q. 1, a. 3, ll. 23–35, pp. 10–1. 
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the separation are in the thought, and not in the things.”10 Far from novel, then, Burley’s 
commitment to intellectualism is fairly run-of-the-mill in the medieval period.11
 The mind comes to possess certain truth-bearing states, then, when it engages in 
the activity of composition and division – that is, when it engages in predication, an act 
which produces some representational content. Moreover, given Burley’s commitment to 
a correspondence theory of truth, the truth conditions of that content will be articulated in 
terms of correspondence. But the real challenge of a correspondence theory of truth is to 
specify what the fact(s) are which make a given proposition true, and to specify why that 
proposition corresponds to those facts. Consider, for example, the proposition that 
Socrates is a human. On a correspondence account, that proposition is true just in case 
there exist certain fact to which that proposition corresponds. That account will be 
satisfying, then, only if it can provide some motivated account of (i) the nature of that 
fact and (ii) the proposition’s correspondence to it.  
  
 While I argue that Burley defends two different accounts of correspondence over 
the course of his career, there are some general commitments that Burley has, which 
constrain the ways in which those accounts are articulated. First, Burley is committed to 
the claim that what the mind represents by predicating one thing of another is that a 
certain identity relation (if it is affirmative) or diversity relation (if it is negative) obtains 
between things. In the Comm.Perih, for example, Burley writes that “[i]f the intellect 
                                                            
10 Aristotle, “Metaphysics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. W.D. Ross, 
vol. 2, Bollingen Series 71 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), bk. VI, 1027b18–9, 30–1, pp. 
1622–3. 
11 However, that commitment, when paired with a commitment to referentialism, leads Burley to a theory 
of the proposition that is wholly novel in the medieval period. 
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asserts some things to be the same, then it joins them together, but if it asserts some 
things to be diverse, then it divides them from one another.”12 The same account is 
defended in the Exp.Praed some thirty years later. Burley writes that “[t]he intellect is 
able to combine things together by asserting that they are the same, and it can divide 
them from one another by asserting that they are not the same.”13
 Given that truth is a matter of the mind’s correspondence to reality, moreover, we 
should expect a further commitment: that facts themselves will involve relations of 
identity and diversity. And, in fact, this is precisely what we find. In the Comm.Perih, for 
example, Burley writes that  
  
when the intellect correctly puts things together or correctly divides them, then 
there is truth in the intellect, and when the intellect does not correctly put things 
together or correctly divides them, as, namely, when it puts those together 
which are really diverse, or when it divides those things which are really the 
same, then it is a false intellect.14
 
 
A similar (though not identical) account is provided in the Art.Vet. 
to the copula existing in the intellect (i.e. the mental act of predication), which 
joins together the extremes of a true statement (propositio), there corresponds 
something in reality, namely, the identity of the extremes, or the identity of 
those things for which the extremes supposit.15
                                                            
12 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, 60–1. 
 
13 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), 
Exp.Praed, c3vb . This passage suggests that truth is a matter of the actual identity or diversity of the 
terms of a proposition. But I argue in §5 that Burley defends a different account of correspondence in that 
work.  
14 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, 60–1. 
15 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb: “Sed dubium est an ipsi 
copulae existenti in intellectu correspondeat aliquid in re aut non. Dicendum quod copulae existenti in 
intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis verae adinvicem correspondet aliquid in re, scilicet, identitas 
extremorum vel identitas eorum pro quibus extrema supponunt, divisioni vero vel negatitioni copulae in 
propositione negativa vera correspondet aliquid in re, scilicet, diversitas extremorum vel illorum pro 
quibus extrema supponunt. Sed copulae existenti in intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis false 
adinvicem nihil correspondet in re nisi ipsa extrema, ut patet de copula huius propositionis: homo est 
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Setting aside for now the notion of supposition, these passages indicate Burley’s 
commitment to a certain general metaphysics picture of facts, according to which facts 
are complex entities, consisting of one thing’s being identical to, or different from, 
another. 
 That facts are complex entities, consisting of one thing’s being identical to, or 
different from, one another, and that propositions are true when they corresponding to 
those facts, represents a general framework within which Burley’s accounts of 
correspondence (and the concomitant accounts of facts) are formed. But, just as 
referentialism, compositionality and intellectualism place constraints on Burley’s theory 
of the metaphysics of the proposition but do not themselves entail a particular theory, so 
too Burley’s commitment to the thesis that facts consist in one thing’s being identical to, 
or different from, another, and to the thesis that propositions are made true by 
corresponding to those facts, merely places constraints on the related theories of facts and 
of correspondence that Burley might adopt. In the following sections, then, I want to 
discuss the particular theories of correspondence and facts that Burley defends over his 
career. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
asinus. Similiter nec divisioni vel negationi copulae in propositione falsa negativa nihil correspondet in re 
nisi ipsa extrema.” 
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3. THE NEAR-IDENTITY ACCOUNT OF CORRESPONDENCE 
3.1. Background Metaphysics 
 In the first half of his career, Burley defends what I call a near-identity account of 
correspondence.16
                                                            
16 An identity account of truth is a rival to a correspondence account, since an identity account holds that a 
true proposition just is a fact, and its truth consists precisely in that identity. On identity accounts of truth, 
see Stewart Candlish and Nic Damnjanovic, “The Identity Theory of Truth,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta, Spring 2011, 2011, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entriesruth-identity/. Burley’s near-identity theory is still a 
correspondence account of truth, since true propositions differ from the facts that make them true. But it 
is a near-identity account because true propositions and the facts which make them true significantly 
overlap in their metaphysical makeup. 
 On a near-identity account, there is significant metaphysical overlap 
between true propositions, on the one hand, and the facts that make them true, on the 
other. In particular, true propositions and the facts which make them true contain the 
same “material” parts but differ in their “formal” parts. That is, the things which the mind 
uses to make a true proposition are themselves constituents of the fact which makes that 
proposition true. For example, assume that the proposition that Socrates is a human is 
true. On Burley’s account, that proposition is composed of Socrates and the property of 
humanity. That proposition is true because it corresponds to some fact. And that fact 
which makes that proposition true is the fact that Socrates is a human, that is, the fact of 
Socrates’ being identical to humanity. However, true propositions are only nearly 
identical to the facts that make them true, because the relational or structural component 
of a proposition is a mental act of predication, which merely represents the identity or 
diversity of some two things, whereas the relational or structural component of a fact is 
that very identity or diversity of those two things itself. So the proposition that Socrates is 
a human is only nearly identical to the fact that Socrates is a human, precisely because 
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the former is composed of a mental act of predication, whereas the latter is composed of 
an actual identity relation. 
 Burley is fairly explicit in his earlier works about his endorsement of a near-
identity account of correspondence. As we have already seen, Burley writes in the 
Comm.Perih that  
when the intellect does not correctly put things together or correctly divides them, 
as, namely, when it puts those together which are really diverse, or when it 
divides those things which are really the same, then it is a false intellect.17
 
  
Elsewhere in the same work, when discussing the nature of truth, Burley argues that the 
facts which make a proposition true involve the unity or diversity of the things which are 
components of that proposition.  
The intellect makes true being by putting together those things which are 
united in reality, or by dividing those from each other which are diverse. For 
if the intellect asserts that some things are the same, then it puts them together, 
but if it asserts that they are diverse, them it divides them from each other.18
 
 
A similar though not as explicit claim about correspondence is made in the Quaes.Perih. 
In that work, Burley writes that a proposition is true so long as “those are the same which 
are denoted to be the same, or those are diverse which are denoted to be diverse.”19
                                                            
17  Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, 60. 
 I am 
unaware of any place in which Burley provides an account of the notion of denotation, or 
even of another place where Burley makes important use of that notion. But, for Ockham 
at least, denotation is a property of statements, where the denotation of a statement is 
18  Ibid., para. 1.24, 60–1. 
19 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen Brown, Franciscan 
Studies 34 (1974): para. 3.62, 251. 
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what it represents to be the case.20
 The near-identity theory of correspondence that Burley defends in the first half of 
his career has a kind of simple elegance to it. However, the challenge for this account is 
the far less simple metaphysics of facts that that theory of correspondence requires. What 
it requires is that things which can seem quite different are in fact identical to one 
another. If the proposition that Socrates is a human is true, for example, its truth consists 
in its correspondence to the fact that Socrates is identical to humanity. Presumably, it is at 
least possible that Socrates is a human. And so Burley is committed to the claim that it is 
at least possible that Socrates is identical to humanity – a puzzling claim, given that 
Socrates is a concrete particular, whereas humanity is a property, that is, a certain kind of 
abstract object. 
 The denotation of a statement, in other words, is a 
certain state of affairs, and the denotata of true propositions are obtaining states of 
affairs, or facts. I suggest that Burley has a similar account in mind in the Quaes.Perih. 
Propositions denote things to be the case, and the things which true propositions denote 
are in fact the case, that is, are facts. Given the identity constraint that Burley puts on 
representation, then, propositions represent that one thing is identical to, or different 
from, another, and so denote that thing’s being identical to, or different, from the other. In 
the case of true propositions, moreover, what they denote actually obtains – that is, it is a 
fact – and so that proposition itself is true. 
 I argue that Burley has the metaphysical resources to articulate a metaphysics of 
facts as complex as his simple account of correspondence requires. In particular, I argue 
                                                            
20 Umberto Eco, “Signification and Denotation from Boethius to Ockham,” Franciscan Studies 44 (1984): 
21. 
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that, in the first half of his career, Burley defends a complex theory of identity and 
difference, and that that theory can form the core of the metaphysical picture of facts that 
Burley’s early account of correspondence requires.21 According to the theory of identity 
and difference that Burley defends in the first half of his career, things can be identical to 
one another, or different from one another, in three ways: really, intentionally, or 
conceptually. Burley introduces his theory of identity in order to address a particular 
problem about the relationship of the existence of a thing and its essence – for example, 
the relationship between the existence of Socrates and the essence of Socrates. Burley 
rejects that the existence of a thing is wholly different from its essence – regardless of 
whether that difference is because existence is an accidental feature of a thing (as 
Avicenna, Albert, and Boethius maintain), or because existence is something “flowing 
out from the essential principles of the thing of which it is the being” (as Aquinas and 
Giles of Rome argue).22
                                                            
21 In this section, I examine an account of identity and difference that Burley develops in the first half of his 
career.  A further question is whether relations of identity or difference can be reduced to something else 
– the inherence of a substantial form in matter, for example, or an accident in some substance. 
Alessandro Conti argues that Burley is committed to “macro-objects,” which are “aggregates made up of 
primary substances together with a host of substantial and accidental forms existing in them and through 
them.” (Conti, “Ockham and Burley on Categories and Universals,” 200). (See also Alessandro Conti, 
“Walter Burley,” Fall 2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/burley/.) Perhaps, then, 
relations of identity, at least, can be articulated in terms of these macro-objects. However, it is not clear 
to me how this approach would work with respect to relations of difference. 
 But he also denies that a thing’s existence and essence are 
entirely the same as one another. He rejects, for example, a position according to which 
‘existence’ and ‘essence’ refer to the same thing, but where ‘existence’, unlike ‘essence’, 
connotes a certain relation that a thing has to its creator.  
22 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 4.26, 267. 
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 In response to that problem, then, Burley attempts to cut a middle path between, 
on the one hand, positions according to which existence and essence really differ from 
one another, and, on the other, positions according to which existence and essence differ 
merely at the level of concepts. To cut that middle path, Burley adopts a threefold 
account of identity developed by Henry of Ghent a generation prior.  Burley writes that 
it should be understood that in things there is a threefold difference, namely, real 
difference, difference according to reason [i.e. conceptual], and difference 
according to intention [i.e. intentional].  Those differ really which are diverse 
things regardless of the operation of the soul and they constitute something before 
both of those <together>; a human and a pale [thing] differ in this way. And 
others differ according to reason alone, and in that way the same thing differs 
from itself, because the understanding uses one as two. Also in this way a 
definition and a definitum differ, such as rational animal and human. And those 
which differ in neither way can be understood under the opposite of the other nor 
<need> the other <be> thought [in conjunction with it]. But difference according 
to intention is when some <entities> differ more greatly than according to reason 
and less than according to reality. Hence difference according to intention is in the 
middle between real difference and difference according to reason.  In this way in 
simple <entities> genus and differentia differ: neither is of the understanding per 
se of the other in such cases, and likewise one can be understood under the 
opposite of the other.  For a genus can be understood under the opposite of one 
differentia, because it can be understood under an opposite differentia. And it is 
said that in this way essence and being are different.23
 
 
According to Burley, there are three sorts of difference (and, consequently, three sorts of 
identity too): real, intentional and conceptual. First, things can differ really (differentia 
                                                            
23 Ibid., para. 4.47, 273. “Intelligendum quod in rebus est triplex differentia, scilicet, differentia realis, 
differentia secundum rationem et differentia secundum intentionem.  Ista differunt realiter quae sunt 
diversae res praeter operationem animae et constituunt aliquod prius utroque istorum, et sic differunt 
homo et albus.  Et alia differunt secundum rationem tantum, et isto modo idem differt a se, quia 
intellectus utitur uno et duobus.  Isto etiam modo differunt definitio et definitum, ut animal rationale et 
homo.  Et quae sic differunt neutrum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius nec etiam altero non intellecto.  
Sed differentia secundum intentionem est quando aliqua differunt magis quam secundum rationem et 
minus quam secundum rem.  Unde differentia secundum rationem est media inter differentiam realem et 
differentiam secundum rationem.  Isto modo in simplicibus differunt genus et differentia, et neutrum est 
de per se intellectu alterius in talibus, et similiter unum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius.  Potest enim 
genus intelligi sub opposito unius differentiae, quia potest intelligi sub differentia opposita.  Et dicitur 
quod isto modo differunt essentia et esse.” 
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realis). Real difference is a matter of two things having different modal profiles. Burley’s 
example of this sort of difference is a human and a pale thing. A human – Socrates, for 
example – might actually be pale. But Socrates is not really identical to a pale thing, 
because Socrates could exist without being pale – if, say, he went outside and became 
tan.  
 Second, things might differ conceptually. Conceptual difference (differentia 
secundum rationem) is, unsurprisingly, fundamentally a matter of differences among 
concepts, because it is a case in which “the intellect uses one thing as two.” A merely 
conceptual difference, then, is a difference in which the same thing is referred to by two 
different concepts, but where those concepts themselves differ from each other. Burley 
uses the example of humanity and rational animality. Humanity and rational animality are 
exactly the same property: the property of humanity. Consequently, the concepts 
HUMAN and RATIONAL ANIMAL refer to the same thing. But the concepts 
themselves are different concepts.24
 In addition to real and conceptual difference, however, Burley defends a third sort 
of difference, which he calls intentional difference (differentia secundum intentionem). 
That sort of difference “is when some things differ more so than conceptually and less so 
 The most obvious way in which HUMAN and 
RATIONAL ANIMAL differ from one another is with respect to their syntactic structure. 
HUMAN is a basic concept, such that it really doesn’t have an syntactic structure. 
RATIONAL ANIMAL, in contrast, does have syntactic structure, since that concept is 
syntactically derived from the basic concepts RATIONAL and ANIMAL.  
                                                            
24 Consequently, conceptual difference is actually a kind of real difference between concepts. 
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than really.”25
 How can one tell when the referents of two concepts differ intentionally, rather 
than the concepts themselves differing merely conceptually? Burley never provides an 
explicit answer to this question. But I suggest that that answer is fairly straightforward. 
Things differ intentionally when something can be truly predicated of the one which 
cannot be truly predicated of the other. So, for example, Socrates differs intentionally 
from humanity because Socrates is a concrete particular, but humanity is not a concrete 
particular. Real difference, then, can be seen as the kind of difference which involves 
certain special predicates, such as the predicate ‘could exist independently of x’, where 
 For Burley, then, the three notions of difference he endorses are nested. 
That two things differ really entails that they differ intentionally, which entails that they 
differ conceptually. Likewise, with respect to identity, that two things are conceptually 
identical (i.e. referred to by the same concept) entails that they are intentionally identical, 
which entails that they are really identical. That nested relationship also reveals 
something about the nature of intentional difference itself. On the one hand, because two 
things can differ intentionally but not really, two things which differ merely intentionally 
must have the same modal profile, so that neither could survive the loss of the other. On 
the other hand, since things can differ conceptually but not intentionally, two things 
which do differ intentionally must constitute different semantic contents – that is, 
different referents – for any concepts (and, derivatively, expressions in natural language) 
which might refer to them.  
                                                            
25 Ibid. 
266 
 
 
 
‘x’ is some intentionally specifiable thing.26
 Burley introduces this complex theory of identity to address concerns about the 
nature of existence and essence. But it is appears that he intends for it to have wider 
application. In a different question in his Quaes.Perih, for example, Burley argues that  
 For example, Socrates would be really 
different from Plato, because ‘Socrates could exist independently of Plato’ is true, 
whereas ‘Plato could exist independently of Plato’ is false.  
the nature of the species is one part of Socrates, but it doesn’t follow from this 
that everything that remains (totum residuum) is another part, and this is because 
the nature of the species and what remains are conjoined in being, and they are 
not separated except according to the consideration of the intellect.27
 
 
This passage might seem obscure. But what Burley is attempting to do in this passage is 
navigate some tricky metaphysical waters, brought on by his commitment to the reality of 
properties. In the first half of his career, Burley’s commitment to properties is a version 
of what has been labeled moderate realism. Like many of his philosophical 
contemporaries in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, the early Burley argues 
that properties are essential constituents of the particulars which possess them. That 
Socrates is a human, for example, is due to the fact that Socrates is partly constituted by 
the property of humanity. That property is what Burley describes in the passage above as 
“the nature of the species.”  
                                                            
26 Alternatively, we might assume (as Ockham appears to do; see §4.1) that the notion of mere intentional 
identity and difference is what requires peculiar sorts of predicates, which are “restricted” or 
“diminished” in some way. It does not seem to me that much hangs on how one articulates the difference 
between real and merely intentional difference; what matters is that the differences between real and 
merely intentionally different things requires that we can distinguish in some way between the sorts of 
contradictory predicates truly predicated of things that differ really from the sorts of contradictory 
predicates that can be truly predicated of things which differ merely intentionally. 
27 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.821, 213. 
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 Moreover, while it potentially exists within many concrete particulars, the 
property of humanity exists within each of the concrete particulars that it does as 
particularized. In the first book on a commentary on the De Anima, for example, Burley 
argues that “a common thing (commune) having being in a singular, or contracted to the 
singular, is individuated.”28
  Finally, a concrete substance is not merely some particularized property. For 
example, Socrates is not merely particularized humanity. Indeed, if Socrates is to be 
constituted by particularized humanity, then humanity itself needs to be particularized by 
something. Nor can what particularizes humanity in Socrates be that humanity itself, 
since then Socrates’ humanity would not be particularized but rather particular. And to 
concede that would be to concede realism itself, since then Socrates’ humanity wouldn’t 
be a property (i.e. a form capable of being in many particulars) but rather a trope (i.e. a 
form particular in itself).
 Socrates’ humanity, then, is individuated, or particularized, 
humanity, and so is numerically distinct from Plato’s humanity. At the same time, 
Socrates’ humanity and Plato’s humanity are distinct particularizations of the same 
common entity: humanity; and that fact, Burley suggests, explains one way in which 
Socrates is similar to Plato – namely, with respect to humanity.  
29
                                                            
28  Walter Burley, Expositio libri De Anima, Civitas Vaticana, Bibl. Apost. Vat., Vat. Lat 2151, fols. 9ra-
11ra, transcribed in Alessandro D. Conti, “Ontology in Walter Burley’s Last Commentary on the Ars 
Vetus,” Franciscan Studies 50 (1990), 138-9. On Burley on individuation, see Ivan Boh, “Walter 
Burley,” in Individuation in Scholasticism. The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-
1650, 1994, 347–72.. 
 Consequently, there must be something, external to humanity, 
29 I use ‘trope’ in this context to denote a concrete particular, that is, something that is particular per se. 
Consequently, I distinguish between tropes and abstract particulars, since I take tropes to be concrete 
particulars (in particular, for philosophers like Ockham and the later Burley, concrete forms), whereas I 
take properties, whether particular or universal, to be abstract. Moreover, and in contrast to some 
contemporary accounts of abstracta, my use of the distinction does not take a position on whether 
abstracta have spatial and temporal location, or can be causally efficacious. In fact, Burley appears to 
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which particularizes humanity within Socrates. That something, for Burley, is the 
compound of concrete matter and concrete form – that is, Socrates’ body and soul. The 
compound of Socrates’ body and soul, then, is the “everything that remains” from the 
passage above.  
 The challenge for Burley is to provide a motivated account of the relationship 
between Socrates, Socrates’ humanity, and the compound of Socrates’ body and soul. 
One possibility is to treat the relationship as a straight parthood relationship. On this 
view, Socrates is a compound of two parts: his humanity, on the one hand, and the 
compound of his body and his soul, on the other, where both those parts are really 
different from one another. But Burley argues that that solution is not plausible, because 
“in what remains is the complete nature of Socrates.”30
 Burley’s solution is thus to argue that the relationship between Socrates’ 
humanity and the compound of Socrates’ body and soul is such that those two things are 
“conjoined in being, and are not separated except according to the consideration of the 
 That is, the compound of 
Socrates’ body and his soul is not some (proper) part of Socrates; rather, it just is 
Socrates. In contrast, then, Burley needs to defend a theory according to which Socrates 
just is a compound of some concrete matter and some concrete form, but is also 
constituted by the property of humanity.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
take a positive stance on both of those issues. On the concrete/abstract distinction generally, see Gideon 
Rosen, “Abstract Objects,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta, Spring 2012, 
2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/abstract-objects/. 
30 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.821, 213. Also note 
that, on this conception of their relationship, a property would be need to be particular per se, since it is 
really distinct from some compound of particular matter and particular form, that is, it could exist as 
particular regardless of whether it was combined with some compound of particular matter and particular 
form – a position Burley rejects.  
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intellect.” In other words, he argues that Socrates’ humanity and the compound of his 
body and his soul are merely intentionally different from one another. In reality, however, 
Socrates’ humanity is identical to the compound of his body and soul, so that Socrates’ 
humanity does not constitute some further thing (res), in addition to that compound. 
Consequently, that compound needn’t be some proper part of Socrates, even if Socrates is 
constituted by the property of humanity, because that property (in Socrates) is really 
identical to that compound. Socrates’ humanity and that compound still differ from one 
another, however; they differ intentionally from one another. That compound, for 
example, is a concrete substance – namely, Socrates himself – whereas humanity is a 
certain abstract object realized within Socrates as his humanity.  
3.2. Facts: Substantial Predication and Real Identity 
 With that background theory of identity and difference in place, we can consider 
the metaphysics of facts, according to Burley’s early account. In this section, I intend to 
construct the core theory of Burley’s early metaphysics of facts, given more general 
philosophical commitments he has. That theory will explain the metaphysics of those 
facts which make true only certain sorts of propositions– namely, propositions involving 
substantial predication. By ‘substantial predication’, I mean those propositions in which 
substances are predicated of substances. For example, the proposition that Socrates is a 
human involves substantial predication, since both Socrates and humanity exist in the 
category of substance. Similarly, the proposition that Socrates is Plato involves 
substantial predication, because both Socrates and Plato exist in the category of 
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substance.31
 Facts which make propositions involving substantial predication true are, I 
suggest, facts constituted by relations of real identity or real diversity. Burley’s 
discussion in the Quaes.Perih about the relationship between Socrates, his humanity, and 
the compound of his body and his soul straightforwardly applies here. The fact that 
Socrates is a human contains Socrates, the property of humanity, and a relation of real 
identity between them, but this is entailed already by what Burley has to say about the 
relationship between Socrates, his humanity and the compound of his body and his soul. 
Burley argues that Socrates’ humanity is really identical to the compound of Socrates’s 
body and soul. But that compound is at least really identical to Socrates himself. Via 
transitivity, then, Socrates’ humanity is really identical to Socrates.  
 In the next section, I intend to supplement that core theory with a further 
metaphysical theses to which Burley is committed, commitments that will allow us to 
develop an account of the metaphysics of facts which is sufficiently robust to handle the 
near-identity account of correspondence generally.    
 Socrates still differs from humanity, of course. Socrates is concrete, whereas 
humanity is not concrete. But that difference is not real but merely intentional. It is 
merely intentional because Socrates and humanity have the same modal profile. First, 
Socrates existentially depends on humanity because humanity is constitutive of Socrates. 
                                                            
31 I treat identity claims as a kind of predication. Identity claims can be treated in that way because Burley 
adopts an identity theory of the copula, in contrast to an inherence theory. Identity theories of the copula 
take the copula to establish a claim of identity between the subject and the predicate, whereas inherence 
theories take the copula to establish the inherence of the predicate in the subject. For a discussion the 
shift from inherence to identity theories in the early fourteenth century, see E. A. Moody, Truth and 
Consequence in Mediaeval Logic, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland Pub. Co, 1953), 36. For a critical examination of the distinction, see John Malcolm, “A 
Reconsideration of the Identity and Inherence Theories of the Copula,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 17, no. 4 (1979): 383–400. 
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Socrates is essentially human, and he has the nature that he does on account of his 
possession of the property of humanity. Second, humanity, while itself a property, and so 
something that can be realized within many concrete particulars, exists in each concrete 
particular only as particularized within that concrete particular, and so is numerically 
distinct from other particularized instances of humanity. The humanity that exists in 
Socrates, then, exists as an abstract particular, peculiar to Socrates himself, and so 
existentially depends on Socrates. Consequently, since Socrates cannot survive the loss of 
humanity, nor can humanity, realized in Socrates, survive the loss of Socrates, Socrates 
and (his) humanity are existentially interdependent. That is, they share the same modal 
profile. But, on Burley’s account of identity, identity of modal profile is sufficient for real 
identity.  
 Whereas Burley is explicitly concerned in the Quaes.Perih with the relationship 
between concrete substances and their natures, however, the principles Burley employs in 
his response to that concern are general. Consequently, those same principles can be used 
to describe the relationship that any two substances might have to one another – for 
example, the relationship that two (substantial) properties might have. Consider the 
proposition that a human is an animal. That proposition is composed of the property of 
humanity and the property of animality. Its truth, then, requires that there is a fact of 
humanity’s being really identical to animality. But, since identity is a transitive relation, 
humanity’s being really identical to animality is guaranteed so long as there exists some 
human, such as Socrates, in whom humanity and animality are both realized, since both 
will be really identical to that particular. That a particular can be identical to a property is 
clear from what Burley says in the Quaes.Perih. Moreover, since identity is a transitive 
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relation, we can appeal to that fact to explain how two properties are really identical to 
one another. For example, if humanity is really identical to Socrates, and Socrates is 
really identical to animality, then, by transitivity, humanity will be really identical to 
animality. In fact, the relationship between humanity and animality is even tighter than 
that argument might suggest, because animality is itself constitutive of humanity, as its 
genus. So anything which realizes humanity ipso facto realizes animality as well.  
 Beyond true affirmative propositions which involve substantial predication, 
Burley’s account of truth helps handle true negative propositions of that type as well. 
Those propositions will be true just in case the things which compose it are really 
different from one another. For example, the proposition that Socrates is not a cat is true 
just in case Socrates is really different from the property of cathood. And, of course, 
Socrates is really different from cathood, since Socrates has a different modal profile 
from every instance of cathood. Falsehood, then, is simply a matter of the things which 
the mind represents as being really identical being in fact really different, or is a matter of 
the things that the mind represents being different, in fact being really identical to one 
another.  
3.3. Facts, cont’d: Accidental Predication and Sameness 
 Unfortunately, the account of identity and difference that Burley develops in the 
Quaes.Perih can only go so far in articulating the metaphysics of facts for us. In 
particular, it doesn’t help explain the metaphysics of the facts which make true those 
propositions which involve accidental, rather than substantial, predication. The truth of 
the proposition that Plato is pale, for example, depends on Plato’s being identical to 
paleness. But, unlike in the case of propositions involving substantial predication, this 
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proposition, which involves accidental predication, can’t require for its truth the real 
identity of Plato and a pale thing.  
 Why can’t the account of identity developed in the Quaes.Perih help explain the 
truth conditions of propositions such as the proposition that Plato is pale? Because Plato 
can never be really identical to paleness. Real identity occurs when the relevant relata 
share the same modal profile. Plato and his humanity, for example, are really identical to 
one another because their existence conditions are identical. However, unlike with 
concrete substances and their substantial properties, concrete substances and their 
accidental properties have different modal profiles. Plato, for example, really differs from 
paleness, because Plato could lack the property of paleness – for example, if Plato were 
to go on vacation to some sunny beach hideaway, spending his days lying on the beach 
and getting tan. At the same time, it seems perfectly possible that the proposition that 
Plato is pale is true. Perhaps Plato has in fact been spending all his days indoors in front 
of a computer screen, furiously editing the Republic, and has become pale as a ghost in 
the process. Given Burley’s commitment to correspondence, however, the truth of the 
proposition that Plato is pale requires a fact, and in particular the fact of Plato’s being 
identical to paleness. Consequently, there must be a kind of identity that Plato bears (or at 
least can bear) to paleness that cannot be captured by the theory of identity Burley 
develops in the Quaes.Perih.  
 To address the truth of propositions of that sort, then, Burley’s account of the 
metaphysics of the proposition needs to be expanded. That expansion, I argue, involves 
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introducing a further notion: sameness.32
That which is the same as some accidental thing is said to be the same, in the way 
that a sitting person or a musical person is said to be the same as Socrates. And 
that an accidental thing taken up in this way is concretely the same in number as 
the subject is proven, because when we want to order someone or to call someone, 
oftentimes in ordering or calling we use the name of an accident, as when we say 
‘You, the one sitting, come here’ or ‘I call the one sitting or the one arguing over 
to us’, which would not be unless an accidental thing were the same in number as 
the subject.
 Sameness is a notion even broader than real 
identity. Two things which are really identical are the same, but two things which are the 
same need not be really identical. Burley introduces the notion of sameness in a 
commentary on Aristotle’s Topics.  
33
 
 
The theory of identity that Burley develops in the Quaes.Perih entails that, for example, 
Socrates cannot be really identical to a seated person, since a seated person is necessarily 
seated, but Socrates could be standing (and so not seated). But the theory of sameness 
that Burley develops in this passage allows that Socrates can be the same as a seated 
person. For we can call Socrates ‘the seated person’, and that we can do so is because the 
seated person can be, numerically speaking, the same as Socrates.34
                                                            
32  The notion of sameness was a standard feature in most medieval metaphysical accounts, often featuring 
in attempts to provide a philosophically satisfying explanation of the trinity. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Brower, 
“Abelard on the Trinity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Abelard (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
Jeff Brower and Michael Rea have recently attempted to resurrect the notion. See Jeffrey E. Brower and 
Michael Rea, “Material Constitution and the Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy 22, no. 1 (2005): 57–76. 
 
33  Alessandro Conti, “Ontology in Walter Burley’s Last Commentary on the Ars Vetus,” Franciscan 
Studies 50 (1990): 132, n. 26. 
34 Burley’s theory of identity and his theory of sameness are, I assume, theories of numerical identity and 
numerical sameness, respectively. Properties, then, enter into relations of identity or sameness only 
insofar as they are particularized in some concrete substance. In his later metaphysics, Burley denies that 
properties exist as particular in the concrete particulars that possess them, and so can never be 
numerically distinct, strictly speaking. See, e.g., Walter Burley, Super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et 
Aristotelis, Exp.Porph, a4rb–vb. However, Burley argues that properties can be numerically distinct in a 
broad sense. See Ibid., Exp.Praed, d3rb–va. 
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 The notion of sameness that Burley introduces in this passage is not ad hoc, but 
rather can be motivated by his larger metaphysics. In his ontology, Burley distinguishes 
between beings per se, and beings per accidens.35
 Burley can employ that constitutive relationship in his explanation of how beings 
per se and beings per accidens can be the same as one another. In the simplest case, a 
being per accidens is the same as a being per se so long as that being per se is 
constitutive of that being per accidens. Socrates and pale Socrates, for example, are a 
 Beings per accidens are not merely 
accidental properties. Rather, they are compounds, composed of at least one property 
from one of the accidental categories as well as something from the category of 
substance. A pale thing (that is, the referent of ‘pale’), for example, is a complex 
property, composed of the properties of substance and paleness. Consequently, when one 
believes that Socrates is pale, one asserts the identity not of Socrates and paleness, but 
rather of Socrates and a compound of the property of substance and the property of 
paleness. Beings per se, on the other hand, are those particulars and properties entirely 
within the category of substance – Socrates, for example, or the property of humanity. 
Beings per accidens and beings per se are really different, because they have different 
modal profiles. Seated Socrates – a compound the property of being seated and Socrates 
– would cease to exist if Socrates were to stand, but Socrates himself can (and likely 
does) continue to exist if he were to stand. Though beings per accidens have different 
modal profiles from beings per se, however, a being per accidens is always partly 
constituted by a being per se, since beings per accidens are partly constituted by 
something from the category of substance. 
                                                            
35 See Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, e8va–b. 
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being per se and a being per accidens, respectively. Though really different from one 
another, pale Socrates is partly constituted by Socrates himself. Because Socrates partly 
constitutes pale Socrates, Socrates will be the same as pale Socrates. We can express this 
notion of sameness in the following way: 
(S1) A being per accidens will be the same as a being per se so long as  
(i) any accidental property which is constitutive of that being per accidens 
inheres in that being per se, and  
(ii) the substance which is constitutive of the being per accidens is really 
identical to that being per se. 
Socrates is the same as pale Socrates, then, just in case paleness inheres in Socrates, so 
that Socrates partly constitutes pale Socrates. Moreover, (S1) can also handle the kinds of 
cases Burley himself mentions in the passage quoted above, such as the case in which 
Socrates is the same as a pale thing. In that case, first, paleness inheres in Socrates, per 
(i). Second, the property of substance, which partly constitutes a pale thing, is really 
identical to Socrates, per (ii). Consequently, Socrates is the same as a pale thing. And that 
fact, I suggest, makes true the proposition that Socrates is pale. 
  While (S1) can handle the sorts of cases Burley himself considers, there are a 
great number of cases that it cannot. Consider, for example, the proposition that a human 
is pale. If that proposition is true, it is because the property of humanity is at least the 
same as a certain being per accidens – namely, the compound of the property of paleness 
and the property of substance. Per (S1), that requires that the property of paleness inheres 
in the property of humanity. But Burley appears to deny that properties can inhere in 
277 
 
 
 
other properties.36
 The problem with (S1) is that it requires that accidental properties inhere in the 
relevant being per se – which might be a property itself. However, because Burley argues 
that substantial properties are really identical to their particulars, we can modify (S1) in a 
way that accommodates cases of this sort, resulting in the following account of sameness: 
 The property of paleness, for example, does not inhere in the property 
of humanity. Rather, it can only inhere in particular humans (as well as other particular 
substances).  
(S2) A being per accidens will be the same as a being per se so long as  
(i) any accidental property which is constitutive of that being per accidens 
inheres in a particular that is really identical to that being per se and  
(ii) the substance which is constitutive of that being per accidens is really 
identical to that being per se.  
Assume, for example, that Socrates is pale. Consequently, paleness inheres in Socrates, 
who (given Burley’s account of identity) is really identical to the property of humanity, 
as per (i). Moreover, as per (ii), the property of substance, which partly constitutes a pale 
thing, is really identical to the property of humanity, because Socrates is really identical 
to both properties, and identity is transitive.37
                                                            
36  With respect to terms of second intention, such as ‘property’ for example, Burley argues that those terms 
do not signify anything other than what terms of first intention signify, so that the meaning of terms of 
second intention are context sensitive. That they do not signify anything other than what terms of first 
intention signify appears to be motivated in part by worries that, if they were to signify some distinct 
properties, then properties would inhere in properties. See Ibid., Exp.Prol, a2rb–va. 
 Consequently, the property of humanity is 
the same as a pale thing, that is, a compound of paleness and the property of substance. 
37  In fact, the property of substance is partly constitutive of the property of humanity, since a human is 
rational substance. 
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And so the proposition that a human is pale is likewise true, because the constituents of 
that proposition are the same in fact.38
 Before we conclude our analysis of sameness, I want to consider one final case. 
Besides cases in which a being per accidens is the same as a being per se, it also the case 
that two beings per accidens can be the same as one another. For example, a musical 
person might also be a pale person. (S2) is explicitly articulated in terms of the 
relationship of a being per accidens to a being per se, however, and as such cannot 
accommodate these cases. But it seems to me that Burley already possess all the tools he 
needs to make sense of the relationships between two beings per accidens, along the 
following lines:   
   
(S3) two beings per accidens - (a) and (b) - will be the same as one another so 
long as  
(i) every accidental property which is constitutive of (b) inheres in a 
particular which is really identical to the substance of (a) and  
(ii) every accidental property which is constitutive of (a) inheres in that 
particular 
(iii) the substance which is constitutive of (b) is really identical to that 
particular 
                                                            
38  Just as with general propositions involving essential, or substantial, claims, then, such as the proposition 
that a human is an animal, the truth of general propositions involving accidental claims are ultimately 
grounded in particulars, such as Socrates. This has two advantages for Burley. First, Burley argues that 
properties only exist within concrete particulars, and so the identity of any two properties would have to 
be due to their being realized within particulars. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in 
librum Perihermeneias,” para. 4.52–3, 274. Second, it seems to respect the fact that even general 
propositions are about particulars, even if those particulars are not themselves constituents of those 
propositions.  
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For example, assume that Socrates is both pale and a musician. Consequently, a pale 
thing is a musician. First, the property of being musical inheres in Socrates, who is really 
identical to the substance of a pale thing – namely, the property of substance itself. 
Second, the property of paleness also inheres in Socrates. Third, the property of substance 
– this time, as the substance of a musician – is really identical to Socrates. Consequently, 
a pale thing is a musician, because a pale thing is the same as a musician.39
 Supplemented with the notion of sameness, then, the core theory of the 
metaphysics of facts can be expanded to include all the kinds of facts necessary to make 
sense of Burley’s first account of correspondence. Note, however, that the notions of real 
identity and real difference are still the central notions of the account, because the notion 
of sameness itself is partly articulated in terms of real identity. That also suggests, I think, 
that the account can be modified in such a way that Burley’s account of correspondence 
can be uniformly articulated with respect to both substantial and accidental predication – 
though it is unclear to me whether Burley himself would be amenable to such an account. 
It involves, first, the introduction of a slightly different notion, sameness*. Sameness 
presupposes that at least one of the relevant relata is a being per accidens. Sameness* has 
no such presupposition, and so can capture the kind of real identity that substances can 
have with one another. Two things will differ*, moreover, just in case they fail to be the 
same*. With sameness* and difference* in hand, we can understand Burley’s theory of 
correspondence to be the following: propositions are true just in case they correspond to 
 
                                                            
39  (S3) isn’t perfect.  In particular, it isn’t nuanced enough to handle different kinds of quantified 
propositions (e.g. the proposition that every human is pale vs. the proposition that some human is pale). 
Delving into those issues, however, would take us too far afield for our purposes in this paper. At the 
very least, it provides a general account of the notion of sameness, one which allows us to make sense of 
the truth-conditions of a large class of propositions. 
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the fact of their subject term’s being the same* as their predicate term (if they are 
affirmative), or correspond to the fact of their subject term’s being different* from their 
predicate  term (if they are negative). We can capture the notion of sameness* in the 
following way. 
(S4) two things - (a) and (b) - will be the same* as one another so long as  
(i) the substance of (a) is really identical to some particular 
(ii) any accidental property which is constitutive of (a) inheres in that 
particular and  
(iii) any accidental property which is constitutive of (b) inheres in that 
particular 
(iv) the substance which is constitutive of (b) is really identical to that 
particular 
Since things in the category of substance are not constituted by accidental properties, 
those things will trivially fulfill clauses (ii) and (iii). Clauses (i) and (iv), however, 
requires that, regardless of whatever accidental properties they may have, two substances 
can be the same only if they are really identical. It also accommodates the old notion of 
sameness, however, since it requires not just that two things that are the same* have 
really identical substantial parts (at least transitively, via the real identity of each to the 
same particular), but also that, if they are constituted by any accidental properties, that 
those properties inhering in some particular which is really identical to its substantial 
part. Difference*, moreover, requires that two things fail to meet at least one clause in 
(S4). 
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 Let me be clear: the account of the metaphysics of facts that I have developed in 
this section is speculative. It does not constitute a particular reading of some of Burley’s 
early texts, or even a reconstruction of a particular account Burley himself actually held, 
given those texts. My own view is that Burley never had any explicit account of the 
metaphysics of facts, especially in the first half of his career. I hold that view in part 
because there is at least some looseness in the relevant notions he employs when 
discussing the truth conditions of a proposition – sometimes discussing sameness (where 
it is unclear whether Burley means sameness or identity) and sometimes talking simply 
about things being “united in reality.” Rather than a reconstruction of a particular view, 
then, the account I have developed in this section and is a construction of a theory of the 
metaphysics of facts, whose construction is both motivated and constrained by certain 
other commitments – metaphysical, semantic, and alethic – which appear in various 
works of Burley’s early corpus. It is the theory of the metaphysics of facts that I think 
Burley is required to have, given his various views about the nature of correspondence, 
identity and sameness, and ontology generally – even if it is not a theory he did in fact 
ever hold.  
 
4. REALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
4.1. Ockham contra Moderate Realism 
 Whatever account of the metaphysics of facts that Burley held, or should have 
held, in the first half of his career, that account is closely tied to a particular program of 
realism about properties – moderate realism. Moderate realism is the thesis that 
substantial properties are constitutive parts of the concrete particulars that possess them, 
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and that those properties are really identical to those concrete particulars.40 The high 
watermark of moderate realism in the medieval period occurs at the turn of the fourteenth 
century, with the maturation of Scotus’ metaphysical system. But those metaphysical 
approaches die a fairly quick philosophical death in the subsequent decades, principally 
at the hands of Ockham.41 In fact, the target of Ockham’s criticisms of realism is broader 
than just moderate realism (though, as we will see, not as broad as Ockham himself took 
them to be). Developed most fully in his Ordinatio and Summa Logicae, Ockham 
attempts to argue that any form of realism is philosophically suspect, regardless of 
whether or not one takes properties to be really identical to the particulars that possess 
them.42
                                                            
40 This account of properties is most at home with respect to substantial properties, since substantial 
properties are, according to moderate realism, constitutive of concrete substances. Accidental properties, 
in contrast, are not constitutive of concrete substances. However, they are constitutive of beings per 
accidens. Paleness, for example, is constitutive of pale Socrates. Ockham’s criticisms of properties are 
often directed towards substantial properties, even while those criticisms are represented as being 
applicable to properties simpliciter. Ockham appears to expect that, if one comes to deny substantial 
properties, there will be little motivation left to accept accidental properties.   
 Ockham’s criticisms of realism clearly influenced in some way the development 
of Burley’s own metaphysics, pushing him to a radically different view of the nature of 
properties, the relationship between properties and their bearers, and the proper role of 
properties in a philosophical system. That influence is most apparent in the objections 
41 Realist metaphysics of that sort do appear to undergo a renaissance at the end of the fourteenth century 
and into the fifteenth century, with the metaphysical accounts developed by the “Oxford Realists,” 
philosophers such as John Wyclif, William Penbygull, and Johannes Sharpe. See Alessandro Conti, 
“Johannes Sharpe’s Ontology and Semantics: Oxford Realism Revisited,” Vivarium 43 (April 2005): 
156–86.  
42 For Ockham’s critique of realism (and related matters) in the Ordinatio, see William Ockham, Scriptum 
in librum primum Sententiarum Ordinatio, Distinctiones II-III, ed. Gedeon Gál and Stephen Brown, vol. 
2, Opera Theologica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1970), d. 2, qq. 1–7, pp. 3–266.. For 
Ockham’s critique of realism in the Summa Logicae, see William Ockham, Summa Logicae, ed. 
Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gal, and Stephen Brown, vol. 1, Opera Philosophica (St. Bonaventure, 
N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1978), bk. 1, chs. 14–17, pp. 47–62.  
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that the later Burley considers to his (very different) account of properties, objections 
which clearly originate with Ockham.43
  In this section, therefore, I intend to focus on arguments that Ockham raises 
against two different versions of realism. I will focus on Ockham’s arguments, first, 
against moderate realism, and in particular on his argument that a distinction between real 
and a less-than-real kind of difference is philosophically implausible. As we will see, the 
later Burley agrees with Ockham on this point, and consequently adopts in its place the 
simpler account of identity and difference that Ockham favors. That simpler account will 
have important consequences for both the account of correspondence, and the 
metaphysics of facts, that Burley develops in the second half of his career.  
 But Burley’s response to Ockham’s criticisms of 
realism isn’t wholly reactionary; on the contrary, on some points at least, Burley’s later 
views are sympathetic to Ockham’s concerns. In particular, the later Burley agrees with 
Ockham that accounts which posit a multitude of identity relations ought to be rejected.  
 I then will focus on Ockham’s arguments against the general form of realism that 
Burley ultimately adopts, a form I label abstract universalism. Abstract universalists hold 
that numerically the same property can be in many particulars at once. Ockham rejects 
this account as philosophically (and theologically) problematic. Burley, however, 
develops a radical version of abstract universalism – “exaggerated realism” – which he 
argues escapes Ockham’s criticisms. I argue that the radical version of abstract 
universalism that Burley adopts indicates two things about Burley’s philosophical 
                                                            
43 While Burley never identifies Ockham by name, addressing his response to ‘certain moderni’, the 
objections to realism that Burley considers are precisely the objections Ockham raises at various points in 
his corpus. There can be little doubt but that Burley has Ockham in mind in these passages. See, e.g., 
Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, d2ra–3va. 
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outlook – one general, the other specific. First, it indicates that Burley’s philosophical 
commitments are ultimately driven by semantic considerations. His commitment to 
properties, for example, is not ultimately driven by the belief that they do important 
ontological work, but rather by the belief that they are necessary for correct epistemic and 
semantic theorizing. In particular, Burley commitment to properties is driven by the 
belief that they are required to explain the semantic content of general expressions, that 
is, expressions which can be univocally said of more than one concrete thing.  
 Second, then, Burley’s later realism indicates that Burley has a very particular 
view about semantics, and especially about referentialism. For Burley, signification must 
be a two-place relation. For each categorematic expression in a language, in other words, 
there must be some one thing to which it refers. And properties, Burley argues, are the 
only things that general expressions could signify, since only they could explain the 
ability of those expressions to be univocally said of many. That account of referentialism 
is starkly at odds with Ockham’s own, since Ockham argues that signification is variably 
polyadic, that is, signification need not be two-place (and usually isn’t in the case of 
predicate expressions, since there is typically more than one individual of a given kind, 
and it is these particulars, Ockham argues, to which a predicate expression refers). 
Moreover, as we will see in §5, Burley’s account of reference, given the simpler account 
of identity and difference that he comes to adopt, also requires an account of 
correspondence that is very different from the near-identity account – one which 
integrates a central semantic notion into the analysis of correspondence itself. 
 Ockham’s attacks on moderate realism are principally aimed at Scotus’ 
metaphysical views, whose account Ockham appears to regard as the most sophisticated 
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form of realism available.44 But the criticisms of Scotus’ metaphysical views are, I argue, 
generalizable to any view according to which properties are abstract particulars, really 
identical to, though less-than-really different from, the concrete substances which possess 
them. Ockham’s criticism of Scotus’ metaphysics is two-pronged, though we will focus 
merely on the first prong here.45
 Ockham’s view is that the distinction between real and formal difference (and, 
mutatis mutandis, identity) is philosophically unsustainable. Anticipating McTaggart’s 
Dissimilarity of the Diverse – that if any two things are different, there is at least one 
feature which the one has and the other lacks – Ockham argues that Scotus’ notion of a 
formal difference leaves no room for real difference.
 On the first prong of his attack, Ockham attempts to 
undermine Scotus’ notion of a formal difference (a notion similar to Burley’s notion of 
intentional difference) by arguing that the distinction between real and merely formal 
difference is philosophically incoherent.  
46
                                                            
44 Adams notes that Ockham responds both to an early and to a late conception of the formal distinction in 
his arguments. See Marilyn McCord Adams, “Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century,” in The 
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 417–
9.  My discussion is framed in terms of the first alone, for the sake of brevity.  
 As Marilyn Adams notes, Ockham 
takes the equality of inconsistency between contradictories to entail that “if some 
proposition of the form ‘x is F’ and ‘y is not F’ can be true about really existent property-
45 On Ockham’s criticism of Scotus’s realism, see William Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum 
Sententiarum ordinatio, distinctiones II-III, 2:d. 2, q. 6, pp. 173–92. 
46 McTaggart’s Dissimilarity of the Diverse is logically equivalent to Leibniz’s Law, the Identity of 
Indiscernibles. McTaggart argues that his own nomenclature is to be preferred, however, as it avoids any 
suggestion that there are indiscernibles that are identical to one another. See John McTaggart, The Nature 
of Existence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 101.  
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bearers that are only formally distinct, then any pair of contradictories can.”47
 One possible response which Ockham considers holds that things which differ 
really have what Ockham calls “primary contradictories” truly predicated of them, that is, 
contradictory predicate terms which are not restricted or diminished (either implicitly or 
explicitly) in some way. Merely formally distinct things, in contrast, can have truly 
predicated of them only contradictory predicates which necessarily are diminished in 
some way (by containing in some way the notion of being formally of a kind). For 
example, if a universal differs only formally from a particular, then, since ‘is a universal’ 
can be truly predicated of the first whereas ‘is not a universal’ is truly predicated of the 
second, these two contradictory terms – ‘is a universal’ and ‘is not a universal’ – must be 
restricted or diminished by implicitly containing the notion of mere formality, for 
example. But Ockham argues that “’really’ is not a destructive or diminishing 
determination, and neither is ‘formally’.”
 That is, if 
some contradictory pair of predicates can be predicated of objects that are merely 
formally different on Scotus’ account, then, since each pair of contradictories are as 
contradictory as any other, every contradictory pair can in principle be predicated of 
objects that are merely formally different. For example, if Socrates is a human and Fido 
is not a human (but rather is a dog), they differ. But what reason does Scotus have for 
regarding that difference as real, rather than merely formal? Ockham suggests that Scotus 
has none.  
48
                                                            
47 Adams, “Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century,” 418. See also Marilyn McCord Adams, William 
Ockham (University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 49–50. 
 In other words, Ockham argues that being 
48 See William Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio, distinctiones II-III, d. 2, q. 5, 
p. 158. 
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formally F and being formally not-F is just as contradictory as being F and being not-F 
simpliciter, neither being a notion of restriction or diminution, so that the latter pair can 
no more pick out a real difference between two things than the former.  
 Whatever the ultimate philosophical success of Ockham’s arguments against the 
distinction between real and formal difference, Ockham’s intended result, among other 
things, is a simplified account of identity and difference, which does not recognize a 
distinction between real and merely formal identity and difference. On Ockham’s account 
of identity and difference, then, two things differ simpliciter just in case something can be 
truly said of one which cannot be truly said of the other; they are identical simpliciter just 
in case they can truly be said of, and truly have said of them, the very same things. The 
later Burley’s account of identity and difference reflects this position.49
if the one is [truly] predicated of something of which the other is not [truly] 
predicated, then they are not the same but diverse. And if something is [truly] 
predicated of the one which is not [truly] predicated of the other, they are not the 
same but diverse. But if something is truly predicated of the one which is [truly] 
predicated of the other, then they are the same.
 In the Exp.Perih, 
for example, Burley writes that  
50,51
                                                            
49 See also Walter Burley, In Physicam Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones (New York: Georg Olms, 1972), 
9ra–b. 
 
50 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, g3rb: “Nota quod ex isto loco 
sumitur doctrina bona ad cognoscendum identitatem vel diversitatem aliquorum adinvicem. Si unum 
praedicatur de aliquo de quo non praedicatur reliquum illa non sunt eadem sed diversa. Et si aliquid 
praedicatur de uno quod non predicatur de reliquo illa non sunt eadem sed diversa. Et si aliquid 
praedicatur de uno vere de quo reliquum praedicatur illa sunt eadem.” 
51 Because of the way in which it is articulated, Burley’s account of identity and diversity in this passage 
may seem to face a serious problem. It relies on the notion of true predication, or truth, but truth itself is 
partly articulated by him in terms of identity and diversity. However, that problem is only serious if we 
take Burley to be introducing the concepts of identity and diversity via the notion of truth. Another way 
to conceive of Burley’s project here, I suggest, is one which tries to illuminate for us concepts we already 
possess, by setting out a clear criterion for their application. That criterion might already contain – 
explicitly or implicitly – concepts which are themselves partly articulated in terms of identity and 
diversity, but that should not matter if Burley’s goal is simply to produce a criterion for their applicability 
– one which both captures our intuitions about “obvious” cases and at the same time illuminates for why 
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Of course, Scotus could accept this principle as well, so long as the larger theory is 
suitably supplemented with an account of primary and diminished contradictory 
predicates. But Burley makes it clear in a number of passages that he does not intend for 
his account to be supplemented in that way. With respect to the relationship between 
concrete particulars and properties especially, and contra his earlier account, Burley uses 
that principle to acknowledge that concrete particulars and properties differ from one 
another. “And on the basis of that principle, given that there are many contradictories 
which can be truly predicated (verificantur) of them, it is clear that the singular and the 
universal are not the same.”52 And Burley is clear that the relevant notion of difference 
between concrete particulars and properties is not merely intentional. He writes, for 
example, that “the universal [...] outside the mind is some thing distinct (aliqua res 
distincta) from the singular thing out of which it is taken.”53 It seems, then, that Burley 
takes his principle of predication to entail more than merely intentional difference 
between the relevant subjects of that predication – including properties and concrete 
particulars.54
 However, given that account of identity and difference, Burley can no longer 
claim that a property and a concrete particular that possesses it differ merely 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
we judge those cases in the way that we do. The same criterion can then be used to settle less “obvious” 
cases as well. 
52 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Porph, a4va: “Et isto fundamento 
probatur quod singulare et universale non sunt idem per multa contradictoria qui verificantur de eis.” 
53 Ibid., Exp.Porph, a4rb: “[U]universale tam illud quod est in anima quam illud quod est extra animam est 
aliqua res distincta a re singulari qua extrahitur.” 
54 For more on Burley’s later account of identity and difference, see Conti, “Ockham and Burley on 
Categories and Universals,” 193–5. 
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intentionally, a consequence which Burley himself clearly recognizes. One option for 
Burley is to deny that they differ at all – in essence, to adopt Ockham’s nominalist 
position, and so deny that there are properties, something over and above concrete 
particulars whose natures those properties constitute. Another option, however, is to 
accept that a concrete particular and a property of it differ from one another, but to 
acknowledge that that difference is not diminished in any way. If one accepts that 
concrete particulars and properties differ in that way, however, the late medieval realist 
faces a dilemma: either she must continue to maintain that properties are abstract 
particulars, or she must now take properties to be abstract universals.  
4.2. Burley’s Exaggerated Realism 
 Both horns, Ockham argues, are problematic for the realist. The first horn is 
problematic because it does not allow for a philosophically consistent account of realism 
about properties. Rather, Ockham argues, it leads to a (perhaps profligate) form of 
nominalism, since “properties” must be regarded as not abstract but rather concrete, and 
so leads to a rejection of properties in favor of tropes.55
                                                            
55 This view is the main object of Ockham’s attack in the fifth question of dist. 2 of the Ordinatio. See 
William Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio, distinctiones II-III, 2:d. 2, q. 5, pp. 
154–9. It is also mentioned at points in the fourth question. See, e.g., Ibid., d. 2, q. 4, 114–5. 
 Burley wisely never pursues this 
first horn, perhaps seeing the success of Ockham’s arguments against that view. Rather, 
Burley develops a version of the second. The second horn of Ockham’s dilemma takes a 
property to be an abstract universal, something capable of being in many concrete 
particulars as universal. Ockham argues that this form of realism too faces a number of 
devastating metaphysical challenges. We will focus on one of these challenges: the 
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problem of annihilation, since Burley makes explicit mention of this challenge when 
developing his mature ontology.  
 Annihilation, unlike mere destruction, is an act whereby all the parts of a thing are 
destroyed. To annihilate Socrates, for example, is to destroy all that composes him. 
Ockham assumes that annihilation is an action that God can undertake. But, more than 
simply that, Ockham assumes that God’s ability to annihilate some one thing need not 
infringe on God’s ability to sustain the rest of the created order.56 That is, Ockham 
assumes that it is possible that God could at once annihilate something – Socrates, for 
example – without that act of annihilation having implications for the continued existence 
of the rest of the things which make up reality, such as Plato. But Ockham argues that 
such an assumption is not possible for someone committed to the view that a property is 
an abstract universal. Since annihilation requires the destruction of everything that 
composes Socrates, it will require the destruction of humanity, a certain property that is a 
constitutive part of Socrates. But, since properties are understood to be abstract 
universals, the very same property of humanity is also constitutive of other humans, such 
as Plato. Since humanity is constitutive of Plato too, Ockham argues that the annihilation 
of Socrates (and so the destruction of the property of humanity) must result in the 
destruction of Plato as well. And this is because Plato cannot survive the loss of 
something constitutive of him, such as humanity. Realism, then, is unpalatable at least 
because it imposes unacceptable limits on divine power.57
                                                            
56 See William Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio, distinctiones II-III, d. 2, q. 4, 
115–6. 
   
57 One might retort, of course, that, while realism imposes limits on divine power, those limits are not 
unacceptable. And, in general, many of Ockham’s arguments against abstract universalism are intended 
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 Likely in response to arguments of this sort, Burley adopts what some have called 
“exaggerated” realism.58
[I]t is not necessary that, by annihilating an individual, humanity (species 
hominis) will be annihilated, because humanity is not a part of Socrates. Thus, by 
annihilating this matter and this form, Socrates is annihilated, because Socrates is 
composed of nothing except this matter and this form.
 Like the target of Ockham’s annihilation argument, Burley’s 
exaggerated realist take properties to be abstract universals. But, unlike that target, he 
argues that properties are not parts of the particulars which they inform. On this account, 
a concrete substance, such as Socrates, is composed of nothing except concrete matter 
and concrete form. Because properties are not parts of their particulars, Burley argues, his 
mature ontology escapes the problem of annihilation that Ockham presents.  
59
 
 
As Burley sees it, it is in virtue of being a part of some concrete particular – Socrates, for 
example – that the property of humanity is destroyed when Socrates is annihilated. If, in 
contrast, properties were not parts of their bearers – if, for example, Socrates were 
nothing more than the compound of a concrete particular bit of matter (i.e. his body) and 
a concrete form (i.e. his soul) – then the annihilation of Socrates need not result in the 
destruction of the property of humanity itself. And, if that annihilation does not result in 
the destruction of something universal, then Socrates’ annihilation need not have any 
impact on the existential status of distinct concrete substances, such as Plato. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
to show that the philosophical costs of that realism are simply too high, rather than to show that there is 
anything conceptually incoherent in that form of realism itself. 
58 On the introduction of this term, see Herman Shapiro, “A Note on Walter Burley’s Exaggerated 
Realism,” Franciscan Studies 20 (1960): 206. 
59 Burley, Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, d3rb: “Ad aliud 
dicendum quod non oportet quod annihilando individuum annihiletur species hominis, quia species 
hominis est non pars Socratis. Unde annihilata haec materia et haec forma annihilatur Socrates, quia 
Socrates non componitur nisi ex haec materia et haec forma.”  
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 Scholars are still just beginning to understand what Burley’s exaggerated realism 
amounts to, and so just beginning to understand the philosophical implications that his 
commitment to it brings. Marilyn Adams, for example, in partial critique of Burley’s 
response to Ockham’s annihilation argument, argues that Burley’s exaggerated realism is 
unsatisfying because Ockham’s “annihilation arguments depend, not on whether 
universals are parts of particulars, but on whether they are essential constituents of them; 
and surely Burley would not deny that human nature is essential to Socrates.”60 On 
Adams’ understanding of exaggerated realism, then, questions of mereology are distinct 
from questions of nature. Even if properties are not parts of their concrete particulars, 
Adams argues, they must still be essential constituents of those concrete particulars, 
serving in explanations of why those concrete particulars are what they are.61
 Adams’ interpretation of Burley’s exaggerated realism raises interesting questions 
about the relationship between composition and constitution, and about the form – 
Aristotelian or Platonic – that exaggerated realism must take. However, more recent 
scholarship suggests a different interpretation of Burley’s exaggerated realism. 
Alessandro Conti, for example, writes that, on Burley’s theory, a property “is not a 
constitutive part of the individuals it is predicated of, but only a form coming together 
with their essences, and making their metaphysical structure known.”
 
62
                                                            
60  Adams, “Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century,” 427. 
 Conti here 
61 On this view, for example, properties might be best understood as Platonic forms which particular 
substances exemplify. Particular substances are thus not composed of properties, but still essentially 
depend on them.   
62  Conti, “Ockham and Burley on Categories and Universals,” 194. Conti is not entirely clear about what 
this “coming together” relation amounts to; at least it must entail that particulars could, in some sense, 
exist without them. See also Catarina Dutilh Novaes, “The Ockham-Burley Dispute,” in A Companion to 
Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician and Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 
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suggests that exaggerated realism entails that properties do not constitute the essences of 
the concrete particulars that they inform, and instead merely “come together” with those 
essences.63
 The central question for Burley’s exaggerated realism, then, is whether or not 
properties, such as humanity, are constitutive of the concrete particulars that posses them. 
Adams suggests, of course, that they are – and so Burley's exaggerated realism is still 
liable to Ockham's argument from annihilation. But, in a slightly later passage from the 
same work, Burley makes clear that properties are not essential constituents of concrete 
particulars.
 This interpretation has the resources to skirt some of the philosophical issues 
that Adams’ interpretation raises, since constitution can be treated as identical to, or at 
least a kind of, parthood relation. More importantly, it also suggests that Burley 
successfully responds to Ockham’s annihilation argument, since properties are not, on 
this interpretation, essential constituents of particulars. 
64
[Q]uiddity and form are one, and therefore just as there are two sorts of form, 
namely, a form which declares (declarans) a quiddity and a form which perfects 
the matter, so too there are two sorts of quiddity, because a certain one is a 
quiddity which is a form which perfects matter, and a certain one is a form which 
declares the quiddity. The quiddity which is a form perfecting the matter is a part 
of an individual whose quiddity it is, but the quiddity which declares a quiddity is 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
54–62;Hans-Ulrich Wöhler, “Universals and Individuals,” in A Companion to Walter Burley: Late 
Medieval Logician and Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 173–89.  
63 Elsewhere, Conti argues that “macro-objects are what [are] signified by a proper name or definite 
description, such as ‘Socrates’ or ‘this man here.” (Conti, “Ockham and Burley on Categories and 
Universals,” 200; on Conti’s notion of a macro-object, see n. 19). I am not sure how to reconcile this 
claim with his account of Burley’s response to the annihilation argument, since that response appears to 
presuppose that ‘Socrates’, for example, signifies merely an aggregate of concrete matter and concrete 
form, rather than an aggregate along with the various abstract forms that that aggregate possesses.  
64 Conti himself makes note of this passage, and its implications for the constitution question. See Conti, 
“Ontology in Walter Burley’s Last Commentary on the Ars Vetus,” 142–4. 
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not a part of the individual whose quiddity it is, nor is it a part of the essence (de 
essentia) of such an individual, but it essentially accompanies its essence.65
 
  
Burley's point in this passage is that a quiddity, or “whatness,” of some concrete 
substance is simply a form of that substance. And forms are of two sorts: concrete and 
abstract. Concrete forms – which are particular per se – “perfect” the matter in which 
they inhere. Socrates' soul, for example, is a concrete form in the category of substance, 
“perfecting,” or unifying, Socrates’ matter in a certain way, and the matter’s being 
unified in that way by that form just is Socrates himself. A concrete form, then, is what 
principally explains why the thing which it constitutes is what it is. Socrates’ soul, for 
example, is constitutive of Socrates, and it makes him what he is: namely, a human, an 
animal, a thing capable of laughter, etc. In addition to concrete forms, however, Burley 
argues that there are also abstract forms, or properties – humanity, for example. These 
abstract properties are, on the mature account at least, universal, that is, they are able to 
be universally possessed by, or to be in, many concrete particulars. But Burley stresses 
that they are not in any way constitutive of the concrete particulars which they are in, 
arguing that they are not “parts of the essence” (de essentia) of the particulars that 
possess them.66
                                                            
65 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, d3rb: “Ad illud quando probatur 
quod species est pars individui quia est quidditas individui, dicendum quod quidditas et forma unum 
sunt, et ideo sicut forma est duplex, scilicet, forma declarans quidditatem et forma perficiens materiam, 
sic quidditas est duplex, quia quaedam est quidditas quae est forma perficiens materiam, et quaedam est 
forma declarans quidditatem. Quidditas quae est forma perficiens materiam est pars individui cuius est 
quidditas, sed quidditas declarans quidditatem non est pars individui cuius est quidditas, nec est de 
essentia talis individui, sed est essentialiter  concomitans essentiam eius.”  
 They rather merely “declare” the quiddity, or nature, of a concrete 
particular, a claim which we will return to in the last section. 
66 Burley stresses elsewhere that particular effects can only have particular causes, though his concern in 
that passage is material causation. See, e.g., Ibid., Exp.Praed, d2vb: “[I]ndividuum est effectus 
particularis, et species est effectus univeralis, et ideo individuum non componitur nisi ex haec materia et 
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 This is an extremely radical metaphysics. So radical, in fact, that it is easy to see 
how scholars such as Adams could misunderstand the view. I do not think it is too much 
to suggest that the primary motivation for a commitment to a realist metaphysics 
throughout philosophical history has been metaphysical: the argument that realism best 
serves to explain why things have the intrinsic causal powers that they do.67 That 
Socrates is able to reason discursively, for example, or is able to laugh at a joke needs 
some explanation, and the realist suggests that that explanation comes in the form of 
Socrates' possession of a certain property: humanity. Burley's exaggerated realism is a 
radical outlier in the realist tradition, then, because his account of properties is not meant 
to answer those sorts of metaphysical questions. In fact, with respect to the question of 
why concrete particulars are what they are, Burley's account is almost identical to 
Ockham’s: concrete particulars have the natures that they do merely because of the 
compounds of concrete form and concrete matter that they are.68
                                                                                                                                                                                 
ex haec forma qui sunt causae particulares, et species cum sit effectus univeralis componitur ex causis 
univeralibus, scilicet, ex genere et differentia.” See also Ibid., Exp.Porph, a5va. This passage also serves 
to highlight that Burley does not deny that properties still retain some ontological functions – for 
example, that they account for what Burley calls universal causes. However, those ontological roles, on 
the later account, are not grounded in the role of the property as an essential constituent of a concrete 
particular. They rather appear to be grounded in a certain semantic role that the property plays (see §5). 
 Socrates, for example, is 
67 It might best to think of realism as traditionally motivated by two concerns: causality and similarity, with 
the realist holding that the same object – a property – can explain both. At least part of the novelty of 
Burley’s later account is that he separates these two issues. Issues of causality (that is, the causal powers 
of particular substances) are explained by appeal to concrete forms, whereas issues of similarity still 
require appeal to properties (though merely as representations of concrete particulars). On the issue of the 
role of properties in similarity relations, see Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, 
Exp.Porph, a4vb. 
68 For the later Burley, the fact that a concrete form (e.g. Socrates’ soul) makes a thing that it constitutes 
what it is can’t depend on some property or other, since then the annihilation argument would retain its 
force. That is, explanations of a concrete form’s enabling the thing that it constitutes to act in various 
ways (and so have a certain nature) can’t involve appeal to some property or other, in virtue of which that 
concrete form provides that nature. Consequently, for the later Burley, concrete forms cannot instantiate 
or exemplify properties (see §5). 
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a human (i.e. has the causal powers peculiar to a human) not because of any property he 
might possess, but rather because he is a concrete bit of matter structured by a concrete 
substantial form (or, on Ockham’s account, a number of concrete substantial forms). That 
Socrates is a human, then, isn't to be explained in terms of a property he possess, but 
rather in terms of the compound of concrete matter and concrete substantial form that he 
is. 
4.3. Semantic Motivations for Burley’s Exaggerated Realism 
 Why, then, does Burley remain committed to the reality of properties, even when 
that commitment requires an account of properties that in no way figures into causal 
explanation? I argue that Burley remains committed to the reality of properties because of 
a fundamental semantic commitment, a commitment which constitutes a (perhaps the) 
core principle of Burley’s philosophical outlook. According to that principle, 
signification is necessarily dyadic. In other words, each meaningful expression in a 
language must have some distinct thing as its content. Proper names and demonstratives 
will have concrete substances are their contents. But kind terms and predicates, since they 
can be said of many concrete particulars, cannot have concrete particulars as their 
contents. They require rather things which can be in many concrete particulars: 
properties.  
 That Burley actually has this view of language should be fairly obvious, given the 
theory of referentialism sketched in chapter 2. But that it is a central philosophical 
commitment will require a bit more evidence. And the best evidence, I think, that Burley 
is steadfastly committed to this position comes in his De Puritate – not (as we might 
expect) in a discussion about the nature of signification, but rather in the context of a 
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discussion about another medieval semantic notion: supposition (simple supposition, in 
particular). I will have plenty to say about supposition shortly. But, right now, all that we 
need to know is (1) that supposition is “the taking of a term for something” (i.e. terms can 
be used to talk about things), (2) that there are different kinds of supposition, (3) that 
Burley and Ockham agree about the things that are talked about in at least one kind of 
supposition (i.e. personal supposition), but (4) that they disagree about how two kinds of 
supposition – personal and simple – should be defined. Ockham and Burley agree that 
personal supposition involves a term standing for, or representing, concrete substances. 
But Ockham argues that personal supposition is the kind of supposition a term has when 
it supposits for what it signifies, whereas Burley argues that a term supposits not 
personally but simply when it supposits for what it signifies.  
 Burley argues for his position in the following manner. First, he argues that “a 
name is not imposed except on the known.”69 Recall the notion of imposition introduced 
in chapter 3. Imposition is the act of imposing an expression onto something, and Burley 
includes an epistemic restriction on imposition: to impose an expression onto something, 
you need to be thinking of that thing. But, Burley continues, “he who imposed the name 
‘human’ to signify did not know me or John who is now present.”70
                                                            
69 Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic: The Shorter and the Longer Treatises, trans. Paul 
Vincent Spade (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 88. 
 In other words, 
whoever introduced ‘human’ into the English language had not ever heard of or seen – 
70 Ibid. Ockham will deny this. He argues that, in fact, anyone who is competent with ‘human’ thinks of 
each and every human, but he does not think of any one of them distinctly. On Ockham’s understanding 
of the epistemic constraint on signification, see infra. 
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indeed, had never thought of – either Burley or his friend John.71 And so Burley 
concludes, “[t]herefore, this name ‘human’ does not signify me or John who is now 
present.”72
 Burley’s argument gets him (he believes) his preferred account of personal 
supposition. But it isn’t quite enough yet to secure the necessity of the dyadic nature of 
signification. For that, Burley needs a further argument. Besides relying on philosophical 
authority, Burley argues that “the name ‘human’ signifies something first.”
 But, if it doesn’t signify every human, but ‘human’ can supposit personally 
for every individual human, then personal supposition must not be the supposition a term 
has when it supposits for what it signifies. 
73 As Paul 
Spade notes, Burley is here relying on the Aristotelian notion of the ‘first subject’ of an 
attribute; in other words, what an expression signifies “first” is what is “determinately 
and distinctly” thought by someone who understands the meaning of that expression.74 
But, Burley argues, “it does not signify first Socrates or Plato, because in that case 
someone hearing the utterance and knowing what is signified by the utterance would 
determinately and distinctly understand Socrates, which is false.”75
                                                            
71 This might seem to presuppose a suspect picture of how expressions come to have the meaning that they 
do – by fiat from some Adam-like figure. But Burley’s position need not require this. For example, he 
could follow the example of Roger Bacon, and maintain that every use of an expression constitutes a re-
imposition of that expression. See Roger Bacon, “An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon’s ‘Opus Maius’: ‘De 
Signis,’” ed. Jan Pinborg, K.M. Fredborg, and Lauge Nielsen, Traditio 34 (1978): sec. 143–155, pp. 127–
130. All that Burley’s argument requires is the concession that the competent use of an expression does 
not require that one think about each thing of which it can be predicated. 
 That is, if Socrates 
72 Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic, 88. 
73 Ibid., 87. 
74 See Ibid., 86, n. 30, and p. 88. 
75 Ibid., 87–8. 
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were signified “first” by ‘human’, then competence with ‘human’ would involve a 
determinate and distinct thought about Socrates. But that, of course, is absurd, since 
plenty of individuals competent with the expression ‘human’ have never even heard of 
Socrates. Of course, that is true for any given human individual. So “the name ‘human’ 
does not signify something singular.”76 And, since things are either singular or common, 
“it first signifies a common entity. And a common entity is a species,” that is, a 
property.77
 Burley’s argument here is far from great; Ockham himself, while accepting the 
epistemic constraint on signification, is going to reject the assumption that cognition must 
be of a “determinate and distinct” variety. For Ockham, kind terms and predicates signify 
concrete particulars, but they do so in a “confused” manner.
 
78
 Even if his argument is not all that great, however, I do think the argument reveals 
that Burley is committed an account of signification according to which signification is 
necessarily dyadic in nature. And I argue that his commitment to “exaggerated realism,” 
 Competent use of the 
expression ‘human’, on this view, involves thinking about all the humans – but not any 
one human in particular, that is, not any one in a “determinate and distinct” manner. And 
this is because the concept HUMAN is itself confused, representing every individual 
human, but no one human is determinately and distinctly.  
                                                            
76 Ibid., 88. 
77 Ibid. 
78 See William Ockham, Expositio in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis, ed. Philotheus Boehner, vol. 2, 
Opera Philosophica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1978), 354.88–355.105. See also Paul 
Vincent Spade, “Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic 
Theory, Version 1.2,” December 27, 2007, 154–5, 
http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Thoughts,%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf. 
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where properties are stripped of any sort of ontological role, strongly suggests how 
deeply held that commitment is. It is Burley’s commitment to the necessity of a dyadic 
analysis of signification, then – rather than any deep metaphysical concerns about the 
necessity of properties to account for the causal powers of particular substances – that 
sets him so opposed to Ockham’s nominalism. 
 
5. A SEMANTIC THEORY OF CORRESPONDENCE 
 Burley’s “exaggerated realism” might be well and good on semantic and 
metaphysical fronts (with a stress on ‘might’), but it raises a serious alethic concerns. As 
we saw in §2, propositions involve representations of identity and difference. But 
Burley’s mature account of identity and difference is much simpler than the earlier 
account, and that simplicity threatens the complex metaphysics of facts that allowed his 
“near-identity” account of correspondence to work. That simpler account of identity and 
difference requires an equally simpler metaphysics of facts: each numerically distinct 
thing is identical only to itself, and different from everything else.79
                                                            
79 It is unclear whether Burley endorses the notion of sameness later in his career. Moreover, it is not clear 
to me whether he needs it, since the semantic account of correspondence that he develops seems to treat 
cases of substantial and accidental predication in a similar manner. 
 For example, 
Socrates is identical to Socrates, and nothing else. Likewise, the property of humanity is 
identical to the property of humanity, and nothing else. In particular, Socrates cannot in 
any way be identical to the property of humanity, since Socrates is a concrete particular 
but the property of humanity is not a concrete particular. There is, in other words, no fact 
that Socrates is a human, since that fact would require that Socrates and humanity are 
identical to one another, but they are not.  
301 
 
 
 
 Given the simplicity of the metaphysics of facts that Burley’s new account of 
identity requires, his account of correspondence will need to become more complex. For, 
unlike the near-identity account, which merely required an appeal to the identity or 
difference of the terms themselves of a proposition, Burley’s simplified account of 
identity requires that the truth of most propositions will appeal to facts that are not 
constituted by the terms of those propositions. The truth of the proposition that Socrates 
is a human, for example, cannot consist in its correspondence to the fact that Socrates is a 
human, because there can be no such fact. Consequently, Burley’s commitment to a 
correspondence theory of truth requires a motivated account of how any given 
proposition can be made true by facts whose constituents may be wholly different from 
the terms of that proposition itself.  
 Late medieval semantics is dominated by two central notions: signification and 
supposition. Signification, as we have already seen, is the establishing of an 
understanding, and, for Burley, it is a property that a categorematic expression has just in 
virtue of being an expression in a language. Supposition, in contrast, is a property of a 
term in a statement, or propositio.80 Moreover, supposition is “the taking of a term for 
something,” that is, it is the use of a term to represent something – including, perhaps, 
itself.81
                                                            
80 Supposition has its roots in the notion of natural supposition, which is roughly equivalent to the 
extension of a term.  Unlike the property of supposition described here, however, natural supposition was 
not a semantic property had only within a sentential context. See Stephen Read, “Medieval Theories: 
Properties of Terms,” accessed March 10, 2011, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-terms/.  The 
theory of supposition was extended to conceptual sentences by Ockham, among others.  See William 
Ockham, Ockham’s Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae, ed. Michael Loux (University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1975), chap. 63–4, pp. 188–91.  
 Unlike signification, then, supposition does not carry with it any epistemic 
81  Walter Burley, De puritate artis logicae, 1st Edition (Louvain: The Franciscan Institute, 1951), tr. 1, p. 
1, ch. 1, pp. 1–2. 
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constraints. What an expression supposits for may be what one thinks when one 
competently uses that term; Burley in fact argues that this is the case when a term has 
simple supposition. But nothing in the notion of supposition more generally requires this. 
 Though it has its roots in the eleventh century, the theory of supposition matures 
in the early fourteenth century, in part at the hands of Burley.82 An original intent of the 
theory of supposition is to provide medieval philosophers a way to codify and explain 
how sentential context allows one to use a term to talk about, or refer to, different things, 
and in what way we can refer to those things.83
                                                            
82  There is little consensus in the literature on the purpose of supposition theory in medieval philosophy 
generally.  Some claim that its principal purpose is to provide a theory of quantification, while others 
claim that it is a medieval theory of reference.  See, e.g., Gareth B. Matthews, “Two Theories of 
Supposition?,” Topoi 16, no. 1 (March 1, 1997): 35–40; Paul Vincent Spade, “The Logic of the 
Categorical: The Medieval Theory of Descent and Ascent,” in Meaning and Inference in Medieval 
Philosophy, vol. 32, Synthese Historical Library (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 187–
224; Terence Parsons, “The Development of Supposition Theory in the Later 12th through 14th 
Centuries,” in Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 2: Medeival and Renaissance Logic, ed. Dov 
Gabbay (Boston: Elsevier, 2004), 157–280; Terence Parsons, “Supposition as Quantification versus 
Supposition as Global Quantificational Effect,” Topoi 16, no. 1 (March 1, 1997): 41–63. Catarina Dutilh 
Novaes, in contrast, argues that there is no direct contemporary counterpart to the medieval notion of 
supposition.  See Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories: Suppositio, 
Consequentiae and Obligationes (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007). In particular, and contrary to most 
accounts, she argues that the theory of supposition is not a theory of reference. Rather, the theory of 
supposition is a theory of  “codifying the different uses of terms in propositions,” where different uses 
allows one to talk about different things - e.g., a particular which instantiates a universal, the universal 
itself, or a term which refers to that universal - and distinguishing such uses serves an important role in 
analyses of truth, inference and propositional content, among others (Catarina Dutilh Novaes, 
“Supposition,” ed. Henrik Lagerlund, Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 
1230).   
 On Burley’s view, for example, it 
explains how ‘human’ can be used to refer to individual humans (“personal supposition”) 
or the property of humanity which every human possesses (“simple supposition”) or the 
term ‘human’ itself (“material supposition”).  So, while for Burley ‘human’ always 
83 Note that this is a different notion of reference than the one I employ when I talk about Burley’s 
commitment to referentialism, according to which signification is a referential relation. Both are kinds of 
reference, on my account, because both involve talking about things. In fact, with regard to linguistic 
entities, reference qua signification is required for reference qua supposition, since (in cases of formal 
supposition at least) a term has the supposition that it does in virtue of having the signification that it 
does.    
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signifies a certain property, different sentential contexts allow one to use that term to 
refer to – that is, to supposit for – things other than that universal.  For example, in 
(1) A human is an animal (Homo est animal) 
‘human’ has personal supposition, so that it is used to refer to individual humans.  But in 
(2) Human is a species (Homo est species) 
‘human’ has simple supposition, so that it is used to refer to its significate, that is, 
humanity itself.84
(3) Human is a noun (Homo est nomen) 
 Personal and simple supposition are species of a more general kind of 
supposition, called formal supposition. Burley contrasts formal supposition with material 
supposition, in which a term is used to refer to itself. For example, in 
‘human’ is used to talk about the term ‘human’ itself. Formal and material supposition 
differ from one another in that, roughly, formal supposition concerns the semantic 
content (or form) of the expression, whereas material supposition concerns the matter of 
the expression, that is, the linguistic sign itself which has some content. For example, 
humanity, which is signified by ‘human’, figures explicitly into one’s analysis of the 
simple supposition of ‘human’ in (2). Moreover, it also plays a role in the analysis of the 
personal supposition of ‘human’ in (1). ‘Human’ supposits for individual humans in (1) 
because it signifies a property which all humans possess. However, when ‘human’ 
                                                            
84 While proper names cannot supposit simply, certain singular names can supposit simply – namely, 
aggregate singular names, like ‘Pale Socrates’.  ‘Pale Socrates’ signifies pale Socrates, and pale Socrates 
is a being per accidens, an aggregate of Socrates and the universal quality of paleness.  So ‘Pale 
Socrates’ supposits simply for Pale Socrates.  But ‘Pale Socrates’ supposits personally for Socrates.  On 
this topic, see Paul Vincent Spade, “Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular Terms,” Topoi 
16, no. 1 (March 1, 1997): 7–13.  
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supposits materially, as in (3), what it is used to talk about does not depend on what it 
signifies but rather on the expression itself, as an element within some language. 
 In its canonical form, supposition theory is a theory about the semantic properties 
of terms in sentences of natural language. But that canonical form is revised by Ockham 
in important ways. In particular, Ockham argues that supposition theory can be used in a 
semantic analysis not just of the terms of sentences in natural language but in an analysis 
of the terms of sentences in mental language as well – that is, in an analysis of concepts. 
Ockham argues that concepts, like expressions in natural language, are signs. And a sign 
“is anything which brings something to mind and is naturally suited to supposit for that 
thing.”85
 Ockham’s move here is novel, and (when paired with the particular theory of 
supposition he develops) allows for a philosophical account that handles the semantics of 
general statements despite his relatively bare, nominalist metaphysics. But underpinning 
Ockham’s move, at least in part, is a recognition that supposition theory can be applied to 
the terms of anything that has predicate form.  
 Concepts, on this picture, are regarded as expressions in a language of thought, 
capable of serving as subjects and predicates in mental sentences, and so capable of 
having the kinds of semantic properties (such as supposition) that terms of sentences 
more generally have.  
 On Ockham’s account, the only things which have predicate structure are 
sentences in natural and mental language. However, Burley’s view is that the predicate 
structure of sentences in natural and mental language reflects the predicate structure of 
the propositions that they express. In part because propositions have the same predicate 
                                                            
85  William Ockham, Summa Logicae, 1978, bk. 1, ch. 1, p. 7. 
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structure as sentences in natural and mental language, then, Burley argues in a later work 
that the terms of propositions (just as the terms of sentences in natural and mental 
language) can supposit.86
to the copula existing in the intellect (i.e. a mental act of predication), which joins 
together the extremes of a true statement (propositio), there corresponds 
something in reality, namely, the identity of the extremes, or the identity of those 
things for which the extremes supposit. Moreover, to a divisive or negative 
copula in a true negative statement, there corresponds something in reality, 
namely, the diversity of the extremes, or the diversity of those things for which 
the extremes supposit. But to the copula existing in the intellect, which joins 
together the extremes of a false statement, there corresponds nothing in reality 
except those extremes, as it clear with the copula of this statement: ‘A human is a 
donkey’. Similarly, to a divisive or negative copula in a false negative statement, 
there corresponds nothing in reality except those extremes.
 And it is just this ability to supposit that Burley will employ in 
his new account of correspondence. He writes that 
87
                                                            
86 Elizabeth Karger argues that Burley likely intended already in the Quaes.Perih and Comm.Perih to 
extend supposition theory to the terms of a proposition. She points to the fact that Burley explicit claims 
that the terms of a proposition can have distribution, another semantic property, and she argues that it 
“would be surprising, then, if Burley had not been just as prepared to extend the property of supposition 
to terms in [real] sentences” (Elizabeth Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early 
Ockham,” Vivarium 34 (1996): 207).  But Burley needs to extend distribution to the terms of 
propositions in those works in order to have a fully coherent semantics. Given the metaphysics he 
defends in the early part of his career, however, he can account for the truth-conditions of a proposition 
without the use of the notion of supposition. Consequently, I am doubtful that Burley intended in the 
early works to extend supposition theory to the terms of propositions. 
 
87 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb: “Sed dubium est an ipsi 
copulae existenti in intellectu correspondeat aliquid in re aut non. Dicendum quod copulae existenti in 
intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis verae adinvicem correspondet aliquid in re, scilicet, identitas 
extremorum vel identitas eorum pro quibus extrema supponunt, divisioni vero vel negatitioni copulae in 
propositione negativa vera correspondet aliquid in re, scilicet, diversitas extremorum vel illorum pro 
quibus extrema supponunt. Sed copulae existenti in intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis false 
adinvicem nihil correspondet in re nisi ipsa extrema, ut patet de copula huius propositionis: homo est 
asinus. Similiter nec divisioni vel negationi copulae in propositione falsa negativa nihil correspondet in re 
nisi ipsa extrema.” I treat the disjuncts in this passage epexegetically. There is some textual evidence for 
this approach. First, ms Canon. Misc. omits the claim that true propositions involve the identity of their 
terms (if affirmative) or non-identity (if negative), stating only that truth involves the identity or non-
identity of the things for which the terms of the proposition supposit. Second, in a related passage in the 
Exp.Perih (see appendix D, pp. 407–11), Burley articulates the truth of a statement wholly in terms of the 
identity (in the case of affirmative statements) or non-identity (in the case of negative statements) of the 
supposits of its terms. However, even if the disjuncts should not be treated epexegetically, that does not 
undermine the reading that I defend. Rather, in that case, I think it just mirrors the distinction between 
simple and personal supposition, where simple supposition occurs when a property (or compound of 
property and particular) supposits for itself, and personal supposition occurs when the term of a 
proposition supposits for its supposits, that it, for concrete particulars.  
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On Burley’s view, then, the terms of propositions – things – can supposit, in just the way 
that expressions in natural and mental language can supposit, and those supposits can be 
identical or different. The correspondence of a proposition to some fact, then, is the 
correspondence of that proposition to the fact(s) of the thing(s) for which the 
proposition’s subject term supposits being identical to or different from something(s) for 
which its predicate term supposits.88 For example, assume that the proposition that 
Socrates is a human is true. Consequently, that proposition corresponds to some fact(s). 
Assume that Socrates supposits for himself. Assume also that humanity supposits for 
each and every concrete particular that possesses that property. Because Socrates is a 
human, Socrates possesses the property of humanity.89 So humanity supposits for 
Socrates. So both Socrates and humanity supposit for Socrates. Moreover, this is a fact: 
Socrates is identical to Socrates. And so the proposition that Socrates is a human is made 
true by the fact that Socrates is Socrates.90
 The move to extend properties of supposition to things – even if only insofar as 
they are elements (or “terms”) within some proposition – is extremely radical, and I am 
   
                                                            
88 In fact, as the text makes clear, it is not the proposition that corresponds to reality. Rather, it is the copula 
in a true proposition – that is, a mental act of predication – that corresponds to relations of identity or 
non-identity. On the later account, then, it might be best to think of facts not as compounds of things and 
identity and non-identity relations, but rather merely relations of identity and non-identity themselves, 
those relations being individuated by their relata. This account has the advantage of fitting easily within 
a broadly Aristotelian metaphysics, since identity and non-identity relations are simply objects in the 
category of relation, whereas compounds of things and identity relations don’t seem to fit easily in that 
framework. A disadvantage, however, is that even propositions just about substances (e.g. the proposition 
that Socrates is human) depend for their truth on entities in an accidental category, namely the category 
of relation. 
89 Note, however, that he is not human in virtue of his possession of the property of humanity. He is human 
because of the compound of a particular body and a particular soul. 
90 This provides an account of the truth of singular, or particular, sentences.  General sentences will require 
a number of these truth-makers, taken jointly.    
307 
 
 
 
aware of no other medieval philosopher who takes a position even approaching this one. 
What is perhaps most radical about it, however, is not the extension of supposition per se 
to things, but rather what such an extension presupposes. Supposition is the taking of 
something for something. That is, supposition is a semantic relationship, between certain 
kinds of representations and the things represented by them. So mere predicate structure 
won’t sufficiently explain what the terms of that structure supposit for, and likewise how 
it is that they supposit in the first place. Sufficient explanation requires, in addition, an 
explanation of how the terms of a proposition represent the things for which they can 
supposit, in virtue of which they can supposit for them. Ockham, for example, argues that 
concepts can supposit for things because concepts represent (more specifically, are signs 
of) things, where that representation is analyzed in terms of a concepts causal covariance 
with a thing, or a kind of thing.91
 The question, then, is whether we have any reason to think that things such as 
Socrates or the property of humanity can represent, that is, have semantic properties. I 
don’t want to spend too much time on the semantic properties that concrete particulars, 
such as Socrates, might possess, because, frankly, Burley has nothing expressly to say 
about them. But, briefly, Burley’s account requires that concrete particulars have a thin 
kind of representation: self-representation, in which they represent themselves. Because 
concrete particulars self-represent, those concrete particulars are able to supposit for 
themselves. Self-representation, I suggest, can be seen as a necessary consequence of 
  
                                                            
91 See William Ockham, Quodlibeta septem, ed. Joseph Wey, vol. 9, Opera Theologica (St. Bonaventure, 
N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1980), Quodlibet 1, q. 13, p. 76. See also Peter King, “Rethinking 
Representation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Mediaeval Theories of Mental Representation,” 
in Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2007), 95–7. 
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being itself; in virtue of the fact that something has being, that thing represents itself. 
Consequently, it is not just concrete objects that self-represent. Anything that has being, 
has self-representation. Properties, for example, self-represent.92
 Self-representation, then, explains why a thing, whether concrete or abstract, can 
supposit for itself: because it necessarily represents itself. The success of Burley’s mature 
account of correspondence, however, requires that properties are able to supposit for 
more than just themselves. In particular, properties must be able to supposit for the 
concrete particulars that possess them. The proposition that Socrates is a human is true, 
for example, in part because the property of humanity supposits in that proposition for 
Socrates (among other particular humans), and Socrates is in fact identical to Socrates. 
But, if properties can supposit for concrete substances, they must represent those 
substances. How, though, can they represent them? 
 But unlike properties, 
concrete particulars merely self-represent. And, because concrete particulars merely self-
represent, they can supposit only for themselves when the mind uses them as terms in a 
proposition. 
 Representation of that sort, I suggest, is a matter of possession. Properties 
represent concrete substances when they are possessed by those concrete substances. The 
property of humanity, for example, represents Socrates, among other humans, because it 
is possessed by Socrates, in virtue of which humanity can supposit for Socrates. 
However, if that sort of representation is a consequence of possession, then a satisfying 
                                                            
92 The self-representation of abstract objects is, in fact, a benefit rather than a cost for Burley, because there 
are some propositions whose truth requires that the abstract objects that are its terms supposit for 
themselves. For example, the proposition that human is a species (i.e. the significate of ‘homo est 
species’) contains the property of humanity as a term, and that proposition is true in part because that 
property supposits for itself. See infra. 
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explanation of that sort of representation requires a more fundamental explanation of 
property-possession itself. That is, to understand why properties represent concrete 
substances, we need to understand why concrete particulars possess the properties that 
they do. One possibility for the realist is that this explanation is ontological: property-
possession is to be articulated in terms of the sorts of roles that properties play in 
explanations of what concrete particulars are. But, of course, that possibility is no longer 
live for Burley, since he denies that properties are constitutive of the concrete particulars 
that possess them.  
 Burley offers an alternative, semantic explanation. He argues that the possession 
of a property by a concrete substance is due to a semantic relationship that that property 
bears to a concrete form that does constitutes that substance. Recall his discussion of the 
nature and function of concrete and abstract forms earlier.93
[J]ust as there are two sorts of form, namely, a form which declares (declarans) a 
quiddity and a form which perfects the matter, so too there are two sorts of 
quiddity, because a certain one is a quiddity which is a form which perfects 
matter, and a certain one is a form which declares the quiddity.
 
94
 
  
Burley’s point in this passage is to distinguish between abstract and concrete forms, that 
is, between properties and tropes. Tropes serve to organize, or “perfect,” a particular bit 
of matter. Consequently, they explain why a particular concrete substance has the 
abilities that it does. As we have seen, properties, in contrast, don’t factor into ontological 
explanations of that sort. But we now have reason to highlight the positive proposal 
Burley makes in this passage about the nature of properties. Burley argues here that 
                                                            
93 See §4.2, pp. 293. 
94 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, d3rb. 
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properties represent, or “declare,” tropes – the “quiddities,” or natures, of particular 
concrete substances that make them what they are.95
 Properties, consequently, have three different semantic relations essential to them. 
First, like all things, they are self-representational. Second, they represent tropes. Third, 
and as a consequence of the second, they represent the concrete substances that possess 
them. The third depends on the second because the possession of a property by a concrete 
substance is due to a more fundamental, semantic relation that that property bearers to a 
trope that is constitutive of that substance.  
 The property of humanity, for 
example, “declares” or represents (among other things) Socrates’ soul, a certain trope, 
which Burley argues is what explains why Socrates has the human nature that he does. 
Socrates’ soul makes Socrates human, then, and the property of humanity represents that 
soul.  
 Can anything more be said about the semantic relation that a property bears to a 
trope? That is, is that semantic relation itself liable to further analysis? It does not seem 
that it is. If it were, we would expect that analysis to be ontological: properties represent 
tropes because properties bear some more fundamental metaphysical relation to them 
(exemplification, for example). But Ockham’s arguments generally against abstract 
objects, and the way in which Burley responds to them, give us good reason to think that 
any ontological explanation will not be in the offing. If those relations aren’t liable to 
                                                            
95 Thomas de Vio Cajetan, in his commentary on Aquinas’ On Being and Essence, notes that Averroes uses 
the premise that “the essence of a thing is a substance manifesting [declarans] a thing quidditatively [rem 
quidditative]” to deny that matter is part of the essence of a thing (Thomas de Vio Cajetan, Commentary 
on St. Thomas Aquinas’s On Being and Essence, ed. Lottie Kendzierski (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette 
University Press, 1964), 90). Burley’s use of the notion of declaration in this context, then, might have 
been influenced by Averroes. 
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further analysis, however, Burley’s exaggerated realism requires that the most 
fundamental relation that properties bear is semantic, rather than ontological; properties, 
in other words, are to be understood as fundamentally semantic objects, representing 
tropes. This is, as far as I can tell, the heart of Burley’s exaggerated realism. And it is 
radical, an account of the nature of properties which doesn’t appear to find any parallels 
in the rest of the medieval philosophical tradition. Burley’s account requires that a certain 
semantic relation essential to properties is not just resistant to reductive analysis, but that 
that relation is a fundamental feature of reality itself.  
 I want to end this section by noting at least one way in which one might find 
Ockham’s nominalist alternative more inviting than Burley’s later realism, despite how 
ingenious and sophisticated his new account of correspondence seems to be. As I 
mentioned, a central disagreement between Burley and Ockham is over signification: 
whether or not signification can be variably polyadic in nature. Ockham argues that 
signification can be variably polyadic; Burley argues, in contrast, that signification 
cannot be anything but two-placed. But both recognize that semantic variable polyadicity 
needs to enter the semantic picture somewhere, since predicate expressions can supposit 
for all the concrete particulars of which they can be truly predicated, and that ability 
needs some further explanation. Ockham argues that what allows for that sort of 
supposition is signification itself; it is in virtue of the fact that predicate expressions (and 
general concepts in particular) signify those particulars that they can supposit for them. 
Burley, in contrast, cannot explain that sort of supposition primarily in terms of 
signification, since he denies that signification can be anything other than dyadic. Burley, 
instead, tells a reifying story: predicate expressions can supposit for concrete particulars 
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because their contents – properties – represent those particulars. Burley’s properties, then, 
are somewhat analogous to Ockham’s concepts, since they are central to the explanation 
of how it is that predicate expressions can supposit for many concrete particulars.  
 However, the later Burley – unlike Ockham – cannot explain the semantic 
relationship that predicate expressions bear to concrete particulars in terms of more 
fundamental natural or metaphysical relations. For Ockham, a general concept signifies 
particulars because those particulars are able to produce that concept within some mind; 
reference, in other words, is explained by more fundamental, causal relationships. 
Likewise, for the early Burley, the semantic relationship that properties bear to concrete 
particulars can be explained by a more fundamental ontological relation: constitution. But 
those sorts of analyses are unavailable to the later Burley. For him, that a property 
represent various concrete substances is fundamentally a matter of that property’s 
representing the concrete forms constitutive of those substances. But the semantic 
relationship that properties bear to concrete forms is not liable to further analysis. For 
anyone who assumes that non-natural features of the world, like representation, must be 
liable to further analysis, Burley’s later realism seems likely to be a tough pill to 
swallow.96
                                                            
96 Jeff Brower has pointed out to me that Burley’s account might be more plausible if properties in Burley’s 
later account we treated rather as ideas in the mind of God. On such an account, their semantic properties 
would be explicable in terms of their status as representations in the divine mind. However, Burley 
appears to hold that there are both properties in individuals and ideas representing those things in the 
divine mind, and that only the former are at issue here. See, e.g., Walter Burley, Tractatus de 
Universalibus, ed. H.U. Wöhler (Leipzig: Verlag der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999), 
46–60. 
 None of this results in the charge that the position Burley adopts is incoherent, 
of course. But it at least challenges some deeply-held philosophical assumptions about 
the relationship between representation and reality. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 As a general matter, Burley is committed to a certain kind of correspondence 
theory of truth, according to which truth is a matter of adequation. Moreover, throughout 
his career, Burley is committed to the idea that the truth conditions of a proposition 
fundamentally involve representations of identity or difference, so that correspondence is 
a matter of representations of identity or difference being adequated, or made equal, to 
facts which are constituted by relations of that sort. Burley’s account, therefore, faces a 
choice: either provide a suitably complex metaphysics of facts to account for truth 
conditions of those sorts, or provide a suitably complex account of correspondence itself. 
The first half of Burley’s career is dominated by a push in the first direction. During that 
time, Burley endorses a complex theory of identity and difference which, when paired 
with a notion I call sameness, allows for a near-identity account of correspondence. On 
the near-identity account, the same things constitute true propositions and the facts that 
make them true, but where true propositions and facts differ is in their “formal” features. 
The “formal” feature of a proposition merely represents the identity or difference of its 
terms, whereas the “formal” feature of a fact is the actual relation of identity or difference 
of those terms. 
 That theory of identity receives rigorous philosophical scrutiny at the hands of 
William Ockham. And, shortly after Ockham raises his objections to that theory of 
identity, and the moderate realism it was meant in part to support, Burley abandons that 
account of identity in favor of one which does not distinguish between different kinds of 
identity and difference. That change of opinion about the nature of identity and 
difference, however, means that Burley’s ontology of facts has to become far sparser – so 
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sparse that it cannot support the “near-identity” account of correspondence Burley 
defends in the first half of his career. 
 Consequently, Burley develops a very different account of correspondence in his 
later works, one which is articulated in large part in terms of the semantic notion of 
supposition. That move is, I argue, ingenious, because it sees Burley employing the 
standard philosophical tools of his day to address an essential feature of his broader 
semantic program. It is also an extremely radical move, since (especially when paired 
with his “exaggerated realism”) it requires a highly unusual ontology, involving both 
tropes and properties, and moreover assumes that properties fundamentally serve a 
semantic, rather than an ontological, function in philosophical theorizing. 
 
7. APPENDIX: AQUINAS AND BURLEY ON TRUTH 
 The account of truth that Burley defends isn’t wholly novel. In fact, on its face, it 
looks very much like the account developed by Thomas Aquinas. Like Burley, Aquinas 
distinguishes broadly between two kinds of correspondence: world to mind, and mind to 
world. And, like Burley, the notion of direction of fit is essential to Aquinas’ account. 
Aquinas writes, for example, that “truth means a proportion or a commensuration.”97 
Truth, in other words, is asymmetric; it is a matter of measurement, so that a thing is true 
insofar as it measures up to some standard. Moreover, they each articulate a similar 
generic structure of truth.98
                                                            
97 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputate de veritate, 22/1:1a5, p. 18. 
 With respect to world to mind fit, for example, both argue 
98 See Thomas Aquinas, Truth, ed. Robert William Mulligan, James McGlynn, and Robert William 
Schmidt, vol. 1 (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1952), 1a2, pp. 10–2. 
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that we should distinguish between the fit that the world has to the human mind, and to 
the divine mind. Likewise, both argue that, with respect to mind to world fit, we should 
distinguish between simple mental activity, and complex mental activity. That is, both 
distinguish between the mind’s ability to think of something, and the mind’s ability to 
think that something. Consequently, while Burley never explicitly cites Aquinas when he 
articulates his own account of truth, it seems highly likely that Burley relies heavily on 
Aquinas when constructing that account. 
 However, even if Burley was influenced by Aquinas, his account differs in 
important ways from Aquinas’s own. In particular, Burley has a drastically different 
account of truth involving world to mind fit. For Aquinas, the distinction between world 
to mind and mind to world fit reflects a distinction between the work of practical and 
speculative intellect.99
                                                            
99 This view is also defended by Scotus. See John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones subtilissime super libros 
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, vol. 7, Opera Omnia (Paris: Vives, 1893), Lib. VI, q. 3, n.5, pp. 337–8). 
 Minds, Aquinas recognizes, have both beliefs and intentions, and, 
whereas beliefs aim to describe the world, intentions seek to shape it. Consequently, 
whereas beliefs are measured by the world, insofar as they accurately describe or 
represent it, intentions serve as measures of the world, or at least certain features of it, 
insofar as those features are effects of intentional activity. Because Aquinas distinguishes 
direction of fit by appeal to distinct faculties of the mind, however, he argues that what 
things a mind can measure are restricted to the thing that mind can make. Human minds 
serve as measures for artifacts, because artifacts are products of human intention. A knife, 
for example, is truly a knife insofar as it serves the end for which it is intended – namely, 
to cut. Human minds do not serve as the measure of natural things, however, because 
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natural things are not the products of intentional human activity. Rather, the natural 
created order “is measured by the divine intellect,” so that something in the natural 
created order “is said to be true [...] insofar as it fulfills the end to which it was ordained 
by the divine intellect.”100
 In contrast to Aquinas, Burley articulates world to mind notions of fit wholly with 
reference to the mind’s cognitive, rather than volitional, faculties. He writes that “truth is 
the adequation of a thing to an intellect in the way that truth is a property of a thing which 
is naturally suited to manifest itself to an intellect, so that it manifests itself to an intellect 
so that it appears to the intellect just as it is.”
 With respect to world to mind fit, then, truth is a matter of 
doing what one was made to do – whether that is cutting a tree, hunting a gazelle, or 
contemplating the divine nature.  
101
 Because Burley has a very different conception of world to mind fit generally 
when it comes to truth than Aquinas, his analysis both of the world’s fit to the divine 
mind and to the human mind is quite different from Aquinas’s. First, with respect the 
world’s fit to the divine mind, Burley argues that truth “is a certain common property 
 World to mind fit, then, isn’t a matter of 
something fulfilling the role that its maker intended. Rather, it is a matter of presenting 
itself to an intellect as it is in fact. Of course, that might well involve acting in a way 
intended by one’s maker, since acting in that way might be a means to presenting oneself 
to an intellect as it is in fact. But truth itself doesn’t consisting in acting in that way;  
rather it consists in how well or poorly the representations that it produces in the mind 
represent it itself.  
                                                            
100 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputate de veritate, 22/1:1a2, p. 9. 
101 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.22, p. 59. 
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accompanying each being (ens), because each being is naturally apt to manifest itself to 
the divine intellect just as it is.”102
 Second, with respect to the world’s fit to the human mind, Burley’s account is far 
more permissive than Aquinas’s. For Burley, not just artificial things but natural things as 
well can be “adequated to,” or measured by, the human mind. “By taking truth in the 
second way, as, namely, the adequation of a thing to our intellect, truth is a property of a 
thing through which the thing is apt to bring about a true estimation about itself.”
 Unlike Aquinas, then, who takes a thing’s truth to 
consist in its fulfilling the sort of role set out of it by its creator, Burley argues that a 
thing’s truth consists in its natural aptitude to manifest what it actually is to the divine 
intellect. That natural aptitude is certainly a consequence of its being created by God. But 
that creative activity itself is only incidental to the truth of a thing. A thing is true to the 
divine mind, on Burley’s account, because that thing has being. That is has being by 
being created by God is important, of course, but truth itself doesn’t make reference to 
God’s creative activity.  
103
 These differences with Aquinas’s might seem trivial. But, first, I suggest that 
Burley’s account of the world’s fit to the human mind can better capture a certain range 
of linguistic practices, a range which, when taken literally at least, Aquinas’s account 
 This 
sort of truth, unlike the last, doesn’t necessarily follow from the being of the thing itself. 
Unlike in the divine case, then, thing’s needn’t manifest themselves just as they are to the 
human mind. But it does mean that everything, regardless of whether it is an artifact of 
human activity or not, can succeed or fail to be adequated to the human intellect.  
                                                            
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., para. 1.23, p. 59. 
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doesn’t appear to accommodate. These include claims about false flags, for example, and 
false currency, which is Burley’s favored example, so that the notion of falsity that 
Burley has in mind with respect to falsity concerns deception.104
 Second, however, these differences between Aquinas and Burley about the nature 
of world to mind fit more generally reflect, I think, an important transition in the way in 
which philosophers of the late medieval period approached issues of truth. Aquinas’s 
account of truth, though clearly Aristotelian in character, also allows Aquinas to situate 
his account within a tradition that predates the re-introduction of much of Aristotle’s 
corpus to the Latin West in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. That tradition is perhaps 
best represented by Anselm of Canterbury. For Anselm, truth is fundamentally a kind of 
rectitude, and the ultimate source of that rectitude is Truth itself.
 On Aquinas’s account, 
‘false currency’, literally speaking, is currency that doesn’t meet the intentions of its 
creator; it is, in other words, defective currency. But ‘false currency’ can also be used to 
mean not defective currency but counterfeit currency. Counterfeit currency (if its 
convincing, at least) certainly measures up to the intentions of the counterfeiter, its 
creator. On Aquinas’s account, then, even false currency has a certain kind of truth to it. 
But Burley wants his account of truth to capture a different aspect that the counterfeit 
currency has, namely, its aptitude to presenting itself to the consuming public not as it is 
(i.e. counterfeit currency) but rather as it is not (i.e. genuine currency). 
105
                                                            
104 One could also include here, for example, false friends, and perhaps also sticks “bent” in water. 
 More than successful 
representation, then, truth is a matter of right action, of doing what one ought, given the 
105 See, e.g., Anselm, Three Philosophical Dialogues: On Truth, On Freedom of Choice, On the Fall of the 
Devil, trans. Thomas Williams (Hackett Publishing Co., 2002), On Truth, ch. 10, pp. 18–20. 
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sort of thing one has been created to be. Creatures, then, are true insofar as they meet that 
standard, that is, insofar as they live up to the ideal set for them by Truth Itself. Aquinas’s 
theory of truth retains elements of that tradition, since the truth of a thing depends not on 
that thing’s ability to manifest itself to the divine mind, but rather on its ability to live up 
to plan for it established in the divine mind.106 In fact, Aquinas’s attempt to connect his 
account with that earlier account of truth is explicit. He writes, for example, that “truth is 
properly and primarily in the divine intellect,” because “all things are true by means of 
one truth, the truth of the divine intellect.”107
 In contrast, the Platonic notion that all truth is derived from Truth itself is 
completely foreign to the theory of truth Burley defends. Rather, truth – or, at least, the 
truth of a thing – is derived from the natural tendency of each thing de se to present itself 
to the speculative intellect as it is, where those natural abilities can be articulated either 
relative to a created intellect or relative to the divine intellect. Relative to whichever sort 
of intellect, however, the truth of a thing is not articulated in terms of its fulfillment of 
some standard set by its creator, but rather in terms of its ability to produce a certain 
accurate representation of it within some mind.  
 For Aquinas, then, as for Anselm, there is a 
genealogy of truth. The ability to represent the world, or the world’s being a certain way, 
depends on the truth of the things which the mind represents, and the truth of those things 
depends on Truth Itself, so that all truth is truth derived from Truth Itself.  
 Burley, in this respect, exemplifies an important shift in view in the fourteenth 
century about the nature of truth. Burley clearly wants to hold onto elements of that 
                                                            
106 See Thomas Aquinas, Truth, 1:1a4, pp. 17–8. 
107 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputate de veritate, 22/1:1a4, p. 13–4. 
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tradition; he links the ability of a thing to present itself to the human mind just as it is 
with the notion of rectitude.108
                                                            
108 See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.23, p. 
59. Note that Burley applies the notion of rectitude only with respect to the world’s fit to the created 
mind. 
 However, the effect of his alethic program generally is to 
depart significantly from that tradition. Truth is simply a matter of speculative mental 
representation, where that representation can either be what sets the standard (as in world 
to mind fit cases) or what is measured against some other standard (as in mind to world 
fit cases). Beginning a half generation after Burley, even pretentions of following an 
Anselmian tradition of truth will be dropped. Many in the nominalist tradition that 
Ockham inaugurates, for example, have a restrictive view of truth, where truth is merely 
a property of a sentence (in either natural or mental language) which successfully 
represents. In that respect, Burley represents an important transition in the history of 
alethic theory. 
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APPENDIX B: A CHRONOLOGY AND  
BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WORKS OF BURLEY 
 
1. CHRONOLOGY 
De potentiis animae  before 1301 
Expositio vetus super librum Praedicamentorum  c. 1300 
Expositio vetus super librum Perihermeneias  c. 1300 
Expositio vetus super librum Porphyrii  c. 1300 
Quaestiones circa tertium De Anima  c. 1300 
Commentarius super librum Porphyrii  c. 1300 - c. 1307 
Expositio super libros Topicorum Aristotelis  c. 1300 - c. 1307 
Expositio super librum Posteriorum  c. 1300 - c. 1307 
Summa librorum Elenchorum, vel Tractatus fallaciarum  c. 1300 - c. 1307 
Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum  c. 1300 - c. 1307 
Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos  c. 1300 - c. 1307 
Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias  1301 
De suppositionibus  1302 
De obligationibus  1302 
Commentarius in librum Perihermeneias  1302 
Tractatus super Praediamenta Aristotelis  before 1310 
De syncategorematibus  1310s 
Expositio cum quaestionibus super libros Physicorum  before 1316 
Quaestiones super libros Physicorum  before 1316 
Expositio libri De Anima  1316 
De puritate artis logicae. Tractatus brevior  before 1324 
Quaestiones octo super logicam in communi necnon super 
Porphyrii Isagogen  probably after 1324 
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In Physicam Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones, Bks 1-6  1324 - 1327 
De puritate artis logicae. Tractatus longior  1325 - 1328 
In Physicam Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones, Bks 7 & 8  1334 - 1337 
Expositio super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis   1337 
 Expositio super Porphyrii Isagogen   
 Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis   
 Expositio super librum sex principorum   
 Expositio super librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis   
Tractatus de universalibus  after 1337 
 
2. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WORKS 
 The list of Burley’s works above is not a complete list of Burley’s corpus. Rather, 
it indicates the chronology of works that bear in some important way on the topics raised 
in this dissertation – either because they contain discussions about the nature and function 
of the proposition proper, or because they contain discussions about topics that closely 
relate to it. Of those works, those most central to this dissertation are: the Quaestiones in 
librum Perihermeneias (Quaes.Perih), the Commentarius in librum Perihermeneias 
(Comm.Perih), the Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum (Quaes.Post), and the 
Expositio super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis (Art.Vet), with special focus on the 
Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis (Exp.Praed) and the Expositio 
super librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis (Exp.Perih) which are contained in it. All but the 
commentary on the Posterior Analytics are commentaries on works contained within the 
old logic.1
                                                            
1 The “old logic” includes Porphyry’s Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categories and Aristotle’s Perihermeneias. 
Burley also includes a commentary in the old logic on a work from the twelfth century, likely by Gilbert of 
 Of the works that are most central to this dissertation, the first three were 
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written during Burley’s defense of his early account of the metaphysics of the proposition 
(see ch. 3, §3), whereas the Art.Vet (including the Exp.Praed and Exp.Perih) provides an 
articulation and defense of Burley’s late account of the metaphysics of the proposition 
(see idem).  
 Unsurprisingly, Burley’s various commentaries on the Perihermeneias are 
especially fruitful when it comes to understanding his account of the proposition. More 
surprising, perhaps, is the amount of discussion the proposition receives in his late 
commentary on the Categories. But Burley explicitly connects the subject matter of the 
Categories to the subject matter of the Perihermeneias in the Exp.Praed.  Responding to 
the view that the Categories must be about signs rather than things, because the 
Categories deals with the parts of a statement, and a statement cannot be composed of 
anything except signs, Burley responds by recollecting the view he had defended in his 
earlier commentaries on the Perihermeneias, according to which a statement (propositio) 
can be composed of things just as much as it can be composed of signs of things. That 
response, then, allows Burley to address in the Categories what had up until the point 
been largely restricted to commentaries on the Perihermeneias. Finally, his questions 
commentary on the Posterior Analytics is important not only because it deals with the 
issue of the metaphysics of the proposition, but because Burley explicitly addresses in 
that work tensions between, on the one hand, his account of the proposition, and, on the 
other, his account of demonstrative science. Consequently, that work provides an account 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Poitiers, that considers more fully the last six categories in Aristotle’s metaphysical system, namely place, 
time, position, possession, action, and passion.  
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– even if somewhat opaque – of the way in which Burley’s theory of the proposition 
figures into a larger account of knowledge and the nature of science. 
 Of the five works I mentioned above, it is important to highlight the relative 
chronology of two in particular: the Comm.Perih and the Quaes.Post. There is general 
consensus that both were written sometime during the first decade of the fourteenth 
century. But that does not settle whether the Comm.Perih was written before or after the 
Quaes.Post, and their relative chronology remains in dispute. That chronology matters, 
moreover, because we find very different accounts of the proposition (and related 
philosophical matters) in each.2 Knowing the order of composition would thus allow us 
to be more certain about the evolution of Burley’s project, which in turn would help us 
better understand that project itself. Indeed, assumptions about their relative chronology 
already play a significant role in the scholarship. Laurent Cesalli, for example, relies on 
the thesis that the Quaes.Post predates the Comm.Perih in defense of his thesis that 
propositiones in re are composed of intentional rather than real objects.3
 My own view is that Cesalli gets the dates the wrong way around, that the 
Comm.Perih was written before the Quaes.Post. My position relies mostly on 
philosophical evidence (e.g. the lack of Burley’s defense of a mental language in the 
Comm.Perih and his defense of it in the Quaes.Post, a defense that one finds in the later 
Art.Vet as well). But it must be admitted that the current philological and historical 
 
                                                            
2 This opinion is not universally held. Alessandro Conti, for example, appears to assume that one finds the 
same account in the Quaes.Perih, the Comm.Perih, and the Quaes.Post. See Alessandro Conti, “Walter 
Burley,” Fall 2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/burley/. 
3 See Laurent Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” in A Companion to Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician 
and Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 124–27.. He assumes that the Quaes.Post 
was written sometime before 1307, and the Comm.Perih sometime after 
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evidence leaves the issue underdetermined. Marta Vittorini, for example, argues that the 
Comm.Perih was written in 1302, noting that the text “may have arisen from Burley’s 
post-1301 teaching activity.”4 Moreover, Mary Sommers, who edited the Quaes.Post, 
argues that “[t]he most certain statement concerning the dating of these questions that can 
be made at present, therefore, is that they were composed between 1297 and 1307 during 
Walter Burley’s teaching career at Oxford, and probably after his inception as master (by 
1301).”5
                                                            
4 Marta Vittorini, “Life and Works,” in A Companion to Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician and 
Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 32. 
 That leaves a full half-decade after the composition of the Comm.Perih in which 
the Quaes.Post could have been written. But the philological and historical evidence still 
leaves open the possibility that the Quaes.Post was written just before the Comm.Perih, 
in 1301 or 1302. None of this changes my own view, that the chronological relationship 
between the two can be settled reasonably well by turning to the philosophical content of 
each work, and that that evidence strongly suggests that the Comm.Perih was written 
before the Quaes.Post. But it is my hope that future research will allow us to muster 
additional evidence, beyond the content of the texts themselves, to more decisively settle 
the issue. 
5 Walter Burley, Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
2000), ed. Mary Catherine Sommers, 9. 
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), 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
w
ith
in
 th
os
e 
br
ac
ke
ts
 th
e 
te
xt
 fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 m
an
us
cr
ip
t(s
). 
W
he
n 
an
 o
m
is
si
on
 is
 
no
t a
t i
ss
ue
, I
 in
di
ca
te
 a
 v
ar
ia
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
on
e 
or
 m
or
e 
m
an
us
cr
ip
ts
 a
nd
 th
e 
14
97
 e
di
tio
n 
w
ith
 b
ra
ce
 b
ra
ck
et
s (
{}
), 
pl
ac
in
g 
th
e 
m
an
us
cr
ip
t v
ar
ia
nt
(s
) i
n 
a 
fo
ot
no
te
. I
 ig
no
re
 m
er
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s i
n 
w
or
d 
or
de
r (
e.
g.
 ‘s
ub
ie
ct
um
 e
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
’ v
s. 
‘p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 e
t s
ub
ie
ct
um
’)
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
te
xt
s. 
2  B
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{p
ra
ed
ic
am
en
ti}
3  
es
t 
en
s 
di
ci
bi
le
 i
nc
om
pl
ex
um
, o
rd
in
ab
ile
 i
n 
ge
ne
re
, 
in
te
lli
ge
nd
o 
pr
o 
ge
nu
s 
co
or
di
na
tio
ne
m
 
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
ta
le
m
. O
m
ne
 {
na
m
}4
 d
e 
qu
o 
pe
r 
se
 d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 
in
 
ho
c 
lib
ro
 
es
t 
en
s 
di
ci
bi
le
 
in
co
m
pl
ex
um
 
or
di
na
bi
le
 
in
 
co
or
di
na
tio
ne
m
 
se
u 
in
 
lin
ea
 
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
ta
li.
 
Et
 
ita
 
ho
c 
co
m
m
un
e 
en
s 
di
ci
bi
le
 e
st
 {
pr
ae
di
ca
bi
le
}5
 d
e 
om
ni
bu
s 
de
 
qu
ib
us
 [
hi
c]
6  
pe
r 
se
 {
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
}7
 i
n 
ho
c 
lib
ro
. 
<M
ul
ta
 
ta
m
en
 s
un
t p
ar
tic
ul
a 
su
bi
ec
ta
 d
e 
qu
ib
us
 {
pr
ob
at
ur
}8
 p
as
si
on
es
 
et
 p
ro
pr
ei
ta
te
s i
n 
ho
c 
lib
ro
.>
9  U
tru
m
 a
ut
em
 h
ic
 d
et
er
m
in
et
ur
 d
e 
re
bu
s 
{a
n}
10
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s 
su
nt
 o
pi
ni
on
es
. B
oe
th
iu
s 
et
 S
im
pl
ic
iu
s 
vi
de
nt
ur
 d
ic
er
e 
qu
od
 in
 h
oc
 li
br
o 
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
 d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s. 
D
ic
it 
en
im
 B
oe
th
iu
s 
qu
od
 i
n 
ho
c 
{l
ib
ro
}1
1  
in
te
nt
io
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
i 
es
t 
pr
im
is
 
re
ru
m
 
no
m
in
ib
us
 
et
 
de
 
vo
ci
bu
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ib
us
 r
es
 d
is
pu
ta
re
. E
t S
im
pl
ic
iu
s 
di
ci
t q
uo
d 
in
te
nt
io
 
in
 h
oc
 {
ne
go
ci
o}
12
 e
st
 d
e 
si
m
pl
ic
ib
us
 e
t p
rim
is
 e
t g
en
er
al
ib
us
 
vo
ci
bu
s 
se
cu
nd
um
 
qu
od
 
su
nt
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
ae
 
[r
er
um
]1
3  
de
te
rm
in
ar
e.
 E
t 
si
qu
is
 {
ve
lle
t}
14
 i
st
am
 o
pi
ni
on
em
 s
us
tin
er
e 
ha
be
t d
ic
er
e 
qu
od
 h
ic
 d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s <
de
 q
ui
bu
s>
15
ex
pr
es
si
bl
e 
be
in
g,
 c
ap
ab
le
 o
f 
be
in
g 
or
de
re
d 
in
 k
in
d,
 b
y 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
fo
r 
‘k
in
d’
 
ca
te
go
ric
al
 
co
or
di
na
tio
n.
 
Fo
r 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 a
bo
ut
 w
hi
ch
 p
er
 s
e 
is
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 th
is
 b
oo
k 
is
 a
 
no
n-
co
m
pl
ex
, e
xp
re
ss
ib
le
 b
ei
ng
, c
ap
ab
le
 o
f 
be
in
g 
or
de
re
d 
in
 c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
or
 i
n 
a 
ca
te
go
ric
al
 l
in
e.
 A
nd
 s
o 
‘c
om
m
on
 
be
in
g 
ca
pa
bl
e 
of
 b
ei
ng
 e
xp
re
ss
ed
’ 
ca
n 
be
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 a
bo
ut
 w
hi
ch
 p
er
 s
e 
is
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 i
n 
th
is
 b
oo
k.
 
B
ut
 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
m
an
y 
pa
rti
cu
la
r 
su
bj
ec
ts
 
of
 
w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
an
d 
at
tri
bu
te
s 
de
sc
rib
ed
 
in
 
th
is
 
bo
ok
 
ar
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
. 
O
pi
ni
on
s 
di
ff
er
, 
m
or
eo
ve
r, 
on
 w
he
th
er
 t
ho
se
 
su
bj
ec
ts
 a
re
 t
hi
ng
s 
or
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
. B
oe
th
iu
s 
an
d 
Si
m
pl
ic
iu
s 
se
em
 to
 s
ay
 th
at
 th
is
 b
oo
k 
is
 p
rin
ci
pa
lly
 a
bo
ut
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
. 
Fo
r 
B
oe
th
iu
s 
sa
ys
 
th
at
 
A
ris
to
tle
 
in
te
nd
s 
to
 
ha
ve
 
a 
di
sc
us
si
on
 a
bo
ut
 t
he
 p
rim
ar
y 
na
m
es
 o
f 
th
in
gs
 a
nd
 a
bo
ut
 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 s
ig
ni
fy
in
g 
th
in
gs
 i
n 
th
is
 b
oo
k.
 A
nd
 S
im
pl
ic
iu
s 
sa
ys
 th
at
 th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 th
is
 w
or
k 
is
 to
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
si
m
pl
e 
an
d 
pr
im
ar
y 
an
d 
ge
ne
ra
l 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 t
ha
t 
si
gn
ify
 t
hi
ng
s. 
A
nd
 i
f 
so
m
eo
ne
 w
an
ts
 to
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
th
at
 o
pi
ni
on
, h
e 
ha
s 
to
 s
ay
 th
at
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9  A
, B
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ut
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 ‘o
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 A
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 ‘v
el
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in
 g
ra
m
m
at
ic
a 
si
m
ili
te
r <
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s>
16
, s
ed
 a
lit
er
 
et
 
al
ite
r 
<q
ua
m
 
in
 
gr
am
m
at
ic
a>
17
, 
qu
ia
 
in
 
gr
am
m
at
ic
a 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s q
ua
nt
um
 a
d 
pr
op
rie
ta
te
s {
ca
us
an
te
s}
18
 
co
ng
ru
ita
te
m
 {
ve
l}
19
 i
nc
on
gr
ui
ta
te
m
 i
n 
or
at
io
ne
, 
os
te
nd
en
do
 
qu
ae
 v
ox
 e
st
 n
om
en
 [
et
]2
0  
qu
ae
 v
er
bu
m
 [
et
 c
ui
us
 g
en
er
is
 e
t]2
1  
cu
iu
s 
ca
su
s 
<c
ui
us
 m
od
i, 
cu
iu
s 
nu
m
er
ii>
22
, 
et
 s
ic
 d
e 
al
iis
 
pr
op
rie
ta
tib
us
 
{c
au
sa
nt
ib
us
}2
3  
co
ng
ru
ita
te
m
 
{e
t}
24
 
in
co
ng
ru
ita
te
m
 
in
 
or
at
io
ne
. 
Se
d 
in
 
ho
c 
lib
ro
 
<p
ra
ed
ic
am
en
to
ru
m
>2
5  
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
 d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s 
se
cu
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
su
nt
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
ae
 r
er
um
. 
[E
t]
26
 i
de
o 
in
 h
oc
 
lib
ro
 d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 ta
m
 d
e 
re
bu
s 
qu
am
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s, 
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
 
ta
m
en
 
de
 
vo
ci
bu
s. 
<E
t>
27
 
H
ae
c 
es
t 
in
te
nt
io
 
B
oe
th
ii 
et
 
Si
m
pl
ic
ii,
 e
t {
m
ul
to
ru
m
 a
lio
ru
m
}2
8
th
is
 w
or
k 
di
sc
us
se
s 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 a
nd
 g
ra
m
m
ar
 d
oe
s 
as
 w
el
l, 
bu
t 
on
e 
is
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 w
ith
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 i
n 
on
e 
w
ay
 a
nd
 t
he
 
ot
he
r 
in
 a
no
th
er
 w
ay
. 
Fo
r 
gr
am
m
ar
 i
s 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
w
ith
 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 i
n 
re
ga
rd
s 
to
 t
he
 p
ro
pe
rti
es
 c
au
si
ng
 c
on
gr
ui
ty
 
an
d 
in
co
ng
ru
ity
 i
n 
a 
se
nt
en
ce
, 
by
 p
oi
nt
in
g 
ou
t 
w
hi
ch
 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
is
 a
 n
ou
n 
an
d 
w
hi
ch
 a
 v
er
b,
 a
nd
 o
f w
ha
t k
in
d 
an
d 
ca
se
 i
t 
is
, a
nd
 s
o 
on
 f
or
 t
he
 o
th
er
 p
ro
pe
rti
es
 w
hi
ch
 c
au
se
 
co
ng
ru
ity
 a
nd
 in
co
ng
ru
ity
 in
 a
 s
en
te
nc
e.
 B
ut
 th
e 
sc
ie
nc
e 
of
 
th
is
 w
or
k 
is
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 w
ith
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 p
rin
ci
pa
lly
 i
ns
of
ar
 
as
 t
he
y 
si
gn
ify
 t
hi
ng
s. 
A
nd
 t
he
re
fo
re
 t
hi
s 
w
or
k 
de
al
s 
as
 
m
uc
h 
w
ith
 t
hi
ng
s 
as
 i
t 
do
es
 w
ith
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
, 
th
ou
gh
 i
t 
pr
in
ci
pa
lly
 d
ea
ls
 w
ith
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
. T
hi
s 
is
 th
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
of
 B
oe
th
iu
s a
nd
 o
f S
im
pl
ic
iu
s a
nd
 o
f m
an
y 
ot
he
rs
. 
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A
lia
 e
st
 o
pi
ni
o 
A
vi
ce
nn
ae
 e
t 
A
ve
rr
oi
i, 
qu
am
 c
re
do
 v
er
io
re
m
, 
qu
od
 in
 li
br
o 
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
 d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 d
e 
re
bu
s 
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
, 
et
 e
x 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
i e
t s
ec
un
<c
3v
b>
da
rio
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s. 
D
ic
it 
en
im
 
A
vi
ce
nn
a,
 in
 p
rim
a 
pa
rte
 s
ua
e 
lo
gi
ca
e 
si
c 
ad
 c
on
si
de
ra
tio
ne
m
 
di
ct
io
nu
m
 
du
xi
t 
no
s 
ne
ce
ss
ita
s. 
Lo
gi
cu
s 
{t
an
tu
m
 
ut
 
A
vi
ce
nn
a 
an
d 
A
ve
rr
oe
s 
of
fe
r 
a 
di
ff
er
en
t 
op
in
io
n 
(a
n 
op
in
io
n 
w
hi
ch
 I
 b
el
ie
ve
 i
s 
m
or
e 
co
rr
ec
t) 
th
at
 t
hi
s 
bo
ok
 
pr
in
ci
pa
lly
 
de
al
s 
w
ith
 
th
in
gs
, 
an
d 
th
at
 
it 
de
al
s 
w
ith
 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 o
nl
y 
as
 a
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
 a
nd
 i
n 
a 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
m
an
ne
r. 
Fo
r 
A
vi
ce
nn
a 
sa
ys
, 
in
 t
he
 f
irs
t 
pa
rt 
of
 h
is
 l
og
ic
, 
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 B
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 ‘c
on
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: B
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 ‘e
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 A
, B
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 B
 
22
 B
 
23
 ‘c
on
si
de
ra
nt
ib
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’: 
B
 
24
 ‘v
el
’: 
A
 
25
 A
, B
 
26
 B
 
27
 A
, B
 
28
 ‘m
ul
to
ru
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A
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al
io
ru
m
 m
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ru
m
’: 
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lo
gi
cu
s}
29
 n
on
 h
ab
et
 <
pr
im
o>
30
 o
cc
up
ar
i 
ci
rc
a 
ve
rb
a 
ni
si
 
qu
an
tu
m
 a
d 
lo
qu
en
du
m
 e
t d
is
ce
rn
en
du
m
 [v
er
um
 a
b 
fa
ls
o]
31
. S
i 
en
im
 e
ss
et
 p
os
si
bi
le
 {
so
lo
}3
2  <
pe
r>
33
 in
te
lle
ct
u 
{d
ic
er
e}
34
, n
on
 
in
di
ge
re
m
us
 
ve
rb
is
. 
Si
 
en
im
 
do
ct
or
 
ar
tis
 
po
ss
et
 
[il
lu
d]
35
 
re
ve
la
re
 <
id
>3
6  
qu
od
 e
st
 i
n 
an
im
a 
{s
ua
}3
7  
al
io
 m
od
o 
qu
am
 
lo
qu
en
do
 <
pe
r 
vo
ce
s>
38
, s
em
pe
r 
su
pe
rs
ed
er
et
 a
b 
ve
rb
is
. U
nd
e 
si
 l
og
ic
a 
po
ss
et
 d
oc
er
i a
lio
 m
od
o 
 q
ua
m
 p
er
 v
oc
ib
us
, u
t 
pu
ta
 
pe
r 
{s
ig
na
 d
ig
ito
ru
m
 v
el
 p
er
 n
ut
um
 o
cu
lo
ru
m
}3
9 , 
lo
gi
cu
s 
no
n 
in
di
ge
re
t 
vo
ci
bu
s. 
Q
uo
d 
au
te
m
 
{l
og
ic
us
}4
0  
co
ns
id
er
at
 
de
 
vo
ci
bu
s, 
ho
c 
no
n 
es
t e
x 
pr
im
ar
ia
 in
te
nt
io
ne
, s
ed
 s
ec
un
da
ria
 e
t 
ex
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
i, 
{s
ec
un
du
m
 
sc
ie
nt
ia
 
lo
gi
ca
lis
 
no
n 
al
ite
r 
co
m
m
od
e 
do
ce
ri 
po
te
st
}4
1 . 
U
nd
e 
si
 {
al
iq
ui
s}
42
 s
ur
du
s 
ab
 
na
tiv
ita
te
 p
os
se
t 
in
ve
ni
re
 a
rte
m
 s
yl
lo
gi
za
nd
i 
et
 d
em
on
st
ra
nd
i, 
tu
nc
 p
os
se
t 
{l
og
ic
am
 s
in
e 
co
gi
ta
tio
ne
 v
oc
um
 h
ab
er
e}
43
. 
Se
d 
ho
c 
fo
rte
 e
st
 p
os
si
bi
le
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
qu
od
 [
su
rd
us
 a
b 
na
tiv
ita
te
 
ha
be
ns
 a
lio
s 
se
ns
us
 p
os
si
t 
in
ve
ni
re
 a
rte
m
 l
og
ic
ae
, 
qu
ia
]4
4
th
at
 t
he
 n
ec
es
si
ty
 o
f 
lo
gi
c 
le
ad
 u
s 
to
 a
 c
on
si
de
ra
tio
n 
of
 
th
e 
ex
pr
es
sio
n.
 L
og
ic
, i
ns
of
ar
 a
s 
it 
is
 lo
gi
c,
 d
oe
s 
no
t h
av
e 
to
 b
e 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
w
ith
 w
or
ds
, 
ex
ce
pt
 t
o 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 t
ha
t 
it 
ne
ed
s 
to
 
be
 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
w
ith
 
sp
ea
ki
ng
 
an
d 
w
ith
 
di
st
in
gu
is
hi
ng
 t
he
 t
ru
e 
fr
om
 t
he
 f
al
se
. 
Fo
r 
if 
it 
w
er
e 
po
ss
ib
le
 fo
r t
he
 in
te
lle
ct
 to
 s
pe
ak
 b
y 
its
el
f, 
w
e 
w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
no
 n
ee
d 
fo
r 
w
or
ds
. F
or
 if
 a
 te
ac
he
r 
of
 a
n 
ar
t w
er
e 
ab
le
 to
 
re
ve
al
 t
ha
t 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
in
 h
is
 s
ou
l 
in
 w
ay
 o
th
er
 t
ha
n 
by
 
sp
ea
ki
ng
, h
e 
w
ou
ld
 a
lw
ay
s r
ef
ra
in
 fr
om
 w
or
ds
. T
he
re
fo
re
 if
 
lo
gi
c 
co
ul
d 
be
 
ta
ug
ht
 
in
 
an
ot
he
r 
w
ay
 
th
an
 
th
ro
ug
h 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 
(a
s 
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
si
gn
 
la
ng
ua
ge
 
or
 
th
ro
ug
h 
bl
in
ki
ng
 o
ne
’s
 e
ye
s)
, l
og
ic
 w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
no
 n
ee
d 
fo
r 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
. T
ha
t 
th
e 
lo
gi
ci
an
 c
on
si
de
rs
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
, t
he
n,
 i
s 
no
t o
n 
ac
co
un
t o
f 
a 
pr
im
ar
y 
co
nc
er
n 
in
 lo
gi
c,
 b
ut
 d
ue
 to
 a
 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
l o
ne
, b
ec
au
se
 lo
gi
c 
is
 n
ot
 a
bl
e 
to
 
be
 
ta
ug
ht
 
co
nv
en
ie
nt
ly
 
in
 
an
ot
he
r 
w
ay
. 
H
en
ce
, 
if 
so
m
eo
ne
 d
ea
f 
fr
om
 b
irt
h 
w
er
e 
ab
le
 t
o 
di
sc
ov
er
 t
he
 a
rt 
of
 
 
su
rd
us
 a
b 
na
tiv
ita
te
 h
ab
en
s 
al
io
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er
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ct
os
 p
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es
t h
ab
er
e 
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er
ro
r}
45
, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
po
te
st
 h
ab
er
e 
lo
gi
ca
m
 p
er
 i
nv
en
tio
ne
m
, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
lo
gi
ca
 n
on
 e
st
 
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s, 
qu
ia
 <
a 
vo
ci
bu
s>
46
 tu
nc
 p
os
se
t a
liq
ui
s 
ha
be
re
 s
ci
en
tia
m
 a
liq
ua
m
 <
et
>4
7  
ig
no
ra
re
 s
ci
bi
le
 d
e 
qu
o 
es
t 
sc
ie
nt
ia
 il
la
, q
uo
d 
es
t <
va
ld
e>
48
sy
llo
gi
zi
ng
 a
nd
 d
em
on
st
ra
tin
g,
 t
he
n 
he
 w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
lo
gi
c 
w
ith
ou
t 
th
e 
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
an
 u
tte
ra
nc
e.
 B
ut
 t
hi
s 
pe
rh
ap
s 
is
 
po
ss
ib
le
, n
am
el
y 
th
at
 a
 p
er
so
n 
de
af
 fr
om
 b
irt
h 
ca
n 
di
sc
ov
er
 
th
e 
ar
t o
f 
lo
gi
c,
 b
ec
au
se
 a
 p
er
so
n 
de
af
 f
ro
m
 b
irt
h 
w
ho
 h
as
 
ot
he
r 
se
ns
es
 w
hi
ch
 w
or
k 
pe
rf
ec
tly
 w
el
l 
ca
n 
ha
ve
 s
om
e 
or
de
re
d 
co
nc
ep
ts
, 
an
d 
so
 c
an
 r
ea
so
n 
di
sc
ur
si
ve
ly
 f
ro
m
 
kn
ow
n 
pr
em
is
es
 to
 a
 c
on
cl
us
io
n,
 a
nd
 h
e 
ca
n 
di
sc
ov
er
 th
at
 
in
 
su
ch
 
di
sc
ur
si
ve
 
re
as
on
in
g 
th
er
e 
is
 
no
 
er
ro
r, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 
he
 
ca
n 
ha
ve
 
lo
gi
c 
th
ro
ug
h 
di
sc
ov
er
y.
 
C
on
se
qu
en
tly
 l
og
ic
 i
s 
no
t 
pr
in
ci
pa
lly
 a
bo
ut
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
en
 s
om
eo
ne
 c
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
so
m
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
w
hi
le
 
be
in
g 
ig
no
ra
nt
 o
f 
w
ha
t 
th
at
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
is
 a
bo
ut
, w
hi
ch
 i
s 
ab
su
rd
.  
 a
bs
ur
du
m
.  
 
 
 
Et
 {
hi
c}
49
 e
st
 o
pi
ni
o 
A
ve
rr
oi
i, 
qu
i, 
in
 d
iv
id
en
do
 c
ap
itu
la
 h
ui
us
 
lib
ri,
 d
ic
it 
qu
od
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 in
 p
rim
o 
ca
pi
tu
lo
 <
hu
iu
s 
lib
ri>
50
 
na
rr
at
 
qu
as
da
m
 
{d
is
tin
ct
io
ne
s}
51
 
en
tiu
m
 
se
cu
nd
um
 
qu
od
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ur
 
pe
r 
di
ct
io
ne
s, 
et
 
ita
 
vu
lt 
qu
od
 
is
te
 
lib
er
 
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
 s
it 
de
 e
nt
ib
us
, 
di
st
in
gu
en
do
 e
ns
 c
on
tra
 v
oc
em
. 
Is
tu
d 
vi
de
tu
r c
on
co
rd
ar
i p
ro
ce
ss
ui
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
i {
qu
i p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 
de
te
rm
in
at
 
in
 
ho
c 
lib
ro
 
de
 
pr
op
rie
ta
tib
us
 
et
 
pa
ss
io
ni
bu
s 
re
ru
m
}5
2
Th
is
 i
s 
al
so
 t
he
 o
pi
ni
on
 o
f 
A
ve
rr
oe
s, 
w
ho
, i
n 
di
vi
di
ng
 u
p 
th
e 
ch
ap
te
rs
 o
f 
th
is
 b
oo
k,
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 A
ris
to
tle
, 
in
 t
he
 f
irs
t 
ch
ap
te
r 
of
 th
is
 b
oo
k,
 d
is
cu
ss
es
 c
er
ta
in
 d
ef
in
iti
on
s 
of
 b
ei
ng
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 a
re
 s
ig
ni
fie
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
ex
pr
es
si
on
s, 
an
d 
so
 h
e 
cl
ai
m
s 
th
at
 t
hi
s 
bo
ok
 i
s 
pr
in
ci
pa
lly
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 
w
ith
 b
ei
ng
s, 
by
 d
is
tin
gu
is
hi
ng
 a
 b
ei
ng
 f
ro
m
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e.
 
Th
at
 
cl
ea
rly
 
ag
re
es
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
pl
an
 
of
 
A
ris
to
tle
, 
w
ho
 
de
sc
rib
es
 in
 th
is
 b
oo
k 
th
e 
pr
op
er
tie
s a
nd
 a
ttr
ib
ut
es
 o
f t
hi
ng
s 
– 
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 th
e 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
of
 s
ub
st
an
ce
, o
f 
qu
al
ity
, a
nd
 
, 
ut
 
de
 
pr
op
rie
ta
tib
us
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
e 
et
 
qu
al
ita
tis
 
et
 
qu
an
tit
at
is
. 
N
un
c 
au
te
m
 s
ci
en
tia
 v
id
et
ur
 e
ss
e 
de
 i
st
is
 e
ss
e 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
45
 ‘n
on
 e
st
 e
rr
or
’: 
A
; ‘
er
ro
r n
on
 e
ss
et
’: 
B
  
46
 B
 
47
 A
 
48
 A
, B
 
49
 ‘h
ae
c’
: B
 
50
 A
, B
 
51
 ‘d
iff
in
iti
on
es
’: 
A
, B
 
52
 ‘i
n 
ho
c 
lib
ri,
 q
ui
a 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 n
on
 d
et
er
m
in
at
 d
e 
pr
op
rie
ta
tib
us
 e
t p
as
si
on
ib
us
 v
oc
um
, s
ed
 re
ru
m
’: 
B
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pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
 
de
 
qu
or
um
 
pr
op
rie
ta
tib
us
 
et
 
pa
ss
io
ni
bu
s 
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 
in
 
ill
a.
 
Se
d 
in
 
ho
c 
lib
ro
 
no
n 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 d
e 
pr
op
rie
ta
tib
us
 <
et
 p
as
si
on
ib
us
>5
3
of
 q
ua
nt
ity
. B
ut
 n
ow
 c
le
ar
ly
 a
 s
ci
en
ce
 is
 fi
rs
t a
nd
 fo
re
m
os
t 
ab
ou
t 
th
os
e 
th
in
gs
 
w
hi
ch
 
po
ss
es
s 
th
e 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
an
d 
at
tri
bu
te
s 
pr
in
ci
pa
lly
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 th
at
 s
ci
en
ce
. B
ut
 in
 th
is
 
bo
ok
 t
he
 p
ro
pe
rti
es
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 a
re
 n
ot
 t
ho
se
 o
f 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 
bu
t o
f t
hi
ng
s. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 e
tc
. 
 v
oc
um
 s
ed
 
re
ru
m
. E
rg
o,
 e
t c
et
er
a.
 
 
 
Ite
m
 i
st
e 
lib
er
 p
rin
ci
pa
lit
er
 e
st
 d
e 
[d
ec
em
]5
4  
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
tis
. 
Er
go
 si
 is
te
 li
be
r p
rin
ci
pa
lit
er
 e
ss
et
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s, 
se
qu
er
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
de
ce
m
 p
ra
ed
ic
am
en
ta
 e
ss
en
t [
de
ce
m
]5
5  
vo
ce
s. 
Se
d 
om
ni
s 
vo
x 
es
t i
n 
ge
ne
re
 q
ua
lit
at
is
. [
Er
go
 o
m
ni
a 
de
ce
m
 p
ra
ed
ic
am
en
ta
 su
nt
 
in
 g
en
er
e 
qu
al
ita
tis
,]5
6  
et
 s
ic
 n
on
 e
ss
et
 n
is
i 
un
um
 g
en
us
 
ge
ne
ra
lis
si
m
um
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
qu
al
ita
s. 
D
ic
o 
er
go
 
qu
od
 
lib
er
 
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
to
ru
m
 e
st
 d
e 
re
bu
s 
se
cu
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
ei
s 
in
su
nt
 
in
te
nt
io
ne
s 
se
cu
nd
ae
, s
ci
lic
et
 in
te
nt
io
 g
en
er
is
 g
en
er
al
is
si
m
i, 
et
 
[g
en
er
is
]5
7  
su
ba
lte
rn
i, 
et
 in
te
nt
io
 s
pe
ci
ei
 <
sp
ec
ia
lis
si
m
e>
58
Si
m
ila
rly
, t
hi
s 
bo
ok
 is
 p
rin
ci
pa
lly
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
te
n 
ca
te
go
rie
s. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 if
 th
is
 b
oo
k 
w
er
e 
pr
in
ci
pa
lly
 a
bo
ut
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
, i
t 
w
ou
ld
 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 
th
e 
te
n 
ca
te
go
rie
s 
w
ou
ld
 
be
 
te
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
.  
B
ut
 e
ve
ry
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 is
 in
 th
e 
ge
nu
s 
of
 q
ua
lit
y.
  
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 a
ll 
th
e 
te
n 
ca
te
go
rie
s 
ar
e 
in
 th
e 
ge
nu
s 
of
 q
ua
lit
y,
 
an
d 
so
 th
er
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
on
ly
 o
ne
 m
os
t g
en
er
al
 g
en
us
, n
am
el
y 
qu
al
ity
.  
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 I 
sa
y 
th
at
 th
e 
C
at
eg
or
ie
s i
s a
bo
ut
 th
in
gs
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 w
hi
ch
 s
ec
on
d 
in
te
nt
io
ns
 a
re
 in
 th
em
, n
am
el
y 
th
e 
in
te
nt
io
n 
of
 a
 m
os
t g
en
er
al
 g
en
us
, a
nd
 th
e 
in
te
nt
io
n 
of
 a
 
su
ba
lte
rn
at
e 
ge
nu
s, 
an
d 
an
 i
nt
en
tio
n 
of
 a
 m
os
t 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
sp
ec
ie
s, 
an
d 
so
 o
n 
fo
r t
he
 re
st
. 
, e
t 
si
c 
de
 a
lii
s. 
 
 
Se
d 
du
bi
um
 
es
t 
[h
ic
]5
9 , 
qu
ia
 
vi
de
tu
r 
qu
od
 
in
 
lib
ro
 
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
to
ru
m
 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
 
de
 
pa
rti
bu
s 
en
un
ci
at
io
ni
s 
de
 q
ui
bu
s 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 i
n 
lib
ro
 p
er
ih
er
m
en
ei
as
. 
Se
d 
pa
rte
s 
en
un
ci
at
io
ni
s 
no
n 
su
nt
 re
s, 
se
d 
vo
ce
s 
ve
l c
on
ce
pt
us
. 
[E
rg
o 
et
 
ce
te
ra
.]6
0  
Si
 
{n
am
}6
1
B
ut
 t
he
re
 i
s 
a 
do
ub
t 
he
re
, 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
se
em
s 
th
at
 i
n 
th
e 
Ca
te
go
ri
es
 
th
e 
pa
rts
 
of
 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
ar
e 
pr
in
ci
pa
lly
 
de
sc
rib
ed
, w
hi
ch
 p
ar
ts
 th
e 
Pe
ri
he
rm
en
ei
as
 tr
ea
ts
 q
ua
 p
ar
ts
 
of
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t. 
B
ut
 th
e 
pa
rts
 o
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t a
re
 n
ot
 th
in
gs
, 
bu
t 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 
or
 
co
nc
ep
ts
. 
Fo
r 
if 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
w
er
e 
 
en
un
ci
at
io
 
ve
l 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
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co
m
po
ne
re
tu
r 
ex
 r
eb
us
, 
se
qu
er
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
in
te
r 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 e
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 p
os
se
t 
av
is
 v
ol
ar
e,
 e
t 
qu
od
 {
in
te
r 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 e
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 i
st
iu
s 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
, 
‘P
ar
is
iu
s 
es
t 
R
om
a’
, 
es
se
nt
 
ce
nt
um
 m
ila
ria
}6
2 . 
 I
te
m
, 
se
qu
er
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 p
os
se
t 
co
m
ed
er
e 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, 
qu
ia
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 i
st
iu
s 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
, 
‘H
om
o 
es
t 
{p
an
is
}6
3 ’
, 
po
ss
et
 
<s
ub
ie
ct
um
>6
4  
co
m
ed
er
e 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, {
sc
ili
ce
t p
an
em
}6
5
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 t
hi
ng
s, 
it 
w
ou
ld
 f
ol
lo
w
 t
ha
t 
a 
bi
rd
 c
ou
ld
 f
ly
 
be
tw
ee
n 
a 
su
bj
ec
t 
an
d 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 o
r 
th
at
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
an
d 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
of
 t
hi
s 
st
at
em
en
t, 
‘P
ar
is
 i
s 
R
om
e’
, 
th
er
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
10
00
 m
ile
s. 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 it
 w
ou
ld
 fo
llo
w
 th
at
 a
 
su
bj
ec
t 
co
ul
d 
ea
t 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
 o
f 
th
is
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
‘A
 h
um
an
 i
s 
br
ea
d’
, 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
ab
le
 t
o 
ea
t 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 n
am
el
y,
 b
re
ad
. 
. 
 
 
Ite
m
 
se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 
ho
m
o 
es
se
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 
qu
ia
 
om
ne
 
co
m
po
si
tu
m
 e
x 
co
rp
e 
et
 a
ni
m
a 
in
te
lle
ct
iv
a 
es
t 
ho
m
o.
 S
ed
 
al
iq
ua
 e
st
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 c
om
po
si
ta
 e
x 
co
rp
e 
et
 a
ni
m
a 
in
te
lle
ct
iv
a,
 
si
 re
s 
su
bi
ci
un
tu
r e
t p
ra
ed
ic
an
tu
r. 
Er
go
 a
liq
ua
 e
ss
et
 p
ro
po
si
tio
. 
Se
d 
ho
c 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 e
st
 f
al
su
m
. E
rg
o 
es
t 
fa
ls
um
 d
ic
er
e 
qu
od
 
<h
ae
c>
66
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 c
om
po
si
tu
r e
x 
re
bu
s, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
in
 
lib
ri 
{p
ra
ed
ic
am
en
ti}
67
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 i
t 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 a
 h
um
an
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
st
at
em
en
t, 
be
ca
us
e 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 c
om
po
se
d 
of
 a
 b
od
y 
an
d 
an
 in
te
lle
ct
iv
e 
so
ul
 is
 a
 h
um
an
. B
ut
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 is
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t c
om
po
se
d 
of
 
bo
dy
 a
nd
 i
nt
el
le
ct
iv
e 
so
ul
, 
if 
th
in
gs
 c
an
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
in
to
 
su
bj
ec
ts
 a
nd
 p
re
di
ca
te
s. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
st
at
em
en
t. 
B
ut
 th
is
 c
on
se
qu
en
t i
s f
al
se
. T
he
re
fo
re
, i
t i
s 
fa
ls
e 
to
 s
ay
 t
ha
t 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 c
om
po
se
d 
ou
t 
of
 t
hi
ng
s, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
, 
th
e 
C
at
eg
or
ie
s, 
in
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 p
ar
ts
 o
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t a
re
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
, i
s n
ot
 a
bo
ut
 th
in
gs
.  
  
 
in
 
qu
o 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 
de
 
pa
rti
bu
s 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 n
on
 d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 d
e 
re
bu
s. 
 
 
A
d 
{i
llu
d}
68
 d
ub
iu
m
 r
ec
ol
o 
m
e 
di
xi
ss
e 
et
 in
 s
cr
ip
tis
 re
liq
ui
ss
e 
qu
od
 in
te
lle
ct
us
 p
ot
es
t f
ac
er
e 
pr
op
os
iti
on
em
 e
x 
qu
ib
us
cu
m
qu
e,
 
{q
ui
a}
69
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
 p
ot
es
t 
as
se
re
re
 [
ill
a]
70
To
 th
is
 d
ou
bt
 I
 r
ec
al
l m
ys
el
f 
to
 h
av
e 
sa
id
 a
nd
 to
 h
av
e 
pu
t 
do
w
n 
in
 w
rit
in
g 
th
at
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 c
an
 m
ak
e 
a 
st
at
em
en
t o
ut
 
of
 a
ny
th
in
g 
w
ha
ts
oe
ve
r, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 c
an
 a
ss
er
t 
 e
ss
e 
ea
de
m
 v
el
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 ‘e
ni
m
’: 
B
 
62
 ‘i
nt
er
 su
bi
ec
tu
m
 e
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 e
ss
en
t c
en
tu
m
 m
ila
ria
,q
ui
a 
in
te
r s
ub
ie
ct
um
 h
ui
us
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
s, 
‘p
ar
is
iu
s e
st
 ro
m
a’
, e
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 e
iu
s s
un
t m
ill
e 
m
ill
ar
ia
”:
 A
  
63
 ‘p
an
em
’: 
B
 
64
 B
 
65
 ‘q
ui
a 
ho
m
o 
po
te
st
 c
om
ed
er
e 
is
tu
d 
pa
ne
m
’: 
A
; ‘
qu
ia
 h
om
o 
po
te
st
 c
om
ed
er
e 
pa
ne
m
’: 
B
  
66
 B
 
67
 ‘p
ra
ed
ic
am
en
to
ru
m
’: 
A
 
68
 ‘h
oc
’: 
B
 
69
 ‘q
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: A
 
 
  
334 
di
ve
rs
am
, 
qu
ia
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
no
n 
es
t 
al
iu
d 
qu
am
 
co
pu
la
tio
 
al
iq
uo
ru
m
 
{p
er
}7
1  
in
te
lle
ct
um
 
ad
in
vi
ce
m
, 
{u
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
af
fir
m
at
iv
a,
}7
2  a
ut
 d
iv
is
io
 a
liq
uo
ru
m
 a
bi
nv
ic
em
, [
ut
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 
ne
ga
tiv
a]
73
. 
Q
ua
ec
um
qu
e 
er
go
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
 p
ot
es
t 
co
m
po
ne
re
 
ad
in
vi
ce
m
 
au
t 
di
vi
de
re
 
ab
in
vi
ce
m
 
{p
on
en
t}
74
th
os
e 
to
 b
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
or
 to
 b
e 
di
ff
er
en
t, 
be
ca
us
e 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 n
ot
hi
ng
 o
th
er
 th
an
 a
 p
ut
tin
g 
to
ge
th
er
 o
f s
om
e 
ob
je
ct
s 
by
 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, a
s 
in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f a
n 
af
fir
m
at
iv
e 
st
at
em
en
t, 
or
 a
 
se
tti
ng
 a
pa
rt 
of
 s
om
e 
ob
je
ct
s 
fr
om
 o
ne
 a
no
th
er
, a
s 
in
 t
he
 
ca
se
 
of
 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
st
at
em
en
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
w
ha
te
ve
r 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 c
an
 p
ut
 to
ge
th
er
 o
r s
et
 a
pa
rt 
fr
om
 o
ne
 a
no
th
er
 c
an
 
be
 p
ar
ts
 o
f a
 s
en
te
nc
e,
 a
nd
 c
on
se
qu
en
tly
 c
an
 b
e 
a 
su
bj
ec
t o
r 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e.
 B
ut
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 is
 a
bl
e 
to
 p
ut
 to
ge
th
er
 th
in
gs
, 
by
 a
ss
er
tin
g 
th
at
 th
ey
 a
re
 th
e 
sa
m
e,
 a
nd
 c
an
 s
et
 th
in
gs
 a
pa
rt 
fr
om
 o
ne
 a
no
th
er
 b
y 
as
se
rti
ng
 t
ha
t t
he
y 
ar
e 
no
t t
he
 s
am
e.
 
A
ls
o 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 c
an
 p
ut
 to
ge
th
er
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 a
nd
 c
on
ce
pt
s, 
an
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
so
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t i
s c
om
po
se
d 
of
 th
in
gs
 o
ut
si
de
 
th
e 
so
ul
, a
no
th
er
 is
 c
om
po
se
d 
of
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
, a
nd
 a
no
th
er
 is
 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 c
on
ce
pt
s. 
 
 
es
se
 
pa
rte
s 
or
at
io
ni
s, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
es
se
 s
ub
ie
ct
a 
ve
l 
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
ta
. 
Se
d 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 p
ot
es
t a
di
nv
ic
em
 c
om
po
ne
re
 re
s 
as
se
re
nd
o 
ill
as
 
es
se
 e
as
de
m
, e
t 
po
te
st
 d
iv
id
er
e 
re
s 
ab
in
vi
ce
m
 a
ss
er
en
do
 i
lla
s 
no
n 
es
se
 e
as
de
m
. P
ot
es
t e
tia
m
 in
te
lle
ct
us
 c
om
po
ne
re
 v
oc
es
 e
t 
co
nc
ep
tu
s a
di
nv
in
ce
m
. E
t i
de
o 
al
iq
ua
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 c
om
po
ni
tu
r e
x 
re
bu
s e
xt
ra
 a
ni
m
am
, a
liq
ua
 e
x 
vo
ci
bu
s, 
al
iq
ua
 e
x 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
.  
 
 
Q
uo
d 
{a
tq
ue
}7
5  
pr
op
os
iti
o 
po
ss
it 
co
m
po
ni
 e
x 
re
bu
s 
{p
ro
ba
tu
r 
qu
at
to
r 
m
od
is
}7
6 . 
Et
 p
rim
o 
si
c.
 I
n 
om
ni
bu
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ib
us
 e
t 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tis
 [
et
]7
7  
or
di
na
tis
 i
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
o 
es
t 
de
ve
ni
re
 a
d 
ul
tim
at
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
m
 
qu
od
 
{i
ta
}7
8  
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
r 
qu
od
 
{a
lte
riu
s}
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no
n 
{s
ig
ni
fic
at
}8
0
Th
at
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t c
an
 b
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 th
in
gs
 I 
pr
ov
e 
in
 fo
ur
 
w
ay
s. 
Fi
rs
t, 
in
 a
ll 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
th
in
gs
 a
nd
 t
hi
ng
s 
be
in
g 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 a
nd
 t
hi
ng
s 
be
in
g 
or
de
re
d 
in
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
io
n,
 o
ne
 
m
us
t c
om
e 
to
 a
 fi
na
l s
ig
ni
fic
at
e,
 w
hi
ch
 is
 si
gn
ifi
ed
 in
 su
ch
 a
 
w
ay
 t
ha
t 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 s
ig
ni
fy
 a
ny
th
in
g 
el
se
, 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
an
 
, 
al
ite
r 
es
se
t 
pr
oc
es
su
s 
in
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 ‘p
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bo
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A
; ‘
pr
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 A
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in
fin
itu
m
 e
ss
en
tia
lit
er
 o
rd
in
at
is
, 
[c
on
tra
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
um
]8
1 . 
Se
d 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
in
 
sc
rip
to
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
pr
op
os
iti
on
em
 
in
 
vo
ce
, 
[p
ro
po
si
tio
 in
 v
oc
e]
82
 si
gn
ifi
ca
t p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
m
 in
 {
co
nc
ep
tu
}8
3 , 
sc
ili
ce
t p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
m
 c
om
po
si
ta
m
 [
ex
 c
on
ce
pt
ib
us
]8
4 . 
Q
ua
er
o 
tu
nc
 {
au
t}
85
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 c
om
po
si
ta
 e
x 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
 s
it 
ul
tim
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
m
, 
[s
ci
lic
et
]8
6  
qu
od
 u
lte
riu
s 
no
n 
<c
4v
a>
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
, 
au
t 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
al
iq
ui
d 
ul
te
riu
s. 
N
on
 e
st
 d
ar
e 
pr
im
um
, 
qu
ia
 
co
nc
ep
tu
s 
ex
 
qu
ib
us
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
in
 
m
en
te
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
. 
Ig
itu
r 
to
ta
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 c
om
po
si
ta
 e
x 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t. 
C
ui
us
 {
na
m
}8
7
es
se
nt
ia
lly
 o
rd
er
ed
 i
nf
in
ity
 w
ou
ld
 o
cc
ur
, c
on
tra
ry
 t
o 
w
ha
t 
A
ris
to
tle
 c
la
im
s. 
B
ut
 a
 w
rit
te
n 
st
at
em
en
t s
ig
ni
fie
s 
a 
sp
ok
en
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
a 
sp
ok
en
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
in
 t
he
 
m
in
d,
 n
am
el
y,
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 c
on
ce
pt
s. 
I 
as
k,
 
th
en
, w
he
th
er
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t c
om
po
se
d 
of
 c
on
ce
pt
s 
is
 a
 f
in
al
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
, 
na
m
el
y 
on
e 
w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
in
 t
ur
n 
si
gn
ify
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 e
ls
e,
 o
r w
he
th
er
 it
 in
 tu
rn
 d
oe
s s
ig
ni
fy
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 
el
se
. 
 I
t 
m
us
t 
no
t 
be
 t
he
 f
irs
t, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
co
nc
ep
ts
 f
ro
m
 
w
hi
ch
 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 
co
m
po
se
d 
in
 
th
e 
m
in
d 
si
gn
ify
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 
st
at
em
en
t 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 
co
nc
ep
ts
 
si
gn
ifi
es
, f
or
 th
at
 th
e 
pa
rts
 o
f w
hi
ch
 si
gn
ify
, a
ls
o 
as
 a
 w
ho
le
 
si
gn
ifi
es
. 
 p
ar
te
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 e
t 
ip
su
m
 t
ot
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t. 
 
 
Q
ua
er
o 
tu
nc
 d
e 
{i
llo
}8
8  q
uo
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
r p
er
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
m
 in
 
m
en
te
 
co
m
po
si
ta
m
 
ex
 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
. 
Ill
ud
 
no
n 
po
te
st
 
es
se
 
si
m
pl
ex
, q
ui
a 
{p
ar
te
s 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t i
nc
om
pl
ex
ae
, e
t 
ill
ud
 
qu
od
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
r 
pe
r 
to
ta
m
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
em
 
es
t 
co
m
pl
ex
um
. 
Er
go
 i
llu
d 
es
t 
co
m
po
si
tu
m
. 
A
ut
 e
rg
o 
ill
ud
 e
st
 
co
m
po
si
tu
m
 e
x 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
 a
ut
 e
x 
re
bu
s}
89
. S
i e
x 
re
bu
s, 
ha
be
o 
pr
op
os
itu
m
, s
ci
lic
et
 q
uo
d 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ex
 r
eb
us
, [
et
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
er
 
se
qu
itu
r 
ill
ud
]9
0  
{q
uo
d}
91
I 
as
k,
 
th
en
, 
ab
ou
t 
th
at
 
w
hi
ch
 
is
 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
st
at
em
en
t i
n 
th
e 
m
in
d 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 c
on
ce
pt
s. 
Th
at
 c
an
no
t 
be
 s
im
pl
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 t
he
 p
ar
ts
 o
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
si
gn
ify
 n
on
-
co
m
pl
ex
es
, a
nd
 t
ha
t 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 t
hr
ou
gh
 t
he
 w
ho
le
 
st
at
em
en
t i
s 
co
m
pl
ex
. T
he
re
fo
re
, w
ha
t i
s 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
a 
st
at
em
en
t i
n 
th
e 
m
in
d 
is
 c
om
po
si
te
. T
he
re
fo
re
, e
ith
er
 it
 is
 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 c
on
ce
pt
s 
or
 o
f t
hi
ng
s. 
If
 o
f t
hi
ng
s, 
I 
ha
ve
 m
y 
cl
ai
m
, n
am
el
y 
th
at
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t c
om
po
se
d 
of
 th
in
gs
, 
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
r 
pe
r 
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en
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A
, B
 
84
 A
 
85
 ‘a
n’
: A
, B
 
86
 A
, B
 
87
 ‘e
ni
m
’: 
B
 
88
 ‘i
st
o’
: A
 
89
 ‘p
ar
te
s p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
s s
ig
ni
fic
an
t p
ar
te
s o
f i
lli
us
 q
uo
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
r p
er
 to
ta
m
 p
ro
po
si
te
m
. E
rg
o 
ill
ud
 e
st
 c
om
po
si
tu
m
. A
ut
 e
rg
o 
es
t c
om
po
si
tu
m
 e
x 
re
bu
s a
ut
 e
x 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
’: 
A
; ‘
pe
r p
ar
te
s i
lli
us
 q
uo
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
r p
er
 to
ta
m
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
m
. E
rg
o 
ill
ud
 e
st
 c
om
po
si
tu
m
 d
e 
re
bu
s a
ut
 d
e 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
’: 
B
  
90
 B
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pr
op
os
iti
on
em
 i
n 
m
en
te
 e
ss
e 
co
m
pl
ex
um
, 
et
 n
on
 e
st
 a
liu
d 
co
m
pl
ex
um
 
qu
am
 
pr
op
os
iti
o.
 
[E
rg
o,
 
et
 
ce
te
ra
]9
2 . 
Si
 
si
t 
co
m
po
si
tu
m
 
ex
 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
, 
tu
nc
, 
[[
cu
m
]9
3  
co
nc
ep
tu
s 
si
gn
ifi
ce
nt
 
et
]9
4  
no
n 
su
nt
 
{u
lti
m
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
m
}9
5 , 
qu
ae
re
nd
um
 
es
t 
de
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tio
 
ill
iu
s 
co
m
po
si
tio
ni
s 
[e
x 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
]9
6  
si
cu
t 
pr
iu
s. 
Et
 s
ic
 v
el
 {
pr
oc
ed
en
du
m
 e
st
}9
7  
in
 
in
fin
itu
m
 v
el
 t
an
de
m
 {
es
t 
de
ve
ni
re
}9
8  
ad
 a
liq
ui
d 
co
m
po
si
tu
m
 
ex
 r
eb
us
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
ul
tim
at
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
um
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
s 
in
 
pr
ol
at
io
ne
 
<e
t>
99
 
in
 
m
en
te
. 
Es
t 
{n
am
}1
00
 
ta
lis
 
or
do
 
in
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
o 
{s
ec
un
du
m
}1
01
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
um
 
pr
im
o 
pe
rih
er
m
en
ei
as
: 
lit
te
ra
e 
sc
rip
ta
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 v
oc
es
 p
ro
la
ta
s, 
et
 
vo
ce
s 
pr
ol
at
ae
 <
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
>1
02
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
, e
t p
as
si
on
es
 
{[
an
im
ae
]1
03
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
co
nc
ep
tu
s 
an
im
ae
,}
10
4  
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 r
es
. 
U
nd
e 
si
cu
t i
n 
is
to
 o
rd
in
e 
es
t d
ar
e 
pr
im
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
s, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
lit
te
ra
m
 s
cr
ip
ta
m
 <
ve
l 
sc
rip
tu
ra
m
>1
05
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 it
 fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 w
ha
t i
s 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
a 
st
at
em
en
t i
n 
th
e 
m
in
d 
is
 c
om
pl
ex
, a
nd
 is
 n
ot
hi
ng
 o
th
er
 th
an
 
a 
st
at
em
en
t. 
If
 i
t 
w
er
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 c
on
ce
pt
s, 
th
en
, s
in
ce
 
th
e 
co
nc
ep
ts
 w
ou
ld
 s
ig
ni
fy
 a
nd
 a
re
 n
ot
 f
in
al
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
es
, 
on
e 
m
us
t 
as
k 
w
ha
t 
th
at
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 c
on
ce
pt
s 
si
gn
ifi
es
, j
us
t a
s 
be
fo
re
. A
nd
 s
o 
ei
th
er
 o
ne
 m
us
t p
ro
ce
ed
 to
 
in
fin
ity
, o
r 
at
 la
st
 o
ne
 m
us
t c
om
e 
to
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 c
om
po
se
d 
of
 th
in
gs
, w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e 
fin
al
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
e 
of
 a
 s
po
ke
n 
st
am
en
t 
an
d 
a 
m
en
ta
l s
ta
te
m
en
t. 
Fo
r s
uc
h 
is
 th
e 
or
de
r i
n 
si
gn
ify
in
g,
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 A
ris
to
tle
 i
n 
bo
ok
 1
 o
f 
th
e 
Pe
ri
he
rm
en
ei
as
: 
w
rit
te
n 
w
or
ds
 
si
gn
ify
 
sp
ok
en
 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
, 
an
d 
sp
ok
en
 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 s
ig
ni
fy
 a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
, a
nd
 a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
, 
na
m
el
y 
co
nc
ep
ts
 i
n 
th
e 
m
in
d,
 s
ig
ni
fy
 t
hi
ng
s. 
H
en
ce
 ju
st
 a
s 
in
 th
is
 o
rd
er
 th
er
e 
m
us
t b
e 
a 
th
in
g 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
fir
st
, 
na
m
el
y 
a 
w
rit
te
n 
w
or
d,
 s
o 
th
er
e 
m
us
t 
be
 a
 f
in
al
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
so
 s
ig
ni
fie
d 
th
at
 i
s 
do
es
 n
ot
 s
ig
ni
fy
 
an
ot
he
r, 
an
d 
th
at
 c
an
no
t 
be
 a
 c
on
ce
pt
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 i
t 
is
 a
 
, 
ita
 e
st
 d
ar
e 
ul
tim
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
m
 q
uo
d 
si
c 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
r 
ul
te
riu
s 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t, 
et
 
ill
ud
 n
on
 p
ot
es
t e
ss
e 
co
nc
ep
tu
s. 
Er
go
 e
st
 r
es
, d
is
tin
gu
en
do
 r
es
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: A
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 A
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co
nt
ra
 v
oc
em
 e
t 
co
nc
ep
tu
m
. 
 E
rg
o 
in
 {
re
bu
s}
10
6  
es
t 
al
iq
ui
d 
co
m
po
si
tu
m
 c
ui
us
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 e
st
 r
es
 e
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 [
si
m
ili
te
r, 
[q
uo
d 
di
ci
tu
r p
ro
po
si
tio
 in
 re
]1
07
]1
08
th
in
g,
 b
y 
di
st
in
gu
is
hi
ng
 a
 t
hi
ng
 f
ro
m
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
an
d 
a 
co
nc
ep
t. 
In
 th
in
gs
, t
he
n,
 th
er
e 
is
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 c
om
po
se
d 
– 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
of
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
a 
th
in
g 
an
d 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
lik
ew
is
e 
– 
w
hi
ch
 is
 c
al
le
d 
a 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
in
 re
. 
. 
 
 
H
ui
c 
fo
rte
 d
ic
itu
r 
qu
od
 h
ae
c 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 ‘
H
om
o 
es
t l
ap
is
’, 
[e
st
 
pr
op
os
iti
o]
10
9  
sc
rip
ta
 v
el
 p
ro
la
ta
 v
el
 in
 m
en
te
 c
on
ce
pt
a 
[e
t]1
10
 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ul
tim
at
ae
 n
is
i 
ill
as
 r
es
, 
[s
ci
lic
et
]1
11
 l
ap
id
em
 e
t 
ho
m
in
em
. 
C
on
tra
, 
si
 
ul
tim
at
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
m
 
{i
lli
us
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
}1
12
, ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t l
ap
is
’, 
no
n 
{s
it 
ni
si
 il
la
e 
re
s, 
ho
m
o 
et
 la
pi
s}
11
3 , 
tu
nc
 id
em
 e
st
 d
ic
er
e 
‘h
om
o 
la
pi
s’
 s
ic
ut
 <
di
ce
re
>1
14
 
‘h
om
o 
es
t l
ap
is
’, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
si
cu
t h
ae
c 
es
t f
al
sa
, ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t l
ap
is
’, 
ita
 h
ae
c 
{e
st
 fa
ls
a}
11
5
H
er
e 
pe
rh
ap
s 
it 
is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 t
hi
s 
st
at
em
en
t, 
‘A
 h
um
an
 i
s 
st
on
e’
, i
s a
 w
rit
te
n 
or
 sp
ok
en
 st
at
em
en
t, 
or
 o
ne
 c
on
ce
iv
ed
 in
 
th
e 
m
in
d,
 a
nd
 i
t 
do
es
 n
ot
 s
ig
ni
fy
 a
ny
 f
in
al
 t
hi
ng
s 
ex
ce
pt
 
th
es
e 
th
in
gs
, n
am
el
y 
a 
st
on
e 
an
d 
a 
hu
m
an
. O
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ry
, 
if 
th
e 
fin
al
 si
gn
ifi
ca
te
 o
f t
hi
s s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
‘A
 h
um
an
 is
 st
on
e’
, 
is
 n
ot
hi
ng
 e
xc
ep
t t
ho
se
 th
in
gs
, a
 h
um
an
 a
nd
 a
 s
to
ne
, t
he
n 
it 
is
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
to
 s
ay
 ‘
a 
hu
m
an
 s
to
ne
’ 
as
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 is
 s
to
ne
’, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 ju
st
 a
s 
th
is
 is
 f
al
se
, ‘
A
 h
um
an
 is
 s
to
ne
’, 
so
 th
is
 is
 fa
ls
e,
 ‘a
 h
um
an
 st
on
e’
. 
, ‘
ho
m
o 
la
pi
s’
. 
 
 
Et
 s
i 
di
ci
tu
r 
qu
od
 q
ua
m
vi
s 
{i
lla
e}
11
6  
vo
ce
s, 
‘h
om
o 
la
pi
s’
, 
et
 
‘h
om
o 
es
t 
la
pi
s’
 s
ig
ni
fic
en
t 
id
em
 e
x 
pa
rte
 r
ei
, 
ta
m
en
 n
on
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 e
od
em
 m
od
o,
 [
et
 id
eo
 u
na
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 f
al
su
m
 e
t a
lia
 
no
n.
 C
on
tra
, q
ua
er
o 
de
 il
lo
 m
od
o 
qu
o 
{h
ae
c}
11
7
A
nd
 i
f 
it 
is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 a
lth
ou
gh
 t
he
se
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
, ‘
a 
hu
m
an
 
st
on
e’
 a
nd
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 is
 s
to
ne
’, 
w
ou
ld
 s
ig
ni
fy
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
on
 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 re
al
ity
, y
et
 th
ey
 d
o 
no
t s
ig
ni
fy
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
ay
, 
an
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
on
e 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 f
al
se
 th
in
g 
an
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
no
t. 
O
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ry
, I
 a
sk
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
w
ay
 in
 w
hi
ch
 th
is
 u
tte
ra
nc
e 
 v
ox
 ‘h
om
o 
es
t 
la
pi
s’
 
et
 
ha
ec
 
vo
x 
‘h
om
o 
la
pi
s’
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
ex
 
qu
o 
no
n 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
10
6  ‘
re
’: 
B
 
10
7  A
 
10
8  B
 
10
9  B
 
11
0  B
 
11
1  B
 
11
2  ‘
hu
iu
s’
: A
, B
 
11
3  ‘
su
nt
 n
is
i i
st
i t
er
m
in
i, 
sc
ili
ce
t h
om
o 
et
 la
pi
s’
: A
 
11
4  A
 
11
5  ‘
om
ni
no
 e
ss
et
’: 
A
 
11
6  ‘
ha
e’
; B
 
11
7  ‘
is
ta
’: 
A
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si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 e
od
em
 m
od
o]
11
8 . 
A
ut
 i
lle
 m
od
us
 t
en
et
 s
e 
ex
 p
ar
te
 
re
i 
au
t 
ex
 p
ar
te
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
. 
Si
 {
pr
im
o 
m
od
o}
11
9  
cu
m
 r
es
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
e 
pe
r 
{d
ic
ta
s 
vo
ce
s}
12
0  
si
nt
 <
om
ni
no
>1
21
 e
ae
da
m
, 
ne
c 
ex
 p
ar
te
 r
ei
 {
si
t 
di
ve
rs
ita
s}
12
2 . 
Se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 m
od
us
 
{e
rit
}1
23
 id
em
, q
ui
a 
no
n 
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
di
ve
rs
ita
s 
m
od
i <
ex
 p
ar
te
 
re
i>
12
4  n
is
i s
it 
{a
liq
ua
}1
25
 d
iv
er
si
ta
s 
ex
 p
ar
te
 re
i. 
Si
 [a
ut
em
]1
26
 
{i
lle
}1
27
 m
od
us
 {
te
ne
t}
12
8  
se
 e
x 
pa
rte
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
, 
au
t 
si
bi
 
{c
or
re
sp
on
de
t}
12
9  
al
iq
ui
d 
in
 r
e 
au
t 
ni
hi
l. 
Si
 n
ih
il 
ex
 p
ar
te
 r
ei
 
si
bi
 {
co
rr
es
po
nd
et
}1
30
, 
tu
nc
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
fic
tic
iu
m
, 
{e
t 
no
n}
13
1  
po
te
st
 
{a
liq
ua
m
 
di
ve
rs
ita
te
m
 
po
ne
re
}1
32
. 
Si
 
ve
ro
 
si
bi
 
{c
or
re
sp
on
de
t 
al
iq
ui
d}
13
3  
in
 r
e,
 c
um
 e
x 
pa
rte
 r
ei
 s
it 
id
en
tit
as
 
om
ni
no
, 
se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 
ex
 
pa
rte
 
{m
od
i 
{s
it}
13
4  
id
en
tit
as
 
om
ni
no
. S
ic
 ig
itu
r 
in
te
r 
ill
as
 o
ra
tio
ne
s}
13
5  
in
 c
om
pa
ra
tio
ne
 a
d 
su
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
 <
sc
ili
ce
t>
13
6
‘A
 h
um
an
 i
s 
st
on
e’
 a
nd
 t
hi
s 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
‘a
 h
um
an
 s
to
ne
’ 
si
gn
ify
, o
n 
ac
co
un
t o
f w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 d
o 
no
t s
ig
ni
fy
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
ay
. E
ith
er
 th
at
 w
ay
 h
ol
ds
 it
se
lf 
on
 th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 re
al
ity
 o
r o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
. I
f 
on
 th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 r
ea
lit
y,
 s
in
ce
 th
e 
th
in
gs
 s
ig
ni
fie
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
bo
th
 e
xp
re
ss
io
ns
 w
ill
 b
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e,
 
th
er
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
no
 d
iv
er
si
ty
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 r
ea
lit
y,
 it
 f
ol
lo
w
s 
th
at
 t
he
 w
ay
 w
ill
 b
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 t
he
re
 c
an
no
t 
be
 
di
ve
rs
ity
 in
 a
 w
ay
 u
nl
es
s 
th
er
e 
is
 s
om
e 
di
ve
rs
ity
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
re
al
ity
. 
Y
et
 i
f 
th
at
 w
ay
 h
ol
ds
 i
ts
el
f 
on
 t
he
 p
ar
t 
of
 t
he
 
in
te
lle
ct
, e
ith
er
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 o
r n
ot
hi
ng
 in
 re
al
ity
 c
or
re
sp
on
ds
 
to
 it
. I
f n
ot
hi
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 re
al
ity
 c
or
re
sp
on
ds
 to
 it
, t
he
n 
th
at
 is
 so
m
e 
m
ad
e 
up
 w
ay
 [f
ic
tic
iu
m
], 
an
d 
it 
ca
nn
ot
 p
ro
du
ce
 
an
y 
di
ve
rs
ity
. Y
et
 if
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 in
 r
ea
lit
y 
do
es
 c
or
re
sp
on
d 
to
 it
, s
in
ce
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 re
al
ity
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 c
om
pl
et
e 
id
en
tit
y,
 
 ‘
ho
m
o 
la
pi
s’
 e
t 
‘h
om
o 
es
t 
la
pi
s’
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
11
8  B
 
11
9  ‘
ex
 p
ar
te
 re
i’:
 A
, B
 
12
0  ‘
du
as
 v
oc
es
 d
ic
ta
s’
: A
; ‘
du
as
 v
oc
es
’: 
B
  
12
1  A
, B
 
12
2  ‘
es
t a
liq
ua
 d
iv
er
si
ta
s m
od
i’:
 A
; ‘
es
t a
liq
ui
d 
di
ve
rs
ita
s’
: B
  
12
3  ‘
es
t’:
 A
, B
 
12
4  A
 
12
5  ‘
al
ia
’: 
B
 
12
6  B
 
12
7  ‘
is
te
’: 
A
 
12
8  ‘
te
ne
at
’: 
B
 
12
9  ‘
co
rr
es
po
nd
ea
t’:
 B
 
13
0  ‘
co
rr
es
po
nd
ea
t’:
 A
, B
 
13
1  ‘
ne
c’
: A
 
13
2  ‘
fa
ce
re
 a
liq
ua
m
 d
iv
er
si
ta
te
m
’: 
A
, B
 
13
3  ‘
co
rr
es
po
nd
ea
t a
liq
ui
d’
: A
; ‘
er
go
 c
or
re
sp
on
de
at
’: 
B
  
13
4  ‘
es
t’:
 A
 
13
5  ‘
re
i’:
 B
 
13
6  A
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no
n 
es
t 
al
ia
 d
iv
er
si
ta
s, 
ne
c 
ex
 p
ar
te
 r
ei
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
ae
, 
ne
c 
ex
 
pa
rte
 
m
od
i 
[s
ig
ni
fic
an
di
]1
37
. 
U
nd
e 
is
tu
d 
ar
gu
m
en
tu
m
 
[p
rim
um
]1
38
 
qu
ae
rit
 
de
 
ul
tim
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
to
 
et
 
ad
eq
ua
to
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 i
n 
pr
ol
at
io
ne
 {
et
}1
39
 i
n 
m
en
te
. 
Ta
le
 {
na
m
}1
40
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
m
 a
de
qu
at
um
 v
el
 u
lti
m
at
um
 n
on
 p
ot
es
t 
es
se
 v
ox
 
{v
el
}1
41
 
co
nc
ep
tu
s. 
Er
go
 
es
t 
re
s 
ex
tra
 
an
im
am
 
{e
t 
pe
r 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 a
liq
ui
d 
co
m
pl
ex
um
 s
eu
 a
liq
ua
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 e
xt
ra
 
an
im
am
 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ex
 
re
bu
s 
ta
nq
ua
m
 
ex
 
su
bi
ec
to
 
et
 
pr
ae
di
ca
to
}1
42
it 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 w
ay
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
ar
e 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 t
he
re
 i
s 
co
m
pl
et
e 
id
en
tit
y 
as
 w
el
l. 
So
 t
he
re
fo
re
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
os
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 
in
 
co
m
pa
ris
on
 
to
 
th
ei
r 
ow
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
s 
– 
‘a
 h
um
an
 s
to
ne
’ 
an
d 
‘A
 h
um
an
 is
 a
 s
to
ne
’ 
– 
th
er
e 
is
 n
ot
 a
ny
 d
iv
er
si
ty
, n
ei
th
er
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
th
in
gs
 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 n
or
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 w
ay
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
ar
e 
si
gn
ifi
ed
. 
H
en
ce
, 
th
is
 f
irs
t 
ar
gu
m
en
t 
se
ek
s 
th
e 
fin
al
 a
nd
 
ad
eq
ua
te
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
e 
of
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
in
 s
pe
ec
h 
an
d 
in
 t
he
 
m
in
d.
 F
or
 su
ch
 a
n 
ad
eq
ua
te
 o
r f
in
al
 si
gn
ifi
ca
te
 is
 n
ot
 a
bl
e 
to
 
be
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
or
 a
 c
on
ce
pt
. T
he
re
fo
re
, i
t i
s 
a 
th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 
so
m
e 
co
m
pl
ex
 
or
 
so
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 i
s 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 t
hi
ng
s 
as
 o
f 
a 
su
bj
ec
t a
nd
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
. 
. 
 
 
Se
cu
nd
o 
<e
ad
em
>1
43
 p
ro
ba
tu
r 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
pr
in
ci
pa
lis
 s
ic
, 
ex
 
ei
sd
em
 
co
m
po
nu
nt
ur
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
es
 
de
 
qu
ib
us
 
{f
iu
nt
}1
44
 
qu
ae
st
io
ne
s, 
se
d 
qu
ae
st
io
ne
s 
su
nt
 d
e 
re
bu
s 
ex
tra
 a
ni
m
am
. E
rg
o 
{e
t 
ce
te
ra
}1
45
. M
ai
or
 p
at
et
, q
ui
a 
qu
ae
 p
rim
o 
su
nt
 q
ua
es
tio
ne
s 
{p
os
te
a 
{f
iu
nt
}1
46
 c
on
cl
us
io
ne
s, 
pe
r 
ph
ilo
so
ph
um
 s
ec
un
du
m
 
Po
st
er
io
ru
m
}1
47
Se
co
nd
, t
he
 o
rig
in
al
 c
on
cl
us
io
n 
ca
n 
be
 p
ro
ve
n 
in
 th
is
 w
ay
: 
st
at
em
en
ts
 a
re
 c
om
po
se
d 
of
 t
ho
se
 t
hi
ng
s 
ou
t 
of
 w
hi
ch
 
qu
es
tio
ne
s 
ar
e 
co
ns
tru
ct
ed
, 
bu
t 
qu
es
tio
ns
 a
re
 o
f 
th
in
gs
 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
st
at
em
en
ts
 a
re
 c
om
po
se
d 
of
 
th
in
gs
 o
ut
si
de
 th
e 
m
in
d.
 T
he
 m
aj
or
 is
 c
le
ar
, b
ec
au
se
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
t 
fir
st
 a
re
 q
ue
st
io
ns
 l
at
er
 b
ec
om
e 
co
nc
lu
si
on
s, 
. 
Et
 
ita
 
op
or
te
t 
qu
od
 
{c
on
cl
us
io
ne
s 
et
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, B
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8  B
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9  ‘
ve
l’:
 A
 
14
0  ‘
en
im
’: 
B
 
14
1  ‘
ne
c’
: B
 
14
2  ‘
co
m
po
si
ta
 e
x 
re
bu
s t
am
qu
am
 e
x 
su
bi
ec
to
 e
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
o,
 e
t p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s e
st
 a
liq
ui
d 
co
m
pl
ex
um
 e
xt
ra
 a
ni
m
am
, s
eu
 a
liq
ua
m
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 c
om
po
si
ta
, e
t 
ce
te
ra
’: 
B
 
14
3  A
, B
 
14
4  ‘
fu
er
en
t’:
 A
 
14
5  ‘
pr
op
os
iti
on
es
 c
om
po
ni
tu
r d
e 
re
bu
s e
xt
ra
 a
ni
m
am
’: 
A
, B
 
14
6  ‘
su
nt
’: 
A
 
14
7  ‘
pe
r p
hi
lo
so
ph
um
 d
uo
 P
os
te
rio
ru
m
 p
os
te
a 
fiu
nt
 c
on
cl
us
io
ne
s’
: B
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qu
ae
st
io
ne
s}
14
8  
{f
iu
nt
}1
49
 d
e 
ei
sd
em
. S
ed
 o
m
ni
s 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o.
 I
gi
tu
r 
{e
st
 a
liq
ua
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 e
x 
re
bu
s}
15
0
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 A
ris
to
tle
 in
 b
oo
k 
2 
of
 th
e 
Po
st
er
io
r 
An
al
yt
ic
s. 
So
 i
t 
is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 t
ha
t 
co
nc
lu
si
on
s 
an
d 
qu
es
tio
ns
 a
re
 
co
ns
tru
ct
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
gs
.  
B
ut
 e
ve
ry
 c
on
cl
us
io
n 
is
 
a 
st
at
em
en
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
st
at
em
en
ts
 a
re
 m
ad
e 
of
 t
he
 s
am
e 
th
in
gs
 w
hi
ch
 c
on
cl
us
io
ns
 a
re
 m
ad
e 
of
. 
A
nd
 t
he
 m
in
or
 i
s 
cl
ea
r, 
fo
r 
if 
it 
w
er
e 
as
ke
d 
w
he
th
er
 a
 h
um
an
 i
s 
ca
pa
bl
e 
of
 
la
ug
ht
er
, o
r w
he
th
er
 th
e 
ea
rth
 is
 ro
un
d,
 th
os
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 a
re
 
ab
ou
t t
hi
ng
s a
nd
 n
ot
 a
bo
ut
 c
on
ce
pt
s. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 e
tc
. 
. E
t m
in
or
 
pa
te
t, 
na
m
 s
i q
ua
er
itu
r u
tru
m
 h
om
o 
si
t r
is
ib
ili
s, 
ve
l u
tru
m
 te
rr
a 
si
t 
ro
tu
nd
a,
 
is
ta
e 
qu
ae
st
io
ne
s 
su
nt
 
de
 
re
bu
s 
et
 
no
n 
de
 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
. E
rg
o 
et
 c
et
er
a.
 
 
 
Te
rti
o 
po
te
st
 e
ad
em
 c
on
cl
us
io
 p
ro
ba
ri 
si
c.
 S
ci
en
tia
e 
re
al
es
, u
t 
ph
ys
ic
a 
<e
t>
15
1  
m
et
ap
hy
si
ca
, 
co
ns
id
er
an
t 
{r
ea
lit
er
}1
52
 r
es
 e
t 
no
n 
vo
ce
s 
ve
l c
on
ce
pt
us
. S
ed
 h
ui
us
m
od
i a
rti
fic
es
 f
ac
iu
nt
 s
ua
s 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
ne
s 
ex
 h
is
 q
ua
e 
[p
rim
o 
et
]1
53
 p
er
 s
e 
co
ns
id
er
an
t 
<i
n 
ill
a 
sc
ie
nt
ia
>1
54
. E
rg
o 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
ne
s 
{q
ua
e 
fiu
nt
 in
 is
tis
 
sc
ie
nt
iis
 r
ea
lib
us
}1
55
 {
su
nt
}1
56
Th
ird
, t
he
 s
am
e 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 c
an
 b
e 
pr
ov
en
 in
 th
is
 w
ay
: t
he
 
re
al
 s
ci
en
ce
s, 
su
ch
 a
s 
ph
ys
ic
s 
an
d 
m
et
ap
hy
si
cs
, p
rin
ci
pa
lly
 
ex
am
in
e 
th
in
gs
, 
no
t 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 
or
 
co
nc
ep
ts
. 
B
ut
 
pr
ac
tit
io
ne
rs
 o
f 
th
es
e 
sc
ie
nc
es
 m
ak
e 
th
ei
r 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
ns
 
fr
om
 t
ho
se
 t
hi
ng
s 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
ex
am
in
e 
fir
st
 a
nd
 p
er
 s
e.
 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 d
em
on
st
ra
tio
ns
 i
n 
th
e 
re
al
 s
ci
en
ce
s 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
fr
om
 
th
in
gs
. 
B
ut
 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
ns
 
ar
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 
st
at
em
en
ts
, 
na
m
el
y 
of
 
pr
em
is
es
 
an
d 
a 
co
nc
lu
si
on
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 st
at
em
en
ts
 a
re
 c
om
po
se
d 
of
 th
in
gs
. 
 e
x 
re
bu
s. 
Se
d 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
ne
s 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ex
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
ib
us
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
ex
 
pr
em
is
si
s 
et
 
co
nc
lu
si
on
e.
 E
rg
o 
pr
op
os
iti
on
es
 c
om
po
nu
nt
ur
 e
x 
re
bu
s. 
 
 
H
ui
c 
fo
rte
 d
ic
itu
r 
qu
od
 d
em
on
st
ra
tio
ne
s 
in
 s
ci
en
tii
s 
re
al
ib
us
 
no
n 
fiu
nt
 e
x 
ill
is
 q
ua
e 
pe
r 
se
 c
on
si
de
ra
nt
ur
 in
 [
ill
a]
15
7
H
er
e 
pe
rh
ap
s 
it 
is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 d
em
on
st
ra
tio
ns
 i
n 
th
e 
re
al
 
sc
ie
nc
es
 a
re
 n
ot
 m
ad
e 
ou
t 
of
 t
ho
se
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
 s
ci
en
tia
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
14
8  ‘
pr
op
os
iti
on
es
 e
t c
on
cl
us
io
ne
s’
: B
 
14
9  ‘
su
nt
’: 
A
 
15
0  ‘
de
 e
is
de
m
 su
nt
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
s d
e 
qu
ib
us
 q
ua
er
un
t c
on
cl
us
io
ne
s’
: A
; ‘
de
 e
is
de
m
 fi
un
t p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
s d
e 
qu
ib
us
 fi
un
t c
on
cl
us
io
ne
s’
: B
  
15
1  B
; ‘
ve
l’:
 A
 
15
2  ‘
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
’: 
A
, B
 
15
3  A
, B
 
15
4  B
 
15
5  ‘
in
 sc
ie
nt
iis
 re
al
ib
us
’: 
A
 
15
6  ‘
fiu
nt
’: 
A
 
15
7  A
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se
d 
ex
 v
oc
ib
us
 v
el
 c
on
ce
pt
ib
us
 su
pp
on
en
tib
us
 p
ro
 il
lis
 q
ua
e 
pe
r 
se
 c
on
si
de
ra
nt
ur
 in
 il
la
 s
ci
en
tia
. C
on
tra
, s
ub
ie
ct
um
 a
de
qu
at
um
 
sc
ie
nt
ia
e 
ac
qu
is
ita
e 
pe
r 
<u
na
m
>1
58
 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
ne
m
 
es
t 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
ill
iu
s 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
ni
s, 
[q
ui
a 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
ni
s 
sc
itu
r, 
et
 i
llu
d 
qu
od
 s
ci
tu
r 
es
t 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
sc
ie
nt
ia
e]
15
9 . 
Q
ua
er
o 
tu
nc
 a
n 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
sc
ita
 c
om
po
na
tu
r 
ex
 
re
bu
s 
ve
l 
ex
 c
on
ce
pt
ib
us
 v
el
 e
x 
vo
ci
bu
s. 
Si
 e
x 
re
bu
s, 
ha
be
o 
pr
op
os
itu
m
. S
i e
x 
vo
ci
bu
s 
ve
l c
on
ce
pt
ib
us
 {
so
lu
m
}1
60
 s
eq
ui
tu
r 
qu
od
 n
ih
il 
sc
itu
r 
ni
si
 <
c4
rb
> 
vo
x 
ve
l 
co
nc
ep
tu
s, 
qu
od
 e
st
 
in
co
nv
en
ie
ns
 {
in
 s
ci
en
tii
s 
re
al
ib
us
 m
ax
im
e}
16
1 . 
U
nd
e 
ar
gu
itu
r 
si
c.
 
O
m
ni
s 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
es
t 
vo
x 
ve
l 
co
nc
ep
tu
s. 
Se
d 
om
ne
 
de
m
on
st
ra
tiv
e 
sc
itu
m
 e
st
 p
ro
po
si
tio
.  
Er
go
 o
m
ne
 d
em
on
st
ra
tiv
e 
sc
itu
m
 e
st
 v
ox
 v
el
 c
on
ce
pt
us
. C
on
cl
us
io
 [e
st
]1
62
 fa
ls
am
. [
Er
go
 
ill
ud
 e
x 
qu
o 
se
qu
itu
r]
16
3 , 
se
d 
no
n 
m
in
or
. E
rg
o 
m
ai
or
. E
rg
o 
su
a 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ia
 e
st
 v
er
a,
 s
ci
lic
et
 a
liq
ua
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 n
on
 e
st
 v
ox
 
{v
el
}1
64
 
co
nc
ep
tu
s. 
Se
d 
om
ni
s 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
<q
ua
e 
es
t>
16
5  
co
m
po
si
ta
 e
x 
vo
ci
bu
s 
ve
l 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
 e
st
 v
ox
 v
el
 c
on
ce
pt
us
. 
Er
go
 a
liq
ui
d 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
es
t q
ua
e 
ne
c 
es
t c
om
po
si
ta
 e
x 
vo
ci
bu
s 
ne
c 
ex
 c
on
ce
pt
ib
us
, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
co
m
po
si
ta
 e
x 
re
bu
s. 
{I
st
a 
ra
tio
 p
ot
es
t 
co
nf
irm
ar
i}
16
6
pe
r 
se
 i
n 
th
at
 s
ci
en
ce
, 
bu
t 
ou
t 
of
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 o
r 
co
nc
ep
ts
 
su
pp
os
iti
ng
 f
or
 t
ho
se
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
pe
r 
se
 i
n 
th
at
 
sc
ie
nc
e.
 
O
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ry
, 
th
e 
ad
eq
ua
te
 
su
bj
ec
t 
of
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ac
qu
ire
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
n 
is
 
th
e 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 o
f t
ha
t d
em
on
st
ra
tio
n,
 b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 o
f 
a 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
n 
is
 k
no
w
n,
 a
nd
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 is
 k
no
w
n 
is
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t o
f a
 sc
ie
nc
e.
 I 
as
k,
 th
en
, w
he
th
er
 th
e 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 o
f a
 
sc
ie
nc
e 
is
 c
om
po
se
d 
ou
t o
f t
hi
ng
s 
or
 o
ut
 o
f c
on
ce
pt
s 
or
 o
ut
 
of
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
. I
f o
ut
 o
f t
hi
ng
s, 
I h
av
e 
m
y 
cl
ai
m
. I
f t
he
y 
ar
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
ou
t 
of
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 o
r 
ou
t 
of
 c
on
ce
pt
s 
al
on
e,
 i
t 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 n
ot
hi
ng
 i
s 
kn
ow
n 
ex
ce
pt
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
or
 a
 
co
nc
ep
t. 
Th
at
 i
s 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 i
ll-
su
ite
d 
to
 t
he
 r
ea
l 
sc
ie
nc
es
. 
H
en
ce
 i
t 
is
 a
rg
ue
d 
in
 t
hi
s 
w
ay
. 
Ev
er
y 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
or
 a
 c
on
ce
pt
. 
B
ut
 e
ve
ry
th
in
g 
de
m
on
st
ra
tiv
el
y 
kn
ow
n 
is
 
a 
st
at
em
en
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 
de
m
on
st
ra
tiv
el
y 
kn
ow
n 
is
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
or
 a
 c
on
ce
pt
. 
Th
e 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 i
s 
fa
ls
e,
 b
ut
 n
ot
 t
he
 m
in
or
 p
re
m
is
e.
 T
he
re
fo
re
, 
th
e 
m
aj
or
 is
 f
al
se
. T
he
re
fo
re
, i
ts
 o
w
n 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
y 
is
 tr
ue
, 
na
m
el
y 
th
at
 s
om
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 n
ot
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
or
 a
 
co
nc
ep
t. 
B
ut
 e
ve
ry
 st
at
em
en
t c
om
po
se
d 
ou
t o
f u
tte
ra
nc
es
 o
r 
ou
t 
of
 c
on
ce
pt
s 
is
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
or
 a
 c
on
ce
pt
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 
th
er
e 
is
 s
om
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 n
ei
th
er
 
 s
ic
, 
de
 e
is
de
m
 e
st
 o
m
ni
no
 
sc
ie
nt
ia
 n
os
tra
 t
ra
di
ta
 d
e 
re
bu
s 
na
tu
ra
lib
us
 d
e 
qu
ib
us
 f
ui
t 
sc
ie
nt
ia
 A
ris
to
te
lis
, 
qu
am
 n
ob
is
 r
el
iq
ui
t. 
 S
ed
 n
ec
 v
oc
es
 n
ec
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
15
8  A
, B
 
15
9  A
 
16
0  ‘
tu
nc
’: 
A
, B
 
16
1  ‘
m
ax
im
e 
in
 sc
ie
nt
iis
 re
al
ib
us
’: 
A
, B
 
16
2  A
 
16
3  A
; ‘
al
iq
ua
 p
ra
em
is
sa
ru
m
’: 
B
 
16
4  ‘
ne
qu
e’
: B
 
16
5  B
 
16
6  ‘
co
nf
irm
at
ur
 ra
tio
 si
c’
: A
; ‘
co
nf
irm
at
ur
 ra
tio
’: 
B
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co
nc
ep
tib
us
 s
un
t i
de
m
 a
pu
d 
no
s 
et
 a
pu
d 
A
ris
to
te
le
m
, q
ui
 e
ra
t 
gr
ae
cu
s. 
Er
go
 
sc
ie
nt
ia
 
no
st
ra
 
de
 
[r
eb
us
]1
67
 
na
tu
ra
lib
us
 
et
 
sc
ie
nt
ia
 A
ris
to
te
lis
, q
ua
m
 n
ob
is
 tr
ad
id
it 
de
 e
is
de
m
, n
ec
 {
es
t}
16
8  
de
 v
oc
ib
us
 n
ec
 d
e 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
. 
Er
go
 {
es
t}
16
9  
de
 r
eb
us
. 
Se
d 
sc
ie
nt
ia
 e
st
 so
liu
s c
on
cl
us
io
ni
s d
em
on
st
ra
tio
ni
s. 
Er
go
 c
on
cl
us
io
 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
ni
s 
in
 s
ci
en
tia
 n
at
ur
al
i n
ec
 e
st
 v
ox
 n
ec
 c
on
ce
pt
us
, 
et
 
pe
r 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 
ne
c 
co
m
po
si
ta
 
ex
 
vo
ci
bu
s 
ne
c 
ex
 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
 <
se
d 
ex
 re
bu
s>
17
0
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 n
or
 c
on
ce
pt
s, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 it
 is
 c
om
po
se
d 
of
 
th
in
gs
. 
Th
at
 a
cc
ou
nt
 c
an
 b
e 
co
nf
irm
ed
 i
n 
th
is
 w
ay
: 
th
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ha
nd
ed
 d
ow
n 
to
 u
s 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
na
tu
ra
l 
w
or
ld
 i
s 
en
tir
el
y 
ab
ou
t t
he
 s
am
e 
ob
je
ct
s 
as
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 A
ris
to
tle
’s
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
w
as
 a
bo
ut
, a
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
w
hi
ch
 h
e 
ga
ve
 t
o 
us
. 
B
ut
 n
ei
th
er
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 n
or
 c
on
ce
pt
s 
ar
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
ith
 u
s 
an
d 
w
ith
 
A
ris
to
tle
, 
w
ho
 
w
as
 
G
re
ek
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 
ou
r 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
of
 
na
tu
ra
l 
th
in
gs
, 
an
d 
th
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
of
 
A
ris
to
tle
, 
w
hi
ch
 h
e 
ha
nd
ed
 d
ow
n 
to
 u
s 
ab
ou
t 
th
os
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
gs
, 
is
 
a 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ne
ith
er
 
of
 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 
no
r 
of
 
co
nc
ep
ts
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 i
t 
is
 o
f 
th
in
gs
. 
B
ut
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
is
 
m
er
el
y 
th
e 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 o
f 
a 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
n.
 T
he
re
fo
re
, 
th
e 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 o
f 
a 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
n 
in
 n
at
ur
al
 s
ci
en
ce
 is
 n
ei
th
er
 
an
 u
tte
ra
nc
e 
no
r 
a 
co
nc
ep
t, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 is
 c
om
po
se
d 
ne
ith
er
 o
f u
tte
ra
nc
es
 n
or
 o
f c
on
ce
pt
s b
ut
 ra
th
er
 o
f t
hi
ng
s. 
. 
 
 
Q
ua
rto
 p
ot
es
t 
[e
ad
em
 c
on
cl
us
io
]1
71
 p
ro
ba
ri 
pe
r 
au
ct
or
ita
te
s. 
Pr
im
o 
si
c.
 A
ris
to
te
le
s 
{d
ic
en
s}
17
2  
in
 l
ib
ro
 p
ra
ed
ic
am
en
to
ru
m
, 
tra
ct
at
um
 
pr
im
o,
 
ca
pi
tu
lo
 
{s
ec
un
do
}1
73
, 
qu
od
 
qu
ae
da
m
 
pr
ae
di
ca
nt
ur
 d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
 e
t 
no
n 
in
 s
ub
ie
ct
o,
 u
t 
su
bi
ec
ta
e 
se
cu
nd
ae
. Q
ua
er
o 
tu
nc
 {
qu
od
}1
74
 e
st
 il
lu
d 
qu
od
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
 d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
 e
t n
on
 in
 su
bi
ec
to
. A
ut
 e
st
 re
s, 
{v
ox
 v
el
 c
on
ce
pt
us
}1
75
Fo
ur
th
, 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 
ca
n 
be
 
pr
ov
ed
 
vi
a 
ph
ilo
so
ph
ic
al
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s. 
Fi
rs
t i
n 
th
is
 w
ay
: A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s i
n 
th
e 
Ca
te
go
rie
s, 
tra
ct
 1
, c
ha
pt
er
 2
, t
ha
t 
ce
rt
ai
n 
th
in
gs
 a
re
 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 o
f a
 s
ub
je
ct
 a
nd
 a
re
 n
ot
 in
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
, s
uc
h 
as
 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
su
bs
ta
nc
es
. 
I 
as
k 
th
en
 w
ha
t 
th
at
 i
s 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 o
f a
 s
ub
je
ct
 b
ut
 is
 n
ot
 in
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
: i
s 
it 
a 
th
in
g,
 
. 
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16
8  ‘
su
nt
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A
, B
 
16
9  ‘
su
nt
’: 
A
, B
 
17
0  B
 
17
1  B
 
17
2  ‘
di
ci
t’:
 A
, B
 
17
3  ‘
pr
im
o’
: A
 
17
4  ‘
qu
ia
’: 
A
 
17
5  ‘
au
t c
on
ce
pt
us
 a
ut
 v
ox
’: 
A
, B
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Si
 s
it 
re
s 
ex
tra
 a
ni
m
am
, h
ab
itu
r p
ro
po
si
tu
m
, {
qu
ia
}1
76
 re
s 
ex
tra
 
an
im
am
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
 d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
, n
ec
 e
st
 d
ar
e 
qu
od
 il
lu
d 
si
t v
ox
 
ve
l c
on
ce
pt
us
, q
ui
a 
ta
m
 v
ox
 q
ua
m
 <
et
ia
m
>1
77
 c
on
ce
pt
us
 e
st
 in
 
su
bi
ec
to
. U
nd
e 
cu
m
 a
liq
ui
d 
pr
ae
di
ce
tu
r d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
 [e
t]1
78
 n
on
 
es
t 
in
 s
ub
ie
ct
o,
 e
t 
ill
ud
 n
ec
 e
st
 v
ox
 v
el
 c
on
ce
pt
us
, 
se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 a
liq
ui
d 
pr
ae
di
ce
tu
r 
[d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
]1
79
, 
qu
od
 n
ec
 v
ox
 n
ec
 
co
nc
ep
tu
s. 
<S
eq
ui
tu
r>
18
0
an
 u
tte
ra
nc
e,
 o
r a
 c
on
ce
pt
? 
If
 it
 is
 a
 th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
, I
 
ha
ve
 
m
y 
cl
ai
m
, 
be
ca
us
e 
a 
th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 
is
 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 o
f a
n 
su
bj
ec
t. 
N
or
 c
an
 it
 b
e 
th
at
 it
 is
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
or
 a
 c
on
ce
pt
, b
ec
au
se
 b
ot
h 
an
 u
tte
ra
nc
e 
an
d 
a 
co
nc
ep
t a
re
 in
 
a 
su
bj
ec
t. 
H
en
ce
 s
in
ce
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 
an
d 
is
 n
ot
 in
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
, a
nd
 th
at
 is
 n
ei
th
er
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
no
r a
 
co
nc
ep
t, 
it 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 
w
hi
ch
 is
 n
ei
th
er
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
no
r a
 c
on
ce
pt
. T
he
re
fo
re
, i
t i
s 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
th
at
 it
 is
 a
 th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
. 
 e
rg
o 
op
or
te
t 
qu
od
 i
llu
d 
si
t 
re
s 
ex
tra
 
an
im
am
. 
 
 
Ite
m
 
A
ris
to
te
le
s 
{p
rim
o}
18
1  
Pe
rih
er
m
en
ei
as
, 
[c
ap
ut
 
de
 
or
at
io
ne
]1
82
, {
as
se
rit
}1
83
 {
re
s}
18
4  d
e 
re
 p
ra
ed
ic
ar
i, 
di
ce
ns
 H
ae
c 
qu
id
em
 
re
ru
m
 
su
nt
 
un
iv
er
sa
lia
, 
ill
a 
ve
ro
 
si
ng
ul
ar
ia
. 
U
ni
ve
rs
al
e 
qu
id
em
 
de
 
pl
ur
ib
us
 
ap
tu
m
 
na
tu
m
 
es
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
ri
, 
ut
 
 
ho
m
o 
qu
id
em
 
un
iv
er
sa
le
, 
Pl
at
o 
ve
ro
 
si
ng
ul
ar
e.
 E
t i
llu
d 
to
tu
m
 e
xp
on
it 
B
oe
th
iu
s 
de
 re
bu
s 
[e
t]1
85
 n
on
 
de
 
vo
ci
bu
s, 
di
ce
ns
 
qu
od
 
cu
m
 
A
ris
to
te
le
s 
<d
e 
pr
op
os
iti
on
ib
us
>1
86
 a
ge
re
t t
ra
ct
at
um
 s
uu
m
 {
co
nt
in
ua
vi
t}
18
7
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 
A
ris
to
tle
, 
in
 
th
e 
fir
st
 
ch
ap
te
r 
of
 
th
e 
Pe
ri
he
rm
en
ei
as
, 
in
 t
he
 c
ha
pt
er
 o
n 
se
nt
en
ce
s, 
sa
ys
 t
ha
t 
a 
th
in
g 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 a
 th
in
g,
 s
ay
in
g 
In
de
ed
 t
he
se
 t
hi
ng
s 
ar
e 
un
iv
er
sa
ls
, 
bu
t 
th
os
e 
si
ng
ul
ar
s. 
A
 
un
iv
er
sa
l 
is 
na
tu
ra
lly
 s
ui
te
d 
to
 b
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
, s
o 
th
at
 h
um
an
 in
de
ed
 
is
 
un
iv
er
sa
l, 
bu
t 
Pl
at
o 
is
 
sin
gu
la
r.
 
A
nd
 
B
oe
th
iu
s 
in
te
rp
re
ts
 th
at
 w
ho
le
 c
la
im
 to
 b
e 
ab
ou
t t
hi
ng
s 
an
d 
no
t a
bo
ut
 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
, s
ay
in
g 
th
at
 w
he
n 
A
ris
to
tle
 p
us
he
s 
on
 w
ith
 h
is
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R
er
um
 {
ve
ro
}1
88
tre
at
is
e,
 h
e 
lin
ks
 i
t 
to
 t
hi
ng
s. 
Bu
t 
ce
rt
ai
n 
th
in
gs
 a
re
 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
, 
lik
e 
un
iv
er
sa
ls
, 
ot
he
rs
 a
re
 m
ad
e 
su
bj
ec
ts
, 
lik
e 
si
ng
ul
ar
s. 
 q
ua
ed
am
 p
ra
ed
ic
an
tu
r 
ut
 u
ni
ve
rs
al
ia
, 
qu
ae
da
m
 su
bi
ci
un
tu
r 
ut
 si
ng
ul
ar
ia
.  
  
 
 
Ite
m
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 i
n 
lib
ro
 P
er
ih
er
m
en
ei
as
 [
ca
pu
t 
de
 v
er
bo
]1
89
 
di
ci
t 
qu
od
 
ve
rb
um
 
es
t 
no
ta
 
eo
ru
m
 
qu
ae
 
de
 
al
te
ro
 
pr
ae
di
ca
nt
ur
, 
[u
bi
 B
oe
th
iu
s 
di
ci
t 
qu
od
 o
m
ne
 v
er
bu
m
 e
st
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
um
 e
or
um
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 p
ra
ed
ic
an
tu
r]
19
0 , 
et
 d
ic
o 
qu
od
 ‘c
ur
rit
’  
si
gn
ifi
ca
t [
ill
ud
]1
91
 q
uo
d 
de
 c
ur
re
nt
e 
<c
ur
su
s>
19
2  
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r, 
‘c
ur
rit
’ 
{v
er
o}
19
3  
et
 {
‘a
m
at
’}
19
4  
ad
 r
es
 t
am
en
 
{d
es
ig
na
nd
as
}1
95
 
in
ve
nt
a 
su
nt
. 
C
um
 
er
go
 
‘c
ur
rit
’ 
{s
ig
ni
fic
et
}1
96
 i
llu
d 
qu
od
 d
e 
al
te
ro
 <
cu
rr
en
te
>1
97
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
, 
et
 <
si
c>
19
8  
‘c
ur
rit
’ 
so
lu
m
 {
si
gn
ifi
ce
t}
19
9  
re
m
 e
t 
no
n 
vo
ce
m
 
se
cu
nd
um
 B
oe
th
iu
s, 
se
qu
itu
r [
qu
od
 re
s d
e 
re
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
]2
00
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 A
ris
to
tle
, i
n 
th
e 
Pe
ri
he
rm
en
ei
as
, i
n 
th
e 
ch
ap
te
r 
on
 v
er
bs
, s
ay
s 
th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 a
 m
ar
k 
of
 t
ho
se
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 o
f 
an
ot
he
r,
 a
nd
 I
 s
ay
 th
at
 ‘
ru
ns
’ 
si
gn
ifi
es
 th
at
 
w
hi
ch
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 s
om
e 
ru
nn
in
g 
in
di
vi
du
al
, b
ut
 ‘
ru
ns
’ 
an
d 
‘w
al
ks
’ a
re
 fo
un
d 
to
 d
es
ig
na
te
 th
in
gs
. T
he
re
fo
re
, s
in
ce
 
‘r
un
s’
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 o
f 
an
ot
he
r, 
an
d 
‘r
un
s’
 o
nl
y 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 th
in
g 
an
d 
no
t a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 
to
 B
oe
th
iu
s, 
it 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 a
 th
in
g 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 a
 th
in
g.
 
A
nd
 I
 b
el
ie
ve
 t
ha
t 
th
is
 i
s 
un
do
ub
te
dl
y 
tru
e,
 t
ha
t 
in
 s
om
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
a 
th
in
g 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 a
 t
hi
ng
, 
an
d 
in
 s
om
e 
st
at
em
en
t a
 c
on
ce
pt
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 a
 c
on
ce
pt
, a
nd
 in
 s
om
e 
st
at
em
en
t a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e.
 H
en
ce
 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 
ca
n 
pu
t 
to
ge
th
er
 
ev
er
y 
si
m
pl
e 
th
in
g 
ap
pr
eh
en
de
d 
by
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, b
y 
as
se
rti
ng
 th
at
 th
ey
 a
re
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
or
 a
re
 n
ot
 th
e 
sa
m
e.
 T
he
re
fo
re
, s
in
ce
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 is
 
. E
t 
cr
ed
o 
qu
od
 
ill
ud
 
in
du
bi
ta
nt
er
 
si
t 
ve
ru
m
, 
qu
od
 
in
 
al
iq
ua
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
re
s 
de
 r
e,
 e
t 
in
 a
liq
ua
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 
co
nc
ep
tu
s 
de
 c
on
ce
pt
u 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r, 
et
 i
n 
al
iq
ua
 v
ox
 d
e 
vo
ce
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r. 
U
nd
e 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 
po
te
st
 
co
m
po
ne
re
 
ad
in
vi
ce
m
 
om
ni
a 
si
m
pl
ic
ia
 a
pp
re
he
ns
a 
pe
r i
nt
el
le
ct
um
 a
ss
er
en
do
 il
la
 e
ss
e 
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ea
de
m
 v
el
 n
on
 e
ss
e 
ea
de
m
. C
um
 {
ig
itu
r}
20
1  
in
te
lle
ct
us
 p
os
si
t 
{e
xp
on
er
e}
20
2  v
oc
es
, c
on
ce
pt
us
 e
t r
es
, s
eq
ui
tu
r q
uo
d 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 
po
te
st
 c
om
po
ne
re
 {
pr
op
os
iti
on
em
 t
am
 d
e 
re
bu
s 
qu
am
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s q
ua
m
 d
e 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
}2
03
ab
le
 to
 g
ra
sp
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
, c
on
ce
pt
s a
nd
 th
in
gs
, i
t f
ol
lo
w
s t
ha
t 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 c
an
 p
ut
 t
og
et
he
r 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 
th
in
gs
 t
o 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ex
te
nt
 a
s 
it 
ca
n 
pu
t 
to
ge
th
er
 o
ne
 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 o
r c
on
ce
pt
s. 
.  
 
 
 
In
te
lli
ge
nd
a 
su
nt
 h
ic
 tr
ia
. P
rim
o 
qu
od
 in
 o
m
ni
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 e
st
 
{a
liq
uo
d}
20
4  
m
at
er
ia
le
 e
t 
{a
liq
uo
d}
20
5  
fo
rm
al
e.
 F
or
m
al
e 
in
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
es
t c
op
ul
a 
co
pu
la
ns
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 c
um
 s
ub
ie
ct
o 
et
 
ill
a 
co
pu
la
 e
st
 i
n 
in
te
lle
ct
u,
 q
ui
a 
es
t 
co
m
po
si
tio
 v
el
 d
iv
is
io
 
[in
te
lle
ct
us
]2
06
. 
M
at
er
ia
lia
 
{v
er
o}
20
7  
in
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
su
nt
 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
et
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
. 
D
ic
o 
er
go
 
qu
od
 
nu
lla
 
{p
ro
po
si
tio
}2
08
 e
st
 c
om
po
si
ta
 e
x 
re
bu
s 
to
ta
lit
er
 e
xt
ra
 a
ni
m
am
, 
qu
ia
 fo
rm
al
e 
in
 ta
li 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
es
t i
n 
m
en
te
 v
el
 in
 in
te
lle
ct
u.
 
{M
at
er
ia
lia
 a
ut
em
}2
09
 s
un
t 
ex
tra
 a
ni
m
am
. 
{U
nd
e}
21
0  
cu
m
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
si
t 
tri
pl
ex
 –
 q
ua
ed
am
 i
n 
pr
ol
at
io
ne
, 
qu
ae
da
m
 i
n 
co
nc
ep
tu
, 
et
 
qu
ae
da
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
 
pe
r 
pr
op
os
iti
on
em
 
in
 
co
nc
ep
tu
 q
ua
e 
po
te
st
 d
ic
i 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
in
 r
e 
– 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
pr
im
o 
m
od
o 
di
ct
a,
 s
ci
lic
et
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 in
 p
ro
la
tio
ne
, e
st
 to
ta
lit
er
 e
xt
ra
 
an
im
am
, 
{e
t}
21
1  
ta
lis
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
to
ta
lit
er
 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ex
 
vo
ci
bu
s 
qu
i 
ha
be
nt
 e
ss
e 
ex
tra
 a
ni
m
am
. 
{P
ro
po
si
tio
 v
er
o}
21
2
W
e 
m
us
t u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
re
e 
th
in
gs
 h
er
e.
 F
irs
t, 
th
at
 in
 e
ve
ry
 
st
at
em
en
t 
th
er
e 
is
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
m
at
er
ia
l 
an
d 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
fo
rm
al
. 
Th
e 
fo
rm
al
 e
le
m
en
t 
in
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
is
 t
he
 c
op
ul
a 
jo
in
in
g 
to
ge
th
er
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
 w
ith
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
, 
an
d 
th
at
 
co
pu
la
 i
s 
in
 t
he
 i
nt
el
le
ct
, 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
is
 a
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
or
 
di
vi
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
. 
Y
et
 t
he
 m
at
er
ia
l 
el
em
en
ts
 i
n 
a 
st
at
em
en
t a
re
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e.
 T
he
re
fo
re
 I 
sa
y 
th
at
 n
o 
st
at
em
en
t i
s 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 th
in
gs
 c
om
pl
et
el
y 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
, b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
fo
rm
al
 e
le
m
en
t i
s 
su
ch
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
s 
in
 t
he
 m
in
d,
 t
ha
t 
is
, 
in
 t
he
 i
nt
el
le
ct
, 
ye
t 
th
e 
m
at
er
ia
l 
el
em
en
ts
 a
re
 o
ut
si
de
 o
f t
he
 m
in
d.
 H
en
ce
, s
in
ce
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
is
 o
f t
hr
ee
 so
rts
 –
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 sp
ok
en
 o
ne
, a
 c
er
ta
in
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
l 
on
e,
 a
nd
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 o
ne
 s
ig
ni
fie
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
 
st
at
em
en
t 
w
hi
ch
 c
an
 b
e 
ca
lle
d 
a 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
in
 r
e 
– 
 a
 
st
at
em
en
t 
sp
ok
en
 o
f 
in
 t
he
 f
irs
t 
w
ay
, 
na
m
el
y 
a 
sp
ok
en
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co
m
po
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ta
 
ex
 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
 
es
t 
to
ta
lit
er
 
in
 
in
te
lle
ct
u.
 
Et
 
co
m
po
si
tio
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om
po
si
ta
 e
x 
re
bu
s 
pa
rti
m
 e
st
 i
n 
in
te
lle
ct
u 
et
 
pa
rti
m
 e
xt
ra
 i
nt
el
le
ct
u,
 q
ua
nt
um
 
ad
 s
uu
m
 
fo
rm
al
e 
es
t 
in
 
in
te
lle
ct
u 
{s
ed
}2
13
st
at
em
en
t, 
is
 c
om
pl
et
el
y 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
, 
ye
t 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 c
on
ce
pt
s 
is
 c
om
pl
et
el
y 
in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, a
nd
 a
 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 t
hi
ng
s 
is
 p
ar
tly
 i
n 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 
an
d 
pa
rtl
y 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
. W
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 t
o 
its
 f
or
m
al
 
el
em
en
t, 
a 
st
at
em
en
t c
om
po
se
d 
of
 th
in
gs
 is
 in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, 
bu
t 
w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 t
o 
its
 m
at
er
ia
l 
el
em
en
ts
, i
t 
is
 c
om
pl
et
el
y 
ou
ts
id
e 
of
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
. 
 q
ua
nt
um
 a
d 
m
at
er
ia
lia
 e
st
 t
ot
al
ite
r 
ex
tra
 
in
te
lle
ct
um
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Se
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st
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m
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 e
st
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up
le
x,
 s
ci
lic
et
 
{r
ea
lis
 
et
 
in
te
lle
ct
ua
lis
}2
14
. 
C
om
po
si
tio
 
in
te
lle
ct
ua
lis
 
es
t 
<u
t>
21
5  
co
m
po
si
tio
 q
ua
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
 c
om
po
ni
t 
{s
ub
ie
ct
um
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um
 
pr
ae
di
ca
to
}2
16
. 
C
om
po
si
tio
 r
ea
lis
 e
st
 u
t 
co
m
po
si
tio
 a
ni
m
ae
 
cu
m
 c
or
po
re
, 
{e
t}
21
7
Se
co
nd
, 
w
e 
m
us
t 
kn
ow
 
th
at
 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
tw
o 
ki
nd
s 
of
 
co
m
po
si
tio
n,
 n
am
el
y 
re
al
 a
nd
 i
nt
el
le
ct
ua
l. 
A
n 
in
te
lle
ct
ua
l 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
is
 a
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
in
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 i
nt
el
le
ct
 p
ut
s 
to
ge
th
er
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 w
ith
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
. A
 r
ea
l c
om
po
si
tio
n 
is
, 
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 th
e 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 a
 s
ou
l w
ith
 a
 b
od
y,
 o
r 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 a
 h
ou
se
 o
ut
 o
f b
ric
ks
 o
r w
oo
d.
 
 u
t 
co
m
po
si
tio
 d
om
us
 e
x 
la
pi
di
bu
s 
ve
l 
lig
ni
s. 
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ic
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rm
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i]2
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Th
ird
, 
w
e 
m
us
t 
kn
ow
 t
ha
t 
th
es
e 
te
rm
s, 
‘s
ub
je
ct
’ 
an
d 
‘p
re
di
ca
te
’, 
ar
e 
eq
ui
vo
ca
l 
te
rm
s, 
be
ca
us
e 
in
 o
ne
 w
ay
 t
he
y 
ar
e 
ta
ke
n 
fo
r 
a 
su
bj
ec
t o
r 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
in
 r
ea
lit
y,
 in
 a
no
th
er
 
w
ay
 f
or
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 o
r 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
in
 t
he
 i
nt
el
le
ct
, 
an
d 
in
 
an
ot
he
r w
ay
 fo
r a
 su
bj
ec
t o
r p
re
di
ca
te
 in
 sp
ee
ch
. 
 
eq
ui
vo
ci
, 
qu
ia
 
un
o 
m
od
o 
ac
ci
pi
un
tu
r p
er
 s
ub
ie
ct
o 
ve
l p
ra
ed
ic
at
o 
in
 r
e,
 in
 a
lio
 m
od
o 
pr
o 
su
bi
ec
to
 v
el
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
o 
in
 in
te
lle
ct
u,
 in
 a
lio
 m
od
o 
pr
o 
su
bi
ec
to
 
ve
l p
ra
ed
ic
at
o 
in
 v
oc
e.
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B
ut
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 d
ou
bt
 h
er
e:
 h
ow
, f
ro
m
 a
 th
in
g 
ex
is
tin
g 
in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 a
nd
 a
 t
hi
ng
 e
xi
st
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
, 
ca
n 
th
er
e 
 e
xi
st
en
te
 e
xt
ra
 a
ni
m
am
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lis
’: 
B
 
21
5  A
 
21
6  ‘
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 c
um
 su
bi
ec
to
’: 
A
 
21
7  ‘
ve
l’:
 A
 
21
8  B
 
21
9  ‘
re
bu
s’
: A
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D
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
ex
 <
c4
va
> 
ta
lib
us
 <
be
ne
>2
20
 p
ot
es
t f
ie
ri 
un
um
 
co
m
po
si
tu
m
 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
 
in
te
lle
ct
ua
li,
 
no
n 
<t
am
en
>2
21
 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
 
re
al
i, 
et
 
ta
le
 
co
m
po
si
tu
m
 
po
te
st
 
di
ci
 
en
s 
co
pu
la
tu
m
, e
t 
<p
ot
es
t 
fie
ri 
en
s 
co
pu
la
tu
m
>2
22
 n
on
 s
ol
um
 p
er
 
in
te
lle
ct
um
 s
ed
 e
tia
m
 p
er
 s
en
su
m
, 
{v
el
}2
23
 p
er
 i
nt
en
tio
ne
m
 
se
ns
us
. 
D
ic
it 
{e
ni
m
}2
24
 
B
ea
tu
s 
A
ug
us
tin
us
 
qu
od
 
in
te
nt
io
 
co
pu
la
t s
en
su
m
 v
el
 o
pe
ra
tio
ne
m
 s
en
su
s 
cu
m
 s
en
si
bi
li 
ob
ie
ct
o.
 
M
ul
to
tie
ns
 {
na
m
}2
25
 v
is
ib
ile
 {
of
fe
rtu
r 
se
ns
ui
, 
qu
od
 t
am
en
 
pr
ae
se
ns
 s
en
su
i}
22
6  
no
n 
se
nt
itu
r 
si
 s
en
su
s 
no
n 
ad
ve
rta
t 
{n
ec
 
at
te
nd
at
}2
27
 a
d 
ob
ie
ct
um
. 
M
ul
to
tie
ns
 e
ni
m
 <
su
nt
>2
28
 c
ol
or
es
 
{e
t}
22
9  v
is
ib
ili
a 
an
te
 v
is
um
, e
t t
am
en
 n
on
 v
id
em
us
 e
a,
 q
ui
a 
no
n 
ha
be
m
us
 i
nt
en
tio
ne
m
 a
d 
ill
a.
 S
ed
 c
um
 i
nt
en
di
m
us
 {
ea
}2
30
, 
vi
de
m
us
 e
a.
 U
nd
e 
in
te
nt
io
 c
op
ul
at
 a
ct
um
 v
is
us
 v
el
 v
is
um
 c
um
 
ob
ie
ct
o.
 U
nd
e 
ha
ec
 v
ox
, ‘
la
pi
s 
vi
su
s’
, s
ig
ni
fic
at
 q
uo
dd
am
 e
ns
 
co
pu
la
tu
m
 e
x 
la
pi
de
 q
ui
 e
st
 e
xt
ra
 a
ni
m
am
 e
t 
[e
x]
23
1  
ac
tu
 
vi
de
nd
i q
ui
 e
st
 in
 o
cu
lo
, n
ec
 e
st
 in
co
nv
en
ie
ns
 q
uo
d 
ex
 ta
lib
us
 
si
c 
{l
oc
o 
et
 {
si
tu
s}
23
2 }
23
3  
se
pa
ra
tis
 f
ia
t 
[v
er
e]
23
4
co
m
e 
ab
ou
t o
ne
 c
om
po
si
te
 th
in
g?
 It
 m
us
t b
e 
sa
id
 th
at
 fr
om
 
su
ch
 th
in
gs
 th
er
e 
ca
n 
co
m
e 
ab
ou
t o
ne
 th
in
g 
co
m
po
se
d 
by
 a
 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, n
ot
 b
y 
a 
re
al
 c
om
po
si
tio
n,
 a
nd
 
su
ch
 a
 c
om
po
si
te
 c
an
 b
e 
ca
lle
d 
an
 e
ns
 c
op
ul
at
um
, a
nd
 a
n 
en
s 
co
pu
la
tu
m
 
ca
n 
co
m
e 
ab
ou
t 
no
t 
on
ly
 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
th
ro
ug
h 
on
e’
s s
en
se
 fa
cu
lty
, o
r t
hr
ou
gh
 th
e 
at
te
nt
io
n 
[in
te
nt
io
] 
of
 
th
at
 
se
ns
e 
fa
cu
lty
. 
Fo
r 
B
le
ss
ed
 
A
ug
us
tin
e 
sa
ys
 
th
at
 
at
te
nt
io
n 
co
up
le
s 
a 
se
ns
e 
or
 
th
e 
op
er
at
io
n 
of
 a
 s
en
se
 w
ith
 a
 s
en
si
bl
e 
ob
je
ct
. F
or
 o
fte
nt
im
es
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 v
is
ib
le
 i
s 
of
fe
re
d 
to
 a
 s
en
se
, 
ye
t 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
pr
es
en
t t
o 
th
at
 s
en
se
 is
 n
ot
 s
en
se
d 
if 
th
e 
se
ns
e 
ne
ith
er
 tu
rn
s 
no
r a
tte
nd
s 
to
 th
e 
ob
je
ct
.  
Fo
r o
fte
nt
im
es
 c
ol
or
s 
an
d 
th
in
gs
 
w
hi
ch
 c
an
 b
e 
se
en
 a
re
 b
ef
or
e 
ou
r v
is
io
n,
 a
nd
 y
et
 w
e 
do
 n
ot
 
se
e 
th
em
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
do
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
ou
r 
at
te
nt
io
n 
di
re
ct
ed
 a
t 
th
em
. 
B
ut
 w
he
n 
w
e 
pa
y 
at
te
nt
io
n 
to
 t
he
m
, 
th
en
 w
e 
se
e 
th
em
. 
H
en
ce
 a
tte
nt
io
n 
co
up
le
s 
th
e 
ac
t 
of
 s
ee
in
g 
or
 s
ig
ht
 
w
ith
 a
n 
ob
je
ct
. 
Fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 t
hi
s 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 ‘
se
en
 s
to
ne
’, 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 b
ei
ng
 c
om
po
se
d 
ou
t 
of
 s
to
ne
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
 u
nu
m
 e
ns
 
co
pu
la
tu
m
.  
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4  ‘
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22
5  ‘
en
im
’: 
B
 
22
6  ‘
es
t p
ra
es
en
s v
is
ui
, e
t’:
 A
, B
 
22
7  ‘
ve
l i
nt
en
di
t’:
 B
 
22
8  A
 
22
9  ‘
ve
l’:
 A
, B
 
23
0  ‘
ill
a’
: A
 
23
1  A
 
23
2  ‘
su
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ec
to
’: 
B
 
23
3  ‘
lo
qu
en
do
’: 
A
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ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 a
nd
 th
e 
ac
t o
f 
se
ei
ng
 w
hi
ch
 is
 in
 th
e 
ey
e,
 
no
r 
is
 it
 u
nf
itt
in
g 
th
at
 f
ro
m
 s
uc
h 
th
in
gs
 s
ep
ar
at
ed
 b
y 
pl
ac
e 
an
d 
su
bj
ec
t t
he
re
 c
om
es
 a
bo
ut
 a
n 
en
s c
op
ul
at
um
. 
 
 
 
A
d 
ra
tio
ne
s 
in
 c
on
tra
riu
m
 r
es
po
nd
et
ur
. 
A
d 
pr
im
am
, 
qu
an
do
 
di
ci
tu
r 
qu
od
 s
i 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
co
m
po
ne
re
tu
r 
ex
 r
eb
us
, 
{s
eq
ui
tu
r 
qu
od
}2
35
 i
nt
er
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 e
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 p
os
se
t 
av
is
 v
ol
ar
e,
 
di
ce
nd
um
 d
is
tin
gu
en
do
 d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
 e
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
o 
qu
am
 p
os
su
nt
 
ac
ci
pi
 <
ve
l>
23
6  
pr
o 
re
bu
s, 
<v
el
>2
37
 p
ro
 v
oc
ib
us
, 
{e
t}
23
8  
pr
o 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
. 
Si
 
ac
ci
pi
un
tu
r 
pr
o 
re
bu
s, 
tu
nc
 
{i
d}
23
9
H
er
e 
ar
e 
re
sp
on
se
s 
to
 t
he
 r
ea
so
ns
 t
o 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ry
. T
o 
th
e 
fir
st
, w
he
n 
it 
is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 if
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t w
er
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 
th
in
gs
, 
it 
w
ou
ld
 f
ol
lo
w
 t
ha
t 
a 
bi
rd
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
ab
le
 t
o 
fly
 
be
tw
ee
n 
a 
su
bj
ec
t 
an
d 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 o
ne
 s
ho
ul
d 
re
sp
on
d 
to
 
th
is
 o
bj
ec
tio
n 
by
 m
ak
in
g 
a 
di
st
in
ct
io
n 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 ‘s
ub
je
ct
’ 
an
d 
‘p
re
di
ca
te
’, 
in
so
fa
r a
s t
he
y 
ca
n 
be
 ta
ke
n 
to
 m
ea
n 
th
in
gs
, 
or
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
, o
r c
on
ce
pt
s. 
If
 th
ey
 a
re
 ta
ke
n 
to
 m
ea
n 
th
in
gs
, 
th
en
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
de
du
ce
d 
is
 n
ot
 p
ro
bl
em
at
ic
. 
 
qu
od
 
de
du
ci
tu
r, 
no
n 
es
t i
nc
on
ve
ni
en
s. 
 
 
A
d 
al
ia
 d
uo
 s
eq
ue
nt
ia
, 
cu
m
 d
ic
itu
r 
qu
od
 i
nt
er
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 e
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 <
es
se
nt
 v
el
>2
40
 p
os
se
nt
 e
ss
e 
{m
ill
e}
24
1  
m
ila
ria
, 
di
ce
nd
um
 q
uo
d,
 a
cc
ip
ie
nd
o 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 e
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 p
ro
 
re
bu
s, 
[h
oc
]2
42
To
 th
e 
ot
he
r t
w
o 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
it,
 w
he
n 
it 
is
 sa
id
 th
at
 b
et
w
ee
n 
a 
su
bj
ec
t 
an
d 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
th
er
e 
co
ul
d 
be
 1
00
0 
m
ile
s, 
on
e 
ou
gh
t t
o 
sa
y 
th
at
, b
y 
ta
ki
ng
 u
p 
‘s
ub
je
ct
’ a
nd
 ‘p
re
di
ca
te
’ f
or
 
th
in
gs
, t
hi
s i
s t
ru
e.
 
 e
st
 v
er
um
. 
 
 
A
d 
al
iu
d,
 {
cu
m
}2
43
 d
ic
itu
r 
[q
uo
d]
24
4
To
 t
he
 o
th
er
, 
w
he
n 
it 
is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
, 
if 
m
y 
po
si
tio
n 
w
er
e 
co
rr
ec
t, 
th
en
 s
om
e 
st
at
em
en
t w
ou
ld
 b
e 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 b
od
y 
 <
si
 s
ic
, 
tu
nc
 a
liq
ua
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
co
m
po
ne
re
tu
r 
ex
 c
or
po
re
 e
t a
ni
m
a 
in
te
lle
ct
u,
 e
t p
er
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23
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ve
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 A
, B
 
23
9  ‘
ill
ud
 a
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: A
, B
 
24
0  B
 
24
1  ‘
ce
nt
um
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A
, B
 
24
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, B
 
24
3  ‘
qu
an
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co
ns
eq
ue
ns
>2
45
 
al
iq
ua
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
{e
ss
et
}2
46
 
ho
m
o,
 
qu
ia
 
<a
liq
ua
>2
47
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ex
 
co
rp
or
e 
et
 
an
im
a 
in
te
lle
ct
iv
a,
 d
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
ex
 h
oc
 n
on
 s
eq
ui
tu
r 
qu
od
 a
liq
ua
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
si
t 
ho
m
o.
 E
t 
{c
um
}2
48
 d
ic
itu
r 
<q
uo
d>
24
9  
om
ne
 
[q
uo
d]
25
0  
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ex
 c
or
po
re
 e
t 
an
im
a 
in
te
lle
ct
iv
a 
es
t 
ho
m
o,
 d
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
om
ne
 c
om
po
si
tu
m
 e
x 
co
rp
or
e 
et
 a
ni
m
a 
in
te
lle
ct
iv
a 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
 r
ea
li 
es
t 
ho
m
o.
 T
am
en
 n
on
 o
po
rte
t 
om
ne
 
co
m
po
si
tu
m
 
{e
x 
co
rp
or
e 
et
 
an
im
a 
in
te
lle
ct
iv
a 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
 in
te
lle
ct
ua
li}
25
1
an
d 
in
te
lle
ct
iv
e 
so
ul
, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 s
om
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
hu
m
an
, 
be
ca
us
e 
so
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 c
om
po
se
d 
ou
t o
f b
od
y 
an
d 
in
te
lle
ct
iv
e 
so
ul
, o
ne
 s
ho
ul
d 
sa
y 
th
at
 fr
om
 
m
y 
po
si
tio
n 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 f
ol
lo
w
 t
ha
t 
so
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 a
 
hu
m
an
. 
A
nd
 w
he
n 
it 
is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 e
ve
ry
th
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 b
od
y 
an
d 
in
te
lle
ct
iv
e 
so
ul
 i
s 
a 
hu
m
an
, 
on
e 
sh
ou
ld
 
sa
y 
th
at
 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 
bo
dy
 
an
d 
in
te
lle
ct
iv
e 
so
ul
 b
y 
a 
re
al
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
is
 a
 h
um
an
. Y
et
 it
 is
 
no
t 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
th
at
 e
ve
ry
th
in
g 
co
m
po
se
d 
ou
t 
of
 b
od
y 
an
d 
in
te
lle
ct
iv
e 
so
ul
 b
y 
an
 in
te
lle
ct
ua
l c
om
po
si
tio
n 
is
 a
 h
um
an
. 
 si
t h
om
o.
 
 
 
Se
d 
du
bi
um
 
es
t 
an
 
ip
si
 
co
pu
la
e 
ex
is
te
nt
i 
in
 
in
te
lle
ct
u 
co
rr
es
po
nd
ea
t 
al
iq
ui
d 
in
 r
e 
au
t 
no
n.
 D
ic
en
du
m
 <
es
t>
25
2  
qu
od
 
co
pu
la
e 
ex
is
te
nt
i i
n 
in
te
lle
ct
u 
co
pu
la
nt
i e
xt
re
m
a 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 
{v
er
e}
25
3  
ad
in
vi
ce
m
, 
{c
or
re
sp
on
de
t 
al
iq
ui
d}
25
4  
[in
 
re
]2
55
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
id
en
tit
as
 
[e
xt
re
m
or
um
 
ve
l 
id
en
tit
as
]2
56
 
eo
ru
m
 
pr
o 
qu
ib
us
 e
xt
re
m
a 
<p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
s>
25
7
B
ut
 t
he
re
 i
s 
a 
do
ub
t 
w
he
th
er
 o
r 
no
t 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 i
n 
re
al
ity
 
co
rr
es
po
nd
s 
to
 a
 c
op
ul
a 
ex
is
tin
g 
in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
. I
t m
us
t b
e 
sa
id
 t
ha
t 
to
 t
he
 c
op
ul
a 
ex
is
tin
g 
in
 t
he
 i
nt
el
le
ct
, 
tru
ly
 
co
pu
la
tin
g 
th
e 
ex
tre
m
es
 o
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t, 
th
er
e 
co
rr
es
po
nd
s 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 in
 re
al
ity
, n
am
el
y 
th
e 
id
en
tit
y 
of
 th
e 
ex
tre
m
es
 o
r 
of
 t
ho
se
 f
or
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 e
xt
re
m
es
 s
up
po
si
t. 
M
or
eo
ve
r, 
to
 a
 
 s
up
po
nu
nt
. 
D
iv
is
io
ni
 v
er
o 
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25
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25
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fir
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25
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{v
el
}2
58
 
ne
ga
tio
ni
 
co
pu
la
e 
in
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
ne
ga
tiv
a 
ve
ra
 
co
rr
es
po
nd
et
 a
liq
ui
d 
in
 r
e,
 s
ci
lic
et
 d
iv
er
si
ta
s 
ex
tre
m
or
um
 v
el
 
ill
or
um
 p
ro
 q
ui
bu
s 
 e
xt
re
m
a 
su
pp
on
un
t. 
{S
ed
}2
59
 c
op
ul
ae
 
ex
is
te
nt
i 
in
 i
nt
el
le
ct
u 
co
pu
la
nt
i 
ex
tre
m
a 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 f
al
sa
e 
ad
in
vi
ce
m
 n
ih
il 
co
rr
es
po
nd
et
 in
 re
 n
is
i i
ps
a 
ex
tre
m
a,
 u
t p
at
et
 d
e 
co
pu
la
 h
ui
us
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
s, 
‘h
om
o 
es
t 
as
in
us
’. 
Si
m
ili
te
r 
ne
c 
di
vi
si
on
i 
{v
el
}2
60
 
ne
ga
tio
ni
 
co
pu
la
e 
in
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
fa
ls
a 
ne
ga
tiv
a 
ni
hi
l 
co
rr
es
po
nd
et
 i
n 
re
 n
is
i 
ip
sa
 e
xt
re
m
a.
 E
t 
si
 
qu
ae
ra
tu
r 
a 
qu
o 
er
go
 m
ov
et
ur
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
 a
d 
fa
br
ic
an
du
m
 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
co
pu
la
m
 
{v
el
}2
61
 
di
vi
si
on
em
 
ve
l 
ne
ga
tio
ne
m
 
co
pu
la
e,
 d
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
m
ov
et
ur
 n
is
i 
ab
 <
ip
si
us
>2
62
 
ex
tre
m
is
 
ip
si
s 
in
 
pr
op
os
tio
ne
 
et
 
a 
vo
lu
nt
at
e 
im
pe
ra
nt
e 
in
te
lle
ct
ui
 
ad
 
co
pu
la
nd
um
 
ex
tre
m
a 
ad
in
vi
ce
m
 
ve
l 
ad
 
di
vi
de
nd
um
 e
xt
re
m
a 
ab
in
vi
ce
m
 [s
i p
ro
po
si
tio
 si
t f
al
sa
]2
63
di
vi
si
on
 o
r 
to
 a
 n
eg
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 c
op
ul
a 
in
 a
 t
ru
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
th
er
e 
co
rr
es
po
nd
s 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 i
n 
re
al
ity
, 
na
m
el
y 
th
e 
di
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
th
e 
ex
tre
m
es
 o
r 
of
 t
ho
se
 f
or
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 
ex
tre
m
es
 s
up
po
si
t. 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 to
 a
 d
iv
is
io
n 
or
 to
 a
 n
eg
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
co
pu
la
 
in
 
a 
fa
ls
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
no
th
in
g 
co
rr
es
po
nd
s 
in
 r
ea
lit
y 
ex
ce
pt
 t
ho
se
 e
xt
re
m
es
, 
as
 i
s 
w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
co
pu
la
 in
 th
is
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
‘A
 h
um
an
 is
 a
 a
ss
’. 
 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 n
ot
hi
ng
 c
or
re
sp
on
ds
 to
 a
 d
iv
is
io
n 
or
 to
 a
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
co
pu
la
 
in
 
a 
fa
ls
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
pr
op
os
iti
on
 
ex
pe
ct
 
th
os
e 
ex
tre
m
es
. A
nd
 if
 o
ne
 w
er
e 
to
 a
sk
 b
y 
w
ha
t t
he
re
fo
re
 is
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 m
ov
ed
 t
o 
cr
ea
tin
g 
a 
co
pu
la
 o
f 
th
is
 s
or
t 
or
 a
 
di
vi
si
on
 o
r 
ne
ga
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
co
pu
la
, i
t m
us
t b
e 
sa
id
 th
at
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 is
 o
nl
y 
m
ov
ed
 b
y 
th
os
e 
ex
tre
m
es
 in
 th
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
an
d 
by
 t
he
 w
ill
 c
om
m
an
di
ng
 t
he
 i
nt
el
le
ct
 t
o 
pu
t 
th
e 
ex
tre
m
es
 to
ge
th
er
 o
r t
o 
di
vi
de
 th
em
 fr
om
 o
ne
 a
no
th
er
.  
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{V
id
et
ur
 a
ut
em
 p
ra
et
er
 e
os
 q
ui
 d
ic
ti 
su
nt
 a
lte
r 
es
se
 p
ri
or
is 
m
od
us
. E
or
um
 n
am
 q
ua
e 
co
nv
er
tu
nt
ur
 se
cu
nd
um
 e
ss
en
tia
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
m
 q
uo
d 
al
te
ru
m
 a
lte
ri
 q
uo
m
od
ol
ib
et
 c
au
sa
 e
st
 
di
gn
e 
pr
iu
s 
na
tu
ra
m
 d
ic
itu
r,
 q
ui
a 
ve
ro
 q
ua
ed
am
 s
un
t 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
pa
la
m
 e
st
. 
Es
se
 n
am
qu
e 
ho
m
in
em
 c
on
ve
rt
itu
r 
se
cu
nd
um
 
es
se
nt
ia
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
m
 
ad
 
ve
ra
m
 
de
 
se
 
or
at
io
ne
m
. 
N
am
 s
i 
ho
m
o 
es
t, 
ve
ra
 e
st
 o
ra
tio
 q
ua
 d
ic
itu
r,
 
qu
ia
 h
om
o 
es
t, 
et
 h
om
o 
co
nv
er
tit
ur
 o
ra
tio
 q
ui
a 
es
t, 
na
m
 s
i 
ve
ra
 e
st
 o
ra
tio
 q
ua
 d
ic
itu
r,
 q
ui
a 
ho
m
o 
es
t, 
ho
m
in
em
 e
ss
e 
ne
ce
ss
e 
es
t. 
Es
t 
au
te
m
 v
er
a 
or
at
io
 n
eq
ua
qu
am
 c
au
sa
 q
uo
d 
re
s 
sit
. V
er
um
ta
m
en
 v
id
et
ur
 r
es
 e
ss
e 
qu
od
am
m
od
o 
ca
us
a,
 
ut
 s
it 
or
at
io
 v
er
a.
 D
um
 n
am
 r
es
 e
st
 v
el
 r
es
 n
on
 e
st
, v
er
a 
or
at
io
 a
ut
 f
al
sa
 d
ic
at
ur
 n
ec
es
se
 e
st
. 
Id
eo
qu
e 
se
cu
nd
um
 
qu
in
qu
e 
m
od
os
 p
ri
us
 a
lte
ru
m
 a
lte
ro
 d
ic
itu
r}
26
4
It
 se
em
s h
ow
ev
er
 th
at
 th
er
e 
is
 a
no
th
er
 m
od
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
io
r 
be
yo
nd
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 w
er
e 
m
en
tio
ne
d.
 F
or
 o
f t
ho
se
 w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
co
nv
er
te
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 t
he
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
 o
f 
es
se
nc
e,
 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
in
 s
om
e 
w
ay
 t
he
 c
au
se
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
is 
ri
gh
tly
 c
al
le
d 
pr
io
r 
by
 n
at
ur
e.
 T
ha
t 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
ki
nd
s 
of
 
th
is
 s
or
t 
is 
cl
ea
r.
 F
or
 b
ei
ng
 a
 h
um
an
 i
s 
co
nv
er
te
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 t
he
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
 o
f 
es
se
nc
e 
to
 a
 t
ru
e 
se
nt
en
ce
 a
bo
ut
 it
se
lf.
 F
or
 if
 a
 h
um
an
 is
, t
he
 s
en
te
nc
e 
by
 
w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 a
 h
um
an
 is
, i
s 
tr
ue
, a
nd
 a
 h
um
an
 is
 
co
nv
er
te
d 
w
ith
 a
 s
en
te
nc
e,
 th
at
 h
e 
is
. F
or
 if
 th
e 
se
nt
en
ce
 
is
 t
ru
e 
by
 w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 a
 h
um
an
 is
, a
 h
um
an
’s
 
ex
is
tin
g 
is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
. H
ow
ev
er
 a
 t
ru
e 
se
nt
en
ce
 is
 n
ev
er
 
th
e 
ca
us
e 
th
at
 a
 t
hi
ng
 i
s. 
Y
et
 i
t 
do
es
 s
ee
m
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
th
in
g’
s 
be
in
g 
is
 in
 s
om
e 
w
ay
 th
e 
ca
us
e 
th
at
 th
e 
se
nt
en
ce
 
is
 t
ru
e.
 F
or
 w
hi
le
 a
 t
hi
ng
 i
s 
or
 a
 t
hi
ng
 i
s 
no
t, 
it 
is 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
th
at
 t
he
 s
en
te
nc
e 
is 
ca
lle
d 
tr
ue
 o
r 
fa
ls
e.
 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
in
 fi
ve
 w
ay
s i
s o
ne
 c
al
le
d 
pr
io
r 
to
 a
no
th
er
. 
.  
 
 
 
H
ae
c 
es
t q
ui
nt
a 
{p
ar
tic
ul
a}
26
5  h
ui
us
 c
ap
itu
li 
in
 q
ua
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 
{a
dd
it}
26
6  
qu
in
tu
m
 m
od
um
 <
pr
io
ris
>2
67
 d
ic
en
s 
qu
od
 {
pr
ae
te
r 
m
od
os
}2
68
 q
ui
 d
ic
ti 
su
nt
 e
st
 {
un
us
 a
liu
s}
26
9 , 
sc
ili
ce
t {
qu
od
}2
70
 
al
iq
ua
 c
on
ve
rtu
nt
ur
 s
ec
un
du
m
 {
na
tu
ra
m
}2
71
Th
is
 is
 th
e 
fif
th
 p
ar
t o
f t
hi
s 
ch
ap
te
r, 
in
 w
hi
ch
 A
ris
to
tle
 a
dd
s 
a 
fif
th
 m
od
e 
of
 p
rio
rit
y,
 s
ay
in
g 
th
at
 b
ey
on
d 
th
e 
m
od
es
 
w
hi
ch
 w
er
e 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
th
er
e 
is
 a
no
th
er
 o
ne
, 
na
m
el
y 
th
at
 
w
he
n 
so
m
e 
th
in
gs
 
ar
e 
co
nv
er
tib
le
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
, e
t 
un
um
 i
llo
ru
m
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 B
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un
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B
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m
’: 
A
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es
t 
ca
us
a 
al
te
riu
s, 
tu
nc
 i
llu
d 
qu
od
 e
st
 c
au
sa
 [
al
te
riu
s]
27
2  
es
t 
pr
iu
s 
na
tu
ra
 q
ua
m
 i
llu
d 
cu
iu
s 
es
t 
ca
us
a.
 V
er
bi
 g
ra
tia
, 
ha
ec
 
or
at
io
, ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t’,
 e
t 
{h
ae
c 
or
at
io
, ‘
‘h
om
o 
es
t’ 
es
t 
ve
ra
’}
27
3 , 
co
nv
er
tu
nt
ur
. 
N
am
 h
om
in
em
 e
ss
e 
et
 h
om
in
em
 e
ss
e 
<e
st
>2
74
 
ve
ru
m
 c
on
ve
rtu
nt
ur
. {
N
am
}2
75
 s
eq
ui
tu
r, 
‘h
om
o 
es
t, 
er
go
 h
ae
c 
es
t v
er
a,
 ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t’’
, e
t c
on
ve
rs
o,
 <
sc
ili
ce
t>
27
6  
ha
ec
 e
st
 v
er
a,
 
‘‘
ho
m
o 
es
t’,
 e
rg
o 
ho
m
o 
es
t’.
 S
ed
 h
om
in
em
 e
ss
e 
es
t c
au
sa
 q
ua
re
 
ha
ec
 e
st
 v
er
a,
 ‘h
om
o 
es
t’,
 e
t n
on
 e
co
nv
er
so
. {
U
nd
e 
qu
ia
 h
om
o 
es
t, 
ha
ec
 o
ra
tio
 e
st
 v
er
a 
qu
ae
 d
ic
it 
ho
m
in
em
 e
ss
e}
27
7 . 
N
am
 in
 
eo
 q
uo
d 
re
s 
es
t v
el
 n
on
 e
st
, {
es
t o
ra
tio
}2
78
 v
er
a 
ve
l f
al
sa
, s
ed
 
is
ta
 o
ra
tio
, ‘
‘h
om
o 
es
t’ 
es
t v
er
a’
 n
on
 e
st
 c
au
sa
 {
qu
ar
e}
27
9  h
om
o 
es
t, 
et
 id
eo
 h
om
in
em
 e
ss
e 
es
t p
riu
s 
{q
ua
m
 h
ae
c 
or
at
io
, ‘
‘h
om
o 
es
t’ 
{e
st
}2
80
 v
er
a’
}2
81
. U
nd
e 
br
ev
ite
r q
ui
nt
us
 m
od
us
 p
rio
ru
s 
es
t 
{q
ua
nd
o}
28
2  i
llu
d 
qu
od
 c
on
ve
rti
tu
r c
um
 a
liq
uo
 [e
t]2
83
 e
st
 c
au
sa
 
ill
iu
s, 
es
t n
at
ur
al
ite
r p
riu
s {
ill
o}
28
4
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e,
 a
nd
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
os
e 
is
 t
he
 c
au
se
 o
f 
th
e 
ot
he
r, 
th
en
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e 
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r i
s p
rio
r i
n 
na
tu
re
 to
 
th
at
 o
f 
w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 a
 c
au
se
. F
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 th
is
 s
en
te
nc
e,
 ‘
A
 
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s’
, a
nd
 th
is
 se
nt
en
ce
, ‘
‘A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
 is
 tr
ue
’, 
ar
e 
co
nv
er
tib
le
s. 
Fo
r 
a 
hu
m
an
’s
 e
xi
st
in
g,
 a
nd
 a
 h
um
an
’s
 
ex
is
tin
g 
be
in
g 
tru
e 
ar
e 
co
nv
er
tib
le
. 
Fo
r 
it 
fo
llo
w
s:
 ‘
A
 
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
th
is
 is
 tr
ue
: ‘
A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
’, 
an
d,
 
co
nv
er
se
ly
: 
‘T
hi
s 
is
 t
ru
e,
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
a 
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s’
. 
B
ut
 a
 h
um
an
’s
 e
xi
st
in
g 
is
 t
he
 c
au
se
 b
y 
w
hi
ch
 t
hi
s 
is
 t
ru
e:
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
, 
an
d 
no
t 
co
nv
er
se
ly
. 
H
en
ce
, b
ec
au
se
 a
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
th
at
 s
en
te
nc
e 
is
 tr
ue
 w
hi
ch
 
sa
ys
 t
ha
t 
a 
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s. 
Fo
r 
it 
is
 i
n 
th
is
 –
 t
ha
t 
a 
th
in
g 
ex
is
ts
 o
r d
oe
s n
ot
 e
xi
st
 –
 th
at
 a
 se
nt
en
ce
 is
 tr
ue
 o
r f
al
se
. B
ut
 
th
at
 se
nt
en
ce
, ‘
‘A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
 is
 tr
ue
’, 
is
 n
ot
 th
e 
ca
us
e 
by
 
w
hi
ch
 a
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
an
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
a 
hu
m
an
’s
 e
xi
st
in
g 
is
 
pr
io
r b
y 
na
tu
re
. H
en
ce
, b
rie
fly
, t
he
 fi
fth
 m
od
e 
of
 p
rio
rit
y 
is
 
w
he
n 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
co
nv
er
tib
le
 w
ith
 a
no
th
er
 a
nd
 i
s 
th
e 
ca
us
e 
of
 it
, i
s n
at
ur
al
ly
 p
rio
r t
o 
it.
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C
irc
a 
is
ta
m
 p
ar
te
m
 s
un
t t
ria
 in
te
lli
ge
nd
a.
 P
rim
o 
qu
od
 e
x 
di
ct
is
 
{A
ris
to
te
lis
}2
85
 
[h
ic
]2
86
 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r 
un
um
 
co
m
m
un
e 
di
ct
um
 
an
tiq
uo
ru
m
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
qu
od
 o
m
ni
s 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
co
nv
er
tit
ur
 c
um
 
{v
er
o}
28
7  
en
un
ci
at
o 
de
 s
uo
 d
ic
to
, 
ho
c 
es
t, 
om
ni
s 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
co
nv
er
tit
ur
 
cu
m
 
{a
lia
}2
88
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
in
 
qu
a 
ve
ru
m
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
de
 d
ic
to
 i
lli
us
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
s, 
et
 h
oc
 [
se
cu
nd
um
 
qu
od
]2
89
 il
lu
d 
di
ct
um
 s
up
po
ni
t p
ro
 {
su
pp
os
iti
on
e}
29
0
C
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
at
 p
ar
t, 
w
e 
ne
ed
 t
o 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 t
hr
ee
 t
hi
ng
s. 
Fi
rs
t, 
th
at
 g
iv
en
 t
he
se
 w
or
ds
 A
ris
to
tle
 a
cc
ep
ts
 h
er
e 
a 
ge
ne
ra
l d
ic
tu
m
 o
f 
th
e 
ol
d 
ph
ilo
so
ph
er
s, 
na
m
el
y 
th
at
 e
ve
ry
 
st
at
em
en
t i
s 
co
nv
er
tib
le
 w
ith
 a
 tr
ue
 s
ta
te
m
en
t a
bo
ut
 it
s 
ow
n 
di
ct
um
, t
ha
t i
s, 
ev
er
y 
st
at
em
en
t i
s 
co
nv
er
tib
le
 w
ith
 a
no
th
er
 
st
at
em
en
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 ‘t
ru
e’
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 th
e 
di
ct
um
 o
f t
ha
t 
st
at
em
en
t, 
an
d 
th
is
 is
 b
ec
au
se
 th
at
 d
ic
tu
m
 s
up
po
si
ts
 fo
r t
he
 
st
at
em
en
t o
f w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 a
n 
di
ct
um
. 
 c
ui
us
 e
st
 
di
ct
um
. 
 
 
Se
cu
nd
um
 e
st
 in
te
lli
ge
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
cu
m
 d
ic
itu
r {
ex
}2
91
 e
o 
qu
od
 
re
s 
es
t 
ve
l n
on
 e
st
, e
t c
et
er
a,
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 <
pe
r 
‘r
em
’>
29
2  
no
n 
in
te
lli
gi
t r
em
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
am
 p
er
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
, n
ec
 re
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
am
 
pe
r 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, 
qu
ia
 d
e 
no
n 
en
te
 v
er
e 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
al
iq
ui
d 
ta
nq
ua
m
 d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
, q
ui
a 
de
 n
on
 e
nt
e 
ve
ru
m
 e
st
 d
ic
er
e 
ip
su
m
 
es
se
 n
on
 e
ns
, 
et
 i
ta
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 a
ff
irm
at
iv
a 
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
ve
ra
 
qu
am
vi
s 
re
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
 p
er
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 s
it 
no
n 
en
s, 
se
d 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 p
er
 ‘
re
m
’ 
in
te
lli
gi
t 
re
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
am
 p
er
 t
ot
am
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
em
, e
t t
un
c 
in
te
lli
gi
tu
r s
ic
: {
ex
}2
93
 e
o 
qu
od
 r
es
 e
st
, 
ho
c 
es
t, 
ex
 e
o 
qu
od
 it
a 
es
t s
ic
ut
 <
ve
ra
>2
94
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 
es
t p
ro
po
si
tio
 v
er
a,
 [
et
 e
x 
eo
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
es
t i
ta
 s
ic
ut
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
fa
ls
a]
29
5
Se
co
nd
, 
w
e 
m
us
t 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 t
ha
t 
w
he
n 
it 
is
 s
ai
d 
on
 
ac
co
un
t o
f t
hi
s 
th
at
 a
 th
in
g 
ex
is
ts
 o
r 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
, e
tc
., 
A
ris
to
tle
 d
oe
s 
no
t u
nd
er
st
an
d 
by
 ‘t
hi
ng
’ t
he
 th
in
g 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
no
r 
th
e 
th
in
g 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 t
hr
ou
gh
 t
he
 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 is
 tr
ul
y 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 o
f 
a 
no
n-
be
in
g 
as
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
, b
ec
au
se
 it
 is
 tr
ue
 to
 s
ay
 o
f 
a 
no
n-
be
in
g 
th
at
 it
 is
 n
ot
 a
 b
ei
ng
, a
nd
 so
 a
n 
af
fir
m
at
iv
e 
st
at
em
en
t c
an
 b
e 
tru
e 
al
th
ou
gh
 t
he
 t
hi
ng
 s
ig
ni
fie
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
is
 
no
t 
a 
be
in
g.
 R
at
he
r, 
by
 ‘
th
in
g’
, 
A
ris
to
tle
 u
nd
er
st
an
ds
 t
he
 
th
in
g 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
an
d 
th
en
 it
 is
 
un
de
rs
to
od
 i
n 
th
is
 w
ay
: 
on
 a
cc
ou
nt
 o
f 
th
is
 t
ha
t 
a 
th
in
g 
ex
is
ts
, t
ha
t i
s, 
fr
om
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 it
 is
 ju
st
 a
s 
th
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
. 
Et
 e
x 
ho
c 
pa
te
t 
{q
uo
d 
pe
r 
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tu
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96
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
ur
 
al
iq
ua
 re
s c
om
pl
ex
a 
qu
ae
 n
on
 e
st
 p
ro
pr
ie
 a
liq
ua
 re
s [
pr
ec
is
e]
29
7  
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
 [p
er
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
, n
ec
 <
pr
ae
ci
se
>2
98
 re
s 
si
gn
ifi
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ta
]2
99
 
pe
r 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, s
ed
 a
gg
re
ga
tu
m
 e
x 
hi
s, 
{e
t}
30
0  
ill
a 
re
s 
qu
ae
 
es
t u
lti
m
um
 e
t a
da
eq
ua
tu
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
um
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
s 
in
 v
oc
e 
et
 i
n 
co
nc
ep
tu
 e
st
 {
qu
ae
da
m
}3
01
 e
ns
 c
op
ul
at
um
, 
et
 [
pr
op
te
r 
ho
c]
30
2  
po
te
st
 d
ic
i 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
in
 r
e,
 s
ic
ut
 d
ec
la
ra
tu
m
 e
st
 i
n 
pr
in
ci
pi
o 
{h
ui
us
}3
03
si
gn
ifi
es
, t
he
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
s 
tru
e.
 A
nd
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 it
 is
 
no
t 
as
 t
he
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
si
gn
ifi
es
, t
he
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
is
 f
al
se
. A
nd
 
fr
om
 th
is
 it
 is
 c
le
ar
 th
at
 th
ro
ug
h 
a 
st
at
em
en
t i
n 
sp
ee
ch
 a
nd
 
al
so
 i
n 
co
nc
ep
t 
so
m
e 
co
m
pl
ex
 t
hi
ng
 i
s 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
no
t 
pr
op
er
ly
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 p
re
ci
se
ly
 s
ig
ni
fie
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
no
r 
is
 i
t 
a 
th
in
g 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 p
re
ci
se
ly
 t
hr
ou
gh
 t
he
 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 b
ut
 i
t 
is
 a
n 
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
of
 t
he
se
, 
an
d 
th
at
 t
hi
ng
 
w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e 
fin
al
 a
nd
 a
de
qu
at
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
 o
f a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
n 
sp
ee
ch
 a
nd
 i
n 
co
nc
ep
t 
is
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 e
ns
 c
op
ul
at
um
, a
nd
 o
n 
ac
co
un
t 
of
 t
hi
s 
it 
ca
n 
be
 c
al
le
d 
a 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
in
 r
e,
 j
us
t 
as
 
w
as
 st
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
pr
ol
og
ue
 o
f t
hi
s b
oo
k.
 
 li
br
i. 
 
 
Te
rti
o 
es
t i
nt
el
lig
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
cu
m
 d
ic
itu
r a
liq
ui
d 
es
t p
riu
s 
al
io
 
na
tu
ra
, 
pe
r 
ho
c 
no
n 
de
no
ta
tu
r 
qu
od
 i
llu
d 
pr
iu
s 
si
t 
in
 a
liq
ua
 
m
en
su
ra
 in
 q
ua
 n
on
 e
st
 p
os
te
riu
s, 
ut
 s
i a
 s
it 
pr
iu
s 
na
tu
ra
 q
ua
m
 
b,
 e
x 
ho
c 
no
n 
se
qu
itu
r q
uo
d 
a 
si
t a
liq
ua
nd
o 
qu
an
do
 n
on
 e
st
 b
, 
ve
l {
qu
od
}3
04
 a
 fu
it 
ve
l e
rit
 a
liq
ua
nd
o 
qu
an
do
 n
on
 fu
it 
ve
l e
rit
 
b.
 N
ec
 e
st
 d
ic
er
e 
si
cu
t q
ui
da
m
 fi
ng
un
t q
uo
d 
qu
ae
da
m
 in
st
an
tia
 
na
tu
ra
e 
ita
 q
uo
d 
pr
iu
s 
na
tu
ra
 e
st
 in
 a
liq
uo
 in
st
an
ti 
in
 q
uo
 n
on
 
es
t 
po
st
er
iu
s 
na
tu
ra
, 
qu
ia
 i
llu
d 
in
st
an
s 
au
t 
es
t 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
 a
ut
 
ac
ci
de
ns
. N
on
 <
es
t>
30
5
Th
ird
, 
w
e 
m
us
t 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 
th
at
 
w
he
n 
it 
is
 
sa
id
 
th
at
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 i
s 
pr
io
r 
by
 n
at
ur
e 
to
 a
no
th
er
, t
hr
ou
gh
 t
hi
s 
it 
is
 
no
t d
en
ot
ed
 th
at
 th
e 
pr
io
r 
is
 in
 s
om
e 
m
ea
su
re
d 
am
ou
nt
 in
 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
 p
os
te
rio
r 
is
 n
ot
. 
Fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 i
f 
a 
is
 p
rio
r 
by
 
na
tu
re
 t
o 
b,
 f
ro
m
 t
hi
s 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 f
ol
lo
w
 t
ha
t 
a 
ex
is
ts
 a
t 
so
m
e 
tim
e 
th
at
 b
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
ex
is
t, 
or
 t
ha
t 
a 
ex
is
te
d 
or
 w
ill
 
ex
is
t 
at
 a
 t
im
e 
w
he
n 
b 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
. 
N
or
 d
oe
s 
it 
m
ea
n 
 
(ju
st
 a
s 
ce
rta
in
 in
di
vi
du
al
s 
pr
et
en
d)
 th
at
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 in
st
an
ce
 
of
 n
at
ur
e 
is
 s
uc
h 
th
at
 t
ha
t 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
pr
io
r 
by
 n
at
ur
e 
is
 i
n 
 s
ub
st
an
tia
, q
ui
a 
tu
nc
 c
um
 S
oc
ra
te
s 
si
t 
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pr
iu
s 
na
tu
ra
 
su
o 
ac
ci
de
nt
e,
 
So
cr
at
es
 
in
 
al
iq
ua
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
, 
[s
ci
lic
et
]3
06
 in
 S
oc
ra
te
s, 
ve
l i
n 
al
iq
ua
 p
ar
te
 {
So
cr
at
es
}3
07
 e
ss
et
 
pr
io
r s
uo
 a
cc
id
en
te
, q
uo
d 
no
n 
co
nt
in
gi
t d
ic
er
e.
 E
t s
i {
de
tu
r}
30
8  
qu
od
 s
it 
ac
ci
de
ns
, 
cu
m
 S
oc
ra
te
s 
si
t 
pr
io
r 
na
tu
ra
 o
m
ni
 s
uo
 
ac
ci
de
nt
e,
 s
eq
ui
tu
r 
qu
od
 S
oc
ra
te
s 
in
 a
liq
uo
 s
uo
 a
cc
id
en
te
 s
it 
pr
io
r 
om
ni
 s
uo
 a
cc
id
en
te
, q
uo
d 
es
t 
im
po
ss
ib
le
. E
t 
po
te
st
 h
oc
 
ar
gu
i 
de
 p
rim
a 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
 q
ua
e 
es
t 
de
us
, 
qu
od
 n
on
 e
st
 p
rio
r 
{n
at
ur
al
ite
r}
30
9  
om
ni
 
in
st
an
ti 
na
tu
ra
e.
 
Si
 
ta
lia
 
in
st
an
tia
 
{d
ar
en
tu
r e
rg
o 
de
us
 in
 a
liq
uo
 in
st
an
ti 
na
tu
ra
e 
es
se
t p
rio
r o
m
ni
 
in
st
an
ti 
na
tu
ra
e.
 S
ig
ni
fic
ar
et
ur
 i
gi
tu
r 
qu
od
 d
eu
s 
in
 a
liq
uo
 
in
st
an
ti 
fo
re
t p
rio
r o
m
ni
 in
st
an
ti 
qu
an
do
 il
lu
d 
in
st
an
s n
on
 e
ss
et
, 
qu
od
 e
st
 in
co
nv
en
ie
ns
}3
10
so
m
e 
in
st
an
ce
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 i
ts
 p
os
te
rio
r 
by
 n
at
ur
e 
is
 n
ot
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
at
 in
st
an
ce
 is
 e
ith
er
 a
 s
ub
st
an
ce
 o
r a
n 
ac
ci
de
nt
. I
t 
is
 n
ot
 a
 s
ub
st
an
ce
, b
ec
au
se
 th
en
, s
in
ce
 S
oc
ra
te
s 
is
 p
rio
r 
by
 
na
tu
re
 t
o 
hi
s 
ac
ci
de
nt
s, 
So
cr
at
es
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
io
r 
to
 h
is
 
ac
ci
de
nt
 in
 s
om
e 
su
bs
ta
nc
e 
(n
am
el
y 
in
 S
oc
ra
te
s 
or
 in
 s
om
e 
pa
rt 
of
 S
oc
ra
te
s)
, w
hi
ch
 o
ne
 is
 n
ot
 a
bl
e 
to
 s
ay
. A
nd
 if
 it
 is
 
sa
id
 th
at
 th
at
 in
st
an
ce
 is
 a
n 
ac
ci
de
nt
, s
in
ce
 S
oc
ra
te
s 
is
 p
rio
r 
by
 n
at
ur
e 
to
 a
ll 
of
 h
is
 a
cc
id
en
ts
, i
t f
ol
lo
w
s 
th
at
 S
oc
ra
te
s, 
in
 
so
m
e 
ac
ci
de
nt
 o
f 
hi
s, 
is
 p
rio
r 
to
 e
ac
h 
of
 h
is
 a
cc
id
en
ts
, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 im
po
ss
ib
le
. A
nd
 w
e 
ca
n 
m
ak
e 
th
is
 a
rg
um
en
t w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
fir
st
 su
bs
ta
nc
e 
– 
G
od
 –
 th
at
 h
e 
is
 n
ot
 n
at
ur
al
ly
 
pr
io
r 
to
 e
ve
ry
 i
ns
ta
nc
e 
of
 n
at
ur
e.
 I
f 
in
st
an
ce
s 
of
 t
ha
t 
so
rt 
w
er
e 
po
si
te
d,
 th
er
ef
or
e 
G
od
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
 s
om
e 
in
st
an
ce
 o
f 
na
tu
re
 t
ha
t 
is
 p
rio
r 
to
 e
ve
ry
 i
ns
ta
nc
e 
of
 n
at
ur
e,
 a
nd
 s
o 
it 
w
ou
ld
 fo
llo
w
 th
at
 G
od
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
 s
om
e 
in
st
an
ce
 o
f n
at
ur
e 
an
d 
th
en
 G
od
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
 so
m
e 
in
st
an
ce
 w
he
n 
th
at
 in
st
an
ce
 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
, w
hi
ch
 is
 p
ro
bl
em
at
ic
. 
.  
 
 
Ite
m
 p
riu
s 
na
tu
ra
 e
t 
po
st
er
iu
s 
na
tu
ra
 s
un
t 
in
 e
od
em
 i
ns
ta
nt
i 
te
m
po
ris
, u
t p
at
et
 d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
 e
t s
ua
 p
ro
pr
ia
 p
as
si
on
e.
 E
rg
o 
si
 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 s
it 
pr
iu
s 
na
tu
ra
 i
n 
al
iq
uo
 i
ns
ta
nt
i 
na
tu
ra
e 
in
 q
uo
 
<i
ns
ta
nt
i>
31
1
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 p
rio
r b
y 
na
tu
re
 a
nd
 p
os
te
rio
r b
y 
na
tu
re
 a
re
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
in
st
an
ce
 o
f 
tim
e,
 a
s 
is
 c
le
ar
 in
 t
he
 c
as
e 
of
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 
an
d 
its
 p
ro
pe
r a
ttr
ib
ut
e.
 T
he
re
fo
re
, i
f a
 su
bs
ta
nc
e 
w
er
e 
pr
io
r 
by
 n
at
ur
e 
in
 s
om
e 
in
st
an
ce
 o
f 
na
tu
re
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 i
ts
 o
w
n 
 s
ua
 p
as
si
o 
no
n 
es
t, 
se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 i
n 
eo
de
m
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us
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 e
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ic
 se
qu
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ur
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un
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ss
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po
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ur
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m
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m
po
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n 
qu
o 
<s
uu
m
>3
12
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 e
st
 s
ua
 p
as
si
o 
no
n 
es
t, 
et
 s
ic
 r
ep
ug
na
nt
ia
 [
et
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
ia
]3
13
 e
ss
en
t 
si
m
ul
 
ve
ra
 <
et
 s
ic
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
ia
 e
ss
en
t 
ve
ra
>3
14
 p
ro
 i
ns
ta
nt
i 
eo
de
m
 
te
m
po
ris
, 
qu
od
 e
st
 i
m
po
ss
ib
le
. 
D
ic
en
du
m
 e
st
 e
rg
o 
qu
od
 n
on
 
m
ag
is
 d
eb
et
 p
on
i 
in
st
an
s 
na
tu
ra
e 
qu
an
do
 a
liq
ui
d 
es
t 
pr
iu
s 
[n
at
ur
a]
31
5  a
lio
 q
ua
m
 d
eb
et
 p
on
i i
ns
ta
ns
 <
te
m
po
ris
>3
16
 h
on
or
is
 
ve
l 
pe
rf
ec
tio
ni
s 
[q
ua
nd
o 
al
iq
ui
d 
es
t 
pr
iu
s 
ho
no
re
 
ve
l 
pe
rf
ec
tio
ne
 a
lio
]3
17
. 
U
nd
e 
no
n 
es
t 
po
ne
re
 a
liu
d 
in
st
an
s 
qu
am
 
in
st
an
s 
te
m
po
ris
, 
ne
c 
pr
op
te
r 
ho
c 
qu
od
 a
liq
ui
d 
po
ni
tu
r 
pr
iu
s 
al
io
 
{a
liq
uo
ru
m
}3
18
 
is
to
ru
m
 
m
od
or
um
 
hi
c 
{p
os
ito
ru
m
}3
19
 
de
be
t p
on
i i
ns
ta
ns
 v
el
 m
en
su
ra
 in
 q
ua
  
pr
iu
s 
es
t, 
<v
el
>3
20
 f
ui
t 
ve
l [
er
it]
32
1 , 
et
 in
 {
ill
a 
po
st
er
iu
s}
32
2  
no
n 
es
t, 
<v
el
>3
23
 [
no
n]
32
4  
fu
it 
ve
l 
no
n 
er
it,
 n
is
i 
so
lu
m
 q
ua
nd
o 
al
iq
ui
d 
es
t 
pr
iu
s 
al
io
 
te
m
po
re
, [
qu
ia
]3
25
 tu
nc
 {
es
t v
er
um
}3
26
 d
ic
er
e 
qu
od
 p
riu
s e
st
 v
el
 
fu
it 
ve
l e
rit
 <
in
>3
27
 a
liq
uo
 in
st
an
ti 
ve
l <
in
>3
28
at
tri
bu
te
 d
id
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
, 
it 
w
ou
ld
 f
ol
lo
w
 t
ha
t 
in
 t
he
 s
am
e 
in
st
an
ce
 o
f t
im
e 
in
 w
hi
ch
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 e
xi
st
s, 
its
 o
w
n 
at
tri
bu
te
 
w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
, a
nd
 so
 o
pp
os
ite
s a
nd
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
ie
s w
ou
ld
 
be
 t
ru
e 
at
 o
nc
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
in
st
an
ce
 o
f 
tim
e,
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
im
po
ss
ib
le
. T
he
re
fo
re
, w
e 
ou
gh
t t
o 
sa
y 
th
at
 w
e 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 
ho
ld
 m
or
e 
hi
gh
ly
 a
n 
in
st
an
ce
 o
f 
na
tu
re
 w
he
n 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 is
 
pr
io
r 
by
 n
at
ur
e 
fr
om
 a
no
th
er
, 
th
an
 w
e 
sh
ou
ld
 h
ol
d 
an
 
in
st
an
ce
 o
f h
on
or
 o
r 
pe
rf
ec
tio
n 
w
he
n 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 is
 p
rio
r 
in
 
ho
no
r 
or
 p
er
fe
ct
io
n 
th
an
 a
no
th
er
. 
H
en
ce
 w
e 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 
ad
m
it 
so
m
e 
in
st
an
ce
 o
th
er
 th
an
 a
n 
in
st
an
ce
 o
f t
im
e,
 n
or
 o
n 
ac
co
un
t 
of
 t
hi
s, 
th
at
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 i
s 
re
ga
rd
ed
 a
s 
pr
io
r 
to
 
an
ot
he
r, 
sh
ou
ld
 w
e 
po
si
t a
n 
in
st
an
ce
 o
r a
 m
ea
su
re
d 
am
ou
nt
 
in
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 p
rio
r 
is
, 
w
as
, 
or
 w
ill
 b
e,
 a
nd
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
 
po
st
er
io
r i
s 
no
t, 
or
 w
as
 n
ot
, o
r w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e,
 in
 s
om
e 
of
 th
os
e 
m
od
es
 h
er
e 
po
si
te
d,
 e
xc
ep
t 
w
he
n 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 i
s 
pr
io
r 
to
 
an
ot
he
r i
n 
tim
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 th
en
 it
 is
 tr
ue
 to
 s
ay
 th
at
 th
e 
pr
io
r 
 a
liq
uo
 te
m
po
re
 
in
 q
uo
 p
os
te
riu
s n
on
 e
st
 v
el
 n
on
 fu
it 
ve
l n
on
 e
rit
. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
31
2  B
 
31
3  A
, B
 
31
4  A
 
31
5  A
 
31
6  B
 
31
7  B
 
31
8  ‘
al
iq
uo
’: 
A
 
31
9  ‘
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
to
ru
m
’: 
B
 
32
0  A
, B
 
32
1  A
 
32
2  ‘
is
to
 p
os
te
rio
ri’
: A
 
32
3  A
, B
 
32
4  B
 
32
5  A
, B
 
32
6  ‘
ve
ru
m
 e
ni
m
 e
st
’: 
A
, B
 
32
7  B
 
32
8  B
 
 
  
357 
is
, o
r 
w
as
, o
r 
w
ill
 b
e 
in
 s
om
e 
in
st
an
ce
 o
r 
in
 s
om
e 
tim
e 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
po
st
er
io
r i
s n
ot
, o
r w
as
 n
ot
, o
r w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e.
 
 
 
Pr
o 
qu
o 
sc
ie
nd
um
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
qu
od
da
m
 e
st
 p
riu
s 
in
 q
uo
, 
et
 
{i
d}
32
9  
es
t p
riu
s 
in
 q
uo
 p
riu
s 
te
m
po
re
 e
st
 v
el
 f
ui
t [
ve
l e
rit
]3
30
 
qu
am
 p
os
te
riu
s. 
Q
uo
dd
am
 e
st
 p
riu
s 
ex
 q
uo
, 
et
 s
ic
 [
pr
in
ci
pi
a 
ex
tri
ns
ec
a 
re
i 
su
nt
 p
rio
ra
 {
se
cu
nd
um
 n
at
ur
am
ip
so
 p
rin
ci
pi
at
o 
se
cu
nd
um
 n
at
ur
am
}3
31
, q
ui
a 
ex
 e
is
 s
it 
ip
su
m
 p
rin
ci
pi
at
um
, e
t 
si
c 
m
at
er
ia
 e
t 
fo
rm
a 
ex
 q
ui
bu
s 
si
t 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
 c
om
po
si
ta
 s
un
t 
pr
io
re
s q
ua
m
 ip
sa
 su
bs
ta
nt
ia
 c
om
po
si
ta
, [
et
 si
c]
33
2  q
uo
dd
am
 e
st
 
pr
iu
s 
a 
qu
o,
 e
t s
ic
]3
33
 c
au
sa
 e
ff
ec
tiv
a 
es
t p
rio
r {
su
o 
ef
fe
ct
u}
33
4 . 
U
nd
e 
pr
in
ci
pi
um
 m
ot
us
 e
st
 p
rio
r 
na
tu
ra
lit
er
 e
ff
ec
tu
 q
ui
 s
it 
ab
 
ip
so
. E
t q
uo
dd
am
 e
st
 p
riu
s 
ad
 q
uo
d,
 e
t s
ic
 f
in
is
 n
at
ur
al
ite
r 
es
t 
{p
riu
s}
33
5  
hi
s 
qu
ae
 s
un
t a
d 
fin
em
, q
ui
a 
ea
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 a
d 
fin
em
 
or
di
na
nt
ur
 <
ad
 f
in
em
>3
36
 e
t 
in
te
nd
un
tu
r 
pr
op
te
r 
fin
em
. 
U
nd
e 
fin
is
 e
st
 p
rio
r 
[in
]3
37
 i
nt
en
tio
ne
 q
ua
m
 e
a 
qu
ae
 o
rd
in
an
tu
r 
ad
 
fin
em
. E
t q
uo
dd
am
 e
st
 p
riu
s 
in
 q
uo
, {
et
 s
ic
 te
m
pu
s 
in
 q
uo
 e
st
 
pr
iu
s, 
es
t 
pr
iu
s 
al
io
 t
em
po
re
 i
n 
qu
o 
es
t 
po
st
er
iu
s. 
N
am
 p
riu
s 
te
m
po
re
 e
st
 q
ua
nd
o 
po
st
er
iu
s 
te
m
po
re
 e
st
 n
on
}3
38
Fo
r w
hi
ch
 w
e 
ne
ed
 to
 k
no
w
 th
at
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 p
rio
rit
y 
is
 p
rio
rit
y 
in
 w
hi
ch
, a
nd
 a
 th
in
g 
is
 p
rio
r i
n 
w
hi
ch
 it
 is
, o
r w
as
, o
r w
ill
 
be
, 
at
 a
 t
im
e 
pr
io
r 
to
 i
ts
 p
os
te
rio
r. 
A
 c
er
ta
in
 p
rio
rit
y 
is
 
pr
io
rit
y 
ou
t 
of
 
w
hi
ch
, 
an
d 
in
 
th
is
 
w
ay
 
th
e 
ex
tri
ns
ic
 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
a 
th
in
g 
ar
e 
pr
io
r 
to
 t
ha
t 
of
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
ar
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 b
y 
na
tu
re
, 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
is
 o
ut
 o
f 
th
es
e 
th
at
 t
ha
t 
th
in
g 
of
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
ar
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 c
om
es
 a
bo
ut
, 
an
d 
so
 
m
at
te
r 
an
d 
fo
rm
 f
ro
m
 w
hi
ch
 c
om
po
si
te
 s
ub
st
an
ce
 c
om
es
 
ab
ou
t 
ar
e 
pr
io
r 
to
 t
ha
t 
co
m
po
si
te
 s
ub
st
an
ce
. 
A
 c
er
ta
in
 
pr
io
rit
y 
is
 p
rio
rit
y 
fr
om
 w
hi
ch
, a
nd
 in
 th
is
 w
ay
 a
n 
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
ca
us
e 
is
 p
rio
r t
o 
its
 e
ff
ec
t. 
H
en
ce
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
e 
of
 m
ot
io
n 
is
 
na
tu
ra
lly
 p
rio
r 
to
 t
he
 e
ff
ec
t 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
fr
om
 i
t. 
A
 c
er
ta
in
 
pr
io
rit
y 
is
 p
rio
rit
y 
to
 w
hi
ch
, 
an
d 
in
 t
hi
s 
w
ay
 e
nd
s 
ar
e 
na
tu
ra
lly
 p
rio
r t
o 
th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 fo
r a
n 
en
d,
 b
ec
au
se
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 fo
r a
n 
en
d 
ar
e 
or
de
re
d 
an
d 
in
te
nd
ed
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
an
 e
nd
. H
en
ce
 a
n 
en
d 
is
 p
rio
r 
in
 in
te
nt
io
n 
to
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
or
de
re
d 
to
 th
at
 e
nd
. A
nd
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 p
rio
rit
y 
is
 p
rio
rit
y 
in
 
w
hi
ch
, a
nd
 in
 th
is
 w
ay
 th
e 
tim
e 
in
 w
hi
ch
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 p
rio
r 
. 
Si
c 
er
go
 
pa
te
nt
 q
ui
nq
ue
 m
od
i 
pr
io
ris
, 
qu
am
 q
ua
ed
am
 e
st
 p
rio
rit
as
 
se
cu
nd
um
 t
em
pu
s, 
et
 q
ua
ed
am
 s
ec
un
du
m
 c
on
se
qu
en
tia
m
, 
et
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9  ‘
ill
ud
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A
, B
 
33
0  B
 
33
1  ‘
ip
so
 p
rin
ci
pi
at
o 
se
cu
nd
um
 n
at
ur
am
 se
cu
nd
um
 n
at
ur
am
’: 
B
 
33
2  B
 
33
3  A
 
33
4  ‘
cr
ea
to
’: 
B
 
33
5  ‘
pr
io
r’
: B
 
33
6  A
 
33
7  A
, B
 
33
8  ‘
Et
 si
c 
sp
ec
ie
s e
st
 p
riu
s i
n 
qu
o.
 P
riu
s t
em
po
re
 e
st
 q
ua
nd
o 
po
st
er
iu
s t
em
po
re
 n
on
 e
st
’: 
A
, B
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qu
ae
da
m
 se
cu
nd
um
 o
rd
in
em
 d
oc
tri
na
e,
 e
t q
ua
ed
am
 {
se
cu
nd
um
 
ho
no
re
m
}3
39
, 
et
 q
ua
ed
am
 e
st
 p
rio
rit
as
 s
ec
un
du
m
 n
at
ur
am
, 
et
 
ta
lis
 e
st
 tr
ip
le
x:
 {
a 
qu
o,
 e
x 
qu
o 
et
 a
d 
qu
od
}3
40
ex
is
ts
, i
s p
rio
r t
o 
an
ot
he
r t
im
e 
in
 w
hi
ch
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 p
os
te
rio
r 
ex
is
ts
. F
or
 a
 p
rio
r 
tim
e 
is
 w
he
n 
a 
po
st
er
io
r 
tim
e 
do
es
 n
ot
 
ex
is
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 in
 th
is
 w
ay
 th
e 
fiv
e 
m
od
es
 o
f 
pr
io
rit
y 
ar
e 
cl
ea
r, 
as
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 k
in
d 
is
 p
rio
rit
y 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 ti
m
e,
 a
nd
 a
 
ce
rta
in
 k
in
d 
is
 p
rio
rit
y 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
, 
an
d 
a 
ce
rta
in
 k
in
d 
is
 p
rio
rit
y 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
or
de
r 
of
 te
ac
hi
ng
, 
an
d 
a 
ce
rta
in
 k
in
d 
is
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 h
on
or
, a
nd
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 k
in
d 
is
 p
rio
rit
y 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 n
at
ur
e,
 a
nd
 p
rio
rit
y 
of
 th
is
 s
or
t i
s 
of
 
th
re
e 
ki
nd
s:
 fr
om
 w
hi
ch
, o
ut
 o
f w
hi
ch
, a
nd
 to
 w
hi
ch
. 
. 
 
 
Et
 s
ci
en
du
m
 <
es
t>
34
1  
qu
od
 in
 d
iv
in
is
 u
na
 p
er
so
na
 {
di
ci
tu
r}
34
2  
pr
io
r 
al
ia
, 
et
 h
ae
c 
pr
io
rit
as
 d
ic
itu
r 
pr
io
rit
as
 o
rig
in
is
, 
{q
ua
e 
pr
io
rit
as
 e
st
 q
ua
nd
o 
al
iq
ui
d 
di
ci
tu
r 
si
c 
pr
iu
s, 
qu
ia
 e
st
 il
lu
d 
ex
 
qu
o 
es
t 
al
iu
s, 
qu
ia
 p
at
er
 i
n 
di
vi
ni
s 
es
t 
pr
io
r 
fil
io
}3
43
, e
t 
ill
ud
 
qu
od
 s
ic
 e
st
 p
riu
s 
no
n 
es
t 
pr
iu
s 
in
 q
uo
, 
ne
c 
hu
ic
 p
rio
rit
at
i 
co
rr
es
po
nd
et
 a
liq
ui
d 
pr
iu
s i
n 
qu
o,
 se
d 
so
lu
m
 e
st
 ib
i p
riu
s a
 q
uo
, 
[v
el
 e
x 
qu
o]
34
4
A
nd
 w
e 
ne
ed
 t
o 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 t
ha
t 
in
 t
he
 d
iv
in
e 
be
in
g 
on
e 
pe
rs
on
 is
 p
rio
r t
o 
an
ot
he
r, 
an
d 
th
is
 p
rio
rit
y 
is
 c
al
le
d 
pr
io
rit
y 
of
 o
rig
in
. 
Pr
io
rit
y 
of
 t
hi
s 
so
rt 
is
 w
he
n 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 i
s 
pr
io
r 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
is
 t
ha
t 
ou
t 
of
 w
hi
ch
 a
no
th
er
 e
xi
st
s. 
Fo
r 
in
 t
he
 
di
vi
ne
 b
ei
ng
 th
e 
fa
th
er
 is
 p
rio
r t
o 
th
e 
so
n,
 a
nd
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 is
 
pr
io
r 
in
 th
is
 w
ay
 is
 n
ot
 p
rio
r 
in
 w
hi
ch
, n
or
 to
 th
is
 p
rio
rit
y 
do
es
 th
er
e 
co
rr
es
po
nd
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 p
rio
r i
n 
w
hi
ch
, b
ut
 in
 th
is
 
ca
se
 it
 c
an
 o
nl
y 
be
 p
rio
r f
ro
m
 w
hi
ch
. 
. 
 
 
C
irc
a 
{i
st
am
 
pa
rte
m
}3
45
 
du
bi
ta
tu
r 
an
 
om
ni
s 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
co
nv
er
ta
tu
r 
cu
m
 
<u
na
>3
46
C
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
is
 p
ar
t, 
it 
is
 u
nc
le
ar
 w
he
th
er
 e
ve
ry
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
is
 c
on
ve
rti
bl
e 
w
ith
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 ‘
tru
e’
 is
 a
ff
irm
ed
 
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
in
 
qu
a 
ve
ru
m
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tu
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rio
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af
fir
m
at
ur
 d
e 
ill
a 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e.
 E
t v
id
et
ur
 q
ua
m
 n
on
, [
qu
ia
]3
47
 
no
n 
se
qu
itu
r, 
‘h
ae
c 
es
t v
er
a,
 ‘h
om
o 
es
t a
si
nu
s’
, e
rg
o 
ho
m
o 
es
t 
as
in
us
’, 
qu
ia
 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 
es
t 
po
ss
ib
le
, 
[e
t]3
48
 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 
im
po
ss
ib
le
. P
os
si
bi
lit
as
 a
nt
e<
g6
va
>c
ed
en
tis
 p
at
et
, q
ui
a 
<h
ae
c 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 ‘h
om
o 
es
t a
si
nu
s’
, p
ot
es
t s
ig
ni
fc
ar
e 
id
em
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 ‘d
eu
s 
es
t b
on
us
’, 
qu
ia
>3
49
 h
ae
c 
vo
x,
 ‘h
om
o’
, p
ot
es
t 
[im
po
ni
 a
d]
35
0  
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 i
de
m
 q
uo
d 
ho
c 
no
m
en
, 
‘d
eu
s’
, 
[s
ig
ni
fic
at
]3
51
, 
et
 h
ae
c 
vo
x,
 ‘
as
in
us
’, 
po
te
st
 s
ig
ni
fic
ar
e 
id
em
 
ha
ec
 v
ox
, 
‘b
on
us
’, 
er
go
 h
ae
c 
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
ve
ra
, 
‘h
om
o 
es
t 
as
in
us
’, 
si
cu
t 
ha
ec
 
m
od
o 
es
t 
ve
ra
, 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t 
bo
nu
s’
. 
{I
m
po
ss
ib
le
}3
52
 e
rg
o 
qu
od
 h
ae
c 
si
t v
er
a,
 ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t a
si
nu
s’
, e
t 
ta
m
en
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
{p
os
si
bl
e}
35
3 , 
ho
m
o 
es
t 
as
in
us
. 
<E
rg
o 
ha
ec
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
 n
on
 v
er
um
, ‘
ha
ec
 e
st
 v
er
um
, ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t a
si
nu
s’
, 
er
go
 h
om
o 
es
t 
as
in
us
’>
35
4  
Et
 s
ic
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 i
n 
qu
a 
ve
ru
m
 
af
fir
m
at
ur
 i
n 
al
iq
ua
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 n
on
 c
on
ve
rti
tu
r 
cu
m
 i
lla
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
{c
um
}3
55
of
 th
at
 st
at
em
en
t. 
It 
do
es
 n
ot
 se
em
 s
o,
 b
ec
au
se
 th
is
 d
oe
s n
ot
 
fo
llo
w
: ‘
‘A
 h
um
an
 is
 a
n 
as
s’
 is
 tr
ue
, t
he
re
fo
re
 a
 h
um
an
 is
 
an
 
as
s’
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 
is
 
po
ss
ib
le
 
an
d 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
 is
 im
po
ss
ib
le
. T
he
 p
os
si
bi
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 
is
 c
le
ar
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
is
 u
tte
ra
nc
e,
 ‘
hu
m
an
’, 
ca
n 
be
 m
ad
e 
to
 
si
gn
ify
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
na
m
e 
‘G
od
’ s
ig
ni
fie
s, 
an
d 
th
is
 u
tte
ra
nc
e,
 ‘
as
s’
, 
ca
n 
si
gn
ify
 t
he
 s
am
e 
th
in
g 
th
at
 t
hi
s 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 ‘
go
od
’, 
si
gn
ifi
es
. T
he
re
fo
re
, t
hi
s 
ca
n 
be
 tr
ue
, ‘
A
 
hu
m
an
 is
 a
n 
as
s’
, i
n 
ju
st
 th
e 
w
ay
 th
at
 th
is
 is
 tr
ue
, ‘
G
od
 is
 
go
od
’. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 it
 is
 p
os
si
bl
e 
th
at
 th
is
 is
 tr
ue
, ‘
A
 h
um
an
 is
 
an
 a
ss
’. 
Y
et
 i
t 
is
 i
m
po
ss
ib
le
 t
ha
t 
a 
hu
m
an
 i
s 
an
 a
ss
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
th
is
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
 d
oe
s 
no
t h
ol
d:
 ‘T
hi
s 
is
 tr
ue
, ‘
A
 
hu
m
an
 i
s 
an
 a
ss
’, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
a 
hu
m
an
 i
s 
an
 a
ss
’, 
an
d 
so
 a
 
st
at
em
en
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 ‘
tru
e’
 is
 a
ff
irm
ed
 o
f 
so
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t i
s 
no
t 
co
nv
er
tib
le
 w
ith
 t
ha
t 
st
at
em
en
t, 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 
in
fe
r i
t. 
 n
on
 in
fe
rt 
ill
am
. 
 
 
Ite
m
 v
id
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
om
ni
s 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
in
fe
ra
t p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
m
 
in
 q
ua
 ‘v
er
um
’ {
in
fe
rtu
r v
el
 a
ff
irm
at
ur
}3
56
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 
it 
se
em
s 
th
at
 
no
t 
ev
er
y 
st
at
em
en
t 
in
fe
rs
 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
in
 w
hi
ch
 ‘
tru
e’
 i
s 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 o
f 
th
at
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
is
 d
oe
s 
no
t f
ol
lo
w
: ‘
G
od
 is
, t
he
re
fo
re
 th
is
 is
 tr
ue
: 
‘G
od
 is
’, 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
is
 p
os
si
bl
e 
th
at
 th
is
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
‘G
od
 is
’, 
 d
e 
ill
a 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e,
 
qu
ia
 n
on
 s
eq
ui
tu
r, 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t, 
er
go
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
ve
ra
, 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’’
, 
qu
ia
 p
os
si
bl
e 
es
t q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 n
on
 s
it 
in
 re
ru
m
 n
at
ur
a.
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35
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po
ss
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A
, B
 
35
3  ‘
im
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, B
 
35
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35
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qu
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’: 
B
 
35
6  ‘
en
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at
ur
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A
, B
 
 
  
360 
Is
to
 p
os
ito
 a
dh
uc
 d
eu
s 
es
t, 
et
 ta
m
en
 h
ae
c 
es
t n
on
 v
er
a,
 ‘
de
us
 
es
t’,
 q
ui
a 
ill
ud
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
es
t, 
no
n 
es
t v
er
um
 n
ec
 fa
ls
um
.  
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
. H
av
in
g 
sa
id
 th
at
, i
t i
s 
st
ill
 th
e 
ca
se
 th
at
 G
od
 
ex
is
ts
, a
nd
 y
et
 th
is
 is
 n
ot
 tr
ue
, ‘
G
od
 is
’, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
, i
s n
ei
th
er
 tr
ue
 n
or
 fa
ls
e.
  
 
 
Ite
m
 n
on
 s
eq
ui
tu
r, 
‘n
ul
la
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 e
st
, 
er
go
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
ve
ra
, 
‘n
ul
la
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 e
st
’’
, 
qu
ia
 a
liq
ui
d 
se
qu
itu
r 
ad
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
qu
od
 n
on
 s
eq
ui
tu
r 
ad
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
s. 
[N
am
]3
57
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 
th
is
 
do
es
 
no
t 
fo
llo
w
: 
‘N
o 
st
at
em
en
t 
ex
is
ts
, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
th
is
 
is
 
tru
e:
 
‘N
o 
st
at
em
en
t 
ex
is
ts
’’
, 
be
ca
us
e 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 f
ol
lo
w
s 
fr
om
 t
he
 c
on
se
qu
en
t 
th
at
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
fo
llo
w
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
. F
or
 th
is
 is
 tr
ue
, ‘
N
o 
st
at
em
en
t 
ex
is
ts
’, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
so
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
ex
is
ts
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 is
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 a
nd
 n
ot
hi
ng
 p
os
si
bl
e 
in
fe
rs
 it
s 
ow
n 
pr
op
er
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
y.
 
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
ve
ra
, 
‘n
ul
la
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
es
t’,
 
er
go
 
al
iq
ua
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
es
t, 
qu
ia
 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 e
st
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 e
t n
ul
lu
m
 p
os
si
bl
e 
in
fe
rt 
su
um
 p
ro
pr
ie
 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
iu
m
. 
 
 
In
 o
pp
os
itu
m
 e
st
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
, 
<h
ic
>3
58
 d
ic
en
s 
qu
od
 e
ss
e 
<n
am
qu
e>
35
9  
ho
m
in
em
 c
on
ve
rti
tu
r 
se
cu
nd
um
 <
es
se
nt
ia
e>
36
0  
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
m
 a
d 
ve
ra
m
 {
de
 s
e}
36
1  
or
at
io
ne
m
. N
am
 s
i h
om
o 
es
t, 
ve
ra
 e
st
 o
ra
tio
 [i
n]
36
2  q
ua
 d
ic
itu
r q
uo
d 
ho
m
o 
es
t, 
{e
t v
er
um
 
es
t i
ta
 e
ss
e}
36
3
In
 o
pp
os
iti
on
 i
s 
A
ris
to
tle
, w
ho
 s
ay
 t
ha
t 
be
in
g 
a 
hu
m
an
 i
s 
co
nv
er
te
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
 t
o 
a 
tru
e 
se
nt
en
ce
 
ab
ou
t 
its
el
f. 
Fo
r 
if 
a 
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
th
e 
se
nt
en
ce
 i
s 
tru
e 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 sa
id
 th
at
 a
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
an
d 
if 
a 
se
nt
en
ce
 w
hi
ch
 
st
at
es
 th
at
 a
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
is
 tr
ue
, i
t i
s t
he
 c
as
e 
th
at
 a
 h
um
an
 
ex
is
ts
. 
. 
 
 
A
d 
is
tu
d 
du
bi
um
 d
ic
un
t 
m
od
er
ni
, 
ex
pr
es
se
 c
on
tra
di
ce
nt
es
 
A
ris
to
te
li,
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
es
t 
ne
ce
ss
e 
pr
op
os
iti
on
em
 c
on
ve
rti
 c
um
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
in
 q
ua
 ‘v
er
um
’ {
ve
rif
ic
at
ur
}3
64
 d
e 
{i
ps
o}
36
5
To
 
th
at
 
do
ub
t, 
th
e 
m
od
er
ni
, 
ex
pr
es
sl
y 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
in
g 
A
ris
to
tle
, 
sa
y 
th
at
 i
t 
is
 n
ot
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 t
ha
t 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 
co
nv
er
te
d 
w
ith
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 ‘t
ru
e’
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 
 v
el
 d
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36
3  ‘
et
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 v
er
a 
es
t o
ra
tio
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ua
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ic
it 
qu
od
 h
om
o 
es
t, 
ve
ru
m
 e
st
 e
tia
m
 in
 e
ss
e’
: A
 
36
4  ‘
en
un
ci
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ur
’: 
A
, B
 
36
5  ‘
se
ip
sa
m
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su
o 
di
ct
o.
 U
nd
e 
di
cu
nt
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
se
qu
itu
r 
<c
on
se
qu
en
tia
>3
66
 
‘h
om
o 
es
t, 
er
go
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
ve
ra
, ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t’’
, q
ui
a 
po
si
to
 q
uo
d 
ho
m
o 
si
t, 
et
 is
ta
 p
ro
po
si
tio
, ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t’,
 n
on
 {
ex
is
ta
t}
36
7 , 
tu
nc
 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 e
st
 f
al
su
m
 e
t 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 n
on
 [
es
t 
fa
ls
um
]3
68
. 
Fa
ls
ita
s 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
is
 p
at
et
, q
ui
a 
qu
od
 n
on
 e
st
, n
on
 e
st
 v
er
um
 
ne
c 
fa
ls
um
. I
st
a 
ta
m
en
 c
on
se
qu
en
tia
  
se
cu
nd
um
 e
os
 e
st
 b
on
a,
 
‘h
om
o 
es
t, 
er
go
 i
ta
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
ho
m
o 
es
t 
[in
 r
e]
36
9
it 
or
 o
f i
ts
 d
ic
tu
m
. H
en
ce
 th
ey
 s
ay
 th
at
 th
is
 d
oe
s 
no
t f
ol
lo
w
, 
‘A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
th
er
e 
th
is
 i
s 
tru
e,
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
’, 
be
ca
us
e,
 g
iv
en
 t
he
 c
la
im
 t
ha
t 
a 
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
an
d 
th
is
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
‘A
 
hu
m
an
 
ex
is
ts
’, 
do
es
 
no
t 
ex
is
t, 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
is
 f
al
se
 a
nd
 t
he
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
t 
is
 n
ot
 f
al
se
. 
Th
e 
fa
ls
ity
 o
f 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
 is
 c
le
ar
, b
ec
au
se
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
ex
is
t, 
is
 
ne
ith
er
 
tru
e 
no
r 
fa
ls
e.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
is
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
is
 g
oo
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
em
: ‘
A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
it 
is
 th
e 
ca
se
 th
at
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 h
um
an
 in
 re
al
ity
’, 
bu
t 
fr
om
 t
hi
s 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 f
ol
lo
w
 t
ha
t 
th
is
 i
s 
tru
e,
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 
ex
is
ts
’. 
’, 
se
d 
ex
 h
oc
 
no
n 
se
qu
itu
r q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 si
t v
er
a,
 ‘h
om
o 
es
t’.
 
 
 
H
ae
c 
{o
pi
ni
o}
37
0  
{f
un
da
tu
r 
su
pe
r 
ho
c}
37
1 , 
qu
od
 
nu
lla
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
es
t v
er
a 
ni
si
 q
ua
nd
o 
ex
is
tit
 <
ac
tu
al
ite
r>
37
2 . 
Se
d 
qu
ia
 
ha
ec
 o
pi
ni
o 
es
t e
xp
re
ss
e 
co
nt
ra
 A
ris
to
te
le
m
, a
rg
uo
 c
on
tra
 e
am
, 
et
 
pr
im
o 
co
nt
ra
 
fu
nd
am
en
tu
m
 
[<
fa
ls
um
>3
73
 
su
pe
r]
37
4  
qu
o 
fu
nd
at
ur
. E
t p
ro
bo
 q
uo
d 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
es
t v
er
a 
qu
an
do
 n
on
 e
xi
st
it 
ac
tu
. 
<E
t>
37
5  
Pr
ob
o 
si
c.
 H
ae
c 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
 e
st
 b
on
a,
 ‘
al
iq
ua
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
es
t 
fa
ls
a,
 e
rg
o 
su
a 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ia
 e
st
 v
er
a’
, 
se
d 
po
ss
ib
le
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
un
a 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
{e
st
}3
76
Th
is
 p
os
iti
on
 is
 fo
un
de
d 
on
 th
is
 p
rin
ci
pl
e,
 th
at
 n
o 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 t
ru
e 
w
he
n 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
. 
B
ut
 b
ec
au
se
 t
hi
s 
op
in
io
n 
ex
pr
es
sl
y 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
s 
A
ris
to
tle
, I
 a
rg
ue
 a
ga
in
st
 it
, a
nd
 f
irs
t 
ag
ai
ns
t t
he
 p
rin
ci
pl
e 
w
hi
ch
 th
at
 p
os
iti
on
 a
ss
um
es
. A
nd
 s
o 
I 
pr
ov
e 
th
at
 a
 st
at
em
en
t i
s t
ru
e 
w
he
n 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 a
ct
ua
lly
 e
xi
st
 
in
 th
is
 w
ay
. T
hi
s 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
is
 g
oo
d,
 ‘
So
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t i
s 
fa
ls
e,
 th
er
ef
or
e 
its
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
y 
is
 tr
ue
’. 
B
ut
 it
 is
 p
os
si
bl
e 
th
at
 o
ne
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
s 
fa
ls
e 
w
he
n 
its
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
y 
do
es
 n
ot
 
ex
is
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
if 
it 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 s
om
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 f
al
se
, 
 f
al
sa
 q
ua
nd
o 
su
a 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ia
 n
on
 e
xi
st
it.
 E
rg
o 
si
 s
eq
ui
tu
r a
liq
ua
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 e
st
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362 
fa
ls
a,
 e
rg
o 
su
a 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ia
 e
st
 v
er
a,
 [
er
go
]3
77
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
ve
ra
 q
ua
nd
o 
no
n 
ex
is
tit
. 
Q
uo
d 
au
te
m
 {
ha
ec
}3
78
th
er
ef
or
e 
its
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
y 
is
 tr
ue
. T
he
re
fo
re
 a
 st
at
em
en
t c
an
 
be
 tr
ue
 w
he
n 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
. B
ut
 th
at
 th
is
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
 –
 
‘S
om
e 
st
at
em
en
t i
s 
fa
ls
e,
 th
er
ef
or
e 
its
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
y 
is
 tr
ue
’ 
– 
is
 g
oo
d,
 is
 c
le
ar
 fr
om
 w
ha
t A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
in
 M
et
ap
hy
si
cs
 
5.
 
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
, 
‘a
liq
ua
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
es
t 
fa
ls
a,
 
er
go
 
su
a 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ia
 
es
t 
ve
ra
’, 
si
t 
bo
na
, 
pa
te
t 
pe
r 
ph
ilo
so
ph
um
 
qu
in
qu
e 
M
et
ap
hy
si
ca
. 
 
 
Ite
m
, 
pr
ob
at
ur
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
 
pr
ae
di
ct
a 
<s
ic
>3
79
. 
Si
 
al
iq
ua
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
es
t 
fa
ls
a,
 
[ip
sa
]3
80
 
ha
be
t 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
iu
m
, 
et
 
si
 
[a
liq
ua
]3
81
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
es
t 
fa
ls
a,
 
no
n 
ha
be
t 
fa
ls
am
 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
iu
m
, 
qu
ia
 s
ic
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
ia
 e
ss
en
t 
si
m
ul
 f
al
sa
, 
qu
od
 e
st
 im
po
ss
ib
le
. E
rg
o 
si
 a
liq
ua
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 e
st
 f
al
sa
, h
ab
et
 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
iu
m
 v
er
um
, e
t 
pe
r 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
, s
i 
al
iq
ua
 s
it 
fa
ls
a,
 
{s
uu
m
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
iu
m
 e
st
 v
er
um
}3
82
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 m
en
tio
ne
d 
is
 p
ro
ve
d 
in
 
th
is
 
w
ay
. 
If
 
so
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 
fa
ls
e,
 
it 
ha
s 
a 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
y,
 a
nd
 i
f 
so
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 f
al
se
, 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 
ha
ve
 
a 
fa
ls
e 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
y,
 
be
ca
us
e 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ie
s 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
fa
ls
e 
at
 t
he
 s
am
e 
tim
e,
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
im
po
ss
ib
le
. T
he
re
fo
re
, i
f 
so
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 f
al
se
, i
t 
ha
s 
a 
tru
e 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
y,
 a
nd
 c
on
se
qu
en
tly
 i
f 
so
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 
fa
ls
e,
 it
s c
on
tra
di
ct
or
y 
is
 tr
ue
. 
. 
 
 
Et
 s
i d
ic
at
ur
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
se
qu
itu
r, 
‘s
i a
liq
ua
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 e
st
 f
al
sa
, 
er
go
 h
ab
et
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
iu
m
, {
{q
ua
m
}3
83
 s
uu
m
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
iu
m
 
no
n 
ex
is
tit
}3
84
’. 
C
on
tra
, 
se
cu
nd
um
 h
oc
 n
on
 p
os
se
t 
al
iq
ui
s 
{r
ed
uc
i a
d 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
io
ne
m
, a
lia
s 
ad
 re
da
rg
ut
io
ne
m
}3
85
, q
ui
a 
si
 
[p
rim
o]
38
6
A
nd
 if
 it
 is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 it
 d
oe
s 
no
t f
ol
lo
w
, ‘
If
 s
om
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 fa
ls
e,
 th
er
ef
or
e 
it 
ha
s a
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
y’
, b
ec
au
se
 it
 d
oe
s n
ot
 
ha
ve
 a
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
y 
w
he
n 
its
 o
w
n 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
y 
do
es
 n
ot
 
ex
is
t. 
O
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ry
, 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 t
hi
s 
so
m
eo
ne
 c
ou
ld
 
ne
ve
r b
e 
fo
rc
ed
 in
to
 a
 r
ed
uc
tio
 a
d 
ab
su
rd
um
, b
ec
au
se
 if
 h
e 
 
co
nc
ed
at
 
is
ta
m
, 
‘o
m
ni
um
 
op
po
si
to
ru
m
 
ea
de
m
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0  B
 
38
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38
3  ‘
qu
ia
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A
 
38
4  ‘
qu
ia
 n
on
 h
ab
et
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on
tra
di
ct
or
iu
m
 n
on
 q
ua
nd
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su
um
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on
tra
di
ct
or
iu
m
 e
xi
st
it’
: B
 
38
5  ‘
re
du
ci
 a
d 
ar
gu
m
en
tu
m
’: 
A
; ‘
m
al
e 
re
sp
on
de
re
 n
ec
 e
ss
e 
si
bi
 c
on
cl
us
um
’: 
B
  
38
6  A
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{e
st
}3
87
 
di
sc
ip
lin
a’
, 
{e
t 
po
st
ea
 
co
nc
ed
at
 
su
um
 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
iu
m
}3
88
 [
ip
se
]3
89
 n
on
 c
on
ce
de
re
t 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ia
, 
qu
ia
 p
on
am
us
 q
uo
d 
qu
an
do
 a
ff
irm
at
iv
a 
ex
is
tit
 q
uo
d 
ne
ga
tiv
a 
no
n 
ex
is
ta
t, 
et
 {
ec
on
tra
}3
90
. I
st
o 
po
si
to
 {
ill
e}
39
1  
no
n 
co
nc
es
si
t 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ia
, q
ui
a 
{i
lla
}3
92
 q
ua
e 
co
nc
es
si
t n
um
qu
am
 f
ue
ru
nt
 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ia
, 
{q
ui
a 
ne
c 
af
fir
m
at
iv
a 
ha
bu
it 
es
se
 
qu
an
do
 
ne
ga
tiv
a 
ha
bu
it 
es
se
, 
ne
c 
ec
on
ve
rs
o}
39
3
fir
st
 c
on
ce
de
s 
th
is
, ‘
O
f 
al
l 
op
po
si
te
s 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
m
at
te
r 
is
 
th
e 
sa
m
e’
, a
nd
 la
te
r h
e 
co
nc
ed
es
 th
e 
op
po
si
te
, h
e 
w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 
co
nc
ed
e 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ie
s, 
be
ca
us
e 
w
e 
st
ip
ul
at
ed
 t
ha
t 
w
he
n 
an
 a
ff
irm
at
iv
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
ex
is
ts
, t
ha
t 
its
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
do
es
 n
ot
, 
an
d 
co
nv
er
se
ly
. 
G
iv
en
 t
ha
t 
po
si
tio
n,
 h
e 
w
ill
 n
ot
 c
on
ce
de
 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ie
s, 
be
ca
us
e 
ne
ith
er
 
w
ill
 
an
 
af
fir
m
at
iv
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
ha
ve
 b
ei
ng
 w
he
n 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
ha
s 
be
in
g,
 n
or
 
co
nv
er
se
ly
, b
ec
au
se
 w
he
ne
ve
r 
on
e 
of
 th
os
e 
ha
s 
be
in
g,
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
w
ill
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
be
in
g,
 a
nd
 s
o 
th
er
e 
w
ill
 n
ev
er
 b
e 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
ie
s, 
an
d 
so
 n
o 
on
e 
co
ul
d 
be
 re
fu
te
d.
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 q
ua
nd
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um
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e 
un
a 
ill
ar
um
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it 
es
se
, 
re
liq
ua
 
no
n 
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bu
it 
es
se
, 
et
 
ita
 
nu
m
qu
am
 f
ue
ru
nt
 c
on
tra
di
ct
or
ia
, 
et
 i
ta
 n
on
 p
os
se
t 
al
iq
ui
s 
re
ar
gu
i. 
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 d
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t r
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 o
pp
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 t
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si
m
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 l
oq
ui
 s
em
pe
r, 
qu
od
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es
t>
39
9
A
ga
in
, 
th
is
 
re
sp
on
se
 
de
st
ro
ys
 
al
l 
di
sp
ut
at
io
n,
 
be
ca
us
e 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
th
at
 
re
sp
on
se
 
a 
re
sp
on
de
nt
 
co
ul
d 
ne
ve
r 
re
sp
on
d 
to
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t p
ro
po
se
d 
by
 a
n 
op
po
ne
nt
, s
in
ce
 h
e 
w
ill
 
re
sp
on
d 
ei
th
er
 
w
hi
le
 
th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
 
pr
op
os
es
 
th
e 
st
at
em
en
t, 
or
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
 h
as
 p
ro
po
se
d 
it,
 o
r a
fte
r. 
H
e 
w
ill
 n
ot
 r
es
po
nd
 w
hi
le
 t
he
 o
pp
on
en
t 
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 p
ro
po
si
ng
 t
he
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
en
 t
he
 o
pp
on
en
t 
an
d 
th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
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 s
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 f
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la
nt
 s
im
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. N
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1  r
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er
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 d
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m
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ne
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sq
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m
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ue
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 n
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et
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 s
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 n
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ci
t 
qu
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 o
pp
on
en
s 
in
te
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pr
op
on
er
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ne
c 
{h
ab
et
}4
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os
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am
 
{p
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er
it}
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os
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pp
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en
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 n
on
 e
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it,
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t p
er
 c
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se
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 f
al
sa
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m
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re
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d 
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os
iti
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em
 v
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fa
ls
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qu
od
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en
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{o
po
rte
t}
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de
re
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am
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iti
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em
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 d
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tu
m
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ne
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is
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t n
on
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d 
di
ct
um
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pp
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en
tis
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C
on
tra
, 
is
ta
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 q
ua
m
 c
on
ci
pi
t 
no
n 
es
t 
in
 in
te
lle
ct
u 
re
sp
on
de
nt
is
, q
ui
a 
[s
i]4
10
 s
ic
, r
es
po
nd
en
s 
re
sp
on
de
re
t 
ad
 
su
as
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
es
 
et
 
no
n 
[a
d 
<g
6v
b>
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
es
]4
11
w
ou
ld
 n
ee
d 
to
 s
pe
ak
 a
t t
he
 s
am
e 
tim
e 
al
l a
t o
nc
e,
 w
hi
ch
 is
 
ex
ce
ed
in
gl
y 
pr
ob
le
m
at
ic
 (
al
th
ou
gh
 t
ho
se
 w
ho
 d
ef
en
d 
th
is
 
vi
ew
 [i
.e
., 
th
e 
m
od
er
ni
] c
on
du
ct
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
ar
gu
m
en
ts
 in
 th
is
 
w
ay
, b
ec
au
se
 th
ey
 a
re
 a
lw
ay
s p
oi
nt
le
ss
ly
 ra
m
bl
in
g 
on
 a
t t
he
 
sa
m
e 
tim
e)
. N
or
 is
 it
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 re
sp
on
d 
to
 th
e 
di
ct
um
 o
f 
th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
 b
ef
or
e 
he
 h
as
 p
ro
po
se
d 
it,
 b
ec
au
se
 in
 th
e 
ca
se
 
th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 k
no
w
 w
ha
t h
e 
is
 r
es
po
nd
in
g 
to
, 
be
ca
us
e 
he
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
kn
ow
 w
ha
t 
th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
 i
nt
en
ds
 t
o 
pr
op
os
e.
 N
or
 d
oe
s 
he
 h
av
e 
to
 r
es
po
nd
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
 
ha
s 
pr
op
os
ed
 it
, b
ec
au
se
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
st
at
em
en
t s
po
ke
n 
by
 th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
 is
 p
ro
po
se
d,
 it
 d
oe
s 
no
t e
xi
st
, a
nd
 c
on
se
qu
en
tly
 is
 
ne
ith
er
 tr
ue
 n
or
 fa
ls
e.
 A
nd
 in
 th
is
 w
ay
 a
 r
es
po
nd
en
t w
ou
ld
 
ne
ve
r h
av
e 
to
 re
sp
on
d 
to
 a
 tr
ue
 o
r f
al
se
 s
ta
te
m
en
t. 
A
nd
 if
 it
 
is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
 n
ee
ds
 to
 r
es
po
nd
 to
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
w
hi
ch
 h
e 
co
nc
ei
ve
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
di
ct
um
 o
f 
th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
, 
an
d 
no
t 
to
 t
he
 d
ic
tu
m
 o
f 
th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
 i
ts
el
f. 
O
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ry
, 
th
at
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
w
hi
ch
 h
e 
co
nc
ei
ve
s 
is
 n
ot
 i
n 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 
of
 
th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
, 
be
ca
us
e,
 
if 
it 
w
er
e,
 
th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
 w
ou
ld
 r
es
po
nd
 to
 h
is
 o
w
n 
st
at
em
en
t a
nd
 n
ot
 to
 
th
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
of
 t
he
 o
pp
on
en
t. 
Li
ke
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is
, 
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si
m
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te
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se
cu
nd
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ho
c 
in
te
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tu
s 
op
po
ne
nt
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 e
t 
in
te
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 r
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po
nd
en
tis
 n
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ur
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 id
em
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ed
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m
, e
rg
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ec
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ve
rs
o]
41
7
A
ga
in
, i
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t i
s 
no
t t
ru
e 
ex
ce
pt
 w
he
n 
it 
ex
is
ts
, a
ll 
th
es
e 
ru
le
s 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
fa
ls
e 
– 
‘T
he
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
t 
is
 t
ru
e,
 
th
er
ef
or
e 
al
so
 t
he
 c
on
se
qu
en
t’,
 ‘
Th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
 i
s 
fa
ls
e,
 
th
er
ef
or
e 
al
so
 th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
’ 
– 
be
ca
us
e 
an
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
t c
an
 
be
 t
ru
e 
w
he
n 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
ex
is
t, 
an
d 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
 c
an
 b
e 
fa
ls
e 
w
he
n 
th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 d
oe
s n
ot
 e
xi
st
.  
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do
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ce
de
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ri,
 tu
nc
 c
on
se
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en
s 
no
n 
es
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of
er
ri,
 e
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er
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en
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tu
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 c
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en
s 
no
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es
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n 
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t, 
tu
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on
 s
eq
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r 
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al
iq
uo
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 c
on
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w
ou
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e 
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be
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us
e 
w
he
n 
th
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an
te
ce
de
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 t
he
n 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
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s 
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t 
be
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ut
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d,
 a
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co
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eq
ue
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ly
 th
en
 th
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eq
ue
nt
 d
oe
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no
t e
xi
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, a
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 w
he
n 
it 
do
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, 
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 i
t 
do
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 n
ot
 f
ol
lo
w
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m
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 o
th
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Th
er
ef
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e 
w
he
n 
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an
te
ce
de
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ut
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re
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e 
co
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eq
ue
nc
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 h
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 b
ec
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eq
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nt
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llo
w
 fr
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an
te
ce
de
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or
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co
nd
iti
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al
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en
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no
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tu
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tru
e,
 a
nd
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w
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w
he
n 
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e 
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d,
 th
en
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ce
de
nt
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t 
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d,
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t e
xi
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ct
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g 
fo
llo
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Th
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ef
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he
n 
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eq
ue
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 th
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iti
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al
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 n
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th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
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on
in
g 
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ar
 th
at
 n
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co
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iti
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f 
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 t
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e.
 L
ik
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 p
ro
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m
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ef
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e 
th
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tru
e,
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A
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um
an
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xi
st
s’
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be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 c
an
 n
ev
er
 b
e 
tru
e 
w
ith
ou
t 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
. F
or
 t
hi
s 
ca
n 
ne
ve
r 
be
 tr
ue
, ‘
A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
, 
un
le
ss
 th
is
 is
 tr
ue
, ‘
A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
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 tr
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 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
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m
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os
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tu
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 p
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 p
ra
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 d
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Li
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w
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at
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ay
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at
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 c
on
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en
ce
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 g
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d,
 ‘A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
so
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 in
 re
al
ity
, t
ha
t a
 
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s’
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I 
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 w
ha
t 
is
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 s
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ct
 a
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 w
ha
t 
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pr
ed
ic
at
e 
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eq
ue
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f t
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eq
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te
m
en
t)?
 N
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hi
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 e
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th
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 c
an
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e 
sa
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, 
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m
el
y 
th
at
 ‘
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s’
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s 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
an
d 
‘s
o 
it 
is
 i
n 
re
al
ity
’ i
s 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 a
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 th
en
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 th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
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 s
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 p
at
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 p
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er
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ta
 e
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re
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 in
 re
al
ity
 th
at
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um
an
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xi
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ay
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th
at
 a
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
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ec
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se
 A
ris
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, a
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 c
le
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e 
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 te
xt
, h
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in
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tru
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in
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 f
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m
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fo
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 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
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ef
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 re
al
ity
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 h
um
an
 e
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t f
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m
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an
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 m
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m
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ro
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 c
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r d
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t d
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ra
tio
ne
m
 e
st
 q
ui
a 
{s
i 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
as
se
rit
 i
ta
 
es
se
 s
ic
ut
 p
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ra
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s p
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 p
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ef
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 d
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ca
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e 
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en
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th
at
 a
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at
em
en
t i
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w
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 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
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hi
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th
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 s
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te
m
en
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A
ris
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 b
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m
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t 
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 b
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em
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at
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at
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 b
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ra
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 p
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 s
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 r
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. C
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t p
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 p
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s p
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ra
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ra
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t p
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t p
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s p
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ra
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t p
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ra
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t p
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t p
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t p
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 d
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os
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 c
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 p
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 d
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at
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 c
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op
os
iti
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es
t 
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re
’ 
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re
 
pr
ae
di
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tu
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op
os
iti
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e 
no
n 
ex
is
te
nt
e,
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’ e
st
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 d
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ra
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in
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th
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hu
m
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 e
xi
st
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 a
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ue
 s
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te
m
en
t. 
I 
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 w
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xi
st
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 re
al
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 b
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um
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xi
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it 
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m
an
 e
xi
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 s
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te
m
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t 
do
es
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st
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 t
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 c
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 b
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st
 t
hi
s, 
th
at
 a
 h
um
an
 e
xi
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re
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al
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 d
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at
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is
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 d
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pr
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 c
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 b
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os
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r d
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 d
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t p
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 b
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 d
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 c
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 d
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itu
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t p
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itu
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os
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os
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 c
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at
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is
 t
ru
e’
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
is
 i
s 
a 
ce
rta
in
 c
on
di
tio
na
l, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
it 
ha
s 
an
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
t 
an
d 
a 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
 
an
d 
no
th
in
g 
is
 
an
 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 
ex
ce
pt
 
a 
st
at
em
en
t, 
an
d 
w
ha
te
ve
r 
fo
llo
w
s 
fr
om
 t
he
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
t 
an
d 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
 fo
llo
w
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 p
er
 s
e.
 B
ut
 ‘
A
 
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s’
 f
ol
lo
w
s 
fr
om
 i
t, 
an
d 
‘A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
 i
s 
a 
st
at
em
en
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
 i
s 
no
t 
a 
fa
ls
e 
st
at
em
en
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 i
n 
th
is
 w
ay
, 
fr
om
 t
he
se
 t
hr
ee
, 
it 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
 i
s 
a 
tru
e 
st
at
em
en
t. 
Fo
r 
‘A
 
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s’
 fo
llo
w
s, 
an
d 
‘A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
 is
 a
 st
at
em
en
t, 
an
d 
it 
is
 n
ot
 a
 f
al
se
 s
ta
te
m
en
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
it 
is
 a
 t
ru
e 
st
at
em
en
t, 
an
d 
w
ha
te
ve
r f
ol
lo
w
s 
fr
om
 a
n 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 a
nd
 it
s 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
 fo
llo
w
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 p
er
 se
. T
he
re
fo
re
 it
 
fo
llo
w
s, 
‘A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
‘A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
 is
  
a 
tru
e 
st
at
em
en
t’.
 
, e
rg
o 
‘h
om
o 
es
t’ 
es
t p
ro
po
si
tio
 v
er
a’
. 
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[S
ed
]4
58
 si
 n
eg
at
ur
 is
ta
 c
on
di
tio
na
lis
, <
sc
ili
ce
t>
45
9  ‘
si
 h
om
o 
es
t, 
‘h
om
o 
es
t’ 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
[v
er
a]
46
0 ’
. 
C
on
ta
, 
is
ta
 c
on
di
tio
na
lis
 
no
n 
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
fa
ls
a,
 q
ui
a 
si
 i
st
a 
co
nd
iti
on
al
is
 s
it 
fa
ls
a,
 t
un
c 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 
hu
iu
s 
co
nd
iti
on
al
is
 
es
t 
{v
er
a}
46
1 . 
Er
go
 
co
nd
iti
on
al
is
 e
st
 v
er
a 
ut
 n
un
c,
 q
ui
a 
ut
 n
un
c 
ve
ru
m
 s
eq
ui
tu
r 
ad
 
qu
od
lib
et
, e
t s
ic
 c
on
di
tio
na
lis
 n
un
qu
am
 p
ot
es
t e
ss
e 
fa
ls
a,
 q
ui
a 
si
 d
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
in
 a
liq
uo
 n
un
c 
si
t f
al
sa
, s
eq
ui
tu
r 
qu
od
 in
 e
od
em
 
nu
nc
 s
it 
ve
ra
. P
ro
ba
tio
 {
m
ai
or
is
}4
62
: q
ui
a 
si
 h
ae
c 
co
nd
iti
on
al
is
 
si
t 
fa
ls
a,
 t
un
c 
{h
ab
et
}4
63
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
s 
ad
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
se
qu
itu
r 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
. 
Se
d 
ni
hi
l 
es
t 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 
<i
n 
se
>4
64
 
ni
si
 
si
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o.
 
Er
go
 
si
 
co
nd
iti
on
al
is
 
{e
st
}4
65
 
fa
ls
a,
 
{t
un
c 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
}4
66
 c
on
di
tio
na
lis
 e
st
 p
ro
po
si
tio
, e
t p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
si
 h
ae
c 
co
nd
iti
on
al
is
 s
it 
fa
ls
a,
 ‘
si
 h
om
o 
es
t, 
‘h
om
o 
es
t’ 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o’
, 
se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 
<g
7r
a>
 
ho
m
o 
es
t, 
{q
ui
a 
su
um
 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o}
46
7 . 
Er
go
 
si
 
{p
ra
ed
ic
ta
}4
68
 
co
nd
iti
on
al
is
 
{e
st
}4
69
B
ut
 i
f 
th
is
 c
on
di
tio
na
l 
is
 d
en
ie
d:
 ‘
If
 a
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
‘A
 
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s’
 i
s 
a 
tru
e 
st
at
em
en
t’.
 O
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ry
, 
th
at
 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
an
no
t 
be
 f
al
se
, 
be
ca
us
e 
if 
th
at
 c
on
di
tio
na
l 
is
 
fa
ls
e,
 t
he
n 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
 o
f 
th
is
 c
on
di
tio
na
l 
is
 t
ru
e.
 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 
is
 
tru
e 
ut
 
nu
nc
, 
be
ca
us
e 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 tr
ue
 u
t n
un
c 
fo
llo
w
s 
fr
om
 e
ve
ry
th
in
g,
 a
nd
 s
o 
th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
an
 n
ev
er
 b
e 
fa
ls
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 if
 it
 is
 c
on
ce
de
d 
th
at
 
in
 s
om
e 
nu
nc
 it
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
fa
ls
e,
 it
 fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
nu
nc
 it
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
tru
e.
 P
ro
of
 o
f 
th
e 
m
aj
or
: b
ec
au
se
 if
 th
is
 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 w
er
e 
fa
ls
e,
 t
he
n 
it 
ha
s 
an
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
t 
fr
om
 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
 c
on
se
qu
en
t 
do
es
 n
ot
 f
ol
lo
w
. 
B
ut
 n
ot
hi
ng
 i
s 
an
 
an
te
nc
ed
en
t 
un
le
ss
 i
t 
is
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
if 
th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 is
 f
al
se
, t
he
n 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 
is
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 i
f 
th
is
 c
on
di
tio
na
l, 
‘I
f 
a 
hu
m
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
‘A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
 is
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t’,
 is
 f
al
se
, i
t 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 a
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
be
ca
us
e 
its
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
t 
is
 a
 
st
at
em
en
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
if 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 i
s 
fa
ls
e,
 i
t 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 t
he
 c
on
se
qu
en
t 
of
 t
he
 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 i
s 
tru
e,
 o
r 
at
 l
ea
st
 i
t 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 i
t 
is
 s
o 
in
 
 
fa
ls
a,
 
se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 
co
nd
iti
on
al
is
 s
it 
ve
ru
m
, v
el
 s
al
te
m
 s
eq
ui
tu
r 
qu
od
 i
ta
 e
st
 i
n 
re
 
si
cu
t c
on
se
qu
en
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
 e
st
 
bo
na
. D
ic
o 
er
go
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 c
on
se
qu
en
tia
 e
st
 b
on
a,
 ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t, 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
45
8  A
 
45
9  A
 
46
0  A
 
46
1  ‘
ve
ra
m
’: 
A
 
46
2  ‘
pr
im
ae
 c
on
se
qu
en
tia
e,
 sc
ili
ce
t s
i h
ae
c 
co
nd
iti
on
al
is
 si
t f
al
sa
, c
on
se
qu
en
s e
st
 v
er
am
’: 
A
; ‘
pr
im
ae
 c
on
se
qu
en
tia
e,
 sc
ili
ce
t s
i h
ae
c 
co
nd
iti
on
al
is
 e
st
 fa
ls
a,
 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 e
st
 v
er
a’
: B
  
46
3  ‘
ha
be
re
t’:
 A
 
46
4  B
 
46
5  ‘
si
t’:
 A
 
46
6  ‘
an
te
ce
de
ns
’: 
A
 
46
7  ‘
qu
am
 e
st
 su
um
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
s e
ss
e 
pr
op
os
iti
on
em
’: 
B
 
46
8  ‘
di
ct
a’
: B
 
46
9  ‘
si
t’:
 A
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er
go
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
ve
ra
, 
‘h
om
o 
es
t’’
, 
si
cu
t 
A
ris
to
te
le
s 
di
ci
t 
<e
t 
al
iq
uo
>4
70
re
al
ity
 j
us
t 
as
 t
he
 c
on
se
qu
en
t 
si
gn
ifi
es
, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
is
 
go
od
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
I 
sa
y 
th
at
 
th
is
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
is
 g
oo
d,
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
th
is
 i
s 
tru
e,
 ‘A
 h
um
an
 e
xi
st
s’
’, 
ju
st
 a
s A
ris
to
tle
 sa
ys
. 
. 
 
 
 
A
d 
pr
im
um
 i
n 
co
nt
ra
riu
m
, 
di
co
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 c
on
se
qu
en
tia
 e
st
 
bo
na
, ‘
ha
ec
 e
st
 v
er
a,
 ‘h
om
o 
es
t a
si
nu
s’
, e
rg
o 
ho
m
o 
es
t a
si
nu
s’
, 
et
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
s 
es
t 
im
po
ss
ib
le
 s
ic
ut
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
de
m
on
st
ra
nd
o 
is
ta
m
, 
‘h
om
o 
es
t 
as
in
us
’, 
[in
]4
71
 t
er
m
in
is
 s
ic
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
tib
us
 
si
cu
t 
m
od
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
pu
d 
no
s. 
Et
 q
ua
nd
o 
di
ci
tu
r 
qu
od
 i
st
i 
te
rm
in
i 
po
ss
un
t 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
 a
lia
, s
ci
lic
et
 d
eu
m
 e
t 
bo
nu
m
, d
ic
o 
qu
od
 s
i i
st
ae
 v
oc
es
 im
po
na
nt
ur
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 a
lia
, [
ill
a]
47
2  
er
it 
al
ia
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 q
ua
m
 m
od
o 
es
t, 
qu
ia
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 h
ab
et
 
id
en
tit
at
em
 s
ua
m
 v
el
 d
iv
er
si
ta
te
m
 a
b 
id
en
tit
at
e 
ve
l d
iv
er
si
ta
te
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
to
ru
m
 
pe
r 
te
rm
in
os
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
, 
qu
od
 
pa
te
t 
pe
r 
A
ris
to
te
le
m
, p
rim
o 
Pe
rih
er
m
en
ei
as
, q
ui
 d
ic
it 
qu
od
 s
i 
‘tu
ni
ca
’ 
im
po
na
tu
r 
ad
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
du
m
 h
om
in
em
 e
t 
eq
uu
m
, 
is
ta
 o
ra
tio
, 
‘tu
ni
ca
 e
st
 a
lb
a’
, n
on
 e
st
 u
na
 o
ra
tio
 in
 u
na
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
io
ne
 e
t i
n 
al
ia
, s
ed
 p
lu
re
s 
su
nt
 o
ra
tio
ne
s. 
U
na
 q
ua
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t q
uo
d 
ho
m
o 
es
t a
lb
us
, e
t a
lia
 q
ua
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t q
uo
d 
eq
uu
s e
st
 a
lb
us
. E
t [
ex
]4
73
To
 t
he
 f
irs
t 
ar
gu
m
en
t 
to
 t
he
 c
on
tra
ry
, 
I 
sa
y 
th
at
 t
hi
s 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
is
 g
oo
d,
 ‘
Th
is
 i
s 
tru
e,
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 i
s 
an
 a
ss
’’
, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
a 
hu
m
an
 
is
 
an
 
as
s’
, 
an
d 
th
e 
an
te
ce
de
nt
 
is
 
im
po
ss
ib
le
 ju
st
 a
s 
th
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
, b
y 
us
in
g 
th
is
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
‘A
 h
um
an
 is
 a
n 
as
s’
, w
ith
 th
e 
te
rm
s 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
in
 ju
st
 th
e 
w
ay
 t
he
y 
si
gn
ify
 w
ith
 u
s. 
A
nd
 w
he
n 
it 
is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 t
ho
se
 
te
rm
s 
ca
n 
si
gn
ify
 o
th
er
 th
in
gs
, n
am
el
y 
G
od
 a
nd
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 
go
od
, I
 sa
y 
th
at
 if
 th
os
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 a
re
 m
ad
e 
to
 si
gn
ify
 o
th
er
 
th
in
gs
, t
he
n 
it 
w
ill
 b
e 
a 
di
ff
er
en
t s
ta
te
m
en
t t
ha
n 
it 
is
 w
he
n 
th
e 
te
rm
s s
ig
ni
fy
 a
s t
he
y 
do
 fo
r u
s n
ow
, b
ec
au
se
 a
 st
at
em
en
t 
ha
s 
its
 id
en
tit
y 
or
 d
iv
er
si
ty
 fr
om
 th
e 
id
en
tit
y 
or
 d
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
th
in
gs
 si
gn
ifi
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
te
rm
s o
f t
he
 st
at
em
en
t. 
Th
is
 
is
 c
le
ar
 f
ro
m
 A
ris
to
tle
, 
w
ho
 s
ay
s 
in
 t
he
 f
irs
t 
bo
ok
 o
f 
th
e 
Pe
ri
he
rm
en
ei
as
 th
at
 if
 ‘
tu
ni
c’
 is
 m
ad
e 
to
 s
ig
ni
fy
 a
 h
um
an
 
an
d 
a 
ho
rs
e,
 t
hi
s 
se
nt
en
ce
, 
‘A
 t
un
ic
 i
s 
w
hi
te
’, 
is
 n
ot
 o
ne
 
se
nt
en
ce
 w
ith
 tw
o 
di
ff
er
en
t s
ig
ni
fic
at
es
, b
ut
 ra
th
er
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
tw
o 
se
nt
en
ce
s:
 o
ne
 w
hi
ch
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
th
at
 a
 h
um
an
 is
 w
hi
te
, 
an
d 
an
ot
he
r w
hi
ch
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
th
at
 a
 h
or
se
 is
 w
hi
te
. A
nd
 fr
om
 
th
is
 I
 a
rg
ue
 t
ha
t 
no
 l
es
s 
is
 a
 s
en
te
nc
e 
di
ve
rs
e 
fr
om
 t
he
 
di
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
s 
at
 d
iff
er
en
t 
tim
es
 t
ha
n 
fr
om
 t
he
 
 
ho
c 
ar
gu
o 
no
n 
m
in
us
 
es
t 
or
at
io
 
di
ve
rs
a 
ex
 
di
ve
rs
ita
te
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
to
ru
m
 i
n 
di
ve
rs
is
 t
em
po
rib
us
 q
ua
m
 e
x 
di
ve
rs
ita
te
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
to
ru
m
 
in
 
eo
de
m
 
te
m
po
re
, 
qu
ia
 
ca
us
a 
di
ve
rs
ita
tis
 
se
m
pe
r 
m
an
et
 e
ad
em
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
di
ve
rs
ita
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
to
ru
m
. 
C
um
 
er
go
 i
st
i 
te
rm
in
i, 
‘h
om
o’
 e
t 
‘a
si
nu
s’
, 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ce
nt
 i
de
m
 i
n 
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eo
de
m
 t
em
po
re
, 
se
d 
ut
er
qu
e 
ve
l 
al
ite
r 
si
gn
ifi
ce
t 
m
ul
ta
 e
t 
di
ve
rs
a,
 s
eq
ui
tu
r q
uo
d 
{h
ae
c}
47
4  o
ra
tio
 n
on
 e
st
 u
na
 s
ed
 p
lu
re
s. 
Eo
de
m
 
m
od
o 
si
 
ut
er
qu
e 
ill
or
um
 
te
rm
in
or
um
 
ve
l 
al
ite
r 
si
gn
ifi
ce
t 
di
ve
rs
a 
in
 d
iv
er
si
s 
te
rm
po
rib
us
, 
no
n 
er
it 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
un
a 
ne
c 
ea
de
m
 
[p
ro
po
si
tio
]4
75
 n
is
i 
m
at
er
al
ite
r, 
se
d 
al
te
ro
 
<i
st
or
um
>4
76
 t
er
m
in
or
um
 v
el
 u
tro
qu
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
e 
di
ve
rs
a 
in
 
di
ve
rs
is
 t
em
po
rib
us
 e
rit
 a
lia
 e
t 
al
ia
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 i
n 
te
m
po
rib
us
 
di
ve
rs
is
 in
 q
ui
bu
s u
nu
m
 {
si
gn
ifi
ca
t}
47
7
di
ve
rs
ity
 o
f s
ig
ni
fic
at
es
 a
t t
he
 s
am
e 
tim
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
ca
us
e 
of
 d
iv
er
si
ty
 a
lw
ay
s 
re
m
ai
ns
 th
e 
sa
m
e,
 n
am
el
y 
th
e 
di
ve
rs
ity
 
of
 t
he
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
es
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
si
nc
e 
th
es
e 
te
rm
s, 
‘h
um
an
’ 
an
d 
‘a
ss
’, 
do
 n
ot
 s
ig
ni
fy
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
g 
at
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
tim
e,
 
bu
t 
bo
th
 o
r 
ei
th
er
 s
ig
ni
fy
 m
an
y 
an
d 
di
ve
rs
e 
th
in
gs
, 
it 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 th
is
 s
en
te
nc
e 
is
 n
ot
 o
ne
 b
ut
 m
an
y.
 In
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
ay
, i
f 
ei
th
er
 o
r 
bo
th
 o
f 
th
os
e 
te
rm
s 
si
gn
ify
 d
iv
er
se
 th
in
gs
 
at
 d
iff
er
en
t 
tim
es
, 
it 
w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e 
on
e 
an
d 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
sa
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t e
xc
ep
t m
at
er
ia
lly
. F
or
, b
y 
ei
th
er
 o
f 
th
e 
te
rm
s 
or
 
by
 b
ot
h 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
di
ve
rs
e 
th
in
gs
 a
t 
di
ff
er
en
t 
tim
es
, 
th
er
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
on
e 
st
at
em
en
t s
ig
ni
fy
in
g 
on
e 
th
in
g 
at
 o
ne
 ti
m
e 
an
d 
an
ot
he
r 
st
at
em
en
t 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
an
ot
he
r 
st
at
em
en
t 
at
 a
no
th
er
 
tim
e,
 a
lth
ou
gh
 m
at
er
ia
lly
 th
ey
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e.
 
 in
 u
no
 te
m
po
re
, e
t a
liu
d 
in
 a
lio
 te
m
po
re
, q
ua
m
vi
s m
at
er
ia
lit
er
 si
nt
 e
ad
em
. 
 
 
Et
 s
i 
di
ca
tu
r 
qu
od
 v
oc
es
 s
un
t 
ea
ed
em
, 
et
 o
ra
tio
 n
on
 e
st
 n
is
i 
vo
x,
 e
rg
o 
or
at
io
 e
st
 e
ad
em
 q
ua
nt
um
cu
m
qu
e 
te
rm
i 
si
gn
ifi
ce
nt
 
di
ve
rs
a,
 d
ic
en
du
m
 <
es
t>
47
8  
qu
od
 v
ox
 e
st
 {
m
at
er
ia
le
}4
79
 i
n 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
pr
ol
at
a 
[e
t]4
80
 
re
sp
ec
tu
s 
ad
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
m
 
pe
r 
vo
ce
m
 e
st
 f
or
m
al
e 
in
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
, 
et
 i
de
o 
si
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
a 
<i
n 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e>
48
1  
[s
in
t 
et
]4
82
 {
fia
nt
}4
83
 d
iv
er
sa
 [
re
sp
ec
tu
s 
ad
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
]4
84
, 
er
un
t 
di
ve
rs
i 
<p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
s>
48
5
A
nd
 if
 it
 is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 th
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 a
re
 th
e 
sa
m
e,
 a
nd
 th
at
 a
 
se
nt
en
ce
 i
s 
no
th
in
g 
ot
he
r 
th
an
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 t
he
re
fo
re
 a
 
se
nt
en
ce
 i
s 
th
e 
sa
m
e,
 h
ow
ev
er
 m
uc
h 
th
e 
te
rm
s 
si
gn
ify
 
di
ve
rs
e 
th
in
gs
, 
it 
m
us
t 
be
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
is
 t
he
 
m
at
er
ia
l 
in
 a
 s
po
ke
n 
st
at
em
en
t 
an
d 
th
e 
re
sp
ec
tu
s 
to
 a
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
is
 th
e 
fo
rm
al
 e
le
m
en
t i
n 
a 
st
at
em
en
t, 
an
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
if 
th
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
s 
ar
e 
di
ve
rs
e,
 th
ey
 
, 
et
 s
ic
 n
on
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373 
m
an
eb
it 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
ea
de
m
 q
ua
m
tu
m
 a
d 
su
um
 {
fo
rm
al
em
}4
86
, 
qu
am
vi
s 
m
an
ea
t 
ea
de
m
 
qu
am
tu
m
 
ad
 
su
um
 
m
at
er
ia
le
. 
Et
 
pr
op
te
r h
oc
 {
es
t d
ic
en
du
m
}4
87
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 p
ro
po
si
tio
, ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t 
as
in
us
’, 
nu
nq
ua
m
 
po
te
st
 
es
se
 
ve
ra
 
de
m
on
st
ra
nd
o 
pr
op
os
iti
on
em
 in
 q
ua
e 
is
te
 te
rm
in
us
, ‘
ho
m
o’
, s
ig
ni
fic
at
 a
ni
m
al
 
ra
tio
na
le
, [
et
 is
te
 te
rm
in
us
, ‘
as
in
us
’, 
an
im
al
 ir
ra
tio
na
le
]4
88
. A
lia
 
ta
m
en
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 i
n 
ei
sd
em
 <
vo
ci
bu
s>
48
9  
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
ve
ra
 s
i 
te
rm
in
i 
im
po
na
nt
ur
 a
lii
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tis
, u
t 
ar
gu
tu
m
 f
ui
t. 
Se
d 
ill
a 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
no
n 
es
t 
ea
de
m
 {
pr
op
os
iti
on
i}
49
0
w
ill
 b
e 
di
ve
rs
e 
st
at
em
en
ts
, 
an
d 
so
 t
he
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
w
ill
 n
ot
 
re
m
ai
n 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
ith
 
re
sp
ec
t 
to
 
its
 
fo
rm
al
 
el
em
en
t, 
al
th
ou
gh
 i
t 
re
m
ai
ns
 t
he
 s
am
e 
w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 t
o 
its
 m
at
er
ia
l 
el
em
en
ts
. A
nd
 o
n 
ac
co
un
t o
f 
th
is
 it
 m
us
t b
e 
sa
id
 th
at
 th
is
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
‘A
 h
um
an
 i
s 
an
 a
ss
’, 
ca
n 
ne
ve
r 
be
 t
ru
e 
by
 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 
th
is
 
te
rm
, 
‘h
um
an
’, 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 ra
tio
na
l a
ni
m
al
, a
nd
 th
is
 te
rm
, ‘
as
s’
, s
ig
ni
fie
s 
an
 
irr
at
io
na
l a
ni
m
al
. H
ow
ev
er
, a
no
th
er
 s
ta
te
m
en
t c
om
po
se
d 
of
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 c
an
 b
e 
tru
e 
if 
th
e 
te
rm
s 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
to
 
si
gn
ify
 d
iff
er
en
t s
ig
ni
fic
at
es
, a
s w
as
 a
rg
ue
d 
ea
rli
er
. B
ut
 th
at
 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 n
ot
 t
he
 s
am
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
in
 w
hi
ch
 ‘
hu
m
an
’ 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 r
at
io
na
l a
ni
m
al
, a
nd
 ‘
as
s’
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
an
 ir
ra
tio
na
l 
an
im
al
, e
xc
ep
t m
at
er
ia
lly
, a
s w
as
 sa
id
. 
 i
n 
qu
a 
‘h
om
o’
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
an
im
al
 r
at
io
na
le
, e
t 
‘a
si
nu
s’
 a
ni
m
al
 i
rr
at
io
na
le
, n
is
i 
m
at
er
ia
lit
er
, u
t d
ic
tu
m
 e
st
. 
 
 
A
d 
al
ia
m
 r
at
io
ne
m
, q
ua
nd
o 
pr
ob
at
ur
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
se
qu
itu
r, 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t, 
er
go
 h
ae
c 
es
t v
er
a,
 ‘d
eu
s 
es
t’’
, q
ui
a 
po
ss
ib
ile
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 
no
n 
si
t, 
{<
et
>4
91
 
pe
r 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 
po
ss
ib
ile
 e
st
 q
uo
d}
49
2  
no
n 
si
t 
ve
ra
, 
di
ce
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
 e
st
 b
on
a,
 ‘
de
us
 e
st
, 
er
go
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
ve
ra
, 
[‘
de
us
 
es
t’]
49
3
To
 t
ha
t 
ot
he
r 
re
as
on
, 
w
he
n 
it 
is
 p
ro
ve
d 
th
at
 i
t 
do
es
 n
ot
 
fo
llo
w
, 
‘G
od
 e
xi
st
s, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
th
is
 i
s 
tru
e,
 ‘
G
od
 e
xi
st
s’
’, 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
is
 p
os
si
bl
e 
th
at
 th
is
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
‘G
od
 e
xi
st
s’
, d
oe
s 
no
t e
xi
st
, a
nd
 c
on
se
qu
en
tly
 it
 is
 p
os
si
bl
e 
th
at
 it
 is
 n
ot
 tr
ue
, i
t 
m
us
t 
be
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 t
hi
s 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
is
 g
oo
d,
 ‘
G
od
 e
xi
st
s, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
th
is
 is
 tr
ue
, ‘
G
od
 e
xi
st
s’
’. 
A
nd
 I 
sa
y 
th
at
 th
is
 d
oe
s 
no
t f
ol
lo
w
 –
 ‘
Th
is
 s
ta
te
m
en
t d
oe
s 
no
t e
xi
st
, t
he
re
fo
re
 it
 is
 
’. 
Et
 d
ic
o 
qu
od
 n
on
 s
eq
ui
tu
r, 
‘h
ae
c 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
no
n 
es
t, 
er
go
 n
on
 e
st
 v
er
a’
, 
qu
ia
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
m
 e
ss
e 
ve
ra
m
 n
on
 e
st
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49
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pr
op
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49
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49
2  ‘
er
go
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si
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, ‘
de
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49
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374 
al
iu
d 
qu
am
 <
ip
sa
m
>4
94
 s
ig
ni
fic
ar
e,
 v
el
 e
ss
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
am
, 
si
cu
t 
in
 
re
. 
Se
d 
ha
ec
 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 
te
rm
in
is
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ib
us
 s
ic
ut
 {
nu
nc
}4
95
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t, 
se
m
pe
r 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
si
cu
t 
es
t 
<m
od
o>
49
6  
in
 r
e,
 s
iv
e 
<h
ae
c>
49
7  
pr
op
os
iti
o 
si
t 
si
ve
 
no
n 
si
t. 
Q
uo
d 
pa
te
t, 
qu
ia
 s
i i
n 
di
sp
ut
at
io
ne
 o
pp
on
en
s 
pr
op
on
at
 
is
ta
, 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 r
es
po
nd
en
s 
ha
be
t 
is
ta
m
 c
on
ce
de
re
, 
si
 n
on
 
ob
lig
et
ur
 
ad
 
op
po
si
tu
m
. 
Se
d 
no
n 
co
nc
ed
it 
is
ta
m
 
qu
an
do
 
pr
of
er
tu
r, 
qu
ia
 
tu
nc
 
op
po
ne
ns
 
et
 
re
sp
on
de
ns
 
{s
im
ili
te
r 
ha
be
nt
}4
98
 lo
qu
i, 
qu
od
 n
on
 e
st
 v
er
um
. E
t q
ua
nd
o 
no
n 
pr
of
er
tu
r, 
tu
nc
 n
on
 e
st
. E
rg
o,
 h
ab
et
 c
on
ce
de
re
 [i
lla
m
]4
99
 q
ua
nd
o 
no
n 
es
t. 
Et
 {
no
n}
50
0  c
on
ce
de
re
 n
on
 o
bl
ig
at
ur
 n
is
i v
er
um
. E
rg
o 
ha
ec
 e
st
 
{v
er
um
}5
01
no
t 
tru
e’
 –
 b
ec
au
se
 f
or
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
to
 b
e 
tru
e 
is
 n
ot
hi
ng
 
ot
he
r t
ha
n 
fo
r i
t t
o 
si
gn
ify
, o
r t
o 
be
 si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e,
 ju
st
 a
s i
t i
s 
in
 
re
al
ity
. 
B
ut
 
th
is
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
‘G
od
 
ex
is
ts
’, 
its
 
te
rm
s 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
ju
st
 a
s 
th
ey
 d
o 
no
w
, a
lw
ay
s 
si
gn
ifi
es
 ju
st
 a
s 
it 
is
 
in
 re
al
ity
, w
he
th
er
 th
at
 st
at
em
en
t e
xi
st
s o
r n
ot
. T
ha
t i
s c
le
ar
, 
be
ca
us
e 
if 
in
 
a 
di
sp
ut
at
io
n 
th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
 
ut
te
rs
 
th
is
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
‘G
od
 e
xi
st
s’
, t
he
 re
sp
on
de
nt
 h
as
 to
 c
on
ce
de
 it
, i
f 
he
 is
 n
ot
 o
bl
ig
at
ed
 to
 th
e 
op
po
si
te
. B
ut
 h
e 
do
es
 n
ot
 c
on
ce
de
 
it 
w
he
n 
it 
is
 u
tte
re
d,
 b
ec
au
se
 t
he
n 
th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
 a
nd
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
 w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
to
 s
pe
ak
 a
t t
he
 s
am
e 
tim
e,
 w
hi
ch
 is
 
no
t t
ru
e.
 A
nd
 w
he
n 
it 
is
 n
ot
 u
tte
re
d,
 th
en
 it
 d
oe
s 
no
t e
xi
st
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 h
e 
ha
s t
o 
co
nc
ed
e 
th
e 
st
at
em
en
t w
he
n 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 
ex
is
t. 
A
nd
 h
e 
is
 n
ot
 o
bl
ig
at
ed
 to
 c
on
ce
de
 it
 u
nl
es
s 
it 
is
 tr
ue
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 it
 is
 tr
ue
, w
he
n 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
. 
, q
ua
nd
o 
no
n 
es
t. 
 
 
[E
t]5
02
 
co
nf
irm
at
ur
. 
N
am
 
po
st
qu
am
 
{i
ps
a}
50
3  
es
t 
pr
ol
at
a,
 
<i
ps
am
>5
04
 e
st
 {
ob
ie
ct
a}
50
5
Th
is
 is
 c
on
fir
m
ed
. F
or
 a
fte
r 
a 
st
at
em
en
t i
s 
sp
ok
en
, i
t i
s 
an
 
ob
je
ct
 o
f 
m
em
or
y,
 b
ec
au
se
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
 w
ou
ld
 
no
t 
ha
ve
 o
r 
be
 a
bl
e 
to
 h
av
e 
a 
m
em
or
y 
of
 t
he
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
sp
ok
en
 b
y 
th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
, 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
pr
ob
le
m
at
ic
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
en
 t
he
 r
es
po
nd
en
t 
w
ou
ld
 n
ev
er
 b
e 
ab
le
 t
o 
re
sp
on
d 
w
el
l. 
 m
em
or
ia
e,
 q
ui
a 
al
ite
r 
op
po
ne
ns
 
no
n 
ha
be
re
t 
ne
c 
ha
be
re
 
po
ss
et
 
m
em
or
ia
m
 
de
 
pr
ol
at
is
 
a 
re
sp
on
de
nt
e,
 q
uo
d 
es
t i
nc
on
ve
ni
en
s, 
qu
ia
 t
un
c 
nu
nq
ua
m
 b
en
e 
po
ss
et
 re
sp
on
de
re
. E
rg
o 
qu
an
do
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 n
on
 e
st
, p
ot
es
t e
ss
e 
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375 
{o
bi
ec
ta
}5
06
 m
em
or
ia
e,
 e
t p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
{i
ps
i i
nt
el
le
ct
ui
}5
07
, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
qu
an
do
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 n
on
 e
st
, s
ig
ni
fic
at
 a
liq
ui
d 
<i
n>
50
8  
in
te
lle
ct
ui
 a
 q
uo
 in
te
lli
gi
tu
r. 
Er
go
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
 a
ut
 
fa
ls
um
. S
ed
 h
ae
c,
 ‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 n
on
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 fa
ls
um
. E
rg
o 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 q
ua
nd
o 
no
n,
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
. H
oc
 e
tia
m
 p
at
et
, n
am
 b
en
e 
re
sp
on
de
ns
 iu
di
ca
t [
de
 p
ro
la
tis
]5
09
 a
b 
op
po
ne
nt
e 
po
st
qu
am
 s
un
t 
pr
ol
at
a,
 u
tru
m
 su
nt
 v
er
a 
ve
l f
al
sa
, e
t s
ec
un
du
m
 q
uo
d 
iu
di
ca
t s
ic
 
re
sp
on
de
t. 
<P
ro
po
si
tio
>5
10
 e
rg
o 
{q
ua
e}
51
1
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 w
he
n 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
, 
it 
ca
n 
be
 a
n 
ob
je
ct
 o
f m
em
or
y,
 a
nd
 c
on
se
qu
en
tly
 it
 c
an
 b
e 
an
 o
bj
ec
t f
or
 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, a
nd
 s
o 
w
he
n 
th
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
, i
t 
si
gn
ifi
es
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
to
 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 
by
 
w
hi
ch
 
it 
is
 
un
de
rs
to
od
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 
it 
si
gn
ifi
es
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
tru
e 
or
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
. 
B
ut
 t
hi
s, 
‘G
od
 e
xi
st
s’
, 
do
es
 n
ot
 s
ig
ni
fy
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
. T
he
re
fo
re
, ‘
G
od
 e
xi
st
s’
, w
he
n 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 
ex
is
t, 
si
gn
ifi
es
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e.
 T
hi
s 
is
 a
ls
o 
cl
ea
r, 
fo
r 
as
su
m
e 
th
at
 a
 r
es
po
nd
en
t j
ud
ge
s 
co
rr
ec
tly
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
th
in
gs
 
sp
ok
en
 b
y 
an
 o
pp
on
en
t a
fte
r t
he
y 
ar
e 
sp
ok
en
, w
he
th
er
 th
ey
 
ar
e 
tru
e 
or
 f
al
se
, 
an
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 h
ow
 h
e 
ju
dg
es
 s
o 
he
 
re
sp
on
ds
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
th
at
 
w
hi
ch
 
is
 
no
th
in
g 
ex
ce
pt
 
ob
je
ct
iv
el
y 
in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 is
 ju
dg
ed
 to
 b
e 
tru
e 
or
 fa
ls
e,
 a
nd
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 is
 tr
ue
 o
r f
al
se
. 
 n
on
 n
is
i o
bi
ec
tiv
e 
in
 
in
te
lle
ct
u 
ve
ro
 i
ud
ic
io
 i
ud
ic
at
ur
 e
ss
e 
ve
ra
 v
el
 f
al
sa
, 
et
 p
er
 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 e
st
 v
er
a 
ve
l f
al
sa
. 
 
 
Ite
m
 il
lu
d 
qu
od
 n
on
 e
st
 p
ot
es
t {
al
iq
ui
d}
51
2  s
ig
ni
fic
ar
e,
 u
t p
at
et
, 
qu
ia
 
m
ul
to
tie
ns
 
ill
ud
 
qu
od
 
no
n 
es
t 
ap
pa
re
t 
se
ns
ui
 
ve
l 
in
te
lle
ct
ui
, 
{v
el
}5
13
 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 
{r
es
pe
ct
u}
51
4  
ill
iu
s 
al
iq
ui
d 
in
te
lli
gi
t, 
et
 
si
c 
ill
ud
 
qu
od
 
no
n 
es
t 
po
te
st
 
al
iq
ui
d 
{r
ep
re
se
nt
ar
e}
51
5  
in
te
lle
ct
ui
, 
ut
 p
at
et
 <
in
 l
ud
is
iti
s 
(?
) 
et
>5
16
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t e
xi
st
 c
an
 s
ig
ni
fy
 s
om
et
hi
ng
, 
as
 i
t 
cl
ea
r, 
be
ca
us
e 
of
te
nt
im
es
 t
ha
t 
w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
ex
is
t 
ap
pe
ar
s 
to
 o
ne
’s
 s
en
se
s 
or
 i
nt
el
le
ct
, 
an
d 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 it
 th
in
ks
 a
bo
ut
 s
om
et
hi
ng
, a
nd
 
so
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
ex
is
t 
ca
n 
be
 p
re
se
nt
 t
o 
th
e 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
50
6  ‘
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ie
ct
am
’: 
A
, B
 
50
7  ‘
ip
si
us
 in
te
lle
ct
us
’: 
A
, B
 
50
8  A
 
50
9  A
 
51
0  A
 
51
1  ‘
qu
ae
cu
m
qu
e’
: B
 
51
2  ‘
al
iu
d’
: B
 
51
3  ‘
et
’: 
A
, B
 
51
4  ‘
pe
r r
ep
ra
es
en
ta
tio
ne
m
’: 
A
; ‘
pe
r p
ra
es
en
ta
tio
ne
m
’: 
B
  
51
5  ‘
pr
ae
se
nt
ar
e’
: A
 
51
6  A
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[e
tia
m
]5
17
 
in
 
so
m
ni
s 
in
 
qu
ib
us
 
al
iq
ua
nd
o 
vi
de
tu
r 
{s
om
ni
an
ti}
51
8  
qu
od
 lo
qu
at
ur
 c
um
 {
m
or
tu
is
}5
19
, v
el
 [
qu
od
]5
20
 
vi
de
t 
m
on
te
m
 a
ur
eu
m
, 
et
 h
ui
us
m
od
i 
no
n 
en
tia
 a
pp
ar
en
tia
 
in
te
lle
ct
ui
 
in
 
so
m
no
 
al
iq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
{s
om
ni
an
ti}
52
1 , 
et
 
ta
m
en
 n
on
 s
un
t i
n 
re
ru
m
 n
at
ur
a.
  
{Q
ui
a 
er
go
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
ex
is
tit
 
in
 
re
ru
m
 
na
tu
ra
, 
ex
is
te
ns
 
ta
m
en
 
in
 
in
te
lle
ct
u 
ob
ie
ct
iv
e,
 
po
te
st
 
si
gn
ifi
cr
e 
ve
ru
m
 
ve
l 
fa
ls
um
, 
et
 
pe
r 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 a
liq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
 i
nt
el
le
ct
ui
}5
22
. 
<E
t 
qu
on
ia
m
 
in
te
lli
gi
tu
r>
52
3 , 
di
co
 e
rg
o 
qu
od
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
es
t 
in
 
re
ru
m
 n
at
ur
a 
qu
ae
 t
am
en
 {
ac
tu
al
ite
r 
in
te
lle
ct
a}
52
4  
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
{i
nt
el
le
ct
ui
}5
25
in
te
lle
ct
. T
hi
s 
ha
pp
en
s 
in
 s
le
ep
, w
he
re
 s
om
et
im
es
 it
 s
ee
m
s 
to
 s
om
eo
ne
 s
le
ep
in
g 
th
at
 h
e 
ta
lk
s 
w
ith
 th
e 
de
ad
, o
r 
th
at
 h
e 
se
es
 a
 g
ol
de
n 
m
ou
nt
ai
n 
or
 o
th
er
 n
on
-b
ei
ng
s 
of
 t
hi
s 
so
rt,
 
ap
pe
ar
in
g 
to
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 in
 s
le
ep
, s
ig
ni
fy
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 to
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 s
le
ep
in
g,
 a
nd
 y
et
 th
ey
 d
o 
no
t i
n 
fa
ct
 e
xi
st
. T
he
re
fo
re
 
be
ca
us
e 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
in
 f
ac
t 
ex
is
t, 
th
ou
gh
 
ex
is
tin
g 
in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 o
bj
ec
tiv
el
y,
 c
an
 s
ig
ni
fy
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 
tru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 c
an
 s
ig
ni
fy
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 to
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, I
 sa
y 
th
at
 a
 st
at
em
en
t w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
in
 f
ac
t 
ex
is
t, 
w
hi
ch
 y
et
 a
ct
ua
lly
 i
s 
th
ou
gh
t, 
si
gn
ifi
es
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
 t
o 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 is
 tr
ue
 o
r f
al
se
, b
ec
au
se
 a
 st
at
em
en
t i
s n
ot
 tr
ue
 
un
le
ss
 b
ec
au
se
 it
 is
 si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e 
of
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 tr
ue
. 
 v
er
um
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
, e
t 
pe
r 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 e
st
 v
er
a 
ve
l f
al
sa
, q
ui
a 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
no
n 
es
t v
er
a 
ni
si
 q
ui
a 
es
t s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ve
ri.
 
 
 
In
te
lli
ge
nd
um
 
qu
od
 
po
ss
ib
ile
 
es
t 
in
te
lle
ct
um
 
in
te
lli
ge
re
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
em
 q
ua
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
de
um
 e
ss
e,
 n
on
 i
nt
el
lig
en
do
 
is
ta
m
, ‘
de
us
 e
st
’, 
qu
ae
 fu
it 
pr
ol
at
a 
a 
m
e,
 n
ec
 in
te
lli
ge
nd
o 
ill
am
 
qu
ae
 f
ui
t 
pr
ol
at
a 
ab
 a
lio
, 
se
d 
in
te
lli
ge
nd
o 
un
um
 c
om
m
un
e 
ab
st
ra
ct
um
 p
er
 in
te
lle
ct
um
 a
 {
qu
al
ib
us
}5
26
O
ne
 m
us
t u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
at
 it
 is
 p
os
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 to
 
th
in
k 
of
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t w
hi
ch
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
th
at
 G
od
 e
xi
st
s, 
no
t b
y 
th
in
ki
ng
 th
is
, ‘
G
od
 e
xi
st
s’
, w
hi
ch
 w
as
 s
po
ke
n 
by
 m
e,
 o
r b
y 
th
in
ki
ng
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 w
as
 sp
ok
en
 b
y 
yo
u,
 b
ut
 b
y 
th
in
ki
ng
 o
ne
 
th
in
g 
co
m
m
on
 to
 b
ot
h,
 a
bs
tra
ct
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 fr
om
 e
ac
h 
pa
rti
cu
la
r s
ta
te
m
en
t o
r a
 s
im
ila
r o
ne
. H
en
ce
, e
ve
n 
if,
 ju
st
 a
s 
th
e 
m
od
er
ni
 s
ay
, 
a 
un
iv
er
sa
l 
do
es
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
ex
is
te
nc
e 
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 ta
li 
ve
l 
co
ns
im
ili
. U
nd
e 
lic
et
 u
ni
ve
rs
al
e 
no
n 
ha
be
re
t e
ss
e 
ex
is
te
re
 e
xt
ra
 
an
im
am
, 
si
cu
t 
di
cu
nt
 m
od
er
ni
, 
ta
m
en
 n
on
 e
st
 d
ub
iu
m
 q
ui
n 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
51
7  B
 
51
8  ‘
so
m
no
le
nt
o’
: B
 
51
9  ‘
m
or
tu
o’
: A
, B
 
52
0  A
 
52
1  ‘
so
m
no
le
nt
o’
: B
 
52
2  ‘
qu
ar
e 
er
go
 n
eg
et
ur
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
ex
is
tit
 in
 re
ru
m
 n
at
ur
a 
no
n 
po
te
st
 a
liq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
 in
te
lle
ct
ui
 e
t q
uo
m
od
o 
in
te
lle
ct
ur
’: 
A
; ‘
qu
ar
e 
ig
itu
r n
eg
an
tu
r 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
qu
ae
 n
on
 e
xi
st
it 
in
 re
ru
m
 n
at
ur
a 
al
iu
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
 in
te
lle
ct
ui
’: 
B
  
52
3  B
 
52
4  ‘
es
t a
cc
id
en
tia
lit
er
’: 
B
 
52
5  ‘
in
te
nt
io
ni
’: 
B
 
52
6  ‘
qu
al
ib
et
’: 
A
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se
cu
nd
um
 {
om
ne
s}
52
7  
un
iv
er
sa
le
 h
ab
et
 e
ss
e 
{o
bi
ec
tiv
e}
52
8  
in
 
in
te
lle
ct
u.
 P
ot
es
t 
{n
am
}5
29
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
 i
nt
el
lig
er
e 
le
on
em
 v
el
 
el
ep
ha
nt
em
 
[in
 
un
iv
er
sa
li,
 
no
n 
in
te
lli
ge
nd
o 
is
tu
m
 
le
on
em
 
<a
ni
m
al
>5
30
 n
ec
 i
st
um
 e
le
ph
an
te
m
 <
an
im
al
>5
31
]5
32
, e
t 
eo
de
m
 
m
od
o 
po
te
st
 in
te
lle
ct
us
 in
te
lli
ge
re
 u
nu
m
 c
om
m
un
e 
cu
ili
be
t t
al
i 
pr
op
os
iti
on
i, 
sc
ili
et
 h
ui
c,
 ‘
de
us
 e
st
’, 
pr
ol
at
ae
 a
 m
e,
 e
t 
hu
ic
, 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 p
ro
la
ta
e 
a 
So
cr
at
e,
 e
t 
si
c 
de
 a
lii
s. 
C
re
do
 q
uo
d 
in
 
{d
is
pu
ta
tio
ne
}5
33
 
op
po
ne
ns
 
et
 
re
sp
on
de
ns
 
{f
ue
ru
nt
}5
34
 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 s
uo
s 
ad
 t
al
ia
 c
om
m
un
ia
 o
m
ni
bu
s 
pr
op
os
iti
on
ib
us
 
pr
ol
at
is
 d
e 
qu
ib
us
 d
is
pu
ta
nt
, e
t {
fu
er
un
t}
53
5  i
nt
el
le
ct
us
 s
uo
s 
ad
 
id
em
, e
t 
si
c 
{p
at
et
}5
36
 q
uo
d 
re
sp
on
de
ns
 p
ot
es
t 
re
da
rg
ui
, q
ui
a 
po
te
st
 id
em
 c
on
ce
de
re
 e
t n
eg
ar
e 
<s
ci
lic
et
>5
37
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
, y
et
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
do
ub
t b
ut
 th
at
, a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
th
em
, a
 u
ni
ve
rs
al
 h
as
 s
ub
je
ct
iv
e 
be
in
g 
in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
. F
or
 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 c
an
 t
hi
nk
 a
bo
ut
 a
 l
io
n 
or
 a
n 
el
ep
ha
nt
 i
n 
th
e 
un
iv
er
sa
l, 
no
t b
y 
th
in
ki
ng
 th
is
 li
on
 o
r 
th
is
 e
le
ph
an
t. 
In
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
ay
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 c
an
 th
in
k 
on
e 
th
in
g 
co
m
m
on
 to
 e
ac
h 
su
ch
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
na
m
el
y 
th
is
, ‘
G
od
 e
xi
st
s’
, s
po
ke
n 
by
 m
e,
 
an
d 
th
is
, ‘
G
od
 e
xi
st
s’
, s
po
ke
n 
by
 S
oc
ra
te
s, 
an
d 
so
 o
n 
fo
r t
he
 
re
st
. 
I 
be
lie
ve
 t
ha
t 
in
 a
 d
is
pu
ta
tio
n 
th
e 
op
po
ne
nt
 a
nd
 t
he
 
re
sp
on
de
nt
 h
av
e 
di
re
ct
ed
 t
he
ir 
in
te
lle
ct
s 
to
 s
uc
h 
a 
th
in
g 
co
m
m
on
 t
o 
al
l 
th
e 
sp
ok
en
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 a
bu
ot
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
di
sp
ut
e,
 a
nd
 t
he
y 
di
re
ct
 t
he
ir 
in
te
lle
ct
s 
to
 t
he
 s
am
e 
th
in
g,
 
an
d 
so
 it
 is
 c
le
ar
 th
at
 a
 re
sp
on
de
nt
 c
an
 b
e 
re
fu
te
d,
 b
ec
au
se
 
he
 i
s 
ab
le
 t
o 
co
nc
ed
e 
an
d 
to
 d
en
y 
on
e 
th
in
g 
co
m
m
on
 t
o 
m
an
y 
in
di
vi
du
al
, c
om
pl
et
el
y 
si
m
ila
r 
st
at
em
en
ts
. H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 c
an
no
t 
co
nc
ed
e 
an
d 
de
ny
 t
he
 v
er
y 
sa
m
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
r 
st
at
em
en
t, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
r 
st
at
em
en
t 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
ut
te
re
d 
tw
ic
e.
 
 u
nu
m
 c
om
m
un
e 
m
ul
tis
 i
nd
iv
id
ui
s 
pr
op
os
iti
on
ib
us
 o
m
ni
no
 s
im
ili
bu
s. 
Ea
de
m
 
ta
m
en
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
em
 
in
di
vi
du
am
 
no
n 
po
te
st
 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 
co
nc
ed
er
e 
et
 n
eg
ar
e,
 q
ui
a 
id
em
 i
nd
iv
id
uu
m
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
s 
no
n 
po
te
st
 b
is
 p
ro
fe
rr
i. 
 
 
C
on
ta
 h
oc
 –
 q
uo
d 
di
ci
tu
r 
qu
od
 p
ro
po
si
tio
, q
ua
nd
o 
no
n 
es
t, 
es
t 
ve
ra
 v
el
 f
al
sa
 –
 p
ot
es
t a
rg
ui
 q
ui
a 
si
 ta
lis
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
A
ga
in
st
 t
hi
s 
– 
th
at
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
w
he
n 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
, i
s 
tru
e 
or
 f
al
se
 –
 i
t 
ca
n 
be
 a
rg
ue
d 
th
at
 i
f 
su
ch
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
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ni
bu
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: A
 
53
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fe
ru
nt
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A
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es
t, 
es
t 
ve
ra
 
[v
el
 
fa
ls
a]
53
8 , 
er
go
 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 
et
 
pe
r 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 o
ra
tio
. S
ed
 o
m
ni
s 
or
at
io
 e
st
 v
ox
, e
t o
m
ni
s 
vo
x 
es
t 
qu
al
ita
s. 
Er
go
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
es
t, 
es
t 
qu
al
ita
s, 
et
 p
er
 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
qu
ae
 
no
n 
es
t, 
es
t. 
Ite
m
 
ve
rit
as
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 e
st
 a
cc
id
en
s 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
, e
t [
om
ne
]5
39
 a
cc
id
en
s 
es
t i
n 
su
bi
ec
to
 e
xi
st
en
te
. E
rg
o 
si
 v
er
ita
s 
in
si
t p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
es
t, 
{v
id
et
ur
}5
40
 q
uo
d 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
qu
ae
 n
on
 e
st
, {
ex
is
ta
t}
54
1
w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
ex
is
t 
is
 t
ru
e 
or
 f
al
se
, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
it 
is
 a
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 a
 s
en
te
nc
e.
 B
ut
 e
ve
ry
 s
en
te
nc
e 
is
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 a
nd
 e
ve
ry
 u
tte
ra
nc
e 
is
 a
 q
ua
lit
y.
 T
he
re
fo
re
 a
 
st
at
em
en
t 
w
hi
ch
 
do
es
 
no
t 
ex
is
t, 
is
 
a 
qu
al
ity
, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
ex
is
t, 
ex
is
ts
. 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 t
he
 t
ru
th
 o
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
is
 a
n 
ac
ci
de
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
st
at
em
en
t, 
an
d 
ev
er
y 
ac
ci
de
nt
 i
s 
in
 a
n 
ex
is
tin
g 
su
bj
ec
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 if
 tr
ut
h 
is
 in
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t e
xi
st
, i
t 
se
em
s t
ha
t a
 st
at
em
en
t w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s n
ot
 e
xi
st
, e
xi
st
s. 
. 
 
 
A
d 
pr
im
um
, 
{d
ic
o 
co
nc
ed
en
do
}5
42
 q
uo
d 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
qu
ae
 n
on
 
es
t, 
es
t 
ve
ra
, 
et
 p
ot
es
t 
co
nc
ed
i 
qu
od
 e
st
 p
ro
po
si
tio
, 
et
 e
tia
m
 
<q
uo
d 
es
t>
54
3  o
ra
tio
. S
ed
 e
x 
ho
c 
no
n 
se
qu
itu
r q
uo
d 
si
t v
ox
, s
ed
 
{i
lla
}5
44
 d
es
cr
ip
tio
 {
or
at
io
ni
s}
54
5 , 
sc
ili
et
 q
uo
d 
or
at
io
 e
st
 v
ox
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a,
 
{e
t 
ce
te
ra
}5
46
, 
da
tu
r 
de
 
or
at
io
ne
 
{a
ct
u}
54
7  
pr
ol
at
a,
 
no
n 
au
te
m
 
co
m
pe
tit
 
or
at
io
ni
 
ha
be
nt
i 
so
lu
m
 
es
se
 
{o
bi
ec
tiv
e}
54
8  
in
 
in
te
lle
ct
u,
 
ve
l 
po
te
st
 
ha
ec
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
 
ne
ga
ri,
 ‘p
ro
po
si
tio
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
es
t, 
es
t p
ro
po
si
tio
, e
rg
o 
es
t o
ra
tio
’, 
qu
ia
 o
ra
tio
 s
ol
um
 <
es
t>
54
9
To
 th
e 
fir
st
, I
 re
sp
on
d 
by
 c
on
ce
di
ng
 th
at
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t w
hi
ch
 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
 i
s 
tru
e,
 a
nd
 i
t 
ca
n 
be
 c
on
ce
de
d 
th
at
 i
t 
is
 a
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
an
d 
ev
en
 t
ha
t 
it 
is
 a
 s
en
te
nc
e,
 b
ut
 f
ro
m
 t
hi
s 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 fo
llo
w
 th
at
 it
 is
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e.
 T
ha
t d
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 a
 
se
nt
en
ce
, 
na
m
el
y 
th
at
 
a 
se
nt
en
ce
 
is
 
a 
sig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 e
tc
., 
is
 s
ai
d 
ab
ou
t 
a 
se
nt
en
ce
 a
ct
ua
lly
 s
po
ke
n,
 
bu
t 
do
es
 n
ot
 a
pp
ly
 t
o 
a 
se
nt
en
ce
 h
av
in
g 
on
ly
 o
bj
ec
tiv
e 
be
in
g 
in
 t
he
 i
nt
el
le
ct
. 
O
r, 
al
te
rn
at
iv
el
y,
 t
hi
s 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
ca
n 
be
 r
ej
ec
te
d,
 ‘
A
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
ex
is
t, 
is
 a
 
 g
en
us
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
s 
pr
ol
at
ae
, e
t n
on
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, B
 
53
9  ‘
om
ni
s’
: A
; B
 
54
0  ‘
se
qu
itu
r’
: A
 
54
1  ‘
ex
is
tit
’: 
A
 
54
2  ‘
di
ce
nd
um
’: 
A
; ‘
di
co
 c
on
ce
do
’: 
B
  
54
3  A
 
54
4  ‘
is
ta
’: 
A
 
54
5  ‘
vo
ci
s’
: A
 
54
6  ‘
ta
m
en
’: 
A
 
54
7  ‘
a 
ca
su
’: 
A
 
54
8  ‘
su
bi
ec
tiv
e’
: A
, B
 
54
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es
t 
ge
nu
s 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 
ha
be
nt
is
 
es
se
 
{o
bi
ec
tiv
e}
55
0  
[in
 
in
te
lle
ct
u 
ta
nt
um
]5
51
st
at
em
en
t, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
it 
is
 a
 s
en
te
nc
e’
, b
ec
au
se
 a
 s
en
te
nc
e 
is
 
on
ly
 a
 g
en
us
 o
f a
 s
po
ke
n 
st
at
em
en
t, 
an
d 
it 
is
 n
ot
 a
 g
en
us
 o
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t h
av
in
g 
on
ly
 o
bj
ec
tiv
e 
be
in
g 
in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
. 
. 
 
 
Sc
ie
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
ha
be
t 
es
se
 {
qu
at
tu
or
}5
52
 m
od
is
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
in
 s
cr
ip
to
, 
in
 p
ro
la
tio
ne
, 
et
 <
et
ia
m
>5
53
 i
n 
m
en
te
, 
et
 
{e
tia
m
 i
n 
re
}5
54
, 
ut
 v
is
um
 e
st
 {
su
pe
riu
s 
in
 i
st
o 
lib
ro
}5
55
. 
<E
t>
55
6  
pr
op
os
iti
o 
in
 m
en
te
 e
st
 d
up
le
x,
 q
ui
a 
qu
ae
da
m
 h
ab
et
 
es
se
 
<s
ol
um
>5
57
 
su
bi
ec
tiv
e 
in
 
m
en
te
, 
et
 
ta
lis
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ex
 c
on
ce
pt
ib
us
, e
t q
ua
ed
am
 e
st
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 h
ab
en
s 
es
se
 
{o
bi
ec
tiv
e}
55
8  
in
 
in
te
lle
ct
u,
 
et
 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
so
lu
m
 
se
cu
nd
um
 
co
ns
id
er
at
io
ne
m
 
in
te
lle
ct
us
, 
[e
t]5
59
 
ex
 
pa
rti
bu
s 
ha
be
nt
ib
us
 
so
lu
m
 
es
se
 
ob
ie
ct
iv
e 
in
 
in
te
lle
ct
u,
 s
iv
e 
si
nt
 v
oc
es
 p
ra
et
er
ita
e 
si
ve
 f
ut
ur
ae
, 
{e
t 
si
c 
de
 
al
iis
}5
60
W
e 
m
us
t 
kn
ow
 t
ha
t 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
ha
s 
be
in
g 
in
 f
ou
r 
w
ay
s, 
na
m
el
y 
in
 w
rit
in
g,
 in
 s
pe
ec
h,
 a
nd
 in
 th
e 
m
in
d,
 a
nd
 a
ls
o 
in
 
re
al
ity
, a
s 
w
as
 s
ee
n 
ea
rli
er
 in
 th
is
 b
oo
k.
 A
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
m
in
d 
is
 o
f t
w
o 
ki
nd
s, 
be
ca
us
e 
a 
ce
rta
in
 k
in
d 
ha
s 
su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
be
in
g 
in
 th
e 
m
in
d,
 a
nd
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t o
f t
hi
s 
so
rt 
is
 c
om
po
se
d 
ou
t 
of
 c
on
ce
pt
s, 
an
d 
a 
ce
rta
in
 k
in
d 
is
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
ha
vi
ng
 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
be
in
g 
in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, a
nd
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t o
f t
hi
s 
so
rt 
is
 c
om
po
se
d 
so
le
ly
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 t
o 
th
e 
co
ns
id
er
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 
in
te
lle
ct
, a
nd
 o
ut
 o
f p
ar
ts
 h
av
in
g 
on
ly
 o
bj
ec
tiv
e 
be
in
g 
in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, w
he
th
er
 th
os
e 
pa
rts
 a
re
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 fr
om
 th
e 
pa
st
 o
r 
fr
om
 t
he
 f
ut
ur
e,
 a
nd
 s
o 
on
 f
or
 t
he
 r
es
t. 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 a
 
st
at
em
en
t 
ex
is
tin
g 
so
le
ly
 
in
 
th
e 
co
ns
id
er
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
a 
tru
e 
or
 f
al
se
 i
nt
el
le
ct
, 
an
d 
th
is
 i
s 
in
te
lli
gi
bl
e 
en
ou
gh
 to
 e
ac
h 
in
te
lle
ct
 w
ith
 a
 k
ee
n 
di
sp
os
iti
on
. 
. 
Ite
m
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
ex
is
te
ns
 
in
 
so
la
 
co
ns
id
er
at
io
ne
 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 i
nt
el
le
ct
um
 v
er
um
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
, e
t 
ho
c 
es
t 
sa
tis
 in
te
lli
gi
bi
le
 o
m
ni
 in
te
lle
ct
ui
 b
en
e 
di
sp
os
ito
. 
 
 
A
d 
al
iu
d 
cu
m
 
di
ci
tu
r 
ve
rit
as
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 
es
t 
ac
ci
de
ns
 
To
 th
e 
ot
he
r, 
w
he
n 
it 
is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 th
e 
tru
th
 o
f a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
s 
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0  ‘
su
bi
ec
tiv
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: A
, B
 
55
1  A
 
55
2  ‘
qu
in
qu
e’
: B
 
55
3  A
 
55
4  ‘
qu
od
da
m
’: 
A
  
55
5  ‘
in
 p
rin
ci
pi
o 
ill
iu
s l
ib
ri’
: A
 
55
6  A
 
55
7  B
 
55
8  ‘
ob
ie
ct
iv
um
’: 
A
, B
 
55
9  A
 
56
0  ‘
si
ve
 su
nt
 fi
ne
s (
?)
 p
ra
et
er
ita
e 
si
ve
 fu
tu
ra
e’
: A
 
 
  
380 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
, 
di
ce
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
qu
an
do
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 e
xi
st
it,
 t
un
c 
ve
rit
as
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 
es
t 
<a
ct
ua
lis
>5
61
 
ac
ci
de
ns
 
ei
us
, 
se
d 
qu
an
do
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 e
st
 p
ra
et
er
ita
 [
ve
l]5
62
an
 a
cc
id
en
t 
of
 t
he
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
it 
m
us
t 
be
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 w
he
n 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
ex
is
ts
, 
th
en
 t
he
 t
ru
th
 o
f 
th
at
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
is
 a
n 
ac
ci
de
nt
 o
f i
t, 
bu
t w
he
n 
a 
st
at
em
en
t i
s 
in
 th
e 
pa
st
 a
nd
 d
oe
s 
no
t e
xi
st
 in
 a
ct
ua
lit
y,
 th
en
 it
 m
us
t n
ot
 b
e 
co
nc
ed
ed
 th
at
 th
e 
tru
th
 o
f t
ha
t s
ta
te
m
en
t i
s 
an
 a
cc
id
en
t o
f i
t, 
bu
t r
at
he
r t
ha
t i
t 
w
as
 a
n 
ac
ci
de
nt
. 
 n
on
 e
xi
st
en
s 
in
 a
ct
u,
 
tu
nc
 n
on
 e
st
 c
on
ce
de
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
ve
rit
as
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
s 
ill
iu
s 
si
t 
ac
ci
de
ns
, s
ed
 q
uo
d 
fu
it 
ac
ci
de
ns
. 
 
 
{S
ed
}5
63
 s
i 
di
ca
tu
r 
qu
od
 <
si
>5
64
 a
 s
it 
ve
ru
m
, 
et
 s
it 
<a
>
56
5  
pr
op
os
iti
o 
qu
ae
 n
on
 e
st
, e
rg
o 
ve
rit
as
 in
es
t i
sp
i, 
a,
 se
d 
ac
ci
de
nt
is
 
{e
ss
e 
es
t i
ne
ss
e}
56
6 , 
er
go
 si
 v
er
ita
s i
ne
st
 a
, {
ita
 e
st
}5
67
 q
uo
d 
ill
a 
ve
rit
as
 e
st
, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
su
um
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 e
st
, 
<e
st
>5
68
 
di
ce
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
al
iq
ui
d 
in
es
se
 a
lic
ui
 p
ot
es
t e
ss
e 
du
pl
ic
ite
r: 
ve
l 
ta
nq
ua
m
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 su
bi
ec
to
 d
e 
qu
o 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r, 
ve
l t
an
qu
am
 
ac
ci
de
ns
 s
ub
ie
ct
o 
cu
i i
nh
ae
re
t. 
D
ic
o 
tu
nc
 q
uo
d 
be
ne
 s
eq
ui
tu
r, 
‘a
 e
st
 v
er
um
, 
er
go
 v
er
ita
s 
si
ve
 v
er
um
 i
ne
st
 i
ps
i, 
a,
 t
an
qu
am
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 s
ub
ie
ct
o’
. 
Se
d 
ex
 h
oc
 n
on
 s
eq
ui
tu
r 
qu
od
 i
lla
 
ve
rit
as
 
{q
ua
e 
in
es
t}
56
9  
al
ic
ui
 
ta
nq
ua
m
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
[s
ub
ie
ct
o]
57
0  
pr
ae
su
pp
on
at
 i
llu
d 
es
se
, {
ne
c}
57
1
B
ut
 if
 it
 is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 a
 is
 tr
ue
, a
nd
 it
 is
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t w
hi
ch
 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
xi
st
, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
tru
th
 i
s 
in
 t
hi
s, 
a,
 b
ut
 b
ei
ng
 a
n 
ac
ci
de
nt
 is
 b
ei
ng
-in
, t
he
re
fo
re
 if
 tr
ut
h 
is
 in
 a
, i
t i
s 
th
e 
ca
se
 
th
at
 th
at
 tr
ut
h 
ex
is
ts
, a
nd
 c
on
se
qu
en
tly
 it
s 
su
bj
ec
t e
xi
st
s, 
it 
m
us
t b
e 
sa
id
 th
at
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 c
an
 b
e 
in
 a
no
th
er
 in
 tw
o 
w
ay
s:
 
ei
th
er
 a
s 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
in
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t o
f w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d,
 
or
 a
s 
an
 a
cc
id
en
t 
in
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 i
t 
in
he
re
s. 
I 
sa
y 
th
en
 t
ha
t t
hi
s 
rig
ht
ly
 f
ol
lo
w
s, 
‘a
 is
 tr
ue
, t
he
re
fo
re
 t
ru
th
 o
r 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 tr
ue
 is
 in
 th
is
, a
, a
s 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
in
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
’. 
B
ut
 
fr
om
 t
hi
s 
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 f
ol
lo
w
 t
ha
t 
th
at
 t
ru
th
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
in
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 a
s 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
in
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 p
re
su
pp
os
es
 t
ha
t 
it 
ex
is
ts
, 
no
r 
do
es
 i
t 
fo
llo
w
, 
‘a
 i
s 
tru
e,
 t
he
re
fo
re
 t
ru
th
 i
s 
in
 
 s
eq
ui
tu
r 
‘a
 e
st
 
ve
ru
m
, e
rg
o 
ve
rit
as
 i
ne
st
 i
ps
i, 
a,
 ta
nq
ua
m
 a
cc
id
en
s 
su
bi
ec
to
’. 
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56
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 e
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; ‘
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ss
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es
t a
cc
id
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lit
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’: 
B
  
56
7  ‘
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: A
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56
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56
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es
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{E
tia
m
}5
72
 p
ro
pt
er
 h
oc
 n
on
 s
eq
ui
tu
r, 
‘a
 e
st
 v
er
um
, e
rg
o 
ve
rit
as
 
ip
si
us
, a
, e
st
’, 
ne
c 
et
ia
m
 {
qu
od
 a
 e
st
, e
t c
et
er
a}
57
3
th
is
, a
, a
s a
n 
ac
ci
de
nt
 in
 a
 su
bj
ec
t’.
 A
ls
o,
 o
n 
ac
co
un
t o
f t
hi
s, 
th
is
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
 d
oe
s 
no
t f
ol
lo
w
, ‘
a 
is
 tr
ue
, t
he
re
fo
re
 th
e 
tru
th
 o
f t
hi
s, 
a,
 e
xi
st
s’
, n
or
 e
ve
n 
th
at
 a
 e
xi
st
s, 
et
c.
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m
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A
PP
EN
D
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:  
TR
A
N
SC
R
IP
TI
O
N
 A
N
D
 T
R
A
N
SL
A
TI
O
N
 O
F 
 
B
U
R
LE
Y
’S
 L
A
TE
 C
O
M
M
EN
TA
R
Y
 O
N
 D
E 
IN
TE
RP
RE
TA
TI
O
N
E 
(S
EL
EC
TI
O
N
S)
1
 
 
Ex
po
si
tio
 su
pe
r L
ib
ru
m
 P
er
ih
er
m
en
ei
as
,  
C
ap
itu
la
 1
-3
 
 
Ex
pl
an
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
Pe
ri
he
rm
en
ei
as
, 
C
ha
pt
er
s 1
-3
 
 
 
 
G
ua
lte
ru
s B
ur
la
eu
s 
 
W
al
te
r B
ur
le
y 
 
 
 
Ex
 ‘S
up
er
 A
rte
m
 V
et
er
em
 P
or
ph
yr
ii 
et
 A
ris
to
te
lis
’, 
 
V
en
ed
ig
, 1
49
7 
 
Fr
om
 ‘C
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
O
ld
 L
og
ic
 o
f A
ris
to
tle
 a
nd
 
Po
rp
hy
ry
’, 
V
en
ic
e,
 1
49
7 
 
 
 
<C
ap
itu
lu
m
 1
: P
ro
lo
gu
s>
 
 
<C
ha
pt
er
 1
: P
ro
lo
gu
e>
 
 
 
 
<P
ri
m
um
 o
po
rt
et
 c
on
st
itu
er
e 
qu
id
 si
t n
om
en
>2
 
 
Fi
rs
t i
t i
s n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
w
ha
t a
 n
ou
n 
is
. 
 
 
 
{I
st
e 
lib
er
}3
 q
ue
m
 <
ad
>4
 p
ra
es
en
s 
in
te
nd
im
us
 <
br
ev
ite
r>
5  
ex
po
ne
re
 {
es
t}
6
 
 d
e 
en
un
ci
at
io
ne
 ta
nq
ua
m
 d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
. S
ed
 q
ui
a 
Th
is
 b
oo
k,
 w
hi
ch
 a
t p
re
se
nt
 w
e 
in
te
nd
 to
 s
et
 o
ut
 b
rie
fly
, h
as
 
as
 it
s 
su
bj
ec
t t
he
 s
ta
te
m
en
t. 
B
ut
 b
ec
au
se
 B
oe
th
iu
s 
sa
ys
 th
at
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
1  T
he
 b
as
e 
te
xt
 fo
r t
hi
s a
pp
en
di
x 
is
 th
e 
14
97
 V
en
ic
e 
ed
iti
on
 o
f B
ur
le
y’
s l
at
e 
co
m
m
en
ta
ry
 o
n 
th
e 
ol
d 
lo
gi
c 
(i.
e.
, t
he
 S
up
er
 A
rte
m
 V
et
er
m
). 
H
ow
ev
er
, I
 a
ls
o 
in
cl
ud
e 
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
se
ct
io
ns
 I 
ha
ve
 tr
an
sl
at
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
at
 te
xt
 a
nd
 tw
o 
ea
rli
er
 m
an
us
cr
ip
ts
: M
ag
da
le
n 
14
6 
(‘
A
’)
, w
rit
te
n 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
la
te
 fo
ur
te
en
th
 
or
 e
ar
ly
 fi
fte
en
th
 c
en
tu
ry
, a
nd
 C
an
on
 M
is
c 
46
0 
(‘
B
’)
, w
rit
te
n 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
fif
te
en
th
 c
en
tu
ry
. I
 in
di
ca
te
 th
at
 o
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
m
an
us
cr
ip
ts
 o
m
it 
a 
se
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
te
xt
 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
14
97
 e
di
tio
n 
w
ith
 sq
ua
re
 b
ra
ck
et
s (
[]
), 
w
he
re
 a
ny
th
in
g 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
br
ac
ke
ts
 is
 fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
14
97
 e
di
tio
n 
bu
t i
s n
ot
 fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 
m
an
us
cr
ip
t(s
). 
O
cc
as
io
na
lly
, o
ne
 m
an
us
cr
ip
t w
ill
 o
m
it 
a 
w
or
d 
or
 p
hr
as
e,
 w
hi
le
 th
e 
ot
he
r i
nc
lu
de
s a
 v
ar
ia
tio
n.
 In
 th
at
 c
as
e,
 I 
in
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
va
ria
nt
 in
 th
e 
fo
ot
no
te
, i
nd
ic
at
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 m
an
us
cr
ip
t c
on
ta
in
s t
he
 v
ar
ia
nt
 a
nd
 w
hi
ch
 m
an
us
cr
ip
t c
on
ta
in
s t
he
 o
m
is
si
on
. I
 in
di
ca
te
 th
at
 o
ne
 o
r m
or
e 
of
 th
e 
m
an
us
cr
ip
ts
 
in
cl
ud
es
 te
xt
 n
ot
 fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
14
97
 e
di
tio
n 
w
ith
 c
or
ne
r b
ra
ck
et
s (
<>
), 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
w
ith
in
 th
os
e 
br
ac
ke
ts
 th
e 
te
xt
 fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 m
an
us
cr
ip
t(s
). 
W
he
n 
an
 
om
is
si
on
 is
 n
ot
 a
t i
ss
ue
, I
 in
di
ca
te
 a
 v
ar
ia
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
on
e 
or
 m
or
e 
m
an
us
cr
ip
ts
 a
nd
 th
e 
14
97
 e
di
tio
n 
w
ith
 b
ra
ce
 b
ra
ck
et
s (
{}
), 
pl
ac
in
g 
th
e 
m
an
us
cr
ip
t 
va
ria
nt
(s
) i
n 
a 
fo
ot
no
te
. I
 ig
no
re
 m
er
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s i
n 
w
or
d 
or
de
r (
e.
g.
 ‘s
ub
ie
ct
um
 e
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
’ v
s. 
‘p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 e
t s
ub
ie
ct
um
’)
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
te
xt
s. 
2  A
; ‘
pr
im
um
 o
po
rte
t c
on
st
itu
er
e’
: B
 
3  ‘
lib
er
 P
er
ih
er
m
en
ei
as
’: 
A
; ‘
lib
ru
m
 P
er
ih
er
m
en
ei
as
’: 
B
 
4  A
, B
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B
oe
th
iu
s 
di
ci
t q
uo
d 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
 e
st
 h
ic
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
, {
no
ta
nd
um
 
es
t}
7  
qu
od
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
 
di
ci
tu
r 
{t
rip
le
x}
8 . 
U
no
 
m
od
o 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
 e
st
 e
xp
os
iti
o 
un
iu
s 
lin
gu
ae
 p
er
 a
lia
m
. A
lio
 m
od
o 
id
em
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
vo
x 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a,
 e
t h
oc
 s
iv
e 
si
t]9
 v
ox
 c
om
pl
ex
a 
si
ve
 i
nc
om
pl
ex
a,
 e
t 
<i
de
o>
10
 i
st
o 
m
od
o 
si
c 
de
sc
rib
itu
r 
– 
In
te
rp
re
ta
tio
 
es
t 
vo
x 
lit
te
ra
ta
 
{c
um
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
ne
}1
1  
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
i 
pr
ol
at
a 
– 
et
 s
ic
 q
ua
el
ib
et
 v
ox
 {
qu
i}
12
 p
er
 s
e 
al
iq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
{e
x 
im
po
si
tio
ne
}1
3  
si
ve
 s
it 
co
m
pl
ex
 s
iv
e 
in
co
m
pl
ex
a 
di
ci
tu
r 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
. 
Se
d 
in
te
rie
ct
io
ne
s, 
co
ni
un
ct
io
ne
s 
et
 h
ui
us
m
od
i 
<e
t>
14
 e
tia
m
 v
oc
es
 n
at
ur
al
ite
r 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
es
 {
et
}1
5  v
oc
es
 a
ni
m
al
iu
m
 b
ru
to
ru
m
 n
on
 d
eb
en
t d
ic
i 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
ne
s. 
Te
rti
o 
m
od
o 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
 i
de
m
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
vo
x 
lit
te
ra
ta
 v
er
um
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
s, 
et
 is
to
 <
te
rti
o>
16
 m
od
o 
so
la
 e
nu
nc
ia
tio
 e
st
 i
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
, e
t 
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 n
on
 s
un
t 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
ne
s, 
se
d 
su
nt
 
[te
rm
in
i 
et
]1
7  
pr
in
ci
pi
a 
{i
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
ni
s}
18
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
is
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
 o
f 
th
is
 b
oo
k,
 w
e 
ne
ed
 t
o 
no
te
 
th
at
 in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
is
 s
po
ke
n 
of
 in
 th
re
e 
w
ay
s. 
 I
n 
on
e 
w
ay
, 
an
 in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
is
 th
e 
ex
po
si
tio
n 
of
 o
ne
 to
ng
ue
 b
y 
an
ot
he
r. 
In
 
an
ot
he
r 
w
ay
, 
an
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
is
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
as
 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 re
ga
rd
le
ss
 o
f w
he
th
er
 it
 is
 a
 c
om
pl
ex
 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
or
 a
 n
on
-c
om
pl
ex
 u
tte
ra
nc
e,
 a
nd
 it
 is
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 in
 
th
is
 w
ay
 h
er
e:
 a
n 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
is 
a 
w
ri
tt
en
 u
tt
er
an
ce
 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
a 
sp
ok
en
 u
tt
er
an
ce
, 
an
d 
so
 e
ac
h 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
w
hi
ch
 p
er
 s
e 
si
gn
ifi
es
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 b
y 
im
po
si
tio
n 
is
 c
al
le
d 
an
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n,
 w
he
th
er
 i
t 
is
 c
om
pl
ex
 o
r 
no
n-
co
m
pl
ex
. B
ut
 
in
te
rje
ct
io
ns
, 
co
nj
un
ct
io
ns
 a
nd
 t
hi
ng
s 
of
 t
hi
s 
so
rt 
(a
ls
o 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 s
ig
ni
fy
in
g 
na
tu
ra
lly
, 
su
ch
 a
s 
th
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 o
f 
br
ut
e 
an
im
al
s)
 o
ug
ht
 n
ot
 b
e 
ca
lle
d 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
ns
. I
n 
a 
th
ird
 
w
ay
, 
an
 i
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
n 
is
 t
he
 s
am
e 
as
 a
 w
rit
te
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, 
an
d 
in
 t
hi
s 
w
ay
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
al
on
e 
is
 a
n 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n,
 a
nd
 n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 
ve
rb
s 
ar
e 
no
t 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
ns
, 
bu
t 
ar
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 
of
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n.
 
. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
5  A
, B
 
6  ‘
et
’: 
B
 
7  ‘
sc
ie
nd
um
’: 
A
; ‘
sc
ie
nd
um
 e
st
’: 
B
 
8  ‘
tri
pl
ic
ite
r’
: A
, B
 
9  B
 
10
 B
 
11
 ‘i
m
ag
in
at
io
ne
’: 
B
 
12
 ‘q
ua
e’
: A
, B
 
13
 ‘i
n 
ex
po
si
tio
ne
’: 
A
 
14
 A
 
15
 ‘u
t’:
 A
, B
 
16
 A
 
17
 A
, B
 
18
 ‘i
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
nu
m
’: 
B
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Si
 e
rg
o 
qu
ae
ra
tu
r 
qu
od
 e
st
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 {
hu
iu
s}
19
 s
ci
en
tia
e,
 
di
ce
nd
um
 
<e
st
>2
0  
qu
od
 
sc
ie
nt
ia
e 
hi
c 
tra
di
ta
e 
es
t 
du
pl
ex
 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
, s
ci
lic
et
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 c
om
m
un
e 
et
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 s
pe
ci
al
e.
 
Su
bi
ec
tu
m
 c
om
m
un
e 
es
t i
llu
d 
qu
od
 c
on
tin
et
 o
m
ni
a 
de
 q
ui
bu
s 
{i
n 
is
to
 l
ib
ro
 c
on
si
de
ra
tu
r}
21
. 
Su
bi
ec
tu
m
 s
pe
ci
al
e 
es
t 
ill
ud
 
cu
iu
s 
co
gn
iti
o 
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
 {
in
qu
iri
tu
r}
22
 i
n 
{i
st
o}
23
 l
ib
ro
. 
U
nd
e 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
 s
ec
un
du
m
 q
uo
d 
es
t c
om
m
un
is
 a
d 
qu
am
lib
et
 
vo
ce
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
em
 
ad
 
pl
ac
itu
m
 
si
ve
 
si
t 
co
m
pl
ex
a 
si
ve
 
in
co
m
pl
ex
a 
es
t 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
[c
om
m
un
e]
24
 
hu
iu
s 
lib
ri.
 
Se
d 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
 te
rti
o 
<m
od
o>
25
 d
ic
ta
 <
sc
ili
ce
t>
26
 s
ec
un
du
m
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
id
em
 q
ui
d 
en
un
ci
at
io
, 
es
t 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 p
rin
ci
pa
le
 h
ic
, 
et
 
[e
st
]2
7
 
 sp
ec
ia
le
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
if 
on
e 
as
ks
 w
ha
t t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
 o
f t
hi
s 
sc
ie
nc
e 
is
, w
e 
m
us
t s
ay
 th
at
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t o
f t
he
 s
ci
en
ce
 s
et
 o
ut
 in
 th
is
 w
or
k 
is
 o
f 
tw
o 
so
rts
, 
na
m
el
y,
 a
 g
en
er
al
 s
ub
je
ct
 a
nd
 a
 s
pe
ci
fic
 
su
bj
ec
t. 
Th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l 
su
bj
ec
t 
is
 
th
at
 
w
hi
ch
 
co
nt
ai
ns
 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
pe
r 
se
 d
ef
in
ed
 i
n 
th
is
 s
ci
en
ce
. 
Th
e 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
su
bj
ec
t i
s 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
pr
in
ci
pa
lly
 
in
qu
iri
es
 in
to
 in
 th
is
 b
oo
k.
 H
en
ce
 in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
in
so
fa
r a
s 
it 
is
 c
om
m
on
 to
 e
ve
ry
 c
on
ve
nt
io
na
lly
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 
w
he
th
er
 i
t 
is
 c
om
pl
ex
 o
r 
no
n-
co
m
pl
ex
, 
is
 t
he
 g
en
er
al
 
su
bj
ec
t 
of
 t
hi
s 
bo
ok
. 
B
ut
 i
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
n 
st
at
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
th
ird
 
w
ay
, a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
as
 w
ha
t a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
is
, i
s t
he
 p
rin
ci
pa
l a
nd
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
su
bj
ec
t o
f t
hi
s w
or
k.
 
 
 
 
Is
te
 
lib
er
 
co
nt
in
et
 
du
os
 
lib
ro
s 
{p
ar
tia
le
s}
28
. 
In
 
pr
im
o 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 d
e 
pr
in
ci
pi
is
 e
t s
pe
ci
eb
us
 e
nu
nc
ia
tio
ni
s 
ab
so
lu
te
. 
In
 s
ec
un
do
 ib
i: 
Q
uo
ni
am
 <
de
 c
ap
itu
lo
>2
9  
au
te
m
 a
ffi
rm
at
io
, 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 d
e 
en
un
ci
at
io
ne
 c
on
iu
nc
ta
 {
ad
 a
liq
uo
d}
30
 s
ib
i 
ad
di
tu
m
, 
[u
t 
ad
 
te
rm
in
um
 
m
od
al
em
 
ve
l 
op
po
si
tio
ne
m
]3
1
 
. 
Th
is
 b
oo
k 
co
nt
ai
ns
 t
w
o 
sm
al
le
r 
bo
ok
s. 
In
 t
he
 f
irs
t 
bo
ok
, 
A
ris
to
tle
 d
ef
in
es
 t
he
 p
rin
ci
pl
es
 a
nd
 s
pe
ci
es
 o
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
ab
so
lu
te
ly
. 
In
 
se
co
nd
 
bo
ok
, 
w
hi
ch
 
be
gi
ns
 
Si
nc
e 
an
 
af
fir
m
at
io
n,
 
A
ris
to
tle
 
de
fin
es
 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
lin
ke
d 
w
ith
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 a
dd
ed
 t
o 
it.
 H
en
ce
 i
n 
th
e 
fir
st
 b
oo
k 
A
ris
to
tle
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
19
 ‘i
st
iu
s’
: B
 
20
 B
 
21
 ‘d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 in
 h
ac
 sc
ie
nt
ia
’: 
A
; ‘
pe
r s
e 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 in
 h
ac
 sc
ie
nt
ia
’: 
B
 
22
 ‘r
eq
ui
rit
ur
’: 
B
 
23
 ‘h
oc
’: 
B
 
24
 B
 
25
 A
 
26
 A
 
27
 B
 
28
 ‘s
pe
ci
al
es
’: 
B
 
29
 B
 
30
 ‘p
er
 a
liq
ui
d’
: A
, B
 
31
 A
, B
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{U
nd
e}
32
 in
 p
rim
o 
lib
ro
 d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 d
e 
en
un
ci
at
io
ne
 a
bs
ol
ut
e,
 
et
 i
n 
se
cu
nd
o 
<l
ib
ro
>3
3  
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 d
e 
ha
bi
tu
di
ne
 {
et
}3
4  
{c
on
tra
rie
ta
te
}3
5  
en
un
ci
at
io
nu
m
 
ad
in
vi
ce
m
. 
Li
be
r 
pr
im
us
 
co
nt
in
et
 d
uo
s 
tra
ct
at
us
. 
In
 p
rim
o 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 d
e 
pr
in
ci
pi
is
 
en
un
ci
at
io
ni
s 
<e
t e
iu
s 
sp
ec
ie
bu
s>
36
. I
n 
se
cu
nd
o 
ib
i: 
Es
t a
ut
em
 
en
un
ci
at
io
 
[n
on
 
om
ni
s]
37
, 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 
de
 
<i
ps
a>
38
 
en
un
ci
at
io
ne
 e
t 
ei
us
 s
pe
ci
eb
us
. 
Pr
im
us
 t
ra
ct
at
us
 c
on
tin
et
 t
ria
 
ca
pi
tu
la
. I
n 
pr
im
o 
<c
ap
itu
lo
>3
9  
po
ni
tu
r 
pr
oe
m
iu
m
. {
<E
t>
40
 in
 
se
cu
nd
o 
in
ve
st
ig
at
ur
 
qu
ae
da
m
 
{d
es
cr
ip
tio
ne
s 
no
m
in
is
 
et
 
ve
rb
i}
41
, 
qu
ae
 
su
nt
 
pa
rte
s 
{o
ra
tio
ni
s}
42
}4
3 . 
In
 
te
rti
o 
<c
ap
itu
lo
>4
4  i
bi
: O
ra
tio
 e
st
 v
ox
, d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 d
e 
or
at
io
ne
 q
ua
e 
es
t 
ge
nu
s 
pr
op
in
qu
um
 
en
un
ci
at
io
ni
s. 
C
ap
itu
lu
m
 
pr
im
um
 
co
nt
in
et
 tr
es
 p
ar
te
s. 
In
 p
rim
a 
{p
on
it}
45
 p
ro
em
iu
m
. I
n 
se
cu
nd
a 
ib
i: 
Su
nt
 e
rg
o 
ea
, {
in
ve
st
ig
at
}4
6  q
uo
dd
am
 c
om
m
un
e 
no
m
in
i e
t 
ve
rb
o 
et
 e
tia
m
 <
ip
si
>4
7
de
fin
es
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
ab
so
lu
te
ly
, a
nd
 i
n 
th
e 
se
co
nd
 b
oo
k 
he
 
de
fin
es
 th
e 
qu
al
ity
 a
nd
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t a
nd
 th
en
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
rit
y 
of
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
on
e 
af
te
r t
he
 o
th
er
. T
he
 fi
rs
t b
oo
k 
co
nt
ai
ns
 t
w
o 
tra
ct
s. 
In
 t
he
 f
irs
t 
tra
ct
, A
ris
to
tle
 d
ef
in
es
 t
he
 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
an
d 
its
 s
pe
ci
es
. 
In
 t
he
 s
ec
on
d,
 
w
hi
ch
 b
eg
in
s 
A
nd
 y
et
 n
ot
 e
ve
ry
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
th
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
an
d 
its
 s
pe
ci
es
 t
he
m
se
lv
es
 a
re
 d
ef
in
ed
. 
Th
e 
fir
st
 t
ra
ct
 
co
nt
ai
ns
 th
re
e 
ch
ap
te
rs
. I
n 
th
e 
fir
st
 c
ha
pt
er
, A
ris
to
tle
 g
iv
es
 
th
e 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n.
 I
n 
th
e 
se
co
nd
, 
he
 i
nv
es
tig
at
es
 c
er
ta
in
 
th
in
gs
 c
om
m
on
 to
 n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 v
er
bs
, w
hi
ch
 a
re
 th
e 
in
te
gr
al
 
pa
rts
 o
f a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t. 
In
 th
e 
th
ird
, w
hi
ch
 b
eg
in
s 
A
 s
en
te
nc
e 
is
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 A
ris
to
tle
 d
ef
in
es
 th
e 
se
nt
en
ce
, w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e 
ne
ar
es
t 
ge
nu
s 
of
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t. 
Th
e 
fir
st
 c
ha
pt
er
 c
on
ta
in
s 
th
re
e 
pa
rts
. I
n 
th
e 
fir
st
, A
ris
to
tle
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
an
 in
tro
du
ct
io
n.
 
In
 t
he
 s
ec
on
d,
 w
hi
ch
 b
eg
in
s 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
th
os
e 
ar
e,
 h
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
es
 a
 p
ro
pe
rty
 c
om
m
on
 t
o 
a 
no
un
, 
a 
ve
rb
, 
an
d 
a 
 e
nu
nc
ia
tio
ni
, 
qu
od
 e
st
 s
ig
ni
fic
ar
e 
ad
 
pl
ac
itu
m
. E
t p
er
 h
oc
 in
ve
st
ig
at
ur
 g
en
us
 re
m
ot
um
 e
nu
nc
ia
tio
ni
s 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
32
 ‘e
t s
ic
’: 
A
; ‘
ut
 si
c’
: B
 
33
 B
 
34
 ‘s
eu
’: 
A
 
35
 ‘c
on
se
qu
en
tia
’: 
A
 
36
 B
 
37
 B
 
38
 A
; ‘
pr
im
a’
: B
 
39
 A
 
40
 B
 
41
 ‘c
om
m
un
ia
 n
om
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
’: 
B
 
42
 ‘i
nt
eg
ra
le
s e
nu
nc
ia
tio
ni
s, 
sc
ili
ce
t d
e 
no
m
in
e 
et
 v
er
bo
’: 
B
 
43
 ‘e
t i
nv
es
tig
at
ur
 q
ua
ed
am
 c
om
m
un
ia
 n
om
in
i e
t v
er
bo
, q
ua
e 
su
nt
 p
ar
te
s i
nt
eg
ra
le
s e
nu
nc
ia
tio
ni
s. 
In
 se
cu
nd
o 
ca
pi
tu
lo
 ib
i: 
N
om
en
 e
st
 v
ox
, d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 d
e 
pa
rti
bu
s i
nt
eg
ra
lib
us
 e
nu
nc
ia
tio
ni
s, 
sc
ili
ce
t d
e 
no
m
in
e 
et
 v
er
bo
’: 
A
 
44
 A
, B
 
45
 ‘p
on
itu
r’
: A
; ‘
pr
om
itt
itu
r’
: B
 
46
 ‘i
nv
es
tig
at
ur
’: 
A
 
47
 A
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qu
od
 e
st
 v
ox
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
. I
n 
te
rti
a 
<p
ar
te
>4
8  
ib
i, 
es
t 
au
te
m
 
qu
em
ad
m
od
um
, 
os
te
nd
it 
di
ve
rs
ita
te
m
 
[in
]4
9  
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
o 
in
te
r 
vo
ce
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
es
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
 c
ui
us
dm
od
i 
su
nt
 n
om
en
 <
et
>5
0  
ve
rb
um
 e
t e
nu
nc
ia
tio
. I
n 
pr
im
a 
ig
itu
r 
pa
rte
 
{p
ra
em
itt
it}
51
 p
ro
em
iu
m
 in
 q
uo
 {
ex
po
ni
t}
52
 <
ea
>5
3  
de
 q
ui
bu
s 
po
st
ea
 
es
t 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
us
, 
et
 
pr
op
on
it 
qu
at
tu
or
 
[p
ar
te
s]
54
. 
Pr
im
o 
{p
on
it}
55
 p
ar
te
s 
in
te
gr
al
es
 s
ui
 s
ub
ie
ct
i q
ua
e 
su
nt
 n
om
en
 
et
 v
er
bu
m
. 
Se
cu
nd
o 
pr
op
on
it 
pa
rte
s 
su
bi
ec
tiv
as
 s
ui
 s
ub
ie
ct
i 
qu
ae
 s
un
t a
ffi
rm
at
io
 e
t n
eg
at
io
, s
ci
lic
et
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 a
ff
irm
at
iv
a 
et
 <
pr
op
os
iti
o>
56
 n
eg
at
iv
a.
 T
er
tio
 p
ro
po
ni
t s
uu
m
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 d
e 
qu
o 
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
 i
nt
en
di
t 
de
te
rm
in
ar
e,
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
en
un
ci
at
io
. 
Q
ua
rto
 p
ro
po
ni
t g
en
us
 <
su
i>
57
 s
ub
ie
ct
i q
uo
d 
es
t o
ra
tio
.  
U
nd
e 
de
 q
uo
lib
et
 i
st
or
um
 o
po
rte
t 
co
ns
tit
ue
re
 q
ui
d 
si
t 
<e
t 
pr
im
o 
op
or
te
t c
on
st
itu
er
e 
qu
id
 si
t>
58
 n
om
en
 e
t q
ui
d 
[s
it]
59
st
at
em
en
t, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 to
 s
ig
ni
fy
 c
on
ve
nt
io
na
lly
. A
nd
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
is
 h
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
es
 a
 re
m
ot
e 
ge
nu
s 
of
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 
th
e 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e.
 I
n 
th
is
 t
hi
rd
, 
w
hi
ch
 
be
gi
ns
 
Y
et
 
ho
w
 
is
 
it,
 
A
ris
to
tle
 
se
ts
 
ou
t 
ho
w
 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 –
 n
ou
ns
, 
ve
rb
s, 
an
d 
st
at
em
en
ts
 –
 d
iff
er
 i
n 
th
e 
w
ay
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
si
gn
ify
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 p
ar
t, 
he
 g
iv
es
 a
 p
ro
lo
gu
e,
 in
 w
hi
ch
 h
e 
se
t o
ut
 fo
ur
 n
ot
io
ns
 th
at
 m
us
t b
e 
de
fin
ed
 la
te
r. 
Fi
rs
t, 
he
 s
et
s 
ou
t 
th
e 
in
te
gr
al
 p
ar
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
of
 t
hi
s 
sc
ie
nc
e,
 w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
th
e 
no
un
 a
nd
 th
e 
ve
rb
. S
ec
on
d,
 h
e 
se
ts
 o
ut
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
pa
rts
 o
f 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
of
 t
hi
s 
sc
ie
nc
e,
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 a
ff
irm
at
io
n 
an
d 
ne
ga
tio
n,
 
na
m
el
y,
 
an
 
af
fir
m
at
iv
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
an
d 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
st
at
em
en
t. 
Th
ird
, 
he
 s
et
s 
ou
t 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
its
el
f 
w
hi
ch
 f
irs
t a
nd
 f
or
em
os
t h
e 
m
ea
ns
 to
 d
ef
in
e,
 w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e 
st
at
em
en
t. 
Fo
ur
th
, 
he
 s
et
s 
ou
t 
th
e 
ge
nu
s 
of
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 s
en
te
nc
e.
 H
en
ce
 fo
r e
ac
h 
of
 th
es
e 
it 
is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
to
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
w
ha
t a
 n
ou
n 
is
 a
nd
 w
ha
t a
 v
er
b 
is
. 
 v
er
bu
m
.  
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, B
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 A
 
54
 A
, B
 
55
 ‘p
ro
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 A
, B
 
56
 B
 
57
 A
, B
 
58
 A
, ‘
et
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rim
o 
qu
od
 si
t’:
 B
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 A
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N
ot
an
du
m
 s
un
t h
ic
 tr
ia
. <
Et
>6
0  p
rim
o 
no
ta
nd
um
 e
st
 s
ec
un
du
m
 
B
oe
th
iu
m
 {
su
pr
a}
61
 p
re
di
ca
m
en
ta
 [e
t h
ic
]6
2 , 
qu
od
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 
in
 p
ra
ed
ic
am
en
tis
 <
et
 e
tia
m
 h
ic
>6
3  
de
te
rm
in
at
 d
e 
vo
ci
bu
s 
in
co
m
pl
ex
is
 
<s
ed
 
di
ve
rs
im
od
e.
 
In
 
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
tis
 
en
im
 
de
te
rm
in
at
 d
e 
in
co
m
pl
ex
is
>6
4
 
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 n
om
in
a 
re
ru
m
, e
t h
ic
 
de
te
rm
in
at
 d
e 
in
co
m
pl
ex
is
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 n
om
in
a 
no
m
in
um
, 
ho
c 
es
t, 
qu
ae
 s
un
t 
co
m
m
un
ia
 s
ol
um
 v
oc
ib
us
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
io
ni
s 
ad
 
pl
ac
itu
m
, c
ui
us
m
od
i s
un
t n
om
en
 e
t v
er
bu
m
. 
W
e 
ne
ed
 t
o 
no
te
 t
hr
ee
 t
hi
ng
s 
he
re
. F
irs
t, 
w
e 
ne
ed
 t
o 
no
te
 
th
at
, 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 B
oe
th
iu
s 
w
he
n 
he
 c
om
m
en
ts
 o
n 
th
e 
Ca
te
go
ri
es
, 
bo
th
 i
n 
th
e 
C
at
eg
or
ie
s 
an
d 
he
re
, 
A
ris
to
tle
 
de
fin
es
 n
on
-c
om
pl
ex
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
, b
ut
 in
 d
iff
er
en
t w
ay
s. 
Fo
r, 
in
 th
e 
Ca
te
go
ri
es
, A
ris
to
tle
 d
ef
in
es
 n
on
-c
om
pl
ex
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 n
am
es
 o
f t
hi
ng
s, 
an
d 
in
 th
is
 w
or
k 
he
 d
ef
in
es
 n
on
-
co
m
pl
ex
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 n
am
es
 o
f 
na
m
es
, 
th
at
 i
s, 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 o
nl
y 
co
m
m
on
 t
o 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
, o
f w
hi
ch
 k
in
ds
 a
re
 n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 v
er
bs
. 
 
 
 
A
d 
cu
iu
s 
ev
id
en
tia
m
 
es
t 
sc
ie
nd
um
 
<s
ec
un
du
m
 
B
oe
th
iu
m
 
ite
m
>6
5  
qu
od
 q
ua
ed
am
 s
un
t 
no
m
in
a 
pr
im
ae
 i
m
po
si
tio
ni
s, 
et
 
qu
ae
da
m
 s
un
t n
om
in
a 
se
cu
nd
ae
 im
po
si
tio
ni
s. 
[N
am
]6
6  
no
m
in
a 
se
cu
nd
ae
 
im
po
si
tio
ni
s 
su
nt
 
no
m
in
a 
<q
ua
e>
67
 
so
lu
m
 
<s
ig
ni
fic
an
t>
68
 c
om
m
un
ia
 s
ig
ni
s 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 <
k3
rb
> 
in
st
itu
tis
 
ve
l e
or
um
 <
pr
op
rii
s>
69
 a
cc
id
en
tib
us
, c
ui
us
m
od
i s
un
t ‘
no
m
en
’ 
et
 ‘v
er
bu
m
’. 
Is
ta
 {
na
m
}7
0  s
ol
um
 s
un
t c
om
m
un
ia
 s
ol
um
 n
om
in
i 
et
 v
er
bo
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
tib
us
 e
x 
in
st
itu
tio
ne
, 
et
 i
de
o 
su
nt
 n
om
in
a 
se
cu
nd
ae
 i
m
po
si
tio
ni
s 
[v
el
 i
nt
en
tio
ni
s]
71
 
. 
Ill
a 
ve
ro
 n
om
in
a 
Fo
r 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
th
is
, 
w
e 
ne
ed
 t
o 
re
co
gn
iz
e 
th
at
 c
er
ta
in
 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 
ar
e 
na
m
es
 
of
 
fir
st
 
im
po
si
tio
n,
 
an
d 
ce
rta
in
 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 a
re
 n
am
es
 o
f 
se
co
nd
 i
m
po
si
tio
n.
 N
am
es
 o
f 
se
co
nd
 im
po
si
tio
n 
ar
e 
na
m
es
 w
hi
ch
 s
ig
ni
fy
 th
in
gs
 c
om
m
on
 
on
ly
 t
o 
si
gn
s 
in
st
itu
te
d 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
, 
or
 t
o 
ac
ci
de
nt
s 
of
 
th
em
, 
of
 w
hi
ch
 s
or
t 
ar
e 
‘n
ou
n’
 a
nd
 ‘
ve
rb
’. 
Fo
r 
th
es
e 
ar
e 
co
m
m
on
 o
nl
y 
to
 a
 n
ou
n 
an
d 
a 
ve
rb
 si
gn
ify
in
g 
by
 in
st
itu
tio
n,
 
an
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
th
ey
 a
re
 n
am
es
 o
f 
se
co
nd
 i
m
po
si
tio
n.
 Y
et
 
th
os
e 
no
un
s 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 c
om
m
on
 b
ot
h 
to
 c
on
ve
nt
io
na
lly
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 ‘s
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A
, B
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 A
, B
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 A
, B
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 A
, B
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 A
, ‘
se
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nd
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 B
oe
th
iu
m
’: 
B
 
66
 A
, B
 
67
 A
, B
 
68
 A
, ‘
su
nt
’: 
40
6 
69
 A
, B
 
70
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ni
m
’: 
A
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qu
ae
 su
nt
 c
om
m
un
ia
 ta
m
 {
vo
ci
bu
s}
72
 si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
is
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
 
qu
am
 
vo
ci
bu
s 
{s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
is
}7
3  
na
tu
ra
lit
er
 
no
n 
{d
ic
itu
r}
74
 
no
m
in
a 
se
cu
nd
ae
 
im
po
si
tio
ni
s 
cu
iu
sm
od
i 
su
nt
 
{h
ae
c}
75
 
no
m
in
a:
 ‘s
on
us
’, 
[‘
vo
x’
,]7
6  e
t {
ce
te
ra
}7
7 . 
U
tru
m
 a
ut
em
 n
om
in
a 
<s
ig
ni
fic
an
tia
>7
8  
{c
om
m
un
ia
}7
9  
vo
ci
bu
s 
{s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
is
}8
0  
ad
 
pl
ac
itu
m
 {
si
nt
}8
1  
no
m
in
a 
pr
im
ae
 {
in
te
nt
io
ni
s}
82
 v
el
 s
ec
un
da
e,
 
cu
iu
sm
od
i 
su
nt
 ‘
nu
m
er
us
’, 
‘f
ig
ur
a’
, 
‘c
as
us
’, 
et
 h
ui
us
m
od
i 
se
cu
nd
um
 d
e 
ei
s 
lo
qu
itu
r 
gr
am
m
at
ic
us
, d
ub
iu
m
 e
st
. E
t 
po
te
st
 
di
ci
 q
uo
d 
su
nt
 n
om
in
a 
se
cu
nd
ae
 i
m
po
si
tio
ni
s 
eo
 q
uo
d 
so
lu
m
 
co
ns
eq
uu
nt
ur
 
no
m
in
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 
pl
ac
itu
m
, 
{n
eq
ue
}8
3  
im
po
nu
nt
ur
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 a
nt
eq
ua
m
 h
ui
us
m
od
i 
no
m
in
a 
qu
ib
us
 a
cc
id
un
t i
m
po
nu
nt
ur
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
. N
om
in
a 
pr
im
ae
 
im
po
si
tio
ni
s 
su
nt
 n
om
in
a 
re
ru
m
, 
ac
ci
pi
en
do
 r
em
 s
ec
un
du
m
 
qu
od
 d
is
tin
gu
itu
r 
ab
 s
ig
ni
s 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
tib
us
. 
Et
 
di
vi
di
tu
r 
{i
n 
no
m
en
 p
rim
ae
 i
nt
en
tio
ni
s 
et
 n
om
en
 s
ec
un
da
e 
in
te
nt
io
ni
s}
84
. 
N
om
en
 p
rim
ae
 i
nt
en
tio
ni
s 
es
t 
no
m
en
 r
ei
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
es
t n
at
a 
es
se
 s
ig
nu
m
 p
ro
 {
qu
o}
85
 {
su
pp
on
it}
86
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 
an
d 
to
 
na
tu
ra
lly
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 (s
uc
h 
as
 ‘s
ou
nd
’, 
‘u
tte
ra
nc
e’
, e
tc
.) 
ar
e 
no
t c
al
le
d 
na
m
es
 o
f 
se
co
nd
 i
m
po
si
tio
n.
 B
ut
 t
he
re
 i
s 
so
m
e 
do
ub
t 
w
he
th
er
 
na
m
es
 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
ac
ci
de
nt
s 
of
 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 
(o
f 
w
hi
ch
 
so
rt 
ar
e 
‘n
um
be
r’
, 
‘f
ig
ur
e’
, 
‘c
as
e’
, 
an
d 
of
 
th
e 
ki
nd
 
ab
ou
t 
w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
gr
am
m
ar
ia
n 
di
sc
us
se
s)
 a
re
 n
am
es
 o
f 
fir
st
 i
m
po
si
tio
n 
or
 
se
co
nd
 im
po
si
tio
n.
 A
nd
 it
 c
an
 b
e 
sa
id
 th
at
 n
am
es
 o
f s
ec
on
d 
im
po
si
tio
n 
ar
e 
th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 o
nl
y 
fo
llo
w
 c
on
ve
nt
io
na
lly
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e 
no
un
s, 
no
r 
ar
e 
th
ey
 i
m
po
se
d 
to
 s
ig
ni
fy
in
g 
be
fo
re
 n
ou
ns
 o
f 
th
at
 s
or
t, 
by
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
ha
pp
en
, 
ar
e 
im
po
se
d 
to
 si
gn
ify
in
g.
 N
am
es
 o
f f
irs
t i
m
po
si
tio
n 
 a
re
 n
am
es
 
of
 
th
in
gs
, 
by
 
ta
ki
ng
 
‘th
in
g’
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
w
hi
ch
 
it 
is
 
di
st
in
gu
is
he
d 
fr
om
 s
ig
ns
 s
ig
ni
fy
in
g 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
. A
nd
 a
 
na
m
e 
of
 f
irs
t i
m
po
si
tio
n 
is
 d
iv
id
ed
, b
ec
au
se
, a
m
on
g 
na
m
es
 
of
 f
irs
t 
im
po
si
tio
n,
 s
om
e 
ar
e 
na
m
es
 o
f 
fir
st
 i
nt
en
tio
n,
 a
nd
 
so
m
e 
ar
e 
na
m
es
 o
f 
se
co
nd
 i
nt
en
tio
n.
 A
 n
am
e 
of
 f
irs
t 
, c
ui
us
m
od
i 
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: B
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 A
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 A
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od
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 B
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 B
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cc
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A
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A
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un
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 A
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 ‘i
m
po
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: B
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 ‘n
ec
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A
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om
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qu
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in
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tio
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qu
ae
da
m
 su
nt
 n
om
in
a 
pr
im
ae
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te
nt
io
ni
s e
t q
ua
ed
am
 su
nt
 n
om
in
a 
se
cu
nd
ae
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te
nt
io
ni
s’
: 
A
, B
 
85
 ‘a
liq
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’: 
A
, B
 
86
 ‘s
up
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’: 
A
, B
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su
nt
 ‘
ho
m
o’
, 
‘a
ni
m
al
’, 
‘a
lb
um
’, 
‘n
ig
ru
m
’ 
et
 h
ui
us
m
od
i, 
et
 
et
ia
m
 n
om
in
a 
co
m
m
un
ia
 {
hi
s}
87
 r
eb
us
 q
ua
e 
<n
on
>8
8  
su
nt
 
si
gn
a 
[a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ia
]8
9 , 
{u
t 
su
nt
 
no
m
in
a}
90
 
tra
ns
ce
nd
en
tia
 
ut
 
‘e
ns
’, 
‘u
nu
m
’, 
‘a
liq
ui
d’
 
<’
re
s’
>9
1  
et
 
hu
iu
sm
od
i s
un
t n
om
in
a 
pr
im
ae
 in
te
nt
io
ni
s. 
[S
ed
]9
2  {
no
m
in
a}
93
 
se
cu
nd
ae
 
in
te
nt
io
ni
s 
{s
un
t 
no
m
in
a}
94
 
ad
 
pl
ac
itu
m
 
{s
ig
ni
fic
an
tia
}9
5  
co
nc
ep
tu
m
 
ve
l 
in
te
nt
io
ne
m
 
an
im
ae
, 
ve
l 
[a
liq
ui
d]
96
 
co
m
m
un
e 
{h
is
}9
7  
co
nc
ep
tib
us
 
ex
 
qu
ib
us
 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
in
 a
ni
m
a,
 e
t h
ui
us
m
od
i n
om
in
a 
su
nt
 u
t 
‘g
en
us
’, 
‘s
pe
ci
es
’, 
‘p
re
di
ca
bi
le
’, 
‘s
ub
ie
ct
ib
ile
’ 
<e
t 
hu
iu
sm
od
i>
98
. E
t i
llu
d 
di
co
 s
up
po
si
to
 q
uo
d 
un
iv
er
sa
lia
 {
si
nt
}9
9  
so
le
 i
nt
en
tio
ne
s 
an
im
ae
, 
ut
 p
lu
ru
m
 d
ic
un
t. 
Su
pp
os
ito
 t
am
en
 
qu
od
 u
ni
ve
rs
al
ia
 s
in
t 
re
s 
ex
tra
 a
ni
m
am
, {
qu
od
 v
er
iu
s 
es
t}
10
0
in
te
nt
io
n 
is
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 a
 t
hi
ng
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
no
t 
su
ite
d 
to
 b
e 
a 
si
gn
 s
up
po
si
tin
g 
fo
r 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 e
ls
e,
 s
uc
h 
as
 ‘
hu
m
an
’, 
‘a
ni
m
al
’, 
‘th
e 
w
hi
te
’, 
‘th
e 
bl
ac
k’
, 
an
d 
na
m
es
 o
f 
th
at
 s
or
t. 
M
or
eo
ve
r, 
na
m
es
 c
om
m
on
 b
ot
h 
to
 t
hi
ng
s 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 n
ot
 
co
nv
en
tio
na
l 
si
gn
s 
an
d 
to
 t
hi
ng
s 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 c
on
ve
nt
io
na
l 
si
gn
s, 
su
ch
 a
s 
tra
ns
ce
nd
en
ta
l n
am
es
 (
fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 ‘
be
in
g’
, 
‘o
ne
’, 
‘s
om
et
hi
ng
’ a
nd
 n
am
es
 o
f t
ha
t s
or
t) 
ar
e 
na
m
e 
of
 fi
rs
t 
in
te
nt
io
n.
 B
ut
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 s
ec
on
d 
in
te
nt
io
n 
is
 a
 n
am
e 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
 s
ig
ni
fy
in
g 
a 
co
nc
ep
t 
or
 i
nt
en
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 
m
in
d,
 o
r s
om
et
hi
ng
 c
om
m
on
 to
 th
os
e 
co
nc
ep
ts
 fr
om
 w
hi
ch
 
a 
st
at
em
en
t i
n 
th
e 
so
ul
 is
 c
om
po
se
d,
 a
nd
 n
am
es
 o
f t
hi
s 
so
rt 
ar
e 
‘g
en
us
’, 
‘s
pe
ci
es
’, 
‘p
re
di
ca
bl
e’
, [
an
d]
 ‘s
ub
je
ct
ib
le
’. 
A
nd
 
w
he
th
er
 o
ne
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 u
ni
ve
rs
al
s 
ar
e 
on
ly
 i
n 
th
e 
m
in
d,
 a
s 
m
an
y 
sa
y,
 o
r 
th
at
 u
ni
ve
rs
al
s 
ar
e 
th
in
gs
 o
ut
si
de
 t
he
 m
in
d,
 
w
hi
ch
 I
 b
el
ie
ve
 is
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y,
 o
ne
 s
ho
ul
d 
sa
y 
th
at
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 f
irs
t 
in
te
nt
io
n 
is
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 a
 t
hi
ng
 a
s 
it 
fa
lls
 u
nd
er
 a
 
pr
im
ar
y 
co
nc
ep
t 
of
 t
he
 i
nt
el
le
ct
, 
an
d 
a 
na
m
e 
of
 s
ec
on
d 
in
te
nt
io
n 
is
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 a
 th
in
g 
as
 it
 f
al
ls
 u
nd
er
 a
 s
ec
on
da
ry
 
, 
di
ce
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
no
m
en
 p
rim
ae
 i
nt
en
tio
ni
s 
es
t 
no
m
en
 r
ei
 u
t 
ca
di
t 
su
b 
pr
im
o 
co
nc
ep
tu
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
. 
Et
 n
om
en
 s
ec
un
da
e 
in
te
nt
io
ni
s 
es
t 
no
m
en
 r
ei
 u
t 
ca
di
t 
su
b 
se
cu
nd
ar
io
 c
on
ce
pt
u 
in
te
lle
ct
us
. 
V
er
bi
 g
ra
tia
, 
ho
c 
no
m
en
, 
‘h
om
o’
, 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
re
m
 
ex
tra
 u
t 
co
nc
ip
itu
r 
ab
so
lu
te
, e
t 
si
c 
es
t 
su
b 
pr
im
ar
io
 c
on
ce
pt
u 
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90
 ‘e
t r
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us
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ua
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su
nt
 si
gn
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
, c
ui
us
m
od
i s
un
t’:
 A
, B
 
91
 A
, B
 
92
 A
, B
 
93
 ‘n
om
en
’: 
A
, B
 
94
 ‘e
st
 n
om
en
’: 
A
, B
 
95
 ‘s
ig
ni
fic
an
s’
: A
, B
 
96
 A
 
97
 ‘h
ui
us
m
od
i’:
 A
, B
 
98
 A
 
99
 ‘s
un
t’:
 A
 
10
0  ‘
si
cu
t v
er
iu
s c
re
do
’: 
A
, B
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in
te
lle
ct
us
. 
Et
 
ho
c 
no
m
en
, 
‘s
pe
ci
es
’, 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
re
m
 
ut
 
co
m
pa
ra
tu
r 
ad
 [
in
te
lle
ct
um
 p
er
]1
01
 i
nd
iv
id
ua
 q
ui
bu
s 
es
t 
qu
od
 
co
m
m
un
e,
 
et
 
si
c 
es
t 
no
m
en
 
re
i 
ut
 
ca
di
t 
su
b 
se
cu
nd
ar
io
 
co
nc
ep
tu
m
 in
te
lle
ct
us
, e
t i
de
o 
es
t n
om
en
 s
ec
un
da
e 
in
te
nt
io
ni
s. 
Ex
 p
ra
ed
ic
tis
 ig
itu
r a
pp
ar
et
 q
uo
d 
no
m
en
 d
is
tin
gu
itu
r i
n 
no
m
en
 
pr
im
ae
 i
m
po
si
tio
ni
s 
et
 <
in
>1
02
 n
om
en
 s
ec
un
da
e 
im
po
si
tio
ni
s. 
Et
 n
om
en
 p
rim
ae
 i
m
po
si
tio
ni
s 
di
st
in
gu
itu
r 
in
 n
om
en
 p
rim
ae
 
in
te
nt
io
ni
s 
et
 n
om
en
 s
ec
un
da
e 
in
te
nt
io
ni
s. 
N
om
in
a 
se
cu
nd
ae
 
im
po
si
tio
ni
s 
su
nt
 n
om
in
a 
so
lu
m
 c
om
m
un
ia
 s
ig
ni
s 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 
in
st
itu
tis
 e
t 
eo
ru
m
 a
cc
en
tib
us
. 
N
om
in
a 
pr
im
ae
 i
m
po
si
tio
ni
s 
su
nt
 n
om
in
a 
co
m
m
un
ia
 r
eb
us
 e
xt
ra
 a
ni
m
am
 e
t 
co
nc
ep
tib
us
 
an
im
ae
 <
et
>1
03
 tr
an
sc
en
de
nt
ib
us
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 c
om
m
un
ia
 re
bu
s 
et
 
si
gn
is
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
 [s
ig
ni
fic
an
tib
us
]1
04
co
nc
ep
t o
f 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
. F
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 th
is
 n
am
e,
 ‘
hu
m
an
’, 
si
gn
ifi
es
 
a 
th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
m
in
d 
as
 
it 
is
 
co
nc
ei
ve
d 
ab
so
lu
te
ly
, a
nd
 so
 it
 is
 u
nd
er
 a
 p
rim
ar
y 
co
nc
ep
t o
f t
he
 m
in
d.
 
A
nd
 th
is
 n
am
e,
 ‘s
pe
ci
es
’, 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 th
in
g 
as
 it
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 
an
 in
di
vi
du
al
 b
y 
w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 c
om
m
on
, a
nd
 s
o 
it 
is
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 
a 
th
in
g 
as
 it
 fa
lls
 u
nd
er
 a
 s
ec
on
da
ry
 c
on
ce
pt
 o
f t
he
 in
te
lle
ct
, 
an
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
it 
is
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 s
ec
on
d 
in
te
nt
io
n.
 F
ro
m
 w
ha
t 
ha
s 
be
en
 
sa
id
, 
th
er
ef
or
e,
 
it 
ap
pe
ar
s 
th
at
 
th
e 
no
un
 
is
 
di
st
in
gu
is
he
d 
in
to
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 fi
rs
t i
m
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
a 
na
m
e 
of
 
se
co
nd
 i
m
po
si
tio
n.
 A
nd
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 f
irs
t 
im
po
si
tio
n 
is
 
di
st
in
gu
is
he
d 
in
to
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 f
irs
t i
nt
en
tio
n 
an
d 
a 
na
m
e 
of
 
se
co
nd
 i
nt
en
tio
n.
 N
am
es
 o
f 
se
co
nd
 i
m
po
si
tio
n 
ar
e 
na
m
es
 
co
m
m
on
 o
nl
y 
to
 s
ig
ns
 i
ns
tit
ut
ed
 c
on
ve
nt
io
na
lly
, 
an
d 
to
 
ac
ci
de
nt
s 
of
 t
he
m
. 
N
am
es
 o
f 
fir
st
 i
m
po
si
tio
n 
ar
e 
na
m
es
 
co
m
m
on
 to
 th
in
gs
 o
ut
si
de
 th
e 
so
ul
, t
o 
co
nc
ep
ts
 o
f t
he
 s
ou
l, 
an
d 
to
 t
ra
nc
ed
en
ta
ls
, 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 c
om
m
on
 t
o 
th
in
gs
 a
nd
 t
o 
co
nv
en
tio
na
l s
ig
ns
. 
. 
 
 
 
Se
cu
nd
o 
es
t 
no
ta
nd
um
 
qu
od
 
no
m
en
 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r 
du
pl
ic
ite
r, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
co
m
m
un
ite
r 
{e
t 
st
ric
te
. C
om
m
un
ite
r 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r}
10
5  
pr
o 
qu
ae
lib
et
 v
oc
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 e
t 
si
c 
es
t 
co
m
m
un
e 
cu
ili
be
t p
ar
ti 
or
at
io
ni
s, 
et
 s
ic
 a
cc
ip
itu
r 
in
 is
ta
 d
iv
is
io
ne
 {
qu
od
 
al
iq
uo
d}
10
6
 
 e
st
 n
om
en
 p
rim
ae
 i
m
po
si
tio
ni
s 
et
 q
uo
dd
am
 <
es
t 
Se
co
nd
, 
w
e 
m
us
t 
no
te
 t
ha
t 
‘n
ou
n’
 i
s 
us
ed
 i
n 
tw
o 
w
ay
s, 
na
m
el
y 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 a
nd
 in
 th
at
 s
en
se
 it
 is
 c
om
m
on
 to
 e
ac
h 
pa
rt 
of
 a
 
se
nt
en
ce
, 
an
d 
it 
is
 u
se
d 
in
 t
hi
s 
w
ay
 i
n 
th
e 
di
vi
si
on
 j
us
t 
m
en
tio
ne
d,
 th
at
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 is
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 fi
rs
t i
m
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
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no
m
en
>1
07
 s
ec
un
da
e 
<i
m
po
si
tio
ni
s>
10
8
so
m
et
hi
ng
 is
 a
 n
am
e 
of
 s
ec
on
d 
im
po
si
tio
n.
 M
or
e 
st
ric
tly
, i
t 
is
 u
se
d 
to
 m
ea
n 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 d
is
tin
gu
is
he
d 
fr
om
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
pa
rts
 o
f a
 se
nt
en
ce
. 
. 
A
lio
 m
od
o 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r 
st
ric
te
 se
cu
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
di
st
in
gu
itu
r c
on
tra
 a
lia
s p
ar
te
s o
ra
tio
ni
s. 
 
 
 
Te
rti
o 
es
t 
no
ta
nd
um
 
qu
od
 
hi
c 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 
su
b 
no
m
in
e 
co
m
pr
eh
en
di
t 
in
di
ff
er
en
te
r 
no
m
en
 
et
 
pr
on
om
en
. 
D
iff
in
iti
o 
{n
am
}1
09
 n
om
in
is
 h
ic
 d
at
a 
es
t 
co
m
m
un
is
 t
am
 n
om
in
i 
qu
am
 
pr
on
om
in
i, 
et
 
su
b 
ve
rb
o 
co
m
pr
eh
en
di
t 
pa
rti
ci
pi
um
. 
U
nd
e 
<q
ui
a>
11
0  p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 h
ic
 d
et
er
m
in
at
 d
e 
si
m
pl
ic
i e
nu
nc
ia
tio
ne
, 
su
ff
ic
it 
ut
 d
e 
ill
is
 d
et
er
m
in
et
 e
x 
qu
ib
us
 n
ec
es
sa
rio
 {
co
ns
te
t}
11
1  
en
un
ci
at
io
, e
t h
ui
us
m
od
i s
un
t n
om
en
 e
t p
ro
no
m
en
, v
er
bu
m
 e
t 
pa
rti
ci
pi
um
, 
et
 i
de
o 
m
ag
is
 d
e 
hi
s 
de
te
rm
in
at
 q
ua
m
 d
e 
al
iis
 
pa
rti
bu
s {
or
at
io
ni
s}
11
2
 
. 
Th
ird
, w
e 
m
us
t n
ot
e 
th
at
, i
n 
th
is
 w
or
k,
 b
y 
‘n
ou
n’
, A
ris
to
tle
 
in
cl
ud
es
 
in
di
ff
er
en
tly
 
no
un
s 
an
d 
pr
on
ou
ns
. 
Fo
r 
th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f a
 n
ou
n 
gi
ve
n 
in
 th
is
 w
or
k 
is
 c
om
m
on
 b
ot
h 
to
 a
 
no
un
 a
nd
 t
o 
a 
pr
on
ou
n,
 a
nd
 b
y 
‘v
er
b’
, 
he
 i
nc
lu
de
s 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pl
e.
 H
en
ce
, 
in
 t
hi
s 
w
or
k,
 A
ris
to
tle
 d
ef
in
es
 w
ha
t 
su
ff
ic
es
 f
or
 a
 s
im
pl
e 
st
at
em
en
t, 
so
 th
at
 h
e 
de
fin
es
 th
os
e 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t n
ec
es
sa
ril
y 
co
ns
is
ts
, a
nd
 o
f 
th
is
 s
or
t a
re
 
th
e 
no
un
 a
nd
 th
e 
pr
on
ou
n,
 th
e 
ve
rb
 a
nd
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pl
e,
 a
nd
 
th
er
ef
or
e 
he
 m
or
e 
so
 d
ea
ls
 w
ith
 th
os
e 
pa
rts
 o
f 
sp
ee
ch
 th
an
 
ot
he
rs
. 
 
 
 
Su
nt
 e
rg
o 
ea
 q
ua
e 
in
 v
oc
e 
[e
ar
um
 su
nt
 in
 a
ni
m
a 
pa
ss
io
nu
m
 
no
ta
e,
 e
t e
a 
qu
ae
 sc
ri
bu
nt
ur
 e
or
um
 in
 v
oc
e]
11
3
 
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 in
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
ar
e 
m
ar
ks
 o
f 
af
fe
ct
io
ns
 i
n 
th
e 
so
ul
, 
an
d 
th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 w
ri
tt
en
 o
f 
th
os
e 
in
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e.
 
 
 
 
H
ae
c 
es
t 
se
cu
nd
a 
pa
rs
 h
ui
us
 c
ap
itu
li 
in
 q
ua
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 
in
ve
st
ig
at
 q
uo
dd
am
 c
om
m
un
e 
no
m
in
i e
t v
er
bo
 e
t e
nu
nc
ia
tio
ni
, 
qu
od
 e
st
 s
ig
ni
fic
ar
e 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
, e
t c
on
tin
et
 d
ua
s 
pa
rti
cu
la
s. 
In
 
pr
im
a 
po
ni
t o
rd
in
em
 s
ig
no
ru
m
 in
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
do
, s
ci
lic
et
 {
eo
ru
m
 
qu
ae
 
sc
rib
un
tu
r 
et
 
eo
ru
m
 
qu
ae
 
pr
of
er
un
tu
r 
et
 
pa
ss
io
nu
m
 
 
Th
is
 i
s 
th
e 
se
co
nd
 p
ar
t 
of
 t
hi
s 
ch
ap
te
r, 
in
 w
hi
ch
 A
ris
to
tle
 
in
ve
st
ig
at
es
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 n
ou
n,
 t
he
 v
er
b 
an
d 
th
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
al
l 
sh
ar
e,
 
w
hi
ch
 
is
 
th
at
 
th
ey
 
si
gn
ify
 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
, 
an
d 
th
is
 s
ec
on
d 
pa
rt 
co
nt
ai
ns
 t
w
o 
sm
al
le
r 
pa
rts
. 
In
 t
he
 f
irs
t 
pa
rt,
 h
e 
se
ts
 o
ut
 t
he
 o
rd
er
 o
f 
si
gn
s 
in
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an
im
ae
 v
el
 c
on
ce
pt
uu
m
}1
14
. 
In
 s
ec
un
da
 <
pa
rti
cu
la
>1
15
 i
bi
 e
t 
qu
em
ad
m
od
um
 
<n
ec
 
lit
te
ra
m
>1
16
 
po
ni
t 
di
ve
rs
ita
te
m
 
si
gn
or
um
 
pr
ed
ic
at
or
um
 
in
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
o.
 
In
 
pr
im
a 
ig
itu
r 
pa
rti
cu
la
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 n
ar
ra
nd
o 
{d
ic
en
s}
11
7  
si
c,
 S
un
t 
er
go
 e
a 
qu
ae
 su
nt
 in
 v
oc
e 
{e
or
um
}1
18
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 in
 a
ni
m
a 
pa
ss
io
nu
m
 
no
ta
e,
 
er
go
 
in
 
pr
op
os
ito
 
no
n 
di
ci
t 
or
di
ne
m
 
{i
lla
tio
ni
s 
se
qu
en
tiu
m
}1
19
, 
se
d 
m
ag
is
 [
di
ci
t]1
20
 o
rd
in
em
 c
on
tin
ua
tio
ni
s 
se
qu
en
tiu
m
 c
um
 p
ra
ec
ed
en
iti
bu
s. 
Q
ui
a 
{n
am
}1
21
 {
pr
om
is
it}
12
2  
se
 d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
um
 d
e 
no
m
in
e 
et
 v
er
bo
 <
et
>1
23
 c
on
tin
ua
nd
o 
se
 
ad
 p
re
ce
de
nt
ia
 d
ic
it 
<q
uo
d>
12
4  e
a 
qu
ae
 s
un
t i
n 
vo
ce
, e
t c
et
er
a,
 
qu
od
 e
xp
on
it 
tri
pl
ic
ite
r. 
U
no
 m
od
o 
qu
od
 n
om
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 i
n 
vo
ce
 s
ic
ut
 i
nf
er
io
ra
 <
su
nt
>1
25
 i
n 
su
o 
su
pe
rio
ri 
su
nt
 
no
ta
e 
pa
ss
io
nu
m
 a
ni
m
ae
. 
Se
cu
nd
o 
[m
od
o]
12
6  
ex
po
ni
tu
r 
si
c:
 
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 {
qu
ae
 s
un
t 
in
 v
oc
es
ic
ut
 r
es
 a
rti
fic
ia
lis
 i
n 
re
 
na
tu
ra
li.
 V
ox
 e
ni
m
 e
st
 n
at
ur
al
is
. 
N
om
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 s
un
t 
ex
 
in
st
itu
tio
ne
 p
rim
i 
im
po
si
tio
ni
s, 
et
 a
rti
fic
ia
le
 e
st
 in
 r
e 
na
tu
ra
li.
 
Su
nt
 
no
ta
e 
pa
ss
io
nu
m
 
an
im
ae
}1
27
. 
Te
rti
o 
<m
od
o>
12
8
si
gn
ify
in
g,
 n
am
el
y,
 o
f 
w
rit
te
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
, 
an
d 
of
 s
po
ke
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
, a
nd
 o
f a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 s
ou
l, 
or
 c
on
ce
pt
s. 
In
 th
e 
se
co
nd
, w
hi
ch
 b
eg
in
s 
an
d 
ho
w
, h
e 
se
ts
 o
ut
 a
 d
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
ca
te
go
rie
s 
of
 s
ig
ns
 in
 s
ig
ni
fy
in
g.
 T
he
re
fo
re
, i
n 
th
e 
fir
st
 
pa
rt,
 A
ris
to
tle
, b
y 
pu
tti
ng
 th
e 
cl
ai
m
 in
 th
is
 w
ay
 –
 T
he
re
fo
re
 
th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 in
 s
pe
ec
h 
ar
e 
m
ar
ks
 o
f 
pa
ss
io
ns
 w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
in
 th
e 
so
ul
 –
 d
oe
s 
no
t e
xp
re
ss
 th
e 
or
de
r b
y 
w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 
ar
e 
ac
qu
ire
d 
by
 u
s, 
bu
t r
at
he
r 
ex
pr
es
se
s 
th
e 
or
de
r 
in
 w
hi
ch
 
th
ey
 f
ol
lo
w
 o
ne
 a
no
th
er
 in
 s
uc
ce
ss
io
n.
 F
or
 it
 is
 b
ec
au
se
 h
e 
se
ts
 f
or
 h
im
se
lf 
th
e 
ta
sk
 o
f 
de
sc
rib
in
g 
th
e 
or
de
r 
in
 w
hi
ch
 
si
gn
s 
fo
llo
w
 o
ne
 a
no
th
er
 t
ha
t 
he
 s
ay
s 
th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 in
 
sp
ee
ch
, 
et
c.
 T
hi
s 
ca
n 
be
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 i
n 
th
re
e 
w
ay
s. 
In
 o
ne
 
w
ay
, t
ha
t n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 v
er
bs
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 in
 s
pe
ec
h 
ar
e 
m
ar
ks
 o
f 
af
fe
ct
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
 in
 th
e 
w
ay
 th
at
 in
fe
rio
rs
 a
re
 in
 th
ei
r 
su
pe
rio
rs
. S
ec
on
d,
 it
 c
an
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
ne
d 
lik
e 
th
is
: n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 
ve
rb
s 
ar
e 
ar
tif
ic
ia
l 
th
in
gs
 m
ad
e 
by
 t
he
 i
ns
tit
ut
io
n 
of
 m
an
, 
an
d 
an
 u
tte
ra
nc
e 
is
 a
 n
at
ur
al
 th
in
g,
 a
nd
 a
rti
fic
ia
l t
hi
ng
s 
ar
e 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
11
4  ‘
vo
cu
m
 sc
rip
ta
ru
m
 e
t v
oc
um
 p
ro
la
ta
ru
m
 e
t c
on
ce
pt
uu
m
 a
ni
m
ae
’: 
A
, B
 
11
5  A
 
11
6  A
, B
 
11
7  ‘
di
ci
t’:
 A
, B
 
11
8  ‘
ea
ru
m
’: 
B
 
11
9  ‘
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
e’
: A
, B
 
12
0  B
 
12
1  ‘
en
im
’: 
A
, B
 
12
2  ‘
pr
ae
m
is
it’
: A
, B
 
12
3  B
 
12
4  A
, B
 
12
5  A
 
12
6  A
, B
 
12
7  ‘
su
nt
 re
s a
rti
fic
ia
le
s f
ac
ta
e 
ab
 in
st
itu
tio
ne
 h
om
in
um
, e
t v
ox
 e
st
 re
s n
at
ur
al
is
, e
t r
es
 a
rti
fic
ia
le
s s
un
t i
n 
re
 n
at
ur
al
i. 
Id
eo
 d
ic
it 
qu
od
 n
om
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 
in
 v
oc
e 
si
cu
t r
es
 a
rti
fic
al
is
 e
st
 in
 re
 n
at
ur
al
i s
un
t n
ot
ae
 p
as
si
on
um
 a
ni
m
ae
 ’:
 A
, B
 
12
8  A
, B
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{e
xp
on
itu
r}
12
9  
ac
ci
pi
en
do
 ‘
vo
ce
m
’ 
pr
o 
pr
ol
at
io
ne
, [
et
]1
30
 tu
nc
 
es
t 
se
ns
us
: 
ea
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 i
n 
vo
ce
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
<n
om
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 
qu
ae
 h
ab
en
t 
es
se
 i
n 
pr
ol
at
io
ne
, 
ho
c 
es
t>
13
1  
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 
pr
ol
at
a 
su
nt
 n
ot
ae
 p
as
si
on
um
 a
ni
m
ae
, e
t h
ae
c 
ex
po
si
tio
 m
ag
is
 
co
nc
or
da
t t
ex
tu
i [
A
ris
to
te
lis
]1
32
. D
ic
it 
ig
itu
r 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 q
uo
d 
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 in
 v
oc
e,
 h
oc
 e
st
, i
n 
pr
ol
at
io
ne
 s
un
t 
no
<k
3v
a>
ta
e 
pa
ss
io
nu
m
 a
ni
m
ae
, h
oc
 e
st
, c
on
ce
pt
uu
m
 a
ni
m
ae
 
qu
ae
 s
un
t 
si
m
ili
tu
di
ne
s 
re
ru
m
. 
Et
 e
a 
qu
ae
 s
cr
ib
un
tu
r 
eo
ru
m
 
qu
ae
 s
un
t i
n 
vo
ce
, h
oc
 e
st
 n
om
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 s
cr
ip
ta
, s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 p
ro
la
ta
, <
ho
c 
es
t, 
su
nt
 n
ot
ae
 re
ru
m
 n
at
ur
al
iu
m
, 
sc
ili
ce
t, 
pa
ss
io
nu
m
>1
33
. 
Ta
le
m
 i
gi
tu
r 
or
di
ne
m
 s
ig
no
ru
m
 <
in
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
o>
13
4  
{a
ss
ig
na
t}
13
5  
hi
c 
A
ris
to
te
le
s, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
qu
od
 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
, 
ho
c 
es
t 
si
m
ili
tu
di
ne
s 
re
ru
m
 e
xi
st
en
tiu
m
 i
n 
an
im
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
re
s 
ex
tra
, 
et
 
no
m
in
a 
et
 
ve
rb
a 
pr
ol
at
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
, 
<e
t 
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 s
cr
ip
ta
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 n
om
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 p
ro
la
ta
>1
36
, e
t {
ill
ud
}1
37
 n
on
 so
lu
m
 
es
t 
ve
ru
m
 
de
 
no
m
in
ib
us
 
et
 
ve
rb
is
 
qu
ae
 
su
nt
 
pa
rte
s 
en
un
ci
at
io
ni
s, 
se
d 
et
ia
m
 [
es
t]1
38
 v
er
um
 d
e 
ip
sa
 e
nu
nc
ia
tio
ne
. 
N
am
 e
nu
nc
ia
tio
 p
ro
la
ta
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 {
or
at
io
ne
m
}1
39
in
 a
 n
at
ur
al
 th
in
g.
 T
he
re
fo
re
, A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 
ve
rb
s 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 in
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 ju
st
 a
s 
ar
tif
ic
ia
l t
hi
ng
s 
ar
e 
in
 a
 n
at
ur
al
 th
in
g,
 a
re
 m
ar
ks
 o
f a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 so
ul
. T
hi
rd
, 
th
is
 te
xt
 c
an
 b
e 
ex
pl
ai
ne
d 
by
 ta
ki
ng
 ‘
ut
te
ra
nc
e’
 f
or
 s
pe
ec
h,
 
an
d 
th
en
 t
hi
s 
is
 t
he
 s
en
se
: 
th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 i
n 
sp
ee
ch
, 
na
m
el
y,
 s
po
ke
n 
no
un
s 
an
d 
ve
rb
s, 
ar
e 
m
ar
ks
 o
f a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
, 
an
d 
th
is
 e
xp
la
na
tio
n 
fit
s 
be
tte
r 
w
ith
 t
he
 t
ex
t 
of
 
A
ris
to
tle
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 v
er
bs
 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 in
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 t
ha
t i
s, 
in
 s
pe
ec
h,
 a
re
 m
ar
ks
 o
f 
af
fe
ct
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
, t
ha
t i
s, 
co
nc
ep
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
m
in
d 
w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
si
m
ili
tu
de
s 
of
 t
hi
ng
s. 
A
nd
 t
ho
se
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 w
rit
te
n 
ar
e 
si
gn
s 
of
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 in
 s
pe
ec
h,
 th
at
 is
, i
n 
w
rit
te
n 
no
un
s 
an
d 
ve
rb
s 
si
gn
ify
 
sp
ok
en
 
no
un
s 
an
d 
ve
rb
s. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
A
ris
to
tle
 h
er
e 
as
si
gn
s 
an
 o
rd
er
 o
f s
ig
ns
 o
f t
hi
s 
so
rt,
 n
am
el
y,
 
th
at
 a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
, 
th
at
 i
s, 
si
m
ili
tu
de
s 
of
 t
hi
ng
s 
ex
is
tin
g 
in
 t
he
 s
ou
l, 
si
gn
ify
 t
hi
ng
s 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
, 
an
d 
sp
ok
en
 n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 v
er
bs
 s
ig
ni
fy
 a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
, a
nd
 
th
at
 is
 tr
ue
 n
ot
 o
nl
y 
ab
ou
t n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 v
er
bs
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 p
ar
ts
 
of
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
bu
t a
ls
o 
it 
is
 tr
ue
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
st
at
em
en
t i
ts
el
f. 
Fo
r 
a 
sp
ok
en
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 s
en
te
nc
e 
in
 t
he
 m
in
d,
 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
a 
ce
rta
in
 a
ff
ec
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 s
ou
l, 
an
d 
a 
w
rit
te
n 
 i
n 
m
en
te
 
qu
ae
 e
st
 q
ua
ed
am
 p
as
si
o 
m
en
tis
, e
t e
nu
nc
ia
tio
 sc
rip
ta
 si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
en
un
ci
at
io
ne
m
 p
ro
la
ta
m
. 
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st
at
em
en
t s
ig
ni
fie
s a
 sp
ok
en
 st
at
em
en
t. 
 
 
 
N
ot
an
du
m
 
es
t 
hi
c 
qu
od
 
pa
ss
io
 
an
im
ae
 
{p
ot
es
t 
du
pl
ic
ite
r 
ac
ci
pi
}1
40
, 
qu
an
tu
m
 a
d 
{p
ra
es
en
s}
14
1  
sp
ec
ta
t. 
U
no
 m
od
o 
pr
o 
af
fe
ct
io
ne
 
ap
pe
tit
us
, 
et
 
si
c 
de
si
de
riu
m
, 
am
or
, 
<e
t>
14
2  
co
nc
up
is
ce
nt
ia
, 
ira
 e
t 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
di
cu
nt
ur
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
. 
A
lio
 m
od
o 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r 
pr
o 
di
sp
os
iti
on
e 
in
te
lle
ct
us
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
pr
o 
si
m
ili
tu
di
ne
 
re
i 
in
 
in
te
lle
ct
u 
re
pr
es
en
ta
nt
e 
re
m
 
ex
tra
 
[a
ni
m
am
]1
43
 
, e
t s
ic
 a
cc
ip
itu
r i
n 
pr
op
os
ito
.  
 
W
e 
m
us
t n
ot
e 
he
re
 th
at
 ‘
af
fe
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
so
ul
’ 
ca
n 
be
 u
se
d 
in
 tw
o 
w
ay
s, 
to
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
at
 e
xp
re
ss
io
n 
be
ar
s 
on
 
th
e 
pr
es
en
t 
to
pi
c.
 I
n 
on
e 
w
ay
, 
‘a
ff
ec
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 s
ou
l’ 
ca
n 
m
ea
n 
an
 a
pp
et
iti
ve
 p
as
si
on
, a
nd
 s
o 
gr
ie
f, 
lo
ve
, d
es
ire
, h
at
e,
 
an
d 
th
in
gs
 o
f 
th
at
 s
or
t a
re
 c
al
le
d 
af
fe
ct
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
. I
n 
an
ot
he
r w
ay
, i
t m
ea
ns
 a
 d
is
po
si
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, n
am
el
y,
 
a 
si
m
ili
tu
de
 in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 o
f 
a 
th
in
g,
 r
ep
re
se
nt
in
g 
a 
th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
, a
nd
 it
 is
 ta
ke
n 
in
 th
is
 w
ay
 in
 th
e 
pa
ss
ag
e.
 
 
 
 
Se
cu
nd
o 
es
t i
nt
el
lig
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
no
m
en
 e
t v
er
bu
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
ar
e 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
 d
up
lic
ite
r 
po
te
st
 i
nt
el
lig
i. 
U
no
 m
od
o 
qu
od
 
no
m
en
 e
t 
ve
rb
um
 {
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
}1
44
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
 t
an
qu
am
 
ill
a 
{q
ua
e}
14
5  i
m
po
nu
nt
ur
 p
rim
o 
ad
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
du
m
. A
lio
 m
od
o 
po
te
st
 in
te
lli
gi
 q
uo
d 
si
gn
ifi
ce
nt
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
 ta
nq
ua
m
 il
la
 
m
ed
ia
nt
ib
us
 
qu
ib
us
 
im
po
nu
nt
ur
 
ad
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
. 
Pr
im
o 
<m
od
o>
14
6  
no
n 
es
t 
ne
ce
ss
e 
no
m
en
 e
t 
ve
rb
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
ar
e 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
, q
ui
a 
ex
 q
uo
 n
om
en
 e
t v
er
bu
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
, 
po
ss
un
t 
in
di
ff
er
en
te
r 
im
po
ni
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 r
em
 
ex
tra
 [a
ni
m
am
]1
47
 
 e
t a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
. I
st
ud
 
co
nf
irm
at
ur
, 
na
m
 r
es
 e
xt
ra
 p
er
 p
riu
s 
in
te
lli
gi
tu
r 
qu
am
 p
as
si
o 
qu
ae
 e
st
 i
n 
an
im
a 
qu
ia
 r
es
 e
xt
ra
 i
nt
el
lig
itu
r 
di
re
ct
e 
et
 p
as
si
o 
Se
co
nd
, w
e 
m
us
t 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
no
un
 a
nd
 t
he
 v
er
b 
si
gn
ify
 a
ffe
ct
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
 c
an
 b
e 
un
de
rs
to
od
 i
n 
tw
o 
w
ay
s. 
In
 o
ne
 w
ay
, t
ha
t a
 n
ou
n 
an
d 
a 
ve
rb
 s
ig
ni
fy
 a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 
of
 t
he
 s
ou
l 
as
 t
ho
se
 w
hi
ch
 t
ho
se
 n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 v
er
bs
 a
re
 
pr
im
ar
ily
 i
m
po
se
d 
to
 s
ig
ni
fy
. 
In
 a
no
th
er
 w
ay
, 
it 
ca
n 
be
 
un
de
rs
to
od
 t
ha
t 
no
un
s 
an
d 
ve
rb
s 
si
gn
ify
 a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
 a
s t
ho
se
 b
y 
w
ho
se
 m
ed
ia
tio
n 
th
os
e 
no
un
s a
nd
 v
er
bs
 a
re
 
im
po
se
d 
to
 si
gn
ify
. I
n 
th
e 
fir
st
 w
ay
, i
t i
s n
ot
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 th
at
 a
 
no
un
 a
nd
 a
 v
er
b 
si
gn
ify
 a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
, 
be
ca
us
e,
 
fr
om
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 a
 n
ou
n 
an
d 
a 
ve
rb
 s
ig
ni
fy
 c
on
ve
nt
io
na
lly
, 
th
ey
 a
re
 a
bl
e 
to
 b
e 
im
po
se
d 
in
di
ff
er
en
tly
 to
 s
ig
ni
fy
 a
 th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 a
nd
 to
 s
ig
ni
fy
 a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 s
ou
l. 
Th
is
 is
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an
im
ae
 i
nd
ire
ct
e 
<e
t>
14
8  
pe
r 
re
fle
xi
on
em
, 
et
 c
og
ni
tio
 d
ire
ct
a 
pr
ae
ce
di
t 
co
gn
iti
on
em
 
in
di
re
ct
am
 
{s
iv
e}
14
9  
re
fle
xa
m
. 
In
 
{i
llo
}1
50
 i
gi
tu
r 
pr
io
ri 
in
 q
uo
 r
es
 e
xt
ra
 [
an
im
am
]1
51
 i
nt
el
lig
itu
r 
{s
eu
}1
52
 p
as
si
o 
an
im
ae
, p
ot
es
t i
nt
el
le
ct
us
 im
po
ne
re
 n
om
en
 r
ei
 
ex
tra
 c
og
ni
tio
ne
m
, 
qu
am
vi
s 
no
n 
{i
m
po
na
tu
r}
15
3  
ill
ud
 n
om
en
 
{p
as
si
on
i}
15
4  a
ni
m
ae
 c
um
 p
as
si
o 
an
im
ae
 tu
nc
 {
es
t}
15
5  i
gn
ot
a 
et
 
no
m
en
 n
on
 im
po
ni
tu
r n
is
i [
in
]1
56
co
nf
irm
ed
. F
or
 a
 th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 is
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d 
be
fo
re
 
an
 a
ff
ec
tio
n 
w
hi
ch
 is
 in
 th
e 
so
ul
, b
ec
au
se
 a
 th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 i
s 
un
de
rs
to
od
 d
ire
ct
ly
 a
nd
 a
n 
af
fe
ct
io
n 
of
 t
he
 s
ou
l 
is
 
un
de
rs
to
od
 
in
di
re
ct
ly
, 
th
ro
ug
h 
re
fle
ct
io
n,
 
an
d 
di
re
ct
 
co
gn
iti
on
 
pr
ec
ed
es
 
in
di
re
ct
 
or
 
re
fle
ct
iv
e 
co
gn
iti
on
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 w
ay
 in
 w
hi
ch
 a
 th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 
or
 a
n 
af
fe
ct
io
n 
of
 t
he
 s
ou
l 
is
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d,
 t
he
 i
nt
el
le
ct
 c
an
 
im
po
se
 a
 n
am
e 
on
 a
 th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
of
 it
s 
co
gn
iti
ve
 fa
cu
lti
es
, 
al
th
ou
gh
 t
ha
t 
na
m
e 
is
 n
ot
 i
m
po
se
d 
on
to
 a
ff
ec
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 
so
ul
, s
in
ce
 th
e 
af
fe
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
so
ul
 is
 n
ot
 th
en
 k
no
w
n,
 a
nd
 a
 
no
un
 is
 n
ot
 im
po
se
d 
ex
ce
pt
 o
n 
w
ha
t i
s k
no
w
n.
 
 n
ot
o.
 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 
si
 
no
m
en
 
ne
ce
ss
ar
io
 
im
po
ne
re
tu
r 
pa
ss
io
ni
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
si
m
ili
tu
di
ni
 r
ei
, h
ae
c 
es
se
t v
er
a,
 ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t s
im
ili
tu
do
 h
om
in
is
 
ex
is
te
ns
 in
 a
ni
m
a’
, q
uo
ni
am
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 e
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 o
m
ni
no
 
id
em
 {
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
}1
57
, 
qu
ia
 n
on
 e
st
 d
ub
iu
m
 q
ui
n 
ha
ec
 v
ox
, 
‘s
im
ili
tu
do
 h
om
in
is
’, 
{s
ig
ni
fic
et
}1
58
 s
im
ili
tu
di
ne
m
 h
om
in
is
. 
<S
i 
er
go
 
ho
c 
no
m
en
, 
‘h
om
o’
, 
si
gn
ifi
ce
t 
si
m
ili
tu
di
ne
m
 
ho
m
in
is
,>
15
9
 
 s
eq
ui
tu
r 
qu
od
 i
st
ae
 v
oc
es
, ‘
ho
m
o’
 e
t 
‘s
im
ili
tu
do
 
ho
m
in
is
’, 
ei
de
m
 im
po
ne
re
nt
ur
, e
t s
ic
 fo
re
t h
ae
c 
ve
ra
, ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 i
f 
ne
ce
ss
ar
ily
 a
 n
ou
n 
w
er
e 
im
po
se
d 
on
to
 a
n 
af
fe
ct
io
n,
 n
am
el
y 
on
to
 a
 si
m
ili
tu
de
 o
f a
 th
in
g,
 th
is
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
tru
e,
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 i
s 
a 
si
m
ili
tu
de
 e
xi
st
in
g 
in
 t
he
 m
in
d 
of
 a
 
hu
m
an
’, 
si
nc
e 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
si
gn
ify
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
g 
en
tir
el
y.
 F
or
 th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
do
ub
t b
ut
 th
at
 th
is
 u
tte
ra
nc
e,
 
‘s
im
ili
tu
de
 o
f 
a 
hu
m
an
’ 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 s
im
ili
tu
de
 o
f 
a 
hu
m
an
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
if 
th
is
 n
ou
n,
 ‘h
um
an
’, 
w
er
e 
to
 si
gn
ify
 a
 si
m
ili
tu
de
 
of
 a
 h
um
an
, 
it 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 t
he
se
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
, ‘
hu
m
an
’ 
an
d 
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3  ‘
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15
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ne
m
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A
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15
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si
m
ili
tu
do
 h
om
in
is
’, 
qu
od
 e
st
 fa
ls
um
.  
 
‘s
im
ili
tu
de
 o
f 
a 
hu
m
an
’, 
ar
e 
im
po
se
d 
on
to
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
g,
 
an
d 
so
 t
hi
s 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
tru
e,
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 i
s 
a 
si
m
ili
tu
de
 o
f 
a 
hu
m
an
’, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 fa
ls
e.
 
 
 
 
Se
cu
nd
o 
m
od
o 
di
co
 
qu
od
 
no
m
in
a 
et
 
ve
rb
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
, q
ui
a 
pa
ss
io
 a
ni
m
ae
 <
es
t>
16
0  
ill
ud
 m
ed
ia
nt
e 
qu
o 
no
m
en
 si
gn
ifi
ca
t r
em
 e
xt
ra
, q
ui
a 
no
m
en
 n
on
 im
po
ni
tu
r n
is
i 
re
i 
no
ta
e,
 e
t r
es
 n
ot
a 
no
n 
es
t 
ni
si
 {
pr
o}
16
1  
si
m
ili
tu
di
ne
m
 e
iu
s 
{e
xi
st
en
te
}1
62
 i
n 
an
im
a.
 U
nd
e 
si
cu
t 
in
 a
ct
u 
in
te
lli
ge
nd
i 
se
 
ha
be
nt
 
is
ta
 
tri
a,
 <
sc
ili
ce
t>
16
3  
in
te
lle
ct
us
, 
re
s 
in
te
lle
ct
a,
 
et
 
si
m
ili
tu
do
 r
ei
 i
n 
an
im
a,
 <
et
>1
64
 s
ic
 i
st
a 
tri
a 
se
 h
ab
en
t 
in
 
{m
od
o}
16
5  
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
i, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
vo
x 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ns
 
[r
em
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
m
]1
66
, 
re
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
, 
et
 p
as
si
o 
re
i 
in
 a
ni
m
a.
 U
nd
e 
si
cu
t 
si
m
ili
tu
do
 
re
i 
in
 
an
im
a 
no
n 
es
t 
ill
ud
 
qu
od
 
pr
im
o 
in
te
lli
gi
tu
r 
[p
er
 v
oc
em
 ta
nq
ua
m
 il
lu
d 
cu
i v
ox
 p
rim
o 
im
po
ni
tu
r 
se
d 
ill
ud
 e
st
 m
ed
ia
nt
e 
qu
o 
re
s 
ex
tra
 in
te
lli
gi
tu
r]
16
7 , 
si
c 
pa
ss
io
 
an
im
ae
 n
on
 e
st
 i
llu
d 
qu
od
 p
rim
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
r 
pe
r 
vo
ce
m
 
ta
nq
ua
m
 i
llu
d 
cu
i 
vo
x 
im
po
ni
tu
r 
<s
ed
 e
st
 i
llu
d 
m
ed
ia
nt
e 
qu
o 
re
s 
ex
tra
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
ur
 ta
nq
ua
m
 il
lu
d 
cu
i v
ox
 im
po
ni
tu
r>
16
8 . 
Et
 
di
co
 {
ill
ud
}1
69
 
 lo
qu
en
do
 d
e 
no
m
in
ib
us
 p
rim
ae
 in
te
nt
io
ni
s 
qu
od
 
ill
a 
no
n 
im
po
ni
tu
r 
pr
im
o 
ad
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
du
m
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
, 
I 
sa
y 
th
at
 n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 v
er
bs
 s
ig
ni
fy
 a
ff
ec
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
 in
 
th
e 
se
co
nd
 w
ay
, b
ec
au
se
 a
n 
af
fe
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
so
ul
 is
 th
at
 b
y 
w
ho
se
 m
ed
ia
tio
n 
a 
no
un
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
a 
th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
, 
be
ca
us
e 
a 
no
un
 i
s 
no
t 
im
po
se
d 
ex
ce
pt
 o
n 
a 
kn
ow
n 
th
in
g,
 
an
d 
a 
th
in
g 
is
 n
ot
 k
no
w
n 
un
le
ss
 b
y 
a 
si
m
ili
tu
de
 o
f i
t e
xi
st
in
g 
in
 t
he
 s
ou
l. 
H
en
ce
, j
us
t 
as
 i
n 
an
 a
ct
 o
f 
th
in
ki
ng
 t
he
re
 a
re
 
th
re
e 
el
em
en
ts
 –
 t
he
 i
nt
el
le
ct
, 
th
e 
th
in
g 
th
ou
gh
t, 
an
d 
a 
si
m
ili
tu
de
 o
f 
th
e 
th
in
g 
in
 th
e 
so
ul
 –
 s
o 
to
o 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
th
re
e 
el
em
en
ts
 i
n 
an
 a
ct
 o
f 
si
gn
ify
in
g,
 n
am
el
y,
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ed
 t
hi
ng
, 
th
e 
th
in
g 
si
gn
ifi
ed
, 
an
d 
an
 
af
fe
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
th
in
g 
in
 th
e 
so
ul
. H
en
ce
 ju
st
 a
s 
a 
si
m
ili
tu
de
 
of
 a
 t
hi
ng
 i
n 
th
e 
so
ul
 i
s 
no
t 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
pr
im
ar
ily
 
un
de
rs
to
od
, s
o 
to
o 
an
 a
ff
ec
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
so
ul
 is
 n
ot
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 
is
 p
rim
ar
ily
 s
ig
ni
fie
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
an
 u
tte
ra
nc
e,
 a
s 
th
at
 to
 w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
is
 im
po
se
d,
 b
ut
 it
 is
 th
at
 b
y 
w
ho
se
 m
ed
ia
tio
n 
th
e 
th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 is
 si
gn
ifi
ed
, a
s t
ha
t o
nt
o 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
is
 im
po
se
d.
 A
nd
 I
 s
ay
 th
is
 s
pe
ak
in
g 
ab
ou
t n
am
es
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be
ne
 t
am
en
 e
st
 p
os
si
bi
le
 q
uo
d 
al
iq
uo
d 
no
m
en
 <
qu
od
>1
70
of
 
fir
st
 
in
te
nt
io
n 
w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
no
t 
pr
im
ar
ily
 
im
po
se
d 
to
 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
af
fe
ct
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
so
ul
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
it 
ca
n 
ha
pp
en
 
th
at
 s
om
e 
no
un
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
an
 a
ff
ec
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 s
ou
l, 
su
ch
 a
s 
na
m
es
 o
f 
se
co
nd
 i
nt
en
tio
n,
 a
nd
 a
ls
o 
no
un
s 
of
 t
hi
s 
so
rt,
 
‘u
tte
ra
nc
es
’, 
‘a
ff
ec
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
so
ul
’, 
‘s
im
ili
tu
de
 o
f a
 th
in
g 
in
 
th
e 
so
ul
’, 
an
d 
so
 o
n 
fo
r s
im
ila
r c
as
es
. 
 
si
gn
ifi
ce
t p
as
si
on
em
 a
ni
m
ae
, u
t n
om
in
a 
se
cu
nd
ae
 in
te
nt
io
ni
s 
et
 
hu
iu
sm
od
i, 
‘v
oc
es
’, 
‘p
as
si
o 
an
im
ae
’, 
‘s
im
ili
tu
do
 r
ei
 in
 a
ni
m
a’
 
et
 si
c 
de
 si
m
ili
bu
s. 
  
 
 
 
B
oe
th
iu
s 
ta
m
en
 d
ic
it 
hi
c 
qu
od
 v
ox
 n
on
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 p
rim
o 
re
m
 
ex
tra
 s
ed
 a
liq
ui
d 
in
 a
ni
m
a 
et
 e
x 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
i 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
re
m
 
ex
tra
. S
ed
 c
re
do
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
si
c 
in
te
lli
gi
tu
r q
uo
d 
vo
x 
no
n 
pr
im
o 
{i
m
po
ni
tu
r}
17
1 . 
Si
 
ve
ro
 
pr
im
o 
{s
ig
ni
fic
at
}1
72
 
al
iq
ui
d 
<p
rim
o>
17
3  
in
 a
ni
m
a 
no
n 
es
t n
ec
es
se
 q
uo
d 
si
gn
ifi
ce
t [
ill
ud
]1
74
 
ta
nq
ua
m
 i
llu
d 
cu
i 
im
po
ni
tu
r 
pr
im
o,
 s
ed
 t
an
qu
am
 i
llu
d 
qu
od
 
pr
im
o 
m
ov
et
 
in
te
lle
ct
um
 
ad
 
im
po
ne
nd
um
 
{n
om
en
}1
75
 
 
re
i 
in
te
lle
ct
ae
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
B
oe
th
iu
s 
sa
ys
 h
er
e 
th
at
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
do
es
 n
ot
 
si
gn
ify
 p
rim
ar
ily
 a
 th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 b
ut
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 in
 
th
e 
so
ul
, 
an
d 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 t
hi
ng
 o
ut
si
de
 t
he
 s
ou
l 
on
ly
 a
s 
a 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e.
 B
ut
 I
 b
el
ie
ve
 th
at
 w
e 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
el
ie
ve
 th
at
 
an
 u
tte
ra
nc
e 
do
es
 n
ot
 p
rim
ar
ily
 s
ig
ni
fy
 a
 th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 a
s 
th
at
 t
o 
w
hi
ch
 i
t 
is
 i
m
po
se
d.
 M
or
eo
ve
r, 
if 
an
 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
w
er
e 
to
 p
rim
ar
ily
 s
ig
ni
fy
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 in
 th
e 
so
ul
, i
t 
is
 n
ot
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 t
ha
t 
it 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
s 
th
at
 t
o 
w
hi
ch
 i
t 
is
 
im
po
se
d 
pr
im
ar
ily
, b
ut
 a
s 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 p
rim
ar
ily
 m
ov
es
 t
he
 
in
te
lle
ct
 t
o 
im
po
si
ng
 a
 u
tte
ra
nc
e 
on
 a
 t
hi
ng
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
th
ou
gh
t. 
 
 
 
Et
 q
ue
m
ad
m
od
um
 n
ec
 l
itt
er
ae
 s
un
t 
om
ni
bu
s 
ea
ed
em
 s
ic
 
ne
c 
ea
ed
em
 v
oc
es
. 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ae
c 
es
t 
se
cu
nd
a 
pa
rs
 h
ui
us
 p
ar
tis
 i
n 
qu
ae
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 p
on
it 
di
ve
rs
ita
te
m
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
or
um
 s
ig
no
ru
m
 i
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
o,
 s
ci
lic
et
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
17
0  B
 
17
1  ‘
si
gn
ifi
ca
t r
em
 e
xt
ra
 ta
m
qu
am
 il
lu
d 
cu
i i
m
po
ni
tu
r’
: A
, B
 
17
2  ‘
si
gn
af
ic
et
’: 
B
 
17
3  B
 
17
4  B
 
17
5  ‘
vo
ce
m
’: 
B
 
 
  
398 
no
m
in
um
 e
t v
er
bo
ru
m
 p
ro
la
to
ru
m
 e
t s
cr
ip
to
ru
m
 e
t p
as
si
on
um
 
an
im
ae
. E
t 
in
te
nd
it 
ta
le
m
 d
iv
er
si
ta
te
m
 q
uo
d 
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 
pr
ol
at
a 
et
 s
cr
ip
ta
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 e
t 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
na
tu
ra
lit
er
, 
et
 
in
te
nd
it 
hi
c 
pr
ob
ar
e 
is
ta
s 
co
nc
lu
si
on
es
. P
rim
a 
es
t q
uo
d 
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 sc
rip
ta
 e
t p
ro
la
ta
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
, e
t 
id
em
 i
nt
el
lig
en
te
r 
de
 e
nu
nc
ia
tio
ne
. 
Et
 h
ic
 e
st
 c
on
cl
us
io
 p
rim
a 
hu
iu
s 
lib
ri,
 q
ui
 p
ro
ba
tu
r 
si
c.
 I
lla
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
id
em
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
pu
d 
om
ne
s, 
se
d 
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 p
ro
la
ta
 e
t 
sc
rip
ta
 n
on
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
ap
ud
 
om
ne
s. 
Er
go
, e
t c
et
er
a.
 D
e 
ha
c 
ig
itu
r r
at
io
ne
 in
nu
itu
r  
m
in
or
 in
 
lit
te
ra
 c
um
 d
ic
itu
r 
qu
em
ad
m
od
um
  
ne
c 
lit
te
re
, 
ho
c 
es
t, 
qu
em
ad
m
od
um
 l
itt
er
ae
 s
cr
ip
ta
e 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 i
de
m
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s, 
si
c 
ne
c 
vo
ce
s 
pr
ol
at
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 i
de
m
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s. 
U
nd
e 
la
tin
i g
ra
ec
i e
t h
eb
ra
ei
 h
ab
en
t d
iv
er
sa
s 
lit
te
ra
s 
et
 d
iv
er
sa
 
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 p
ro
la
ta
 e
t s
cr
ip
ta
. U
nd
e 
qu
od
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
ur
 p
er
 
al
iq
uo
d 
no
m
en
 
sc
rip
ut
m
 
ve
l 
pr
ol
at
um
 
ap
ud
 
gr
ae
co
s 
no
n 
si
gn
fic
at
ur
 p
er
 id
em
 a
pu
d 
la
tin
os
. 
 
 
 
Q
uo
ru
m
 a
ut
em
  h
ae
 p
ri
m
or
um
 su
nt
 n
ot
ae
 e
ae
de
m
 o
m
ni
bu
s 
an
im
ae
 <
k3
vb
> 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
su
nt
 e
t q
uo
ru
m
 h
ae
 s
im
ili
tu
di
ne
s 
re
s e
st
 e
ae
de
m
. 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ae
c 
es
t 
se
cu
nd
a 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
qu
am
 i
nt
en
di
t 
qu
ae
 e
st
 s
ec
un
da
 
hu
iu
s 
lib
ri,
 s
ci
lic
et
 q
uo
d 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t i
ps
as
 re
s 
na
tu
ra
lit
er
, q
ua
e 
pr
ob
at
ur
 s
ic
. I
lla
 q
ua
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 i
de
m
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s 
ill
ud
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
na
tu
ra
lit
er
. 
Se
d 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 i
de
m
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s. 
Er
go
, e
t 
ce
te
ra
. D
e 
is
ta
 r
at
io
ne
 
in
nu
itu
r 
m
in
or
 i
n 
te
xt
u 
cu
m
 d
ic
itu
r 
qu
od
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
 
su
nt
 o
m
ni
bu
s 
ea
ed
em
, s
ci
lic
et
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t i
de
m
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s, 
si
cu
t 
re
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
e 
pe
r 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
su
nt
 e
ae
de
m
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s 
se
cu
nd
um
 s
pe
ci
es
. 
N
on
 n
am
 s
un
t 
ea
ed
em
 r
es
 n
um
er
o 
ap
ud
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om
ne
s 
se
d 
se
cu
nd
um
 s
pe
ci
es
 s
un
t 
ea
ed
em
 r
es
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s 
na
tio
ne
s. 
Ite
m
 t
ex
tu
s, 
Q
uo
ru
m
 a
ut
em
 p
ri
m
or
um
, 
ex
po
ni
tu
r 
tri
pl
ic
ite
r. 
U
no
 m
od
o 
pr
o 
re
bu
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tis
 p
er
 p
as
si
on
es
 
an
im
ae
, s
ic
 q
uo
d 
‘p
rim
or
um
’ d
ic
at
 o
rd
in
em
 re
ru
m
 a
d 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
et
 
ad
 
vo
ce
s 
pr
ol
at
as
 
et
 
sc
rip
ta
s, 
qu
ae
 
re
s 
su
nt
 
pr
io
re
s 
pa
ss
io
ni
bu
s 
an
im
ae
 e
t 
vo
ci
bu
s 
sc
rip
tis
 e
t 
pr
ol
at
is
, e
t 
tu
nc
 e
st
 
se
ns
us
: 
ha
ec
 p
as
si
on
es
 s
eu
 s
im
ili
tu
di
ne
s 
re
ru
m
 p
rim
ar
um
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
pr
im
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
ru
m
 p
er
 p
as
si
on
es
 v
el
 s
im
pl
ic
ite
r 
pr
im
ar
um
, 
qu
ia
 s
un
t 
pr
io
re
s 
pa
ss
io
ni
bu
s 
et
 v
oc
ib
us
 q
uo
ru
m
 
pr
im
or
um
, s
ci
lic
et
 q
ua
ru
m
 r
er
um
 p
rim
ar
um
 s
im
ili
tu
di
ne
s 
su
nt
 
ea
ed
em
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s 
re
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
e,
 s
in
e 
re
s 
qu
ar
um
 h
ae
 s
un
t 
si
m
ili
tu
di
ne
s 
su
nt
 o
m
ni
bu
s 
ea
ed
em
, h
oc
 e
st
, p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
 
qu
ae
 s
un
t 
si
gn
a 
re
ru
m
 p
rim
ar
um
 s
un
t 
om
ni
bu
s 
ea
ed
em
. A
lio
 
m
od
o 
po
te
st
 e
xp
on
i 
de
 p
as
si
on
ib
us
 a
ni
m
ae
, e
t 
ho
c 
du
pl
ic
ite
r. 
U
no
 m
od
o 
qu
od
 ‘
pr
im
or
um
’ 
di
ca
t 
or
di
ne
m
 r
er
um
 p
ro
la
ta
ru
m
 
ad
 
an
im
ae
 
pa
ss
io
ne
s. 
A
lio
 
m
od
o 
qu
od
 
‘p
rim
or
um
’ 
di
ca
t 
or
di
ne
m
 p
as
si
on
um
 a
ni
m
ae
 a
d 
re
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ta
s 
pr
e 
pa
ss
io
ne
s. 
Pr
im
us
 s
en
su
s 
es
t 
is
te
: 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
 q
ua
ru
m
 p
as
si
on
um
 
ha
e,
 s
ci
lic
et
 v
oc
es
 p
ro
la
ta
e 
pr
im
or
um
, 
ho
c 
es
t, 
pr
im
o 
su
nt
 
no
ta
e,
 h
ae
 p
as
si
on
es
 s
un
t 
ea
ed
em
, h
oc
 e
st
, i
de
m
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
, e
t s
ic
 ‘
pr
io
ru
m
’ 
di
ci
t o
rd
in
em
 te
ne
tu
r 
ad
ve
rb
al
ite
r. 
Se
cu
nd
us
 s
en
su
s 
es
t i
st
e,
 s
ci
lic
et
 q
uo
d 
‘p
rio
ru
m
’ d
ic
it 
or
di
ne
m
 
pa
ss
io
nu
m
 a
ni
m
ae
 a
d 
ip
sa
s 
re
s, 
et
 e
st
 i
st
e:
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
 
qu
ae
 s
un
t 
pr
im
ae
 i
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
o 
qu
or
um
 p
rim
or
um
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
qu
ar
um
 p
rim
ar
um
 p
as
si
on
um
 a
ni
m
ae
 i
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
o 
re
s 
ha
e 
vo
ce
s, 
sc
ili
ce
t n
om
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
, s
un
t n
ot
ae
. H
ae
 p
as
si
on
es
 s
un
t 
om
ni
bu
s 
ea
ed
em
, h
oc
 e
st
, i
de
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
ap
ud
 o
m
ne
s. 
H
oc
 
es
t, 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 p
rim
ae
 i
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
o 
re
s  
qu
ar
um
 p
as
si
on
um
 n
om
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 s
un
t 
no
ta
e 
su
nt
  
ea
ed
em
 
ap
ud
 o
m
ne
s, 
ho
c 
es
t, 
id
em
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
pu
d 
om
ne
s, 
et
 in
te
lli
go
 
qu
od
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
 s
un
t 
pr
im
ae
 i
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
o,
 q
ui
a 
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im
m
ed
ia
te
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t r
es
 q
ua
ru
m
 s
un
t s
im
ili
tu
di
ne
s, 
et
 n
om
in
a 
et
 
ve
rb
a 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
re
s 
im
m
ed
ia
te
 
se
d 
m
ed
ia
tib
us
 
pa
ss
io
ni
bu
s 
an
im
ae
, 
et
 
ha
ec
 
ex
po
si
tio
 
te
rti
a 
vi
de
tu
r 
m
ih
i 
m
el
iu
s. 
 
 
 
D
e 
hi
s 
qu
id
em
 d
ic
tu
m
 e
st
 in
 h
is
 q
ua
e 
di
ct
a 
su
nt
 d
e 
an
im
a.
 
A
lte
ri
us
 n
am
 e
st
 n
eg
oc
ii.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex
cu
sa
t s
e 
a 
di
lig
en
tio
ri 
ho
ru
m
 c
on
si
de
ra
tio
ne
, e
t d
ic
it 
qu
od
 d
e 
hi
s 
de
ce
m
 e
st
 in
 li
br
o 
de
 a
ni
m
a,
 s
ci
lic
et
 d
e 
pa
ss
io
ni
bu
s 
an
im
ae
 
qu
al
ite
r s
ig
ni
fic
an
t r
es
, e
t q
ua
lit
er
 su
nt
 si
m
ili
tu
di
ne
s r
er
um
. 
 
 
 
 
 
D
ub
ita
tu
r 
hi
c,
 q
ui
a 
no
n 
vi
de
tu
r 
qu
od
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
 s
un
t 
ea
ed
em
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s 
si
c 
di
ci
t 
hi
c 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
, 
qu
ia
 d
iv
er
si
 
ho
m
in
es
 d
iv
er
sa
s 
se
nt
en
tia
s 
ha
be
nt
 d
e 
ea
de
m
 r
e,
 s
ed
 s
en
te
nt
ia
 
se
u 
op
in
io
 p
as
si
o 
es
t a
ni
m
ae
. E
rg
o 
ap
ud
 d
iv
er
so
s 
su
nt
 d
iv
er
ae
 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
. I
te
m
 p
er
 v
oc
em
 e
qu
iv
oc
am
 p
ro
la
ta
m
 p
ot
es
t 
un
us
 c
on
ci
pe
re
 u
nu
m
 e
t 
al
iu
s 
al
iu
d.
 E
rg
o 
no
n 
su
nt
 e
ae
de
m
 
co
nc
ep
tio
ne
s 
ne
c 
pe
r 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 e
ae
de
m
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
 
ap
ud
 o
m
ne
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
d 
pr
im
um
 d
ic
en
du
m
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 p
er
 p
as
si
on
es
 
an
im
ae
 
in
te
lli
gi
t 
si
m
ili
tu
di
ne
s 
re
ru
m
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
si
m
pl
ic
es
 
co
nc
ep
tu
s r
ep
re
se
nt
an
te
s r
es
 e
xt
ra
, e
t p
er
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
 n
on
 
in
te
lli
gi
t 
se
nt
en
tia
m
 v
el
 o
pi
ni
on
em
 q
ua
e 
es
t 
de
 c
om
pl
ex
o.
 
N
un
c 
au
te
m
 p
ro
pr
ia
 s
im
ili
tu
do
 r
ei
 d
e 
qu
ae
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 h
ic
 
lo
qu
itu
r 
se
m
pe
r 
et
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s 
re
pr
es
en
ta
t 
re
m
 c
ui
us
 e
st
 
si
m
ili
tu
do
, 
si
c 
si
 e
ss
et
 v
er
a 
im
ag
o 
C
ae
sa
ris
, 
is
ta
 u
bi
cu
m
qu
e 
re
pr
es
en
ta
re
t C
ae
sa
re
m
, e
t n
on
 re
pr
es
en
ta
re
t i
n 
un
o 
lo
co
 u
nu
m
 
et
 in
 a
lio
 lo
co
 a
liu
m
, e
t s
ic
 e
st
 d
e 
pa
ss
io
ni
bu
s 
an
im
ae
, s
ci
lic
et
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qu
od
 i
de
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
et
 r
ep
re
se
nt
an
t 
ap
ud
 o
m
ne
s. 
U
nd
e 
pe
r 
pa
ss
io
ne
m
 a
ni
m
ae
 n
on
 i
nt
el
lig
it 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 o
pi
ni
on
em
, q
ui
a 
de
 
ea
de
m
 
re
 
di
ve
rs
i 
di
ve
rs
as
 
op
in
io
ne
s 
ha
be
nt
, 
se
d 
pe
r 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
 i
nt
el
lig
it 
si
m
pl
ic
es
 s
im
ili
tu
di
ne
s 
re
i. 
U
nd
e 
B
oe
th
iu
s 
vo
ca
t 
hi
c 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
 
si
m
pl
ic
es
 
co
nc
ep
tu
s 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 c
irc
a 
qu
os
 in
te
lle
ct
us
 n
un
qu
am
 d
ec
ep
itu
r. 
 
 
 
A
d 
se
cu
nd
am
 d
ic
en
du
m
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 n
on
 in
te
lli
gi
t h
ic
 
id
en
tit
at
em
 
pa
ss
io
ni
s 
se
u 
co
nc
ep
tu
s 
re
sp
ec
tu
m
 
vo
ci
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
is
 i
ta
 q
uo
d 
un
iu
s 
vo
ci
s 
si
t 
un
a 
co
nc
ep
tio
, 
qu
ia
 
ce
rtu
m
 
es
t 
qu
od
 
de
 
un
a 
vo
ce
 
po
ss
un
t 
es
se
 
di
ve
rs
ae
 
co
nc
ep
tio
ne
s, 
se
d 
pe
r 
ho
c 
qu
od
 d
ic
it 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
es
se
 e
as
de
m
, 
in
te
lli
gi
t 
id
en
tit
at
em
 p
as
si
on
um
 p
er
 c
om
pa
ra
tio
ne
m
 a
d 
re
s 
qu
ar
um
 s
un
t 
pa
ss
io
ne
s. 
Ea
ru
nd
em
 n
am
 r
er
um
 s
un
t 
ea
ed
em
 
pa
ss
io
ne
s a
pu
d 
om
ne
s, 
et
 si
c 
pa
ss
io
ne
s s
un
t e
ae
de
m
 it
a 
re
s s
un
t 
ea
ed
em
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s o
m
ne
s, 
si
cu
t d
ic
en
du
m
 e
st
 su
pe
riu
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
dh
uc
 
du
bi
ta
tu
r, 
qu
ia
 
hi
c 
ho
m
o 
et
 
ho
c 
an
im
al
 
eo
de
m
 
de
m
on
st
ra
to
 s
un
t 
ea
ed
em
 r
es
, e
t 
ta
m
en
 e
qo
ru
m
 s
un
t 
di
ve
rs
ae
 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
an
im
ae
 s
eu
 d
iv
er
si
 c
on
ce
pt
us
. 
Q
uo
d 
pa
te
t, 
qu
ia
 
al
iq
ui
s 
po
ss
et
 e
ss
e 
ce
rtu
s 
de
 h
om
in
e 
al
iq
uo
d 
qu
od
 h
oc
 e
st
 h
oc
 
an
im
al
, e
t 
in
ce
rtu
s 
et
 d
ub
iu
s 
qu
od
 s
it 
hi
c 
ho
m
o.
 N
am
 v
id
en
s 
ce
rtu
m
 h
om
in
em
 a
 r
em
ot
is
 v
en
ie
nt
em
, 
pr
iu
s 
co
gn
os
ci
t 
qu
od
 
ve
ni
en
s 
es
t h
oc
 a
ni
m
al
 q
ua
m
 q
uo
d 
ve
ni
en
s 
si
t h
ic
 h
om
o.
 E
rg
o 
ei
us
de
m
 r
ei
 n
on
 s
un
t 
ea
ed
em
 p
as
si
on
es
 a
ni
m
ae
 s
ed
 d
iv
er
sa
e.
 
C
on
fir
m
at
ur
, 
na
m
 v
id
en
s 
So
cr
at
es
 a
 r
em
ot
is
 h
ab
et
 c
on
ce
pt
us
 
de
 S
oc
ra
te
s, 
qu
od
 e
st
 h
oc
 a
ni
m
al
, e
t n
on
 q
uo
d 
es
t h
ic
 h
om
o.
 E
t 
<k
4r
a>
 e
xi
st
en
s 
iu
xt
a 
So
cr
at
em
 h
ab
en
s 
no
tit
ia
m
 d
e 
So
cr
at
e,
 
ha
be
t c
on
ce
pt
um
 q
uo
d 
es
t h
ic
 h
om
o,
 e
t t
am
en
 S
oc
ra
te
s 
es
t u
na
 
et
 e
ad
em
 r
es
 n
um
er
o.
 E
rg
o 
ei
us
de
m
 r
ei
 n
on
 s
un
t 
ea
ed
em
 
pa
ss
io
ne
s a
pu
d 
om
ne
s. 
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Sc
ie
nd
um
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
i 
es
t 
qu
od
 e
ad
em
 
pa
ss
io
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
ea
de
m
 s
im
ilt
ud
o 
re
i 
ap
ud
 q
uo
sc
um
qu
e 
fu
er
it 
se
m
pe
r 
es
t 
ea
de
m
, 
et
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
 i
de
m
, 
ta
m
en
 p
os
si
bi
le
 e
st
 
qu
od
 e
iu
sd
em
 r
ei
 s
in
t p
lu
re
s 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
se
u 
co
nc
ep
tu
s 
an
im
ae
, 
se
d 
qu
al
em
 i
st
or
um
 c
on
ce
pt
uu
m
 n
on
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
 i
de
m
 a
pu
d 
om
ne
s, 
qu
ia
 d
e 
ea
de
m
 r
e 
si
m
pl
ic
i 
po
ss
un
t 
di
ve
rs
i 
ho
m
in
es
 
ha
be
ri 
di
ve
rs
os
 c
on
ce
pt
us
, 
se
d 
is
te
 e
st
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
i 
qu
od
 id
em
 e
t u
nu
s 
co
nc
ep
tu
s 
ap
ud
 q
uo
sc
um
qu
e 
fu
er
it 
se
m
pe
r 
id
em
 
re
pr
es
en
ta
t. 
U
nd
e 
id
em
 
co
nc
ep
tu
s 
pr
op
riu
s 
no
n 
es
t 
di
ve
rs
ar
um
 r
er
um
, e
ad
em
 ta
m
en
 r
es
 p
os
su
nt
 h
ab
er
e 
co
nc
ep
tu
s 
di
ve
rs
os
. 
Se
d 
ill
ae
 p
as
si
on
es
 n
on
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
di
ve
rs
a 
ap
ud
 
di
ve
rs
os
 c
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
en
t 
na
tu
ra
lit
er
. 
U
nd
e 
ar
ug
m
en
tu
m
 n
on
 
pl
us
 c
on
cl
ud
it 
ni
si
 p
er
 e
iu
sd
em
 r
ei
 p
os
su
nt
 e
ss
e 
di
ve
rs
ae
 
pa
ss
io
ne
s 
se
u 
co
nc
ep
tu
s 
an
im
ae
, e
t n
on
 c
on
cl
ud
it 
qu
od
 e
ad
em
 
pa
ss
io
 d
iv
er
sa
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
, s
iv
e 
ap
ud
 d
iv
er
so
s 
si
ve
 a
pu
d 
eu
nd
em
, 
si
ve
 in
 e
od
em
 te
m
po
re
, s
iv
e 
in
 te
m
po
ris
 d
iv
er
si
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Es
t 
au
te
m
 q
ue
m
ad
m
od
um
 [
in
 a
ni
m
a 
al
iq
uo
tie
ns
 q
ui
de
m
 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 s
in
e 
ve
ro
 v
el
 f
al
so
, a
liq
uo
tie
ns
 a
ut
em
 c
um
 i
am
 
ne
ce
ss
e 
es
t 
ho
ru
m
 a
lte
ru
m
 in
es
se
, s
ic
 e
tia
m
 in
 v
oc
e.
 C
ir
ca
 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
m
 
en
im
 
et
 
di
vi
si
on
em
 
es
t 
fa
ls
ita
s 
ve
ri
ta
sq
ue
]1
76
 
. 
Ju
st
 a
s i
n 
th
e 
so
ul
 so
m
et
im
es
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 th
ou
gh
t i
s n
ei
th
er
 
tr
ue
 n
or
 f
al
se
, 
ot
he
rt
im
es
 w
ith
 n
ec
es
sit
y 
it 
is
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
os
e,
 s
o 
al
so
 in
 s
pe
ec
h.
 F
or
 fa
lsi
ty
 a
nd
 tr
ut
h 
ha
ve
 to
 d
o 
w
ith
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
di
vi
si
on
. 
 
 
 
H
ae
c 
es
t t
er
tia
 p
ar
s 
hu
iu
s 
ca
pi
ta
li 
in
 q
ua
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 o
st
en
di
t 
di
ve
rs
ita
te
m
 
in
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
o 
in
te
r 
vo
ce
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
es
 
ad
 
pl
ac
itu
m
, c
ui
us
m
od
i s
un
t n
om
en
, v
er
bu
m
 e
t e
nu
nc
ia
tio
, e
t h
ae
c 
es
t 
di
ve
rs
ita
s, 
qu
od
 a
liq
ua
 e
st
 v
ox
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 
 
Th
is
 is
 th
e 
th
ird
 p
ar
t o
f t
hi
s 
ch
ap
te
r, 
in
 w
hi
ch
 A
ris
to
tle
 s
et
s 
ou
t t
ha
t, 
am
on
g 
ut
te
ra
nc
es
 w
hi
ch
 s
ig
ni
fy
 c
on
ve
nt
io
na
lly
 (o
f 
w
hi
ch
 s
or
t 
ar
e 
no
un
s, 
ve
rb
s 
an
d 
st
at
em
en
ts
), 
on
e 
so
rt 
is
 a
 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
w
hi
ch
 is
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
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[q
ua
e]
17
7  
es
t 
si
gn
fic
at
iv
a 
ve
ri 
ve
l 
fa
ls
i, 
et
 a
liq
ua
 n
on
. 
Pr
im
o 
ig
itu
r 
os
te
nd
it 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 q
uo
d 
[a
liq
ua
 v
ox
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ad
 
pl
ac
itu
m
 e
st
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ve
ri 
ve
l 
fa
ls
i, 
et
]1
78
 {
al
iq
ua
 e
st
 v
ox
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 
pl
ac
itu
m
 
qu
ae
 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ve
ru
m
 
ne
c 
fa
ls
um
}1
79
, 
et
 s
ec
un
du
m
 h
oc
 p
ar
s 
is
ta
 p
ot
es
t 
di
vi
di
 i
n 
du
as
 
pa
rte
s. 
{S
ec
un
da
 in
ci
pi
t}
18
0  i
bi
: N
om
in
a 
ig
iti
ur
 ip
sa
. I
n 
pr
im
a 
<i
gi
tu
r>
18
1  p
ar
te
 d
ec
la
ra
t <
et
 d
et
er
m
in
at
>1
82
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 q
uo
d 
vo
x 
al
iq
ua
 si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 e
st
 si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ve
ri
 v
el
 
fa
ls
i, 
et
 a
liq
ua
 n
ec
 e
st
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ve
ri
 e
t 
fa
ls
i, 
et
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
te
rti
a 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
hu
iu
s 
lib
ri,
 [
qu
ae
]1
83
 p
ro
ba
tu
r 
si
c.
 S
ic
ut
 i
n 
in
te
lle
ct
u 
si
c 
es
t 
in
 v
oc
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
e 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 c
on
ce
pt
um
 
in
te
lle
ct
us
. 
H
ae
c 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
pa
te
t, 
[q
ui
a]
18
4  
si
gn
um
 d
ic
itu
r 
[p
ro
po
rti
on
ar
i 
et
]1
85
 
co
nf
or
m
ar
i 
si
gn
ifi
ca
to
, 
se
d 
vo
ce
s 
im
po
si
ta
e 
ad
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 
fo
rm
an
tu
r 
ad
 
ex
pr
im
en
du
m
 
co
nc
ep
tu
m
 m
en
tis
, 
et
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
 e
st
 q
ua
nd
oq
ue
 s
in
e 
ve
ro
 e
t 
si
ne
 fa
ls
o,
 e
t q
ua
nd
oq
ue
 e
st
 c
um
 v
er
o 
{e
t}
18
6  c
um
 fa
ls
o.
 Ig
itu
r 
si
c 
es
t 
de
 v
oc
e,
 q
ui
a 
qu
ae
da
m
 v
ox
 e
st
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ve
ri 
ve
l 
fa
ls
i, 
et
 q
ua
ed
am
 n
on
. 
In
te
lle
ct
us
 {
na
m
}1
87
 {
qu
an
do
qu
e}
18
8
of
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, 
an
d 
an
ot
he
r 
is
 n
ot
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 A
ris
to
tle
 f
irs
t s
et
s 
ou
t t
ha
t s
om
e 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
do
es
 n
ot
 s
ig
ni
fy
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, 
an
d 
on
 a
cc
ou
nt
 o
f 
th
is
, 
th
at
 p
ar
t 
ca
n 
be
 
di
vi
de
d 
in
to
 tw
o 
pa
rts
. (
Th
e 
se
co
nd
 b
eg
in
s 
in
 h
er
e:
 T
ho
se
 
na
m
es
, t
he
re
fo
re
). 
In
 th
e 
fir
st
 p
ar
t, 
A
ris
to
tle
 d
ec
la
re
s 
th
at
 
so
m
e 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
of
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
tru
e 
or
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
fa
ls
e,
 
an
d 
th
at
 
so
m
e 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
is
 n
ot
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
of
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, 
an
d 
th
is
 i
s 
th
e 
th
ird
 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 o
f 
th
is
 b
oo
k,
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
pr
ov
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
w
ay
. J
us
t a
s 
is
 th
e 
ca
se
 fo
r t
he
 in
te
lle
ct
, s
o 
to
o 
it 
is
 th
e 
ca
se
 
fo
r 
an
 u
tte
ra
nc
e 
co
nv
en
tio
na
lly
 s
ig
ni
fy
in
g 
a 
co
nc
ep
t o
f 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
. T
hi
s s
ta
te
m
en
t i
s c
le
ar
, b
ec
au
se
 a
 si
gn
 is
 sa
id
 to
 b
e 
co
nf
or
m
ed
 t
o 
its
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
e,
 b
ut
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 i
m
po
se
d 
to
 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
ar
e 
fo
rm
ed
 fo
r e
xp
re
ss
in
g 
a 
co
nc
ep
t o
f t
he
 m
in
d,
 
an
d 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 i
s 
so
m
et
im
es
 l
ac
ks
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 fa
ls
e,
 a
nd
 s
om
et
im
es
 it
 p
os
se
ss
es
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 tr
ue
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7  A
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17
8  B
 
17
9  ‘
no
n.
 S
ec
un
do
 o
st
en
di
t q
uo
d 
vo
x 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 e
st
 si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ve
ri 
et
 fa
ls
i, 
et
 v
ox
 si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 n
ec
 si
gn
ifi
ca
t v
er
um
 n
ex
 fa
ls
um
’: 
A
, ‘
al
iq
ua
 v
ox
 si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 n
ec
 si
gn
ifi
ca
t v
er
um
 n
ec
 fa
ls
um
’: 
B
 
18
0  ‘
in
 se
cu
nd
a 
ip
se
 o
st
en
di
t q
ua
e 
su
nt
 il
la
e 
vo
ce
s, 
et
 c
et
er
a’
: B
 
18
1  A
, B
 
18
2  B
 
18
3  A
 
18
4  B
 
18
5  A
, B
 
18
6  ‘
ve
l’:
 A
, ‘
si
ve
’: 
B
 
18
7  ‘
en
im
’: 
A
, B
 
18
8  ‘
qu
an
do
’: 
B
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co
m
po
ni
t 
re
s 
ad
in
vi
ce
m
 
ve
l 
di
vi
di
t 
<e
as
>1
89
 
ab
in
vi
ce
m
 
<e
st
>1
90
 c
um
 v
er
o 
ve
l f
al
so
, [
et
 q
ua
nd
oq
ue
 {
no
n}
19
1  c
om
po
ni
t 
ne
c 
di
vi
di
t 
<n
ec
 e
st
>1
92
 c
um
 v
er
o 
ne
c 
fa
ls
o]
19
3 . 
N
am
 c
irc
a 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
m
 e
t 
di
vi
si
on
em
 c
on
si
st
it 
ve
rit
as
 e
t 
fa
ls
ita
s, 
[u
t 
di
ci
t A
ris
to
te
le
s {
in
 p
ra
ed
ic
am
en
tis
 e
t t
er
tio
 d
e 
an
im
a}
19
4 ]
19
5
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
al
so
 i
t 
is
 t
he
 c
as
e 
w
ith
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 u
tte
ra
nc
e 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
of
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 tr
ue
 o
r s
om
et
hi
ng
 fa
ls
e,
 a
nd
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 o
ne
 is
 n
ot
. 
Fo
r 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 s
om
et
im
es
 c
om
bi
ne
s 
th
in
gs
 w
ith
 o
ne
 
an
ot
he
r 
or
 d
iv
id
es
 t
he
m
 f
ro
m
 o
ne
 a
no
th
er
 w
ith
 t
he
 r
es
ul
t 
th
at
 i
t 
po
ss
es
se
s 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, 
an
d 
so
m
et
im
es
 i
t 
do
es
 n
ot
 c
om
bi
ne
 t
he
m
 w
ith
 o
ne
 a
no
th
er
 o
r 
di
vi
de
 th
em
 fr
om
 o
ne
 a
no
th
er
 w
ith
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
th
at
 it
 d
oe
s n
ot
 
po
ss
es
s 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
. 
Fo
r 
tru
th
 a
nd
 
fa
ls
ity
 c
on
si
st
 in
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
di
vi
si
on
, a
s 
A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
in
 th
e 
Ca
te
go
ri
es
 a
nd
 in
 th
e 
th
ird
 b
oo
k 
of
 th
e 
D
e 
An
im
a.
 
. 
 
 
 
Sc
ie
nd
um
 e
st
 [
hi
c]
19
6  
qu
od
 h
ae
c 
pr
ob
at
io
 n
on
 te
ne
t s
ol
um
 p
er
 
lo
cu
m
 a
 si
m
ili
, s
ed
 <
et
ia
m
>1
97
 a
rg
um
en
do
 a
 c
au
sa
 a
d 
ef
fe
ct
um
. 
N
am
 
co
nc
ep
tio
ne
s 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 
su
nt
 
ca
us
ae
 
fo
rm
at
io
ni
s 
et
 
im
po
si
tio
ni
s 
vo
ci
s. 
N
am
 v
oc
es
 p
ro
fe
ru
nt
ur
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 
{c
on
ce
pt
us
}1
98
 m
en
tis
, 
et
 i
de
o 
ex
 h
oc
 q
uo
d 
co
nc
ep
tio
ne
s 
m
en
tis
 q
ua
nd
oq
ue
 s
un
t 
cu
m
 v
er
o 
ve
l 
<q
ua
nd
oq
ue
 c
um
>1
99
 
 
fa
ls
o,
 e
t q
ua
nd
qu
e 
<s
in
e 
ve
ro
 e
t q
ua
nd
oq
ue
 s
in
e 
fa
ls
o,
 s
eq
ui
tu
r 
qu
od
 
vo
ce
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
ae
 
qu
an
do
qu
e 
su
nt
 
cu
m
 
ve
ro
 
et
 
W
e 
m
us
t k
no
w
 th
at
 th
is
 p
ro
of
 d
oe
s 
no
t h
ol
d 
on
ly
 f
ro
m
 a
n 
ar
gu
m
en
t f
ro
m
 s
im
ila
rit
y,
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
by
 a
rg
ui
ng
 fr
om
 c
au
se
 to
 
ef
fe
ct
. 
Fo
r 
co
nc
ep
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 a
re
 t
he
 c
au
se
 o
f 
fo
rm
in
g 
an
d 
im
po
si
ng
 a
n 
ut
te
ra
nc
e,
 f
or
 u
tte
ra
nc
es
 a
re
 
ut
te
re
d 
fo
r 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
co
nc
ep
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
m
in
d,
 a
nd
 t
he
re
fo
re
 
fr
om
 th
is
, t
ha
t c
on
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
m
in
d 
so
m
et
im
es
 a
re
 tr
ue
 
or
 fa
ls
e,
 a
nd
 s
om
et
im
es
 n
ot
, i
t i
s 
al
so
 a
rg
ue
d 
fr
om
 c
au
se
 to
 
ef
fe
ct
. 
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m
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qu
an
do
qu
e 
cu
m
 f
al
so
, 
et
 q
ua
nd
oq
ue
>2
00
 
 n
on
, 
et
 a
rg
ui
tu
r 
a 
ca
us
a 
ad
 e
ff
ec
tu
m
. 
 
 
C
irc
a 
ill
ud
 
di
ct
um
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
i, 
<s
ci
lic
et
>2
01
 
ci
rc
a 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
m
 e
t d
iv
isi
on
em
 c
on
si
st
it 
ve
ri
ta
s 
et
 fa
ls
ita
s, 
es
t 
sc
ie
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
ve
rit
as
 u
no
 m
od
o 
es
t a
de
qu
at
io
 re
i a
d 
vi
rtu
te
m
 
co
gn
os
ce
nt
em
, e
t a
lio
 m
od
o 
es
t a
de
qu
at
io
 v
irt
ut
is
 c
og
no
sc
en
tis
 
{u
t}
20
2  
in
te
lle
ct
us
 a
d 
<i
ps
am
>2
03
 r
em
. P
rim
o 
m
od
o 
ve
rit
as
 e
st
 
id
em
 q
uo
d 
co
nf
or
m
ita
s r
ei
 a
d 
vi
rtu
te
m
 c
og
no
sc
en
te
m
 p
er
 q
ua
m
 
m
an
ife
st
at
 v
el
 n
at
a 
<e
st
>2
04
 m
an
ife
st
ra
re
 s
e 
in
te
lle
ct
ui
 t
al
em
 
qu
al
is
 e
st
, 
et
 s
ic
 v
er
ita
s 
no
n 
es
t 
al
iu
d 
qu
am
 c
on
fo
rm
ita
s 
{a
pp
ar
en
tia
e}
20
5  
re
i 
ad
 s
ua
m
 e
xi
st
en
tia
m
. 
Et
 t
al
is
 v
er
ita
s 
es
t 
du
pl
ex
, 
si
cu
t 
vi
rtu
s 
co
gn
iti
va
 e
st
 d
up
le
x,
 s
ci
lic
et
 c
re
at
a 
et
 
in
cr
ea
ta
. V
er
ita
s 
qu
ae
 e
st
 c
on
fo
rm
ita
s 
re
i <
ap
pr
eh
en
sa
e>
20
6  a
d 
vi
rtu
te
m
 c
og
ni
tiv
a 
in
cr
ea
ta
m
, s
ci
lic
et
 a
d 
in
te
lle
ct
um
 d
iv
in
um
, 
{e
st
 i
n}
20
7  
om
ni
 e
nt
e 
ta
m
 c
om
pl
ex
o 
qu
am
 i
nc
om
pl
ex
o,
 q
ui
a 
{q
ua
el
ib
et
}2
08
 r
es
 e
st
 n
at
a 
m
an
ife
st
ar
e 
se
 i
nt
el
le
ct
ui
 d
iv
in
o 
ta
le
m
 q
ua
lis
 e
st
, c
um
 in
te
lle
ct
us
 d
iv
in
us
 n
on
 p
os
si
t <
ci
rc
a>
20
9  
al
iq
ua
m
 re
m
 d
ec
ip
i, 
et
 v
er
um
 q
uo
d 
{d
er
iv
at
ur
}2
10
 
 a
 v
er
ita
te
 s
ic
 
ac
ce
pt
a 
co
nv
er
tu
r c
um
 e
nt
e,
 e
t d
e 
is
ta
 v
er
ita
te
 d
ic
it 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 
se
cu
nd
o 
m
et
ap
hy
si
ca
e,
 q
uo
d 
un
um
qu
oq
ue
 e
ns
 si
cu
t s
e 
ha
be
t a
d 
C
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
is
 d
ic
tu
m
 o
f 
A
ris
to
tle
, 
na
m
el
y 
tr
ut
h 
an
d 
fa
ls
ity
 h
av
e 
to
 d
o 
w
ith
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
di
vi
si
on
, w
e 
m
us
t 
kn
ow
 th
at
 tr
ut
h 
in
 o
ne
 w
ay
 is
 th
e 
ad
eq
ua
tio
n 
of
 a
 th
in
g 
to
 
th
e 
po
w
er
 o
f a
 c
og
ni
tiv
e 
ag
en
t, 
an
d 
in
 a
no
th
er
 w
ay
 it
 is
 th
e 
ad
eq
ua
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
po
w
er
 o
f t
he
 c
og
ni
tiv
e 
ag
en
t, 
su
ch
 a
s 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, t
o 
a 
th
in
g.
 In
 th
e 
fir
st
 w
ay
, t
ru
th
 is
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
as
 th
e 
co
nf
or
m
ity
 o
f a
 th
in
g 
to
 a
 c
og
ni
zi
ng
 p
ow
er
 th
ro
ug
h 
w
hi
ch
 it
 
m
an
ife
st
s 
or
 is
 n
at
ur
al
ly
 s
ui
te
d 
to
 m
an
ife
st
 it
se
lf 
th
at
 it
 is
 o
f 
su
ch
 
as
 
so
rt,
 
an
d 
so
 
tru
th
 
is
 
no
th
in
g 
ot
he
r 
th
an
 
th
e 
co
nf
or
m
ity
 o
f a
n 
ap
pe
ar
an
ce
 o
f a
 th
in
g 
to
 it
s o
w
n 
ex
is
te
nc
e.
 
Th
is
 so
rt 
of
 tr
ut
h 
is
 o
f t
w
o 
so
rts
, j
us
t a
s a
 c
og
ni
tiv
e 
po
w
er
 is
 
of
 tw
o 
so
rts
, n
am
el
y 
cr
ea
te
d 
an
d 
un
cr
ea
te
d.
 T
ru
th
 w
hi
ch
 is
 
th
e 
co
nf
or
m
ity
 o
f a
 th
in
g 
to
 th
e 
un
cr
ea
te
d 
co
gn
iti
ve
 p
ow
er
, 
na
m
el
y 
to
 th
e 
di
vi
ne
 in
te
lle
ct
, i
s 
in
 e
ve
ry
 b
ei
ng
, r
eg
ar
dl
es
s 
of
 w
he
th
er
 i
t 
is
 c
om
pl
ex
 o
r 
no
n-
co
m
pl
ex
, 
be
ca
us
e 
ea
ch
 
th
in
g 
is
 n
at
ur
al
ly
 s
ui
te
d 
to
 m
an
ife
st
 it
se
lf 
th
e 
so
rt 
of
 th
in
g 
th
at
 i
t 
is
 t
o 
th
e 
di
vi
ne
 i
nt
el
le
ct
, 
si
nc
e 
th
e 
di
vi
ne
 i
nt
el
le
ct
 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
de
ce
iv
ed
 b
y 
an
yt
hi
ng
, a
nd
 a
 tr
ue
 th
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 is
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{e
nt
ita
te
m
}2
11
, i
ta
 s
e 
ha
be
t a
d 
ve
rit
at
em
, e
t v
er
ita
s 
si
c 
ac
ce
pt
a 
no
n 
ha
be
t f
al
su
m
 {
pr
o 
su
o 
op
po
si
to
}2
12
. V
er
ita
s a
ut
em
 q
ua
e 
es
t 
ad
eq
ua
tio
 r
ei
 a
d 
vi
rtu
te
m
 c
og
ni
tiv
am
 c
re
at
am
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
ad
 
in
te
lle
ct
um
 n
os
tru
m
, e
st
 il
lu
d 
pe
r 
qu
od
 r
es
 <
es
t>
21
3  
na
ta
 d
e 
se
 
fa
ce
re
 v
er
am
 e
st
im
at
io
ne
m
, 
et
 i
st
o 
m
od
o 
de
na
riu
s 
 h
ab
en
s 
de
bi
ta
m
 f
or
m
am
 e
t 
de
bi
ta
m
 m
at
er
ia
m
 d
en
ar
ii 
di
ci
tu
r 
ve
ru
s 
de
na
riu
s. 
Se
d 
de
na
riu
s 
ha
be
ns
 d
eb
ita
m
 fo
rm
am
 <
de
na
rii
>2
14
 e
t 
no
n 
de
bi
ta
m
 m
at
er
ia
m
 d
ic
itu
r 
fa
ls
us
 d
en
ar
iu
s, 
ut
 d
en
ar
iu
s 
cu
pr
eu
s 
[e
t a
er
eu
s]
21
5  v
el
 p
lu
m
be
us
, q
ui
a 
de
 s
e 
na
tu
s 
es
t f
ac
er
e 
fa
ls
am
 e
st
im
at
io
ne
m
. 
N
am
 u
nu
m
qu
oq
ue
 <
k4
rb
> 
<q
ua
e>
21
6  
ha
be
ns
 f
or
m
am
 {
ar
ge
nt
i}
21
7  
na
tu
m
 e
st
 f
ac
er
e 
de
 s
e 
[v
er
am
]2
18
 
es
tim
at
io
ne
m
 q
uo
d 
es
t a
rg
en
tu
m
 <
si
ve
 d
en
ar
iu
s 
ar
ge
nt
eu
s>
21
9 , 
et
 
id
eo
 
de
na
riu
s 
ha
be
ns
 
{v
er
i}
22
0  
de
na
rii
 
fig
ur
am
 
<s
iv
e 
fo
rm
am
>2
21
, 
et
 
no
n 
m
at
er
ia
m
 
de
bi
ta
m
 
{d
en
ar
ii}
22
2 , 
ut
 
m
at
er
ia
m
 p
lu
m
be
am
 e
t c
up
re
am
, e
st
 fa
ls
us
 d
en
ar
iu
s, 
qu
ia
 d
e 
se
 
fa
ci
t f
al
sa
m
 e
st
im
at
io
ne
m
. {
H
ae
c}
22
3  
au
te
m
 f
al
si
ta
s 
es
t s
ol
um
 
in
 
co
m
po
si
tis
 
ex
 
m
at
er
ia
 
et
 
fo
rm
a,
 
[e
t]2
24
de
riv
ed
 f
ro
m
 t
ru
th
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d 
in
 t
hi
s 
w
ay
 i
s 
co
nv
er
tib
le
 
w
ith
 b
ei
ng
. A
ris
to
tle
 s
pe
ak
s 
ab
ou
t t
ha
t s
or
t o
f 
tru
th
 in
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 b
oo
k 
of
 t
he
 M
et
ap
hy
si
cs
, 
w
he
n 
he
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 e
ac
h 
an
d 
ev
er
y 
be
in
g 
[e
ns
], 
ju
st
 a
s 
it 
is
 re
la
te
d 
to
 b
ei
ng
 [e
nt
ita
s]
, 
so
 to
o 
it 
is
 re
la
te
d 
to
 tr
ut
h,
 a
nd
 tr
ut
h 
ta
ke
n 
in
 th
is
 w
ay
 d
oe
s 
no
t h
av
e 
so
m
e 
fa
ls
e 
th
in
g 
fo
r 
its
 o
pp
os
ite
. H
ow
ev
er
, t
ru
th
 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
th
e 
ad
eq
ua
tio
n 
of
 a
 t
hi
ng
 t
o 
a 
cr
ea
te
d 
co
gn
iti
ve
 
po
w
er
, n
am
el
y 
to
 o
ur
 in
te
lle
ct
, i
s t
ha
t t
hr
ou
gh
 w
hi
ch
 a
 th
in
g 
is
 n
at
ur
al
ly
 s
ui
te
d 
to
 p
ro
du
ce
 a
 tr
ue
 e
st
im
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t i
ts
el
f, 
an
d 
in
 th
is
 w
ay
 a
 c
oi
n 
ha
vi
ng
 th
e 
fo
rm
 a
nd
 d
ue
 m
at
te
r o
f a
 
co
in
 is
 c
al
le
d 
a 
tru
e 
co
in
. B
ut
 a
 c
oi
n 
ha
vi
ng
 d
ue
 f
or
m
 b
ut
 
no
t d
ue
 m
at
te
r, 
su
ch
 a
s 
a 
co
pp
er
 o
r 
br
on
ze
 o
r 
le
ad
 c
oi
n,
 is
 
ca
lle
d 
a 
fa
ls
e 
co
in
, b
ec
au
se
 i
t 
is
 s
ui
te
d 
to
 p
ro
du
ce
 a
 f
al
se
 
es
tim
at
io
n 
of
 it
se
lf.
 F
or
 o
ne
 a
nd
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
g 
ha
vi
ng
 th
e 
fo
rm
 
of
 
si
lv
er
 
is
 
na
tu
ra
lly
 
su
ite
d 
to
 
pr
od
uc
e 
a 
tru
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
of
 i
ts
el
f 
th
at
 i
t 
is
 s
ilv
er
, 
an
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
a 
co
in
 
ha
vi
ng
 th
e 
fig
ur
e 
of
 a
 tr
ue
 c
oi
n 
bu
t n
ot
 th
e 
du
e 
m
at
te
r o
f a
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ilo
so
ph
us
 [i
n]
22
5  t
er
tio
 d
e 
an
im
a 
qu
od
 in
te
lle
ct
us
 c
irc
a 
qu
od
 
qu
id
 [e
st
]2
26
co
in
 (h
av
in
g 
in
st
ea
d,
 fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e,
 c
op
pe
r o
r b
ro
nz
e 
m
at
te
r)
 
is
 a
 f
al
se
 c
oi
n,
 b
ec
au
se
 i
t 
pr
od
uc
es
 a
 f
al
se
 e
st
im
at
io
n 
of
 
its
el
f. 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
hi
s 
fa
ls
ity
 is
 o
nl
y 
in
 th
e 
co
m
po
si
te
 o
ut
 o
f 
m
at
te
r 
an
d 
fo
rm
, a
nd
 th
er
ef
or
e 
A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
in
 b
oo
k 
3 
of
 
th
e 
D
e 
An
im
a 
th
at
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e 
“w
ha
t i
t i
s,”
 
na
m
el
y 
th
e 
si
m
pl
e 
qu
id
di
ty
 o
f a
 th
in
g,
 is
 a
lw
ay
s t
ru
e.
  
, s
ci
lic
et
 c
irc
a 
si
m
pl
ic
em
 q
ui
di
ta
te
m
 re
ru
m
 s
em
pe
r 
es
t v
er
us
.  
 
 
  
V
er
ita
s 
au
te
m
 s
ec
un
do
 m
od
o 
di
ct
a,
 s
ci
lic
et
 {
qu
ae
}2
27
 e
st
 
ad
eq
ua
tio
 v
irt
ut
is
 c
og
no
sc
en
tis
 <
sc
ili
ce
t i
nt
el
le
ct
us
>2
28
 a
d 
re
m
 
co
gn
os
ci
ta
m
, 
es
t 
in
 
vi
rtu
te
 
co
gn
os
ce
nt
e 
<s
ci
lic
et
 
in
 
ip
so
 
in
te
lle
ct
u>
22
9  
si
cu
t 
in
 s
ub
ie
ct
o,
 e
t 
ta
lis
 e
st
 d
up
le
x.
 <
Q
ui
a>
23
0  
qu
ae
da
m
 [
es
t]2
31
 c
om
pl
ex
a 
et
 q
ua
ed
am
 [
es
t]2
32
 i
nc
om
pl
ex
a.
 
V
er
ita
s 
in
co
m
pl
ex
a 
es
t 
[il
la
]2
33
 q
ua
e 
es
t 
ad
eq
ua
tio
 v
irt
ut
is
 
co
gn
os
ce
nt
is
 a
d 
re
m
 c
og
ni
ta
m
 [q
ua
e]
23
4  p
ot
es
t e
ss
e 
no
n 
so
lu
m
 
in
 i
nt
el
le
ct
u 
se
d 
et
ia
m
 i
n 
se
ns
u,
 e
t 
id
eo
 d
ic
it 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 i
n 
se
cu
nd
o 
de
 a
ni
m
a 
qu
od
 s
en
su
s 
re
sp
ec
tu
 p
ro
pr
ii 
ob
ie
ct
i s
em
pe
r 
es
t v
er
us
, h
oc
 e
st
, i
n 
m
ai
or
i p
ar
te
 e
st
 v
er
us
, q
ui
a 
in
 m
ai
or
i p
ar
te
 
se
ns
us
 c
on
fo
rm
at
ur
 o
bi
ec
to
 s
uo
 p
ro
pr
io
, e
t c
irc
a 
{i
llu
d}
23
5
 
 n
on
 
de
ci
pi
tu
r. 
V
er
ita
s 
au
te
m
 
co
m
pl
ex
a 
so
lu
m
 
es
t 
ci
rc
a 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
m
 e
t 
di
vi
si
on
em
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
, 
et
 d
e 
ha
c 
ve
rit
at
e 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
ru
th
 s
po
ke
n 
of
 i
n 
th
e 
se
co
nd
 w
ay
, n
am
el
y 
th
at
 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
n 
ad
eq
ua
tio
n 
of
 a
 p
ow
er
 o
f a
 c
og
ni
tiv
e 
ag
en
t t
o 
a 
co
gn
iz
ed
 t
hi
ng
, 
is
 i
n 
th
e 
po
w
er
 o
f 
th
e 
co
gn
iti
ve
 a
ge
nt
, 
na
m
el
y 
in
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, j
us
t a
s 
in
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
, a
nd
 it
 is
 o
f t
w
o 
ki
nd
s. 
A
 c
er
ta
in
 o
ne
 is
 c
om
pl
ex
, a
nd
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 o
ne
 is
 n
on
-
co
m
pl
ex
. N
on
-c
om
pl
ex
 tr
ut
h 
is
 th
e 
ad
eq
ua
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
po
w
er
 
of
 a
 c
og
ni
tiv
e 
ag
en
t t
o 
a 
th
in
g 
co
gn
iz
ed
, w
hi
ch
 c
an
 o
cc
ur
 
no
t 
on
ly
 i
n 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
in
 a
 s
en
se
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
in
 t
he
 s
ec
on
d 
bo
ok
 o
f 
th
e 
D
e 
An
im
a 
th
at
 a
 
se
ns
e 
w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
its
 p
ro
pe
r o
bj
ec
t i
s a
lw
ay
s t
ru
e,
 th
at
 is
, 
in
 th
e 
gr
ea
te
r 
pa
rt 
it 
is
 tr
ue
, b
ec
au
se
 in
 th
e 
gr
ea
te
r 
pa
rt 
th
e 
se
ns
e 
is
 c
on
fo
rm
ed
 to
 it
s 
pr
op
er
 o
bj
ec
t, 
an
d 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 th
at
 
it 
is
 
no
t 
de
ce
iv
ed
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
co
m
pl
ex
 
tru
th
 
al
on
e 
is
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lo
qu
itu
r 
<h
ic
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36
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 c
um
 d
ic
it 
ci
rc
a 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
m
 
et
 d
iv
isi
on
em
, 
et
 c
et
er
a.
 E
x 
ho
c 
{n
am
}2
37
 q
uo
d 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 
as
se
rit
 a
liq
ua
 e
ss
e 
ea
de
m
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
su
nt
 e
ad
em
 v
el
 {
al
iq
ua
 n
on
 
es
se
 e
ad
em
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 e
ad
em
}2
38
 e
st
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 fa
ls
a,
 q
ua
e 
ho
c 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t, 
<e
t h
oc
>2
39
co
nc
er
ne
d 
w
ith
 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
di
vi
si
on
 
of
 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, a
nd
 A
ris
to
tle
 s
pe
ak
s 
ab
ou
t t
hi
s 
tru
th
 w
he
n 
he
 s
ay
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
di
vi
si
on
, e
tc
. F
or
 f
ro
m
 th
is
, 
th
at
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 a
ss
er
ts
 s
om
e 
to
 b
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 n
ot
 
th
e 
sa
m
e,
 o
r 
so
m
e 
to
 b
e 
no
t t
he
 s
am
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 th
e 
sa
m
e,
 
co
m
es
 a
bo
ut
 a
 fa
ls
e 
st
at
em
en
t, 
w
hi
ch
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
n 
sp
ee
ch
 
or
 in
 th
e 
m
in
d 
si
gn
ifi
es
. 
 s
iv
e 
si
t p
ro
po
si
tio
 in
 p
ro
la
tio
ne
 s
iv
e 
in
 
m
en
te
. 
 
 
 
Se
d 
ut
ru
m
 s
it 
al
iq
ua
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 c
om
po
si
ta
 e
x 
re
bu
s 
ex
tra
 
an
im
am
 <
ve
l 
no
n>
24
0  
di
ct
um
 e
st
 s
up
ra
 {
in
 p
rin
ci
pi
o}
24
1
 
 l
ib
ri 
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
to
ru
m
. 
<N
ot
an
du
m
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
ve
rit
as
 i
nc
om
pl
ex
a 
qu
ae
 
es
t 
ad
ae
qu
at
io
 
ap
pa
re
nt
ia
e 
re
i 
ad
 
su
am
 
ex
is
te
nt
ia
m
 
re
sp
ec
tu
 
vi
rtu
tis
 
co
gn
iti
ve
 
se
pa
ra
tu
r 
in
 
re
bu
s 
na
tu
ra
lib
us
 
in
an
im
at
is
, 
in
 
re
bu
s 
ar
tif
ic
ia
lib
us
, 
in
 
re
bu
s 
an
im
at
is
 
irr
at
io
na
lib
us
, 
in
 r
eb
us
 a
ni
m
at
is
 h
ab
en
tib
us
 r
at
io
ni
, 
et
 e
od
em
 
m
od
o 
es
t 
fa
ls
ita
s. 
In
 r
eb
us
 n
at
ur
al
ib
us
 i
na
ni
m
at
is
, 
ve
rit
as
 e
st
 
co
nf
or
m
ita
s 
ac
ci
de
nt
iu
m
 n
at
ur
al
iu
m
 a
d 
re
m
 n
at
ur
al
em
 i
n 
qu
a 
su
nt
. I
n 
re
bu
s 
ar
tif
ic
ia
lib
us
 e
st
 c
on
fo
rm
ita
s 
ap
pa
re
nt
ia
e 
fo
rm
ae
 
ad
 m
at
er
ia
m
 d
eb
ita
m
 t
al
i 
fo
rm
ae
, 
et
 e
tia
m
 d
ic
itu
r 
ve
rit
as
 i
n 
re
bu
s 
ar
tif
ic
ia
lib
us
 e
st
 c
on
fo
rm
ita
s 
fa
ct
i 
ad
 d
eb
itu
m
 f
ie
ri.
 I
n 
re
bu
s 
an
im
at
is
 ir
ra
tio
na
lib
us
, e
st
 c
on
fo
rm
ita
s 
ap
pa
re
nt
ia
e 
ta
lis
 
re
i 
ad
 s
ua
m
 o
pe
ra
tio
ne
m
. 
In
 r
eb
us
 h
ab
en
tib
us
 r
at
io
ni
, 
es
t 
co
nf
or
m
ita
s 
di
ct
i v
el
 s
er
m
on
is
 a
d 
m
en
te
 e
t a
d 
op
us
. E
t e
is
de
m
 
m
od
is
 
di
ci
tu
r 
fa
ls
ita
s 
di
ff
or
m
ita
s 
ap
pa
re
nt
ia
e 
ad
 
B
ut
 w
he
th
er
 t
he
re
 i
s 
so
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
co
m
po
se
d 
ou
t 
of
 
th
in
gs
 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 
w
as
 
sp
ok
en
 
of
 
ea
rli
er
, 
at
 
th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 th
e 
Ca
te
go
ri
es
. H
ow
ev
er
, s
up
po
si
ng
 (
as
 m
os
t 
do
) t
ha
t t
he
re
 is
 n
ot
 s
om
e 
st
at
em
en
t i
n 
re
al
ity
 c
om
po
se
d 
ou
t 
of
 t
hi
ng
s, 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 d
ou
bt
 w
he
th
er
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 r
ea
lit
y 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 c
or
re
sp
on
ds
 to
 th
e 
tru
th
 o
r f
al
si
ty
 o
f a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
in
 th
e 
m
in
d 
or
 in
 s
pe
ec
h.
 F
or
 it
 is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 th
at
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 
co
rr
es
po
nd
 in
 re
al
ity
 to
 it
 th
ro
ug
h 
w
hi
ch
 w
e 
th
en
 s
ay
 th
at
 it
 
is
 t
ru
e 
th
at
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
in
 t
he
 m
in
d 
or
 i
n 
sp
ee
ch
 i
s 
tru
e,
 
be
ca
us
e 
in
 t
hi
s 
ca
se
 i
t 
si
gn
ifi
es
 j
us
t 
as
 i
t 
is
 i
n 
re
al
ity
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 to
 th
is
, t
ha
t a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
s 
tru
e,
 it
 is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 
sa
y 
th
at
 i
t 
is
 i
n 
re
al
ity
 j
us
t 
as
 t
he
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
si
gn
ifi
es
, a
nd
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 s
om
e 
pr
op
os
iti
on
al
 t
hi
ng
 c
or
re
sp
on
ds
 t
o 
th
e 
tru
th
 o
f a
 st
at
em
en
t i
n 
th
e 
m
in
d 
or
 in
 sp
ee
ch
 o
r i
n 
w
rit
in
g.
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ru
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st
at
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en
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w
rit
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m
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iv
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ec
tu
m
 e
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
. U
nd
e 
ve
rit
at
i 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 a
ff
irm
at
iv
e 
co
rr
es
po
nd
et
 i
n 
re
 i
de
nt
ita
s 
ill
iu
s 
pr
o 
qu
o 
su
pp
on
it 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 a
d 
ill
ud
 p
ro
 q
uo
 s
up
po
ni
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
. 
N
on
 
{n
am
}2
58
 
po
te
st
 
[a
liq
ua
]2
59
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
af
fir
m
at
iv
a 
ca
th
eg
or
em
at
ic
a 
<e
t>
26
0  
in
 r
ec
to
 e
ss
e 
ve
ra
 n
is
i 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 {
su
pp
on
at
 p
ro
 e
o 
pr
o 
qu
o 
su
pp
on
it 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, 
sc
ili
ce
t v
er
ifi
ce
tu
r}
26
1 , 
et
 s
i {
su
pp
on
at
}2
62
 p
ro
 e
od
em
 tu
nc
 e
st
 
af
fir
m
at
iv
a 
ve
ra
, e
t n
eg
at
iv
a 
ca
th
eg
or
em
at
ic
a 
{n
on
 e
st
 v
er
a 
in
 
re
ct
o}
26
3  
si
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 e
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 s
up
po
na
nt
 p
ro
 e
od
em
, 
se
d 
si
 
su
pp
on
an
t 
pr
o 
di
ve
rs
is
 
<o
m
ni
no
 
[tu
nc
]2
64
>2
65
su
bj
ec
t 
an
d 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
su
pp
os
it.
 H
en
ce
 t
o 
th
e 
tru
th
 o
f 
an
 
af
fir
m
at
iv
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
th
er
e 
co
rr
es
po
nd
s 
in
 
re
al
ity
 
th
e 
id
en
tit
y 
of
 th
os
e 
fo
r 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t s
up
po
si
ts
 to
 th
at
 f
or
 
w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
su
pp
os
its
, 
si
nc
e 
so
m
e 
af
fir
m
at
iv
e,
 
ca
te
go
ric
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
t c
an
no
t b
e 
tru
e 
un
le
ss
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t a
nd
 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
su
pp
os
it 
fo
r 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
g.
 A
nd
 if
 th
ey
 s
up
po
si
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
in
g,
 th
en
 it
 is
 a
n 
af
fir
m
at
iv
e 
tru
e 
st
at
em
en
t. 
H
ow
ev
er
, a
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
ca
te
go
ric
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
s 
no
t t
ru
e 
if 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
su
pp
os
it 
fo
r t
he
 sa
m
e 
th
in
g;
 ra
th
er
, 
it 
is
 tr
ue
 if
 th
ey
 su
pp
os
it 
fo
r d
iff
er
en
t t
hi
ng
s. 
 
es
t 
ne
ga
tiv
a 
ve
ra
. 
 
 
 
Et
 s
i 
di
ca
tu
r 
qu
od
 e
st
 a
ff
irm
at
iv
a 
ve
ra
 q
ua
nd
o 
no
n 
es
t 
ta
lis
 
id
en
tit
as
, q
ui
a 
ha
ec
 e
st
 v
er
a,
 ‘C
ae
sa
r e
st
 C
ae
sa
r’
, e
t t
am
en
 n
on
 
es
t 
al
iq
ua
 i
de
nt
ita
s 
<C
ae
sa
ris
>2
66
. 
Si
m
ili
te
r 
ne
ga
tiv
a 
po
te
st
 
es
se
 
ve
ra
 
si
ne
 
[ta
li]
26
7  
di
ve
rs
ita
te
 
ill
or
um
 
pr
o 
qu
ib
us
 
{s
up
po
ni
t}
26
8  s
ub
ie
ct
um
 e
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
, u
t p
at
et
, i
st
a 
{n
am
}2
69
 
 
es
t v
er
a,
 ‘
C
ae
sa
r 
no
n 
es
t P
la
to
’, 
et
 ta
m
en
 C
ae
sa
r 
et
 P
la
to
 n
on
 
su
nt
 d
iv
er
sa
 c
um
 n
on
 s
in
t 
en
tia
, 
et
 i
de
m
 e
t 
di
ve
rs
um
 s
un
t 
di
ff
er
en
tia
e 
en
tis
. 
A
nd
 if
 it
 is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 a
n 
af
fir
m
at
iv
e 
st
at
em
en
t i
s 
tru
e 
w
he
n 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
su
ch
 i
de
nt
ity
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
is
 i
s 
tru
e,
 ‘
C
ae
sa
r 
is
 
C
ae
sa
r’
, a
nd
 y
et
 th
er
e 
is
 n
ot
 s
om
e 
id
en
tit
y,
 a
nd
 li
ke
w
is
e 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
st
at
em
en
t c
an
 b
e 
tru
e 
w
ith
 a
 d
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
th
at
 s
or
t 
of
 th
os
e 
fo
r 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t s
up
po
si
ts
 a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 
as
 is
 c
le
ar
, f
or
 th
is
 is
 tr
ue
, ‘
C
ae
sa
r i
s 
Pl
at
o’
, a
nd
 y
et
 C
ae
sa
r 
an
d 
Pl
at
o 
ar
e 
no
t 
di
ve
rs
e,
 s
in
ce
 t
he
y 
ar
e 
no
n-
be
in
gs
, 
an
d 
id
en
tit
y 
an
d 
di
ve
rs
ity
 a
re
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s o
f b
ei
ng
s. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
25
8  ‘
en
im
’: 
A
, B
 
25
9  A
, B
 
26
0  A
, B
 
26
1  ‘
et
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 su
pp
on
un
t p
ro
 e
od
em
’: 
A
, B
 
26
2  ‘
su
pp
on
an
t’:
 A
, B
 
26
3  ‘
et
 in
 re
ct
o 
no
n 
es
t v
er
a’
: A
, B
 
26
4  B
 
26
5  A
 
26
6  A
 
26
7  A
, B
 
26
8  ‘
su
pp
on
un
t’:
 B
 
26
9  ‘
en
im
’: 
A
, B
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D
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
C
ae
sa
r 
co
rr
up
to
 i
de
nt
ita
s 
es
t 
C
ae
sa
ris
 a
d 
C
ae
sa
re
m
, 
se
d 
ill
a 
id
en
tit
as
 n
on
 e
xi
st
it,
 [
se
d 
es
t 
id
en
tit
as
 
ra
tio
ni
s]
27
0 . 
{E
t i
de
m
}2
71
 {
C
ae
sa
re
m
}2
72
 <
es
t>
27
3  i
de
m
 C
ae
sa
ri 
id
en
tit
at
e 
qu
ae
 n
on
 e
st
, 
ne
c 
op
or
te
t 
qu
od
 i
de
m
 e
t 
di
ve
rs
um
 
se
m
pe
r 
si
nt
 d
iff
er
en
tia
e 
en
tis
 {
m
ax
im
e 
tra
ns
ce
nd
en
tis
 q
uo
d 
sc
ili
ce
t 
es
t 
in
 i
nt
el
le
ct
u}
27
4 . 
U
nd
e 
[s
ic
]2
75
 p
ot
es
t 
di
ci
 q
uo
d 
<s
ic
ut
>2
76
 e
ns
 d
ic
itu
r 
{d
up
lic
ite
r}
27
7  
– 
un
o 
m
od
o 
[u
t]2
78
 e
st
 
co
m
m
un
e 
om
ni
 i
nt
el
lig
ib
ili
, 
al
io
 m
od
o 
id
em
 [
es
t]2
79
 q
uo
d 
ex
is
te
ns
 –
 s
ic
 i
de
m
 e
t 
di
ve
rs
um
 d
ic
itu
r 
<m
ul
tip
lic
ite
r>
28
0  
– 
un
om
od
o 
ut
 [
su
nt
 d
iff
er
en
tia
e 
en
tis
 tr
an
sc
en
de
nt
is
, a
lio
 m
od
o 
ut
]2
81
 
su
nt
 
di
ff
er
en
tia
e 
en
tis
 
in
 
ef
fe
ct
u,
 
ho
c 
es
t, 
in
 
ac
tu
 
ex
is
te
nt
is
, [
et
]2
82
 
 p
er
 h
oc
 p
at
et
 re
sp
on
si
o 
ad
 a
rg
um
en
tu
m
. 
W
e 
m
us
t s
ay
 in
 re
sp
on
se
 th
at
, C
ae
sa
r h
av
e 
di
ed
, t
he
re
 is
 a
n 
id
en
tit
y 
of
 C
ae
sa
r 
w
ith
 C
ae
sa
r, 
bu
t 
th
at
 i
de
nt
ity
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
ex
is
t, 
bu
t i
s 
ra
th
er
 a
n 
id
en
tit
y 
of
 re
as
on
. A
nd
, a
ga
in
, C
ae
sa
r 
is
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
as
 C
ae
sa
r 
by
 a
n 
id
en
tit
y 
w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t e
xi
st
, 
no
r 
is
 i
t 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
th
at
 i
de
nt
ity
 a
nd
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 a
re
 a
lw
ay
s 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
of
 b
ei
ng
 i
n 
ac
tu
al
ity
, 
th
at
 i
s, 
of
 a
n 
ex
is
tin
g 
be
in
g.
 R
at
he
r, 
th
ey
 a
re
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
of
 a
 b
ei
ng
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
m
ax
im
al
ly
 
tra
ns
ce
nd
en
t, 
na
m
el
y 
w
ha
t 
is
 
co
m
m
on
 
to
 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 in
te
lli
gi
bl
e.
 H
en
ce
 in
 th
is
 c
as
e 
it 
ca
n 
be
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 
‘b
ei
ng
’ i
s 
sa
id
 in
 tw
o 
w
ay
s. 
In
 o
ne
 w
ay
 a
s 
it 
is
 c
om
m
on
 to
 
al
l i
nt
el
lig
ib
le
 th
in
gs
, a
nd
 in
 a
no
th
er
 w
ay
 it
 is
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
as
 
an
 e
xi
st
in
g 
be
in
g.
 S
o 
id
en
tit
y 
an
d 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 a
re
 s
po
ke
n 
of
 
in
 m
an
y 
w
ay
s 
– 
on
e 
w
ay
 a
s 
th
ey
 a
re
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
of
 
tra
ns
ce
nd
en
t b
ei
ng
, i
n 
an
ot
he
r 
w
ay
 a
s 
th
ey
 a
re
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
of
 b
ei
ng
 in
 e
ff
ec
t, 
th
at
 is
, i
n 
ac
tu
al
 e
xi
st
en
ce
, a
nd
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
is
 th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 th
e 
ar
gu
m
en
t i
s c
le
ar
. 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
27
0  A
, B
 
27
1  ‘
un
de
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A
, B
 
27
2  ‘
C
ae
sa
r’
: A
 
27
3  A
 
27
4  ‘
in
 e
ff
ec
tu
, h
oc
 e
st
, e
xi
st
en
tis
, s
ed
 su
nt
 d
iff
er
en
tia
e 
en
tis
 q
uo
d 
es
t m
ax
im
e 
tra
nc
en
de
nt
is
, q
uo
d 
sc
ili
ce
t e
st
 c
om
m
un
e 
om
ni
 in
te
lli
gi
bi
li’
: A
; ‘
in
 e
ff
ec
tu
, h
oc
 
es
t, 
ex
is
te
nt
is
 a
ct
u,
 se
d 
qu
od
 su
nt
 d
iv
er
sa
 d
iff
er
en
tia
e 
en
tis
 q
uo
d 
es
t m
ax
im
e 
tra
nc
en
de
nt
is
, q
uo
d 
sc
ili
ce
t e
st
 c
om
m
un
e 
om
ni
 in
te
lli
gi
bi
li’
: B
 
27
5  A
, ‘
m
od
o’
: B
 
27
6  A
 
27
7  ‘
m
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tip
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r’
: A
, B
 
27
8  A
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9  A
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N
om
in
a 
ig
itu
r 
ip
sa
 
et
 
ve
rb
a 
co
ns
im
ili
a 
su
nt
 
si
ne
 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
 v
el
 d
iv
isi
on
e 
in
te
lle
ct
ui
, u
t 
ho
m
o 
ve
l 
al
bu
m
, 
qu
an
do
 n
on
 a
dd
itu
r 
al
iq
ui
d.
 N
am
 e
ni
m
 a
dh
uc
 v
er
um
 v
el
 
fa
ls
um
 e
st
. H
ui
us
 a
ut
em
 s
ig
nu
m
 h
oc
 e
st
 h
ir
co
ce
rv
us
 e
ni
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t a
liq
ui
d 
se
d 
qu
od
 n
on
du
m
 v
er
um
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
 si
t. 
Si
 
es
se
 v
el
 n
on
 e
ss
e 
no
n 
ad
da
tu
r,
 v
el
 s
im
pl
ic
ite
r 
ve
l s
ec
un
du
m
 
te
m
pu
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ae
c 
es
t 
se
cu
nd
a 
pa
rs
 t
er
tia
e 
pa
rti
s 
hu
iu
s 
ca
pi
ta
li 
in
 q
ua
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 o
st
en
di
t q
ua
e 
vo
x 
es
t s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ve
ri 
ve
l f
al
si
 e
t 
qu
ae
 n
ec
 e
st
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ve
ri 
ne
c 
fa
ls
i, 
et
 p
ro
ba
t q
uo
d 
no
m
in
a 
pe
r 
se
 s
um
pt
a 
ne
c 
si
gn
ifi
ce
nt
 v
er
um
 n
ec
 f
al
su
m
, 
et
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
qu
ar
ta
 h
ui
us
 li
br
i, 
qu
ae
 p
ro
ba
tu
r 
si
c.
 P
rim
o 
ex
 d
ic
to
 
im
m
ed
ia
te
 p
ra
ec
ed
en
ti 
si
c,
 c
irc
a 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
m
 e
t d
iv
is
io
ne
m
 
co
ns
is
tu
nt
 v
er
ita
s 
et
 fa
ls
ita
s 
se
d 
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
a 
su
nt
 s
in
e 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
 e
t d
iv
is
io
ne
. E
rg
o 
no
m
in
a 
et
 v
er
ba
 p
er
 
se
 s
um
pt
a 
ne
c 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 v
er
um
 n
ec
 fa
ls
um
. S
ec
un
do
 p
ro
ba
tu
r 
pe
r 
qu
od
da
m
 s
ig
nu
m
, e
t a
rg
ui
tu
r 
pe
r 
lo
cu
tio
ni
s 
cu
m
 a
 m
ai
or
i 
si
c.
 S
i 
al
iq
uo
d 
no
m
en
 e
t 
ve
rb
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
ar
en
t 
<k
4v
a>
 v
er
um
 
ve
l 
fa
ls
um
, 
ho
c 
m
ax
im
e 
es
se
t 
ve
ru
m
 d
e 
no
m
in
e 
et
 v
er
bo
 
co
m
po
si
tio
, 
se
d 
no
m
en
 
ne
c 
ve
rb
um
 
co
m
po
si
tu
m
 
pe
r 
se
 
su
m
pt
um
 s
un
t 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
. 
Ig
itu
r 
nu
llu
m
 n
om
en
 v
el
 
ve
rb
um
 c
om
po
si
tu
m
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
 v
el
 
fa
ls
um
. 
M
ai
or
 p
at
et
, 
et
 m
in
or
 d
ec
la
ra
tu
r 
pe
r 
ex
em
pl
um
 s
ic
. 
H
irc
oc
er
vu
s 
es
t 
no
m
en
 
co
m
po
si
tu
m
, 
et
 
ho
c 
no
m
en
, 
‘h
irc
oc
er
vu
s’
, 
pe
r 
se
 
su
m
pt
um
 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ve
ru
m
 
ne
c 
fa
ls
um
. U
nd
e 
si
 n
on
 a
dd
at
ur
 s
ib
i v
er
bu
m
 p
ra
es
en
tis
 te
m
pi
s 
au
t 
pr
ae
te
rit
i a
ut
 fu
tu
ri 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t v
er
um
 n
ec
 fa
ls
um
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Se
d 
hi
c 
du
bi
ta
tu
r. 
V
id
et
ur
 n
am
 q
uo
d 
un
um
 n
om
en
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 s
it 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
, 
qu
ia
 n
om
in
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
d 
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pl
ac
itu
m
. 
Er
go
 
po
ss
ib
ile
 
es
t 
im
po
ne
re
 
un
um
 
no
m
en
 
ad
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 i
de
m
 q
uo
d 
is
ta
 e
nu
nc
ia
tio
, 
‘h
om
o 
es
t 
an
im
al
’, 
se
d 
is
ta
 e
nu
nc
ia
tio
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
. 
Er
go
 m
ul
to
 
fo
rti
us
 u
nu
m
 n
om
en
 c
om
po
si
tu
m
 p
ot
es
t s
ig
ni
fic
ar
e 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 
fa
lu
m
. A
nt
ec
ed
en
s 
pa
te
t, 
na
m
 h
ae
c 
lit
te
ra
, a
, p
ot
es
t i
m
po
ni
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 
id
em
 
qu
od
 
ha
ec
 
en
un
ci
at
io
, 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t. 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 
si
 
qu
ae
ra
tu
r 
qu
id
 
le
gi
t 
in
 
sc
ho
lis
, 
et
 
re
sp
on
de
at
ur
, 
‘m
ag
is
te
r’
, 
qu
i 
si
c 
re
sp
on
de
t 
di
ci
t 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
, 
et
 n
on
 
di
ci
t 
ni
si
 u
nu
m
 n
om
en
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
. I
gi
tu
r 
no
m
en
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 si
gn
ifi
ca
t v
er
um
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Si
m
ili
te
r h
oc
 v
er
bu
m
, ‘
cu
rr
o’
, s
ig
ni
fic
at
 id
em
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 o
ra
tio
, 
‘E
go
 c
ur
ro
’, 
se
d 
ha
ec
 o
ra
tio
 si
gn
ifi
ca
t v
er
um
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
. 
 
 
 
 
 
D
ic
en
du
m
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
ne
c 
no
m
en
 n
ec
 v
er
bu
m
 s
ep
ar
at
um
, h
oc
 e
st
, 
se
or
su
m
 a
cc
ep
tu
m
, h
oc
 e
st
, p
er
 s
e 
ac
ce
pt
um
, s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
 
<v
el
> 
fa
ls
um
  c
om
pl
ex
e.
 U
nd
e 
po
te
st
 d
ic
i d
is
tin
gu
en
do
 <
na
m
> 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
 v
er
um
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
 e
st
 d
up
le
x,
 s
ci
lic
et
 c
om
pl
ex
e 
et
 
in
co
m
pl
ex
e.
 I
llu
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t v
er
um
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
 c
om
pl
ex
e 
cu
iu
s 
pa
rs
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 p
ar
te
m
 t
ot
iu
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ti,
 i
ta
 q
uo
d 
si
cu
t 
to
tu
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
to
tu
m
 v
er
um
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
, 
ita
 p
ar
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
pa
rte
m
 
ve
ri 
ve
l 
fa
ls
i, 
et
 s
ic
 n
ec
 n
om
en
 n
ec
 v
er
bu
m
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
 c
om
pl
ex
e,
 s
ci
lic
et
 p
er
 m
od
um
 
co
m
pl
ex
i, 
qu
ia
 n
ec
 p
ar
s 
no
m
in
is
 n
ec
 p
ar
s 
ve
rb
i 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
al
iq
ui
d 
pe
r 
se
, 
ut
 d
ic
it 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
ne
c 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t p
ar
te
m
 il
liu
s 
qu
od
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
ur
 p
er
 to
tu
m
. E
t p
ro
pt
er
 
ho
c 
di
co
 q
uo
d 
ne
c 
no
m
en
 n
ec
 v
er
bu
m
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ve
ru
m
 
ve
l 
fa
ls
um
 
co
m
pl
ex
e 
si
ve
 
pe
r 
m
od
um
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co
m
pl
ex
i. 
D
ic
o 
ta
m
en
 q
uo
d 
un
um
 n
om
en
 e
t 
un
um
 v
er
bu
m
 
po
te
st
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
 
ve
ru
m
 
ve
l 
fa
ls
um
 
in
co
m
pl
ex
e 
si
ve
 
pe
r 
m
od
um
 i
nc
om
pl
ex
i, 
et
 s
ic
 p
ot
es
t 
ha
ec
 v
ox
, 
a,
 i
m
po
ni
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 i
de
m
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 p
ro
po
si
tio
, 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 n
ec
 e
x 
ho
c 
se
qu
itu
r q
uo
d 
ill
a 
vo
x,
 a
, s
it 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 q
ui
a 
<n
on
> 
om
ne
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ns
 
ve
ru
m
 
ve
l 
fa
ls
um
 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 
se
d 
so
lu
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ns
 
ve
ru
m
 
ve
l 
fa
ls
um
 
pe
r 
m
od
um
 
co
m
pl
ex
i 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o.
 E
rg
o,
 e
t c
et
er
a.
 S
i d
ic
at
ur
 q
uo
d 
si
, a
, s
ig
ni
fic
at
 id
em
 
qu
od
 i
st
a 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 ‘
de
us
 e
st
’, 
tu
nc
 i
st
a 
es
t 
ve
ra
, 
a 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 q
ui
a 
se
qu
itu
r, 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 e
st
 p
ro
po
si
tio
. E
rg
o,
 a
 e
st
 
pr
op
os
iti
o.
 
A
nt
ec
ed
en
s 
es
t 
ve
ru
m
. 
Er
go
 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
. 
C
on
se
qu
en
tia
 
pa
te
t, 
qu
ia
 
ar
gu
itu
r 
a 
co
nv
er
tib
ili
 
ad
 
su
um
 
co
nv
er
tib
ile
. 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 n
om
in
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
. S
i i
gi
tu
r v
er
um
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
di
st
in
ct
e 
id
em
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 p
ro
po
si
tio
, 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t, 
et
 i
m
po
na
tu
r 
ad
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
du
m
 d
is
tin
ct
e 
ill
ud
 q
uo
d 
is
ta
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
, t
un
c 
se
qu
itu
r q
uo
d 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t v
er
um
 
ve
l f
al
su
m
. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
d 
pr
im
um
 d
ic
en
du
m
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 e
st
 m
ul
tip
le
x,
 ‘
a 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o’
, 
eo
 
qu
od
 
‘a
’ 
po
te
st
 
su
pp
on
er
e 
m
at
er
ia
lit
er
 
et
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e.
 S
i s
um
at
ur
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e,
 s
ic
 h
ae
c 
es
t v
er
a,
 ‘
a 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o’
. S
i a
ut
em
 m
at
er
ia
lit
er
 si
c 
es
t f
al
sa
, q
ui
a 
ha
ec
 li
tte
ra
, 
a,
 n
on
 e
st
 p
ro
po
si
tio
, 
ne
c 
va
le
t 
in
 i
st
o 
se
ns
u:
 ‘
de
us
 e
st
’ 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 e
rg
o 
a 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 n
ec
 v
al
et
 c
on
se
qu
en
tia
 a
 
co
nv
er
tib
ili
 a
d 
co
nv
er
tib
ile
 s
um
pt
is
 t
er
m
is
 m
at
er
ia
lit
er
. 
N
on
 
na
m
 s
eq
ui
tu
r: 
ho
m
o 
es
t b
is
yl
la
bu
s, 
ig
itu
r r
is
ib
ile
 e
st
 b
is
yl
la
bu
s, 
ne
c 
va
le
t: 
ho
m
o 
es
t n
om
en
 s
ub
st
an
tiv
um
, i
gi
tu
r 
ris
ib
ile
. U
nd
e 
su
m
pt
o 
a 
m
at
er
ia
lit
er
 n
on
 d
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
a 
si
t p
ro
po
si
tio
, q
ui
a 
si
 s
ic
, h
ae
c 
fo
re
t b
on
a 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
: a
 e
st
, e
rg
o 
de
us
 e
st
, q
uo
d 
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es
t 
no
n 
ve
ru
m
. U
nd
e 
a 
m
at
er
ia
lit
er
 s
um
pt
um
 n
on
 p
ot
es
t 
es
se
 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 n
ec
 c
on
se
qu
en
s. 
Et
 s
i 
di
ca
tu
r 
de
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
su
m
pt
o 
ve
rif
ic
at
ur
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 e
rg
o 
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
qu
od
 
si
t 
an
te
ce
de
ns
, 
er
go
 
su
m
pt
o 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e 
er
it 
ha
ec
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
 b
on
a:
 S
i a
, d
eu
s e
st
. 
 
 
 
D
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
si
c 
di
ce
nd
o 
‘s
i a
 e
st
 a
’, 
ve
l ‘
si
 a
 e
st
 b
’, 
no
n 
es
t 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ia
, n
ec
 is
ti 
te
rm
in
i p
os
su
nt
 su
m
i s
ic
 n
is
i m
at
er
ia
lit
er
, 
qu
am
vi
s 
re
sp
ec
tu
 a
lte
riu
s 
po
ss
in
t s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
ve
l m
at
er
ia
lit
er
 
su
m
i i
nd
iff
er
en
te
r. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
d 
al
ia
m
 d
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
im
po
ss
ib
ile
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ce
t 
id
em
 d
is
tin
ct
e 
qu
od
 i
st
a 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 ‘
de
us
 e
st
’. 
U
nd
e 
no
m
in
a 
si
gn
ifi
ce
nt
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
 s
ic
 q
uo
d 
po
ss
un
t 
im
po
ni
 c
ui
lib
et
 r
ei
 
in
di
ff
er
en
te
r, 
m
od
us
 
ta
m
en
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
i 
re
m
 
di
st
in
ct
e 
ve
l 
in
di
st
in
ct
e 
no
n 
es
t a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
. U
nd
e 
qu
am
vi
s o
m
ne
 il
lu
d 
qu
od
 
in
te
lli
gi
tu
r 
po
ss
it 
in
te
lli
gi
tu
r 
di
st
in
ct
e 
po
te
st
 s
ig
ni
fic
ar
i 
pe
r 
un
um
 
no
m
en
 
di
st
in
ct
e,
 
qu
ia
 
si
c 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
po
te
st
 
co
ns
ta
re
 
di
ff
in
itu
m
, 
et
 
ho
c 
es
t 
co
nt
ra
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
um
 
se
cu
nd
o 
m
et
ap
hy
si
ca
. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
d 
pr
im
um
 p
rin
ci
pa
le
 q
uo
d 
vi
de
tu
r 
es
se
 i
n 
co
nt
ra
riu
m
, 
es
t 
di
ce
nd
um
, 
co
nc
ed
en
do
 
qu
od
 
un
um
 
no
m
en
 
po
te
st
 
id
em
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
, 
se
d 
ne
c 
un
um
 
no
m
en
 
ne
c 
un
a 
lit
te
ra
 
po
te
st
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
 c
om
pl
ex
e 
id
em
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 p
ro
po
si
tio
, ‘
de
us
 e
st
’. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
d 
<k
4v
b>
 a
liu
d 
di
ce
nd
um
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
si
 q
ua
er
at
ur
 q
ui
s 
le
gi
t i
n 
sc
ho
lis
, 
et
 r
es
po
nd
ea
tu
r 
‘m
ag
is
te
r’
, 
si
c 
re
sp
on
de
ns
 d
e 
vi
rtu
te
 
se
rm
on
is
, 
ne
c 
di
ci
t 
ve
ru
m
 n
ec
 f
al
su
m
, 
de
 b
on
ita
te
 t
am
en
 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 p
ot
es
t p
er
 d
ic
tu
m
 s
uu
m
 in
te
lli
ge
re
 v
er
um
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
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su
bi
nt
el
lig
en
do
 v
er
bu
m
 q
uo
d 
fu
it 
in
te
rr
og
at
iv
e 
po
si
tu
m
. U
nd
e 
ho
c 
no
m
en
, 
‘m
ag
is
te
r’
, 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
, 
de
 
vi
rtu
te
 ta
m
en
 in
te
rr
og
at
io
ni
s d
at
 in
te
lli
ge
re
 v
er
um
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
. 
 
 
 
A
d 
al
iu
d 
di
co
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
a 
qu
ae
 s
un
t 
pr
im
ae
 a
ut
 s
ec
un
da
e 
pe
rs
on
ae
 s
un
t v
er
ba
 e
xc
el
le
nt
is
 a
ct
io
ni
s, 
qu
ia
 in
 e
is
 in
te
lli
gi
tu
r 
no
m
in
at
iv
us
 
de
te
rm
in
at
us
, 
et
 
id
eo
 
in
 
ei
s 
es
t 
im
pl
ic
ita
 
co
m
po
si
tio
. 
U
nd
e 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
ve
rb
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
ve
ru
m
 
ve
l 
fa
ls
um
 i
m
pl
ic
ite
. 
M
el
iu
s 
ta
m
en
 v
id
et
ur
 e
ss
e 
di
ce
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
ve
rb
a 
pr
im
ae
 e
t 
se
cu
nd
ae
 p
er
so
na
e,
 u
t 
‘c
ur
ro
’, 
‘c
ur
ris
’, 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
ve
ru
m
 
ve
l 
fa
ls
um
, 
qu
ia
 
id
em
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 ‘
cu
rr
o’
 e
t 
‘c
ur
rit
’, 
se
d 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
 ‘
cu
rr
it’
 n
on
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 v
er
um
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
, i
gi
tu
r 
ne
c 
‘c
ur
ro
’. 
U
nd
e 
pe
rs
on
a 
no
n 
es
t 
de
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
o 
ve
rb
i, 
se
d 
es
t 
ac
ci
de
ns
 v
er
bi
. 
V
er
um
 
ta
m
en
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 p
rim
ae
 e
t 
se
cu
nd
ae
 p
er
so
na
e 
da
t 
in
te
lli
ge
re
 v
er
um
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
, 
et
 h
oc
 v
er
bu
m
, 
‘c
ur
ro
’, 
da
t 
in
te
lli
ge
re
 h
oc
 p
ro
no
m
en
, ‘
eg
o’
. N
on
 e
st
 ta
m
en
 d
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
to
 
hu
iu
s 
ve
rb
i 
‘c
ur
ro
’. 
U
nd
e 
in
te
nt
io
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
i 
es
t 
ha
ec
, 
qu
od
 
ne
c 
no
m
en
 n
ec
 v
er
bu
m
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
 v
el
 
fa
ls
um
, 
se
d 
so
la
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ve
ru
m
 
ve
l 
fa
ls
um
. 
D
is
tin
ct
e 
ta
m
en
 u
nu
m
 v
er
bu
m
 p
rim
ae
 e
t s
ec
un
da
e 
pe
rs
on
ae
 d
at
 
in
te
lli
ge
re
 v
er
um
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Se
d 
co
nt
ra
 h
oc
. 
Is
ta
 c
on
se
qu
en
tia
 e
st
 b
on
a:
 ‘
cu
rr
o 
ig
itu
r 
m
ov
eo
r’
, e
t p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
‘c
ur
ro
’ e
st
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
s 
et
 ‘m
ov
eo
r’
 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
, 
et
 n
ih
il 
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 s
iv
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 
ni
si
 p
ro
po
si
tio
. 
Ig
itu
r 
‘c
ur
ro
’ 
es
t 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 i
gi
tu
r 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
. 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ui
c 
po
te
st
 r
es
po
nd
er
i d
up
lic
ite
r. 
U
no
 m
od
o 
qu
od
 h
ic
 n
on
 e
st
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al
iq
ua
 c
on
se
qu
en
tia
: 
‘c
ur
ro
, 
ig
itu
r 
m
ov
eo
r’
, 
ne
c 
ex
 o
pp
os
ito
 
se
qu
itu
r 
op
po
si
tu
m
 
qu
od
 
po
te
st
 
es
se
 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 
ve
l 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
. 
 
 
 
Si
 
di
ca
tu
r 
‘c
ur
ro
’ 
et
 
‘e
go
 
cu
rr
o’
 
co
nv
er
tu
nt
ur
, 
et
 
ha
ec
 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 ‘e
go
 c
ur
ro
’, 
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 v
el
 c
on
se
qu
en
s. 
Er
go
 ‘c
ur
ro
’ p
ot
es
t e
ss
e 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 v
el
 c
on
se
qu
en
s. 
D
ic
en
du
m
 
qu
od
 ‘
cu
rr
o’
 e
t 
ha
ec
 o
ra
tio
, 
‘e
go
 c
ur
ro
’, 
co
nv
er
tu
nt
ur
 s
ic
ut
 
co
m
pl
ex
um
 e
t i
nc
om
pl
ex
um
, e
t i
de
o 
no
n 
op
or
te
t q
uo
d 
si
 u
nu
m
 
po
ss
it 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 v
el
 c
on
se
qu
en
s, 
qu
od
 p
ro
pt
er
 h
oc
 r
el
iq
uu
m
 
po
ss
it 
es
se
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
s 
ve
l 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
, 
si
cu
t 
po
si
to
 q
uo
d 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
id
em
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 o
ra
tio
, 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
. 
N
on
 
se
qu
itu
r: 
‘d
eu
s e
st
’ p
ot
es
t e
ss
e 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 v
el
 c
on
se
qu
en
s, 
er
go
 
ha
ec
 l
itt
er
a,
 a
, 
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 v
el
 c
on
se
qu
en
s. 
Se
d 
op
or
te
t 
pl
us
 
ad
de
re
 
qu
od
 
su
nt
 
co
nv
er
tib
ili
a 
ta
m
qu
am
 
co
m
pl
ex
a.
 U
nd
e 
po
si
to
 q
uo
d 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ce
t i
de
m
 q
uo
d 
‘d
eu
s 
es
t’,
 
no
n 
pr
op
te
r h
oc
 e
st
 h
ic
 a
liq
ua
 c
on
se
qu
en
tia
: ‘
de
us
 e
st
, i
gi
tu
r a
 
es
t’,
 n
ec
 h
ic
, ‘
a 
es
t, 
ig
itu
r d
eu
s e
st
’, 
et
 c
au
sa
 d
ic
ta
 e
st
 su
pe
riu
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Et
 s
i d
ic
at
ur
, p
ro
fe
re
ns
 h
oc
 v
er
bu
m
 ‘
ta
ce
o’
, d
ic
it 
fa
ls
um
, e
rg
o 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
 ‘t
ac
eo
’ s
ig
ni
fic
at
 fa
ls
um
, d
ic
o 
qu
od
 p
ro
fe
re
ns
 h
oc
 
ve
rb
um
, ‘
ta
ce
o’
, d
e 
vi
rtu
te
 s
er
m
on
is
 n
ec
 d
ic
it 
ve
ru
m
 n
ec
 d
ic
it 
fa
ls
um
. U
nd
e 
pr
op
te
r h
oc
 d
ic
tu
m
 in
te
lli
gi
tu
r v
er
um
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
, 
se
d 
ho
c 
es
t e
x 
co
m
m
un
i u
su
 lo
qu
en
di
, n
on
 e
x 
vi
rtu
te
 se
rm
on
is
. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
lio
 m
od
o 
po
te
st
 d
ic
i q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 c
on
se
qu
en
tia
 e
st
 b
on
a:
 ‘c
ur
ro
, 
ig
itu
r 
m
ov
eo
r’
, e
t t
un
c 
es
se
t d
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
an
te
ce
de
ns
 e
ss
et
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
im
pl
ic
ite
, n
on
 r
at
io
ne
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
i 
ta
m
en
 s
ed
 r
at
io
ne
 
pr
im
ae
 p
er
so
na
e 
in
te
lle
ct
ae
 i
n 
cu
rr
o,
 n
ec
 v
al
et
 e
st
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 
im
pl
ic
ita
, i
gi
tu
r 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t v
er
um
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
, s
ed
 s
uf
fic
it 
qu
od
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in
cl
ud
it 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
. 
Pr
im
a 
ta
m
en
 r
es
po
ns
io
 m
ag
is
 
co
nc
or
da
t v
er
bi
s e
t s
en
te
nt
ia
e 
A
ris
to
te
lis
. 
 
 
 
< 
C
ap
itu
lu
m
 2
: D
e 
N
om
in
e>
 
 
<C
ha
pt
er
 2
: O
n 
N
am
es
> 
 
 
 
N
om
en
 e
rg
o 
es
t 
vo
x 
sig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
se
cu
nd
um
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 s
in
e 
te
m
po
re
, c
ui
us
 n
ul
la
 p
ar
s e
st
 si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
se
pa
ra
ta
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Is
tu
d 
es
t 
se
cu
nd
um
 
ca
pi
tu
lu
m
 
pr
im
i 
tra
ct
at
us
 
in
 
qu
o 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 d
e 
pa
rti
bu
s 
in
te
gr
al
ib
us
 e
nu
nc
ia
tio
ni
s 
et
 c
on
tin
et
 
du
as
 p
ar
te
s 
pr
in
ci
pa
le
s. 
In
 p
rim
a 
de
te
rm
in
at
ur
 d
e 
no
m
in
e.
 I
n 
se
cu
nd
a 
ib
i, 
ve
rb
um
 e
st
 i
llu
d,
 d
et
er
m
in
at
ur
 d
e 
ve
rb
o.
 P
rim
a 
pa
rs
 c
on
tin
et
 d
ua
s 
pa
rte
s 
in
 p
rim
a 
po
ni
tu
r d
iff
in
iti
o 
no
m
in
is
, e
t 
m
an
ife
st
at
io
 p
ar
tiu
m
 d
iff
in
iti
on
is
. 
In
 s
ec
un
da
 i
bi
, 
no
n 
ho
m
o 
ve
ro
, 
ex
cl
ud
it 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 q
ua
ed
am
 a
 r
at
io
ne
 n
om
in
is
 q
ua
e 
ap
pa
re
nt
 
es
se
 
no
m
in
a 
et
 
no
n 
su
nt
 
no
m
in
a.
 
Pr
im
o 
er
go
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 p
on
it 
di
ff
in
iti
on
em
 n
om
in
is
, 
di
ce
ns
 q
uo
d 
no
m
en
 
es
t v
ox
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 s
in
e 
te
m
po
ris
 c
ui
us
 n
ul
la
 p
ar
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
se
pa
ra
ta
. 
In
 
ha
c 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
po
nu
nt
ur
 
qu
in
qu
e 
di
ff
er
en
tia
e 
pe
r 
qu
as
 d
ic
itu
r 
no
m
en
 a
b 
al
iis
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
su
nt
 
no
m
in
a.
 P
er
 h
oc
 n
am
 q
uo
d 
no
m
en
 e
st
 v
ox
 d
iff
er
t 
no
m
en
 a
 
so
ni
s 
qu
ae
 n
on
 s
un
t 
vo
ce
s. 
N
am
 q
ui
da
m
 s
on
us
 e
st
 v
ox
, 
et
 
qu
id
am
 e
st
 n
on
 v
ox
, e
t q
ua
ed
am
 e
st
 v
ox
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a,
 p
er
 h
an
c 
pa
rti
cu
la
m
, 
‘s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a’
, 
di
ff
er
t 
no
m
en
 
a 
vo
ce
 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a,
 
et
 
qu
ia
 
vo
cu
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
ar
um
 
qu
ae
da
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
, 
et
 q
ua
ed
am
 n
at
ur
al
ite
r. 
Pe
r 
ha
nc
 
pa
rti
cu
la
m
, 
‘a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
’, 
di
ff
er
t 
no
m
en
 a
 v
oc
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
na
tu
ra
lit
er
, 
et
 
qu
ia
 
vo
cu
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
ar
um
 
ad
 
pl
ac
itu
m
 
qu
ae
da
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t c
um
 te
m
po
re
, u
t v
er
bu
m
 e
t p
ar
tic
ip
iu
m
, e
t 
qu
ae
da
m
 s
in
e 
te
m
po
re
. 
Pe
r 
ha
nc
 p
ar
tic
ul
am
, 
‘s
in
e 
te
m
po
re
’, 
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di
ff
er
t n
om
en
 a
 v
er
bo
 e
t p
ar
tic
ip
io
. A
dh
uc
 q
ui
a 
qu
ae
da
m
 v
ox
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 s
in
e 
te
m
po
re
 h
ab
et
 p
ar
te
m
 q
ua
e 
pe
r 
se
 a
liq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t, 
ut
 o
ra
tio
. 
Id
eo
 a
d 
di
ff
er
en
tia
m
 o
ra
tio
ni
s 
po
ni
tu
r 
is
ta
 p
ar
tic
ul
a,
 ‘
cu
iu
s 
nu
lla
 p
ar
s 
pe
r 
se
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
’, 
et
 
ce
te
ra
. U
nd
e 
qu
ia
 p
er
 p
ar
tic
ul
as
 p
os
ita
s i
n 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
po
nu
nt
ur
 
pa
rti
cu
la
e 
ill
ae
. 
Po
ni
tu
r 
na
m
 v
ox
 t
an
qu
am
 g
en
us
 e
t 
al
ia
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
e 
po
nu
nt
ur
 ta
nq
ua
m
 d
iff
er
en
tia
e.
 
  
 
 
In
 n
om
in
e 
en
im
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
eq
ui
fe
ru
s. 
Fe
ru
s 
ni
hi
l 
pe
r 
se
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t q
ue
m
ad
m
od
um
 in
 o
ra
tio
ne
 q
ua
e 
es
t e
qu
us
 fe
ru
s. 
A
t v
er
o 
no
n 
qu
em
ad
m
od
um
 in
 si
m
pl
ic
ib
us
 n
om
in
ib
us
 si
c 
se
 
ha
be
t 
et
 i
n 
co
m
po
si
tis
. 
In
 i
lli
s 
en
im
 n
ul
lo
 m
od
o 
pa
rs
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
es
t. 
In
 h
is 
au
te
m
 v
ul
t q
ui
de
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
es
se
 
se
d 
nu
lli
us
 e
st
 se
pa
ra
tim
, u
t i
n 
eo
 q
uo
d 
es
t e
qu
ife
ru
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Po
si
ta
 d
iff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 e
xe
qu
itu
r, 
de
cl
ar
an
do
 
du
as
 p
ar
tic
ul
as
 p
os
ita
s 
in
 h
ac
 d
iff
in
iti
on
e,
 s
ci
lic
et
 t
er
tia
m
 e
t 
ul
tim
am
. N
am
 d
ua
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
e 
pa
te
nt
 e
x 
pr
ae
ce
de
nt
ib
us
 e
x 
ho
c 
qu
od
 e
a 
qu
ae
 s
un
t 
in
 v
oc
e 
su
nt
 n
ot
ae
 p
as
si
on
um
 a
ni
m
ae
. 
Q
ua
rta
 p
ar
tic
ul
a 
pa
te
bi
t c
ap
itu
la
, d
e 
ve
rb
o.
 P
rim
o 
er
go
 d
ec
la
ra
t 
pa
rti
cu
la
m
 u
lti
m
am
, q
uo
d 
nu
lla
 p
ar
s 
no
m
in
is
 e
st
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
se
pa
ra
tim
, e
t h
ic
 e
st
 c
on
cl
us
io
 q
ui
nt
a 
hu
iu
s 
lib
ri,
 q
ui
 p
ro
ba
tu
r 
pe
r 
lo
cu
tio
 a
 m
ai
or
i 
si
c.
 S
i 
al
iq
ua
 p
ar
s 
no
m
in
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 
se
pa
ra
ti,
 
ho
c 
fo
re
t 
m
ax
im
e 
ve
ru
m
 
de
 
pa
rti
bu
s 
no
m
in
is
 
co
m
po
si
ti,
 
se
d 
pa
rte
s 
no
m
in
is
 
co
m
po
si
ti 
ni
hi
l 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
se
pa
ra
ti.
 Ig
itu
r n
ul
la
 p
ar
s 
no
m
in
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
se
pa
ra
ti.
 M
ai
or
 
pa
te
t. 
M
in
or
 
de
cl
ar
at
ur
, 
de
cl
ar
at
io
ne
 
ex
em
pl
ar
i 
si
c.
 
H
oc
 
no
m
en
, ‘
eq
ui
fe
ru
s’
, e
st
 n
om
en
 c
om
po
si
tu
m
, e
t n
ul
la
 p
ar
s 
hu
iu
s 
no
m
in
is
 s
ec
un
du
m
 q
uo
d 
es
t p
ar
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t a
liq
ui
d 
pe
r s
e,
 q
ui
a 
ne
c 
‘e
qu
us
’ 
ne
c 
‘f
er
us
’ 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
al
iq
ui
d 
se
cu
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
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pa
rs
 h
ui
us
 n
om
in
is
, ‘
eq
ui
fe
ru
s’
. D
iff
er
un
t t
am
en
 p
ar
s 
no
m
in
is
 
co
m
po
si
ti 
et
 
pa
rs
 
no
m
in
is
 
si
m
pl
ic
is
, 
qu
ia
 
pa
rs
 
no
m
in
is
 
si
m
pl
ic
is
 n
ec
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 a
liq
ui
d 
pe
r 
se
, 
ne
c 
ap
pe
re
t 
al
iq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
 p
er
 s
e.
 P
ar
s 
et
ia
m
 n
om
in
is
 s
im
pl
ic
is
 n
ec
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 
al
iq
ui
d 
in
 to
to
 c
ui
us
 e
st
 p
ar
s 
ne
c 
ex
tra
 to
tu
m
, s
ed
 p
ar
s 
no
m
in
is
 
co
m
po
si
ti 
vi
de
tu
r s
ig
ni
fic
ar
e 
al
iq
ui
d,
 e
t s
i n
on
 si
gn
ifi
ce
t a
liq
ui
d 
in
 to
to
 ta
m
en
 e
xt
ra
 to
tu
m
 si
gn
ifi
ca
t p
er
 se
. 
 
 
 
Se
cu
nd
um
 v
er
o 
pl
ac
itu
m
 q
ua
m
 n
at
ur
al
ite
r 
no
m
in
um
 n
ih
il 
es
t, 
se
d 
qu
an
do
 si
t n
ot
a.
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
lia
m
 p
ar
tic
ul
am
, s
ci
lic
et
 q
uo
d 
no
m
en
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
, 
de
cl
ar
at
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
, e
t h
ic
 e
st
 c
on
cl
us
io
 s
ex
ta
 h
ui
us
 l
ib
ri,
 e
t 
pr
ob
at
ur
  
du
pl
ic
ite
r. 
Pr
im
o 
os
te
ns
iv
e.
 S
ec
un
do
 p
er
 r
at
io
ne
 
du
ce
nt
em
 a
d 
im
po
ss
ib
ile
. P
rim
o 
si
c.
 I
llu
d 
qu
od
 n
on
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 
ni
si
 e
x 
ho
c 
qu
od
 s
it 
no
ta
 a
lte
riu
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
, q
ui
a 
qu
od
 f
ia
t n
ot
a 
ho
c 
es
t a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
, s
ed
 n
om
en
 e
st
 h
ui
us
m
od
i. 
Er
go
, e
t c
et
er
a.
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
am
 d
es
ig
na
nt
 e
t 
ill
ite
ra
ti 
so
ni
 v
t 
fe
ra
ru
m
. Q
uo
ru
m
 n
ih
il 
es
t n
om
en
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Se
cu
nd
o 
pr
ob
at
ur
 e
ad
em
 c
on
cl
us
io
 p
er
 i
m
po
ss
ib
ile
 s
ic
. 
Si
 
no
m
en
 n
on
 e
ss
et
 v
ox
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
, 
se
qu
er
et
ur
 
qu
od
 q
ua
ec
um
qu
e 
vo
x 
es
se
t 
in
di
ff
er
en
te
r 
no
m
en
, 
et
 s
ic
 s
on
i 
fe
ra
ru
m
 il
lit
er
at
i q
ui
 n
at
ur
al
ite
r 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 e
ss
en
t n
om
in
a,
 s
ed
 
ho
c 
es
t i
m
po
ss
ib
ile
. E
rg
o 
so
lu
m
 v
ox
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 
es
t n
om
en
. U
nd
e 
qu
ia
 v
oc
es
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
ae
 n
at
ur
al
ite
r n
on
 s
un
t 
no
m
in
a,
 c
ui
us
m
od
i 
su
nt
 s
on
i 
fe
ra
ru
m
 i
lli
te
ra
ti,
 s
ci
lic
et
 q
ui
 
lit
te
ris
 n
on
 p
os
su
nt
 s
cr
ib
i. 
Ex
 h
oc
 c
on
cl
ud
itu
r q
uo
d 
ill
ae
 v
oc
es
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qu
ae
 su
nt
 n
om
in
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
. 
 
 
 
Se
d 
hi
c 
oc
cu
rit
 q
ua
tto
r 
du
bi
a.
 P
rim
um
 e
st
 c
on
tra
 p
rim
am
 
pa
rti
cu
la
m
 d
iff
in
iti
on
is
 n
om
in
is
. N
on
 n
am
 v
id
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
no
m
en
 
si
t 
vo
x,
 q
ui
a 
om
ni
s 
vo
x 
es
t 
re
s 
na
tu
ra
lis
, 
et
 n
om
en
 e
st
 r
es
 
ar
tif
ic
ia
lis
, 
cu
m
 s
it 
fa
ct
um
 p
er
 i
nv
en
tio
ne
m
 h
om
in
um
 e
t 
pe
r 
ar
te
m
, 
se
d 
nu
lla
 r
es
 a
rti
fic
ia
lis
 e
st
 r
es
 n
at
ur
al
is
. 
Er
go
 h
ic
 e
st
 
fa
ls
a,
 ‘n
om
en
 e
st
 v
ox
’, 
si
cu
t i
st
a,
 ‘B
al
ne
um
 e
st
 a
qu
a’
. H
ic
 n
am
 
es
t f
al
sa
, s
ed
 is
ta
 e
st
 v
er
a,
 ‘B
al
en
eu
m
 e
st
 a
qu
eu
m
’. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 
vo
x 
es
t 
m
at
er
ia
 
no
m
in
is
, 
ig
itu
r 
no
n 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
de
 
no
m
in
e,
 q
ui
a 
pa
rs
 m
at
er
ia
lis
 n
on
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
 i
n 
re
ct
o 
de
 t
ot
o 
cu
iu
s e
st
 p
ar
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 v
id
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
om
ne
 n
om
en
 s
ig
ni
fic
et
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
, 
qu
ia
 g
em
itu
s 
et
 l
at
ra
tu
s 
et
 h
ui
us
m
od
i 
su
nt
 n
om
in
a,
 e
t 
ta
m
en
 
na
tu
ra
lit
er
. 
Er
go
 i
n 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
 m
al
e 
po
ni
tu
r 
ha
ec
 
pa
rti
cu
la
, ‘
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
’, 
cu
m
 n
on
 c
on
ve
ni
at
 o
m
ni
 
no
m
in
i. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 n
on
 v
id
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
om
ne
 n
om
en
 s
ig
ni
fic
et
 s
in
e 
te
m
po
re
, 
qu
ia
 ‘d
ie
s’
, ‘
no
x’
 e
t ‘
an
nu
s’
 su
nt
 n
om
in
a,
 e
t s
ig
ni
fic
an
t t
em
pu
s, 
et
 
pe
r 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
si
ne
 
te
m
po
re
, 
qu
ia
 
si
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
nt
 s
in
e 
te
m
po
re
, 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
nt
 s
in
e 
su
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
to
, 
qu
od
 e
st
 im
po
ss
ib
ile
. 
 
 
 
 
 
C
on
tra
 i
lla
m
 p
ar
tic
ul
am
, 
‘c
ui
us
 n
ul
la
 p
ar
s 
al
iq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t’,
 
ar
gu
itu
r s
ic
. A
liq
ui
d 
no
m
en
 c
om
po
ni
tu
r e
x 
m
ul
tis
 n
om
in
ib
us
 e
t 
no
m
in
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
, i
gi
tu
r 
pa
rs
 n
om
in
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t. 
M
ai
or
 e
st
 
ve
ra
, q
ui
a 
ca
pi
o 
ho
c 
no
m
en
, ‘
re
sp
ub
lic
a’
, p
ar
te
s 
is
tiu
s 
no
m
in
is
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si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
, 
qu
ia
 ‘
re
s’
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 e
t 
‘p
ub
lic
a’
 e
tia
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
. 
Er
go
, e
t c
et
er
a.
 
 
 
 
A
d 
pr
im
um
 d
ic
en
du
m
 u
no
 m
od
o 
qu
od
 v
ox
 q
ua
e 
po
ni
tu
r 
in
 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
 e
st
 in
di
ff
er
en
s 
ad
 v
oc
em
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
te
m
 a
d 
pl
ac
itu
m
 e
t 
ad
 v
oc
em
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
te
m
 n
at
ur
al
ite
r, 
al
ite
r 
fr
us
tra
 
po
ne
re
tu
r 
in
 d
iff
in
iti
on
e 
ill
a 
pa
rti
cu
la
, ‘
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
’, 
et
 it
a 
ill
a 
vo
x 
po
si
ta
 i
n 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
ne
c 
es
t 
re
s 
na
tu
ra
lis
 n
ec
 a
rti
fic
ia
lis
, 
se
d 
in
di
ff
er
en
s 
ad
 
ut
ru
m
qu
e,
 
si
cu
t 
in
 
an
im
al
 
in
 
cu
iu
s 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
si
c 
di
ci
tu
r, 
‘s
ub
ie
ct
a 
an
im
at
a 
se
ns
ib
ili
s’
, 
ne
c 
es
t 
ho
m
o 
ne
c 
as
in
us
 s
ed
 e
st
 i
nd
iff
er
en
s 
ad
 u
tra
m
qu
e,
 s
ci
lic
et
 a
d 
om
ne
m
 s
pe
ci
em
 e
t i
nd
iv
id
ui
 a
ni
m
al
is
, e
t s
ic
 v
ox
 q
ua
e 
po
ni
tu
r 
in
 d
iff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
 n
ec
 e
st
 re
s 
na
tu
ra
lis
 n
ec
 a
rti
fic
ia
lis
, s
ed
 
es
t 
ge
nu
s 
ut
ru
m
qu
e.
 P
er
 h
oc
 n
am
 p
at
et
 s
ec
un
du
m
 d
ub
iu
m
, 
qu
am
 v
ox
 q
ua
e 
po
ni
tu
r 
in
 d
iff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
 e
st
 c
om
m
un
is
 
ad
 n
om
en
 e
t a
d 
m
at
er
ia
m
 n
om
in
is
, e
t n
on
 e
st
 m
at
er
ia
 n
om
in
is
. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
lit
er
 p
ot
es
t 
di
ci
 q
uo
d 
si
cu
t 
ho
c 
co
m
m
un
e 
no
m
en
 q
uo
d 
hi
c 
di
ff
in
itu
r 
es
t 
re
s 
ar
tif
ic
ia
lis
, 
qu
ia
 
si
t 
pe
r 
in
st
itu
tio
ne
m
 
im
po
ne
nt
is
, 
ita
 h
oc
 c
om
m
un
e 
vo
x 
po
si
tu
m
 i
n 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
 e
st
 re
s 
ar
tif
ic
ia
lis
, q
ui
a 
si
t p
er
 in
te
nt
io
ne
m
 h
om
in
is
, e
t 
no
n 
se
qu
itu
r q
uo
d 
re
s 
ar
tif
ic
ia
lis
 p
ra
ed
ic
et
ur
 d
e 
re
 n
at
ur
al
i, 
se
d 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r a
rti
fic
ia
le
 d
e 
ar
tif
ic
ia
li.
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
dh
uc
 p
ot
es
t 
di
ci
 a
lit
er
, q
uo
d 
qu
am
vi
s 
no
m
en
 s
it 
no
m
en
 p
er
 
in
st
itu
tio
ne
m
 i
m
po
ne
nt
is
, 
ta
m
en
 n
on
 e
st
 r
es
 a
rti
fic
ia
lis
, 
qu
ia
 
pe
r 
ho
c 
qu
od
 in
st
itu
tit
ur
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 n
ul
la
 r
es
 a
rti
fic
ia
lis
 
si
bi
 in
ha
er
en
s 
ac
qu
iri
tu
r. 
R
es
 n
am
 n
at
ur
al
is
 p
re
su
pp
on
ita
 o
m
ni
 
im
po
si
tio
ni
 i
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ad
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
du
m
. 
U
nd
e 
si
cu
t 
si
gn
um
 
qu
od
 
es
t 
re
s 
na
tu
ra
lis
, 
pu
ta
 
ci
rc
ul
us
, 
po
te
st
 
in
st
itu
ti 
ad
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si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 
vi
nu
m
 
in
 
ta
be
rn
a,
 
ita
 
vo
x 
na
tu
ra
lis
 
po
te
st
 
in
st
itu
ti 
ad
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
du
m
 a
bs
qu
e 
ho
c,
 q
uo
d 
al
iq
ua
 fo
rm
a 
no
va
 
si
bi
 a
cq
ui
ra
tu
r, 
et
 s
ec
un
du
m
 h
oc
 h
ae
c 
es
se
t 
ne
ga
nd
a,
 ‘
no
m
en
 
es
t r
es
 a
rti
fic
ia
lis
’. 
Si
 q
ui
s 
ta
m
en
 v
el
it 
di
ce
re
 q
uo
d 
ex
 h
oc
 q
uo
d 
vo
x 
im
po
ni
tu
r 
ad
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 
ac
qu
iri
tu
r 
vo
ci
 
qu
id
am
 
re
sp
ec
tu
s 
ad
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
du
m
, 
ita
 q
uo
d 
no
m
en
 e
st
 q
uo
dd
am
 
ag
gr
eg
at
um
 e
x 
vo
ce
 e
t 
ex
 r
es
pe
ct
um
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
, 
si
c 
di
ce
ns
 h
ab
et
 d
ic
er
e 
qu
od
 n
om
en
 e
st
 r
es
 a
rti
fic
ia
lis
, 
ne
c 
es
t 
in
co
nv
en
ie
ns
 n
om
en
 re
i n
at
ur
al
is
 p
ra
ed
ic
ar
i i
n 
re
ct
o 
de
 n
om
in
e 
re
i 
ar
tif
ic
ia
lis
 a
cc
ep
to
 i
n 
co
nc
re
to
. S
ub
ie
ct
um
 v
er
o 
ac
ci
de
nt
is
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
de
 a
cc
id
en
te
 a
cc
ep
to
 i
n 
co
nc
re
to
, 
ut
 p
at
et
. 
H
ae
c 
en
im
 e
st
 v
er
a,
 ‘
si
m
us
 e
st
 n
as
us
 c
on
ca
vu
s’
, 
et
 q
uo
dd
am
m
od
o 
po
te
st
 c
on
ce
di
 q
uo
d 
di
sc
us
 e
st
 li
gn
um
 s
ic
 v
el
 s
ic
 fi
gu
ra
tu
m
. E
t 
qu
ia
 h
ae
c 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
da
tu
r 
de
 n
om
in
e 
su
m
pt
o 
in
 c
on
cr
et
o,
 id
eo
 
po
te
st
 m
at
er
ia
 n
om
in
is
, s
ci
lic
et
 v
ox
 q
ua
e 
es
t r
es
 n
at
ur
al
is
 v
er
e 
po
te
st
 p
ra
ed
ic
ar
i i
n 
re
ct
o 
de
 n
om
in
is
 q
uo
d 
es
t r
es
 a
rti
fic
ia
lis
. 
 
 
 
Se
d 
di
ce
re
t 
fo
rte
 a
liq
ui
s 
qu
od
 n
om
en
 h
ic
 d
iff
in
itu
r 
es
t 
re
s 
na
tu
ra
lis
, 
qu
ia
 n
om
in
i 
pr
ae
su
pp
os
ito
 i
m
po
ni
 c
om
pe
tit
 h
ae
c 
di
ff
in
iti
o,
 ‘
vo
x 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
’, 
et
 q
ui
a 
ill
ud
 q
uo
d 
pr
ae
su
pp
on
itu
r i
m
po
ni
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 e
st
 re
s 
na
tu
ra
lis
, e
rg
o 
et
 c
et
er
a.
 D
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
vo
x 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ac
ci
pi
 p
ot
es
t 
pr
o 
m
at
er
ia
li 
in
 
te
m
po
re
 
or
at
io
ni
s 
qu
od
 
qu
id
em
 
m
at
er
ia
le
 
pr
ae
su
pp
on
itu
r 
im
po
ni
, 
ve
l 
po
te
st
 a
cc
ip
i 
pr
o 
ag
gr
eg
at
o 
ex
 
m
at
er
ia
li 
no
m
in
e 
et
 r
es
pe
ct
u 
ad
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
du
m
. 
Pr
im
o 
m
od
o 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r d
e 
vo
ce
 q
ua
e 
es
t r
es
 n
at
ur
al
is
, e
t s
ic
 n
on
 p
on
itu
r i
n 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
, s
ed
 s
ol
um
 p
ro
ut
 a
cc
ip
ut
ur
 p
ro
 a
gg
re
ga
to
 
ex
 m
at
er
ia
li 
in
 p
ar
te
 o
ra
tio
ni
s e
t e
x 
re
sp
ec
tu
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
d 
te
rti
um
 
du
bi
um
 
di
ce
nd
um
 
qu
od
 
ge
m
itu
s, 
la
tra
tu
s 
et
 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
po
ss
un
t 
ac
ci
pi
 m
at
er
ia
lit
er
 v
el
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e.
 S
i 
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m
at
er
ia
lit
er
, s
ic
 h
ae
c 
es
t v
er
a,
 ‘
la
tra
tu
s 
es
t n
om
en
 e
t s
ig
ni
fic
at
 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
’, 
et
 h
oc
 n
om
en
, 
‘la
tra
tu
s’
 s
iv
e 
ho
c 
m
at
er
ia
le
, 
‘la
tra
tu
s’
, 
ita
 b
en
e 
po
tu
it 
fu
is
se
 i
m
po
si
tu
m
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
 
ho
m
in
em
 v
el
 a
si
nu
s, 
si
cu
t 
ad
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
du
m
 i
d 
qu
od
 m
od
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t, 
et
 si
c 
ha
ec
 e
ss
et
 fa
ls
a,
 ‘l
at
ra
tu
s n
at
ur
al
ite
r s
ig
ni
fic
at
’. 
Si
 a
ut
em
 s
um
an
tu
r 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
no
m
in
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e,
 s
ic
 s
un
t 
ha
e 
pr
op
os
iti
on
es
 f
al
sa
e:
 ‘
la
tra
tu
s 
es
t 
no
m
en
’, 
‘g
em
itu
s 
es
t 
no
m
en
’, 
qu
ia
 s
ic
 a
cc
ip
itu
r, 
‘g
em
itu
s’
 p
ro
 v
oc
e 
qu
am
 h
om
o 
pr
of
er
t, 
et
 il
la
 v
ox
 n
on
 e
st
 n
om
en
, e
t s
ic
 h
ui
us
m
od
i s
un
t v
er
ae
: 
‘la
tra
tu
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t n
at
ur
al
ite
r’
, ‘
ge
m
itu
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t n
at
ur
al
ite
r’
, 
et
 si
c 
de
 a
lii
s. 
 
 
 
A
d 
al
iu
d 
du
bi
um
 d
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
ill
ud
 d
ic
tu
m
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
i, 
no
m
en
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 s
in
e 
te
m
po
re
, 
si
c 
in
te
lli
gi
tu
r 
qu
od
 n
om
en
 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
su
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
um
 u
t 
m
en
su
ra
tu
r 
al
iq
ua
 c
er
ta
 
m
en
su
ra
 v
el
 d
iff
er
en
tia
 t
em
po
ris
, 
et
 h
oc
 e
st
 s
ig
ni
fic
ar
e 
si
ne
 
te
m
po
re
 ta
m
qu
am
 s
in
e 
su
o 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
o,
 q
ui
a 
te
m
pu
s 
no
n 
es
t 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
um
 n
om
in
is
 c
um
 n
on
 a
cc
id
at
 n
om
in
i. 
D
ic
o 
ig
itu
r 
qu
od
 ‘
no
x’
 e
t 
‘d
ie
s’
 e
t 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 t
em
pu
s 
et
 n
on
 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
te
m
pu
s. 
N
am
 
‘d
ie
s’
 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
su
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
m
 u
t m
en
su
ra
tu
r a
liq
ua
 c
er
ta
 m
en
su
ra
 se
u 
di
ff
er
en
tia
 
te
m
po
ris
, 
si
cu
t 
‘c
ur
re
re
’ 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
cu
rs
um
 
et
 
m
en
su
ra
tu
r 
te
m
po
re
, 
se
d 
‘d
ie
s’
 e
t 
‘n
ox
’ 
et
 h
ui
us
m
od
i 
su
nt
 a
bs
tra
ct
a 
ab
 
om
ni
 d
iff
er
en
tia
 te
m
po
ris
. U
nd
e 
hu
iu
sm
od
i n
om
in
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
te
m
pu
s 
se
d 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 c
um
 t
em
po
re
, 
et
 q
ua
nd
o 
in
fe
rtu
r 
tu
nc
 q
uo
d 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
no
m
in
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 s
in
e 
su
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
to
, 
di
co
 
ig
itu
r 
qu
od
 
se
cu
nd
um
 
qu
od
 
‘s
in
e’
 
pr
iv
at
 
so
lu
m
 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
um
, 
si
c 
co
nc
ed
o 
qu
od
 ‘
di
es
’ 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
si
ne
 s
uo
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
to
 t
am
qu
am
 s
in
e 
su
o 
ac
ci
de
nt
e,
 q
ui
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
m
 
su
um
 n
on
 e
st
 su
um
 a
cc
id
en
s. 
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A
d 
al
iu
d 
po
te
st
 d
ic
i 
qu
od
 n
ul
lu
m
 n
om
en
 p
ot
es
t 
di
ci
 p
ar
s 
no
m
in
is
. 
Si
cu
t 
en
im
 u
nu
s 
ho
m
o 
no
n 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ex
 p
lu
rib
us
 
ho
m
in
ib
us
, 
ita
 
ne
c 
un
um
 
no
m
en
 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ex
 
pl
ur
ib
us
 
no
m
in
ib
us
. 
D
ic
itu
r 
ta
m
en
 c
om
po
si
tu
m
 q
ui
a 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ex
 
m
at
er
ia
lib
us
 p
lu
riu
m
 n
om
in
um
. U
nd
e 
ho
c 
no
m
en
, ‘
re
sp
ub
lic
a’
, 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r e
x 
m
at
er
ia
li 
et
 h
oc
 n
om
en
, ‘
re
s’
, e
t e
x 
m
at
er
ia
li 
et
 
ho
c 
no
m
en
, ‘
pu
bl
ic
a’
, e
t n
on
 c
om
po
ni
tu
r e
x 
is
tis
 n
om
in
ib
us
. S
i 
qu
is
 n
am
 v
el
it 
di
ce
re
 q
uo
d 
no
m
en
 c
om
po
si
tu
m
 c
om
po
nt
iu
r 
ex
 
pl
ur
ib
us
 n
om
in
ib
us
  s
im
pl
ic
ib
us
, d
eb
et
 d
ic
er
e 
qu
od
 a
liq
ua
 p
ar
s 
no
m
in
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 p
er
 s
e 
et
 n
on
 s
ec
un
du
m
 e
st
 p
ar
s 
no
m
in
is
 
ill
iu
s, 
et
 h
oc
 in
te
lli
gi
t h
ic
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
, e
t t
ex
tu
s s
on
at
. <
k5
va
> 
 
 
 
 
 
N
on
 h
om
o 
ve
ro
 n
on
 e
st
 n
om
en
. 
A
t 
ve
ro
 n
ec
 i
m
po
sit
um
 
no
m
en
 e
st
 e
i q
uo
 il
lu
d 
op
or
te
at
 a
pe
lla
ri
. N
eq
ue
 e
ni
m
 o
ra
tio
 
au
t n
eg
at
io
 e
st
, s
ed
 si
t n
om
en
 in
fin
itu
m
. 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ae
c 
es
t 
se
cu
nd
a 
pa
rti
cu
la
 p
rim
ae
 p
ar
tis
, i
n 
qu
a 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 
re
m
ov
et
 q
ua
ed
am
 a
 r
at
io
ne
 n
om
in
is
 q
ua
e 
ap
pa
re
nt
 n
om
in
a 
et
 
no
n 
su
nt
 n
om
in
a,
 e
t h
oc
 s
ec
un
du
m
 q
uo
d 
di
ci
t B
oe
th
iu
s 
es
t u
t 
in
te
ge
rr
im
a 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
no
m
in
is
 
ha
be
at
ur
 
et
 
su
nt
 
du
o 
qu
ae
 
re
m
ov
et
 a
 r
at
io
ne
 n
om
in
is
, s
ci
lic
et
 n
om
en
 in
fin
itu
m
 e
t n
om
en
 
ob
liq
uu
m
. E
t p
rim
o 
re
m
ov
et
 n
om
en
 in
fin
itu
m
, d
ic
en
s q
uo
d 
no
n 
ho
m
o 
no
n 
es
t n
om
en
 n
ec
 e
st
 n
om
en
 e
i i
m
po
si
tu
m
 q
uo
 o
po
rte
at
 
ill
ud
 a
pp
el
la
ri,
 n
ec
 e
st
 a
ff
irm
at
io
 n
ec
 n
eg
at
io
, 
se
d 
si
t 
no
m
en
 
in
fin
itu
m
. 
H
oc
 e
st
 i
m
po
nt
au
r 
si
bi
 e
t 
om
ni
bu
s 
co
ns
im
ili
bu
s 
no
m
en
 e
t 
vo
ce
tu
r 
no
m
en
 i
nf
in
itu
m
. 
C
au
sa
m
 a
ut
em
 p
ro
pt
er
 
qu
am
 n
om
en
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 n
on
 e
st
 n
om
en
 a
ss
ig
na
vi
t 
B
oe
th
iu
s, 
di
ce
ns
 q
uo
d 
om
ne
 n
om
en
 u
na
m
 r
em
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 d
et
er
m
in
at
am
, 
qu
i 
ve
ro
 
di
ci
t 
no
n 
ho
m
o 
no
n 
hu
nc
 
ho
m
in
em
 
qu
od
 
ta
lis
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ne
c 
qu
od
 i
lla
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
e 
ve
lit
 o
st
en
de
re
 o
m
ni
 
ra
tio
ne
 n
on
 d
iff
in
it 
se
u 
no
n 
os
te
nd
it.
 H
ae
c 
ig
itu
r v
id
et
ur
 c
au
sa
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qu
am
 a
ss
ig
na
t B
oe
th
iu
s q
ua
re
 n
om
en
 in
fin
itu
m
 n
on
 e
st
 n
om
en
, 
qu
ia
 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
re
m
 
de
te
rm
in
at
am
, 
se
d 
ve
rif
ic
at
ur
 
in
di
ff
er
en
te
r 
pr
o 
om
ni
 e
nt
e 
et
 n
on
 e
nt
e,
 e
t d
e 
qu
ol
ib
et
 a
lio
 a
b 
eo
  
qu
od
 i
nf
in
ita
tu
r 
pe
r 
ne
ga
tio
ne
m
 i
nf
in
ita
nt
em
. 
D
ic
it 
na
m
 
B
oe
th
iu
s 
qu
od
 n
eg
at
io
 in
fin
ita
ns
 p
ra
es
en
te
m
 n
at
ur
am
 in
te
rim
it 
cu
m
 a
dd
itu
r 
ne
ga
tio
 i
nf
in
ita
ns
, i
nf
in
ita
ns
 a
lia
s 
de
re
lin
qu
it.
 E
t 
ex
 h
oc
 d
en
ot
at
ur
 q
uo
d 
no
m
in
a 
tra
ns
ce
nd
en
tia
 n
on
 p
on
un
t 
in
fin
ita
ri,
 q
ui
a 
si
 i
nf
in
ita
re
nt
ur
 n
ul
la
 n
at
ur
a 
de
 r
el
in
qu
er
et
ur
. 
U
nd
e 
ac
ci
pi
en
do
 e
ns
 i
n 
su
a 
m
ax
im
a 
co
m
m
un
ita
te
, 
ut
 e
st
 
co
m
m
un
e 
ad
 o
m
ne
 in
te
lli
gi
bi
le
, s
ic
 n
on
 p
ot
es
t i
nf
in
ita
ri.
 U
nd
e 
no
n 
en
s, 
ut
 
no
n 
ca
di
t 
su
pe
r 
en
s 
co
m
m
un
is
si
m
um
 
ni
hi
l 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ne
c 
de
 a
liq
uo
 v
er
ifi
ca
tu
r 
si
ve
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
, 
ne
c 
es
t 
in
fin
itu
m
 n
ec
 in
fin
itu
m
, s
ed
 e
st
 v
ox
 n
on
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a.
 T
am
en
 
en
s 
ex
is
te
ns
 q
uo
d 
so
lu
m
 v
er
ifi
ca
tu
r d
e 
ex
is
te
nt
ib
us
 b
en
e 
po
te
st
 
in
fin
ita
ri,
 
qu
ia
 
ip
so
 
in
fin
ita
to
 
re
lin
qu
un
tu
r 
al
ia
e 
na
tu
ra
e 
po
ss
ib
ile
s, 
qu
am
vi
s n
on
 re
lin
qu
at
ur
 a
liq
ua
 n
at
ur
a 
ex
is
te
ns
 a
ct
u.
 
 
 
 
C
at
on
is
 a
ut
em
 v
el
 c
at
on
i e
t q
ua
ec
um
qu
e 
ta
lia
 su
nt
 n
on
 su
nt
 
no
m
in
a 
se
d 
ca
su
s 
no
m
in
um
. 
R
at
io
 a
ut
em
 e
iu
s 
in
 a
lii
s 
qu
id
em
 e
ad
em
 e
st
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Se
cu
nd
o 
re
m
ov
et
 n
om
in
a 
al
iq
ua
 a
 ra
tio
ne
 n
om
in
is
, d
ic
en
s q
uo
d 
ca
to
ni
s 
et
 c
at
on
em
 n
on
 s
un
t 
no
m
in
a 
et
 s
im
ili
a,
 s
ed
 c
as
us
 
no
m
in
um
. 
R
at
io
 t
am
en
 n
om
in
is
 i
n 
al
iis
 e
st
 e
ad
em
. 
H
ae
c 
es
t 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
no
m
in
is
 s
up
er
iu
s 
 p
os
ita
 e
st
 e
ad
em
 in
 o
bl
iq
ui
s, 
qu
ia
 
co
m
pe
tit
 n
om
in
ib
us
 o
bl
iq
ui
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Se
d 
di
ff
er
un
t 
qu
am
 c
um
 e
st
 v
el
 f
ui
t 
ve
l 
er
it 
ad
iu
nc
tu
m
 
ne
qu
e 
ve
ru
m
 n
eq
ue
 f
al
su
m
 e
st
. 
N
om
en
 v
er
o 
se
m
pe
r 
ut
 
ca
to
ni
s 
es
t v
el
 n
on
 e
st
. N
on
du
m
 e
ni
m
 a
liq
ui
s 
ne
qu
e 
ve
ru
m
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ne
qu
e 
di
ci
t f
al
su
m
. 
 
 
 
O
st
en
di
t 
qu
od
 n
om
in
a 
ob
liq
ua
 n
on
 s
un
t 
no
m
in
a 
qu
am
vi
s 
ei
s 
co
nv
en
ia
t 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
no
m
in
is
 s
up
ra
di
ct
a,
 e
t 
ha
ec
 e
s 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
se
pt
em
 h
ui
us
 li
br
i, 
qu
ae
 p
ro
ba
tu
r s
ic
. E
x 
qu
ol
ib
et
 n
om
in
e 
et
 e
x 
ho
c 
ve
rb
o,
 ‘e
st
’ v
el
 ‘f
ui
t’ 
ve
l ‘
er
it’
, c
on
st
itu
tu
r o
ra
tio
 v
er
um
 v
el
 
fa
ls
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
s, 
se
d 
ex
 h
oc
 n
om
in
e,
 ‘
ol
bi
qu
o’
, 
et
 e
x 
ho
c 
ve
rb
o,
 ‘e
st
’, 
ve
l h
oc
 v
er
bo
, ‘
fu
it’
, v
el
 e
x 
ho
c 
ve
rb
o,
 ‘e
rit
’, 
no
n 
co
ns
tit
ut
ur
 
or
at
io
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ns
 
ve
ru
m
 
ve
l 
fa
ls
um
, 
ut
 
pa
te
t 
ex
em
pl
ar
ite
r. 
Si
 n
am
 d
ic
at
ur
, ‘
C
at
on
is
 e
st
’ v
el
 ‘<
C
at
on
is
> 
fu
it’
 
ve
l 
‘<
C
at
on
is
> 
er
it’
, 
no
n 
es
t 
or
at
io
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
s 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 
fa
ls
um
. E
rg
o 
‘C
at
on
is
’ 
no
n 
es
t 
no
m
en
, e
t 
ea
de
m
 r
at
io
 e
st
 d
e 
al
iis
 o
bl
iq
ui
s. 
D
e 
ha
c 
ra
tio
ne
 p
on
itu
r 
m
in
or
 i
n 
lit
te
ra
 c
um
 
di
ci
tu
r 
qu
od
 d
iff
er
t o
bl
iq
uu
s 
a 
re
ct
o 
qu
am
 e
x 
ho
c 
ve
rb
o,
 ‘f
ui
t’ 
ve
l ‘
er
it’
, e
t o
bl
iq
uo
 n
on
 si
t o
ra
tio
 v
er
a 
ve
l f
al
sa
. 
 
 
 
 
 
N
ot
an
du
m
 q
uo
d 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 s
ig
na
nt
er
 i
nd
uc
it 
ex
em
pl
um
 d
e 
ve
rb
o 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
o 
cu
iu
sm
od
i e
st
 h
oc
 v
er
bu
m
, ‘
es
t’,
 e
t s
un
t h
ae
c 
ve
rb
a 
‘f
ui
t’ 
ve
l ‘
er
it’
, q
ua
e 
su
nt
 su
a 
ob
liq
ua
, q
ui
a 
su
nt
 q
ua
ed
am
 
al
ia
 v
er
ba
, s
ci
lic
et
 im
pe
rs
on
al
ia
 q
ua
e 
cu
m
 o
bl
iq
ui
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
, u
t c
um
 d
ic
itu
r ‘
Pe
ni
te
t m
e’
, q
ui
a 
ac
tu
s 
ve
rb
i 
in
te
lli
gi
tu
r 
fie
ri 
su
pe
r 
ob
liq
uu
m
, 
ac
 s
i 
di
ce
re
tu
r 
‘P
en
ite
nt
ia
 
ha
be
t m
e’
. 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ic
 o
cc
ur
un
t q
ua
ed
am
 d
ub
ia
, q
ui
a 
pr
im
o 
vi
de
tu
r 
qu
od
 n
om
en
 
in
fin
itu
m
, e
t n
om
en
 o
bl
iq
uu
m
 s
un
t n
om
in
a,
 q
ui
a 
ei
s 
co
m
pe
tit
 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
no
m
in
is
 s
up
er
iu
s 
po
si
ta
, 
et
 h
oc
 d
ic
it 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 
ex
pr
es
se
 in
 te
xt
u 
de
 n
om
in
ib
us
 o
bl
iq
ui
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 v
id
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
ra
tio
 B
oe
th
ii 
no
n 
va
le
t p
er
 q
ua
m
 d
ic
it 
qu
od
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no
m
en
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 n
on
 e
st
 n
om
en
, 
qu
ia
 s
i 
ra
tio
 s
ua
 v
al
er
et
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
qu
ia
 n
on
 d
ic
it 
al
iq
ua
m
 r
em
 d
et
er
m
in
at
am
, 
se
qu
er
et
ur
 
qu
od
 n
om
in
a 
tra
ns
ce
nd
en
tia
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
liq
ua
m
 r
em
 
de
te
rm
in
at
am
 n
on
 e
ss
en
t 
no
m
in
a,
 q
ui
a 
co
m
m
un
is
 e
t 
m
ag
is
 
in
de
te
rm
in
at
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 q
ua
m
 n
om
en
 in
fin
itu
m
, u
t q
ua
m
 n
on
 
ho
m
o,
 s
ed
 h
ui
us
m
od
i 
tra
ns
ce
de
nt
ia
 s
un
t 
no
m
in
a.
 E
rg
o 
ra
tio
 
B
oe
th
ii 
no
n 
va
le
t p
er
 q
ua
m
 d
ic
it 
qu
od
 n
om
en
 in
fin
itu
m
 n
on
 e
st
 
no
m
en
, e
t c
et
er
a.
 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 v
id
et
ur
 <
k5
vb
> 
qu
od
 e
x 
no
m
in
e 
ob
liq
uo
 e
t e
x 
ho
c 
ve
rb
o,
 
‘e
st
’, 
po
ss
it 
fie
ri 
or
at
io
 si
gn
ifi
ca
ns
 v
er
um
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
, q
ui
a 
ha
ec
 
es
t 
ve
ra
, 
‘C
at
on
is
 e
st
 g
en
iti
vi
 c
as
us
’, 
et
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
ve
ra
 p
er
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
um
, ‘
C
at
on
is
 n
on
 e
st
 n
om
en
’, 
et
 ta
m
en
 c
on
st
iti
tu
r i
st
a 
or
at
io
 e
x 
no
m
in
e 
ob
liq
uo
 e
t v
er
bo
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 h
ae
c 
vi
de
tu
r 
ve
ra
 v
el
 f
al
sa
, ‘
C
at
on
is
 e
st
’, 
qu
ia
 s
eq
ui
tu
r, 
‘C
at
on
is
 e
st
 a
si
nu
s, 
ig
itu
r 
C
at
on
is
 e
st
 e
ns
’, 
et
 a
nt
ec
ed
en
s 
es
t 
ve
ru
m
 s
up
po
si
to
 q
uo
d 
C
at
o 
ha
be
at
 a
si
nu
m
, e
t p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
ex
 n
om
in
e 
ob
liq
uo
 e
t e
x 
ve
rb
o,
 ‘e
st
’, 
co
ns
tit
ui
tu
r o
ra
tio
 v
er
um
 
et
 fa
ls
um
 si
gn
ifi
ca
ns
. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
d 
pr
im
um
, 
di
ce
nd
um
 s
ec
un
du
m
 q
uo
d 
di
ci
t 
B
oe
th
iu
s 
qu
od
 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
no
m
in
is
 s
up
er
iu
s 
po
si
ta
 n
on
 e
st
 c
om
pl
et
a 
as
si
gn
at
a 
ne
c 
in
te
gr
a 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
no
m
in
is
, 
et
 
id
eo
 
ad
 
co
m
pl
en
du
m
 
di
ff
in
iti
on
em
 n
om
in
is
 e
xc
lu
di
t 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 a
 r
at
io
ne
 n
om
in
is
 
co
m
pl
et
a 
no
m
en
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 e
t 
no
m
en
 o
bl
iq
uu
m
, u
t 
di
ff
in
iti
on
i 
no
m
in
is
 d
ic
ta
e 
ad
da
nt
ur
 is
ta
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
e 
fin
ita
 e
t r
ec
ta
, e
t i
st
is
 
pa
rti
cu
lis
 p
os
iti
s 
in
 d
iff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
 is
ta
 d
iff
in
iti
o 
no
m
in
is
 
in
 q
ua
 p
on
un
tu
r 
is
ta
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
e 
no
n 
co
m
pe
tit
 n
om
in
i i
nf
in
ito
, 
ne
c 
no
m
in
i o
bl
iq
uo
. 
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A
d 
al
iu
d,
 d
ic
en
du
m
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 s
ol
a 
no
n 
ca
us
a 
qu
ar
e 
no
m
en
 
in
fin
itu
m
 n
on
 si
t n
om
en
, s
ci
lic
et
 q
ui
a 
no
m
en
 si
gn
ifi
ca
t a
liq
ua
m
 
re
m
 d
et
er
m
in
at
am
 s
eu
 s
pe
ci
al
em
, 
se
d 
qu
ia
 n
om
en
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 
in
te
rm
it 
un
am
 
na
tu
ra
m
 
et
 
no
n 
po
ni
t 
al
ia
m
 
na
tu
ra
m
 
de
te
rm
in
at
am
, 
se
d 
de
re
lin
qu
it 
in
fin
ita
s 
al
ia
s 
a 
na
tu
ra
 q
ua
m
 
in
te
rm
it.
 
U
nd
e 
ad
 
ho
c 
qu
od
 
al
iq
ui
d 
si
t 
no
m
en
 
in
fin
itu
m
 
re
qu
iru
nt
ur
 d
ua
e 
co
nd
iti
on
es
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
qu
od
 i
nt
er
im
at
 u
na
m
 
na
tu
ra
m
 e
t n
ul
la
m
 p
on
at
 d
et
er
m
in
at
am
 n
at
ur
am
, s
ed
 n
on
 si
c 
es
t 
de
 
no
m
in
ib
us
 
tra
ns
ce
nd
en
tib
us
, 
qu
ia
 
qu
am
vi
s 
no
n 
po
na
nt
 
al
iq
ua
m
 n
at
ur
am
, n
ul
la
m
 ta
m
en
 n
at
ur
am
 in
te
rm
it,
 s
ed
 n
on
 s
ic
 
es
t d
e 
no
m
in
e 
in
fin
ito
. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
liq
ui
 d
ic
un
t 
qu
od
 n
om
en
 o
bl
iq
uu
m
 e
t 
no
m
en
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 n
on
 
su
nt
 n
om
in
a 
pr
in
ci
pa
lit
er
, 
se
d 
se
cu
nd
ar
io
 e
t 
ex
 c
on
se
qu
en
ti 
be
ne
 s
un
t 
no
m
in
a.
 N
am
 i
m
po
si
tio
 s
it 
in
 r
ec
to
, 
et
 n
om
en
 
in
fin
itu
m
 p
rin
ci
pa
lit
er
 i
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ad
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
du
m
, e
t 
ex
 h
oc
 
qu
od
 n
om
en
 f
in
itu
m
 e
t 
re
ct
us
 p
rin
ci
pa
lit
er
 i
m
po
nu
nt
ur
 a
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nd
um
, 
im
po
nu
nt
ur
 e
t 
se
cu
nd
ar
io
 n
om
en
 o
bl
iq
uu
m
 e
t 
no
m
en
 in
fin
itu
m
. 
 
 
 
 
 
A
d 
al
iu
d 
di
co
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 e
st
 c
on
gr
ua
, 
‘C
at
on
is
 e
st
 g
en
iti
vi
 
ca
su
s’
, s
ec
un
du
m
 q
uo
d 
ly
 ‘
C
at
on
is
’ 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r 
 m
at
er
ia
lit
er
, e
t 
si
c 
ha
be
t 
ra
tio
ne
m
 
no
m
in
is
 
re
ct
e 
su
pp
on
en
tis
 
pr
o 
se
ip
so
 
ac
ce
pt
o 
in
 o
bl
iq
uo
. 
U
nd
e 
cu
m
 d
ic
itu
r 
‘C
at
on
is
 e
st
 g
en
iti
vi
 
ca
su
s’
, 
ly
 ‘
C
at
on
is
’ 
su
pp
on
it 
m
at
er
ia
lit
er
 e
t 
ha
be
t 
ra
tio
ne
m
 
no
m
in
at
iv
i 
ca
su
s, 
et
 
se
ns
us
 
hu
iu
s 
es
t 
is
te
, 
‘h
oc
 
no
m
en
, 
‘C
at
on
is
’ 
es
t g
en
iti
vi
 c
as
us
’. 
Et
 s
i d
ic
at
ur
 q
uo
d 
ea
de
m
 r
at
io
ne
 
hi
c 
er
it 
co
ng
ru
a,
 
‘C
at
on
is
 
cu
rr
it’
, 
ac
ci
pi
en
do
 
‘C
at
on
is
’ 
m
at
er
ia
lit
er
, d
ic
en
du
m
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
si
c 
di
ce
nd
o,
 ‘
C
at
on
is
 c
ur
rit
’, 
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no
n 
po
te
st
 l
y 
‘C
at
on
is
’ 
su
m
i 
m
at
er
ia
lit
er
, 
qu
ia
 s
up
po
si
tio
 
di
ci
tu
r 
an
al
og
ic
e 
de
 s
up
po
si
tio
ne
 m
at
er
ia
li 
et
 s
up
po
si
tio
ne
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a.
 S
up
po
si
tio
 m
at
er
ia
lis
 e
st
 s
up
po
si
tio
 s
ec
un
da
ria
 e
t 
m
in
us
 p
ro
pr
ia
, e
t i
de
o 
te
rm
in
us
 n
on
 s
up
po
ni
t m
at
er
ia
lit
er
 n
is
i 
qu
an
do
 c
om
pa
ra
tu
r 
al
ic
ui
 p
ar
tic
ul
ae
 s
ec
un
du
m
 s
up
po
si
tio
ne
m
 
m
at
er
ia
le
m
, 
si
cu
t 
ill
a 
qu
ae
 e
st
 g
en
iti
vi
 c
as
us
. 
C
om
pe
tit
 n
am
 
hu
ic
 d
ic
tio
ni
, 
‘C
at
on
is
’, 
se
cu
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
su
m
itu
r 
m
at
er
ia
lit
er
 
se
d 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, 
‘c
ur
rit
’, 
no
n 
co
m
pe
tit
 
si
bi
 
se
cu
nd
um
 
su
pp
os
ito
ne
m
 m
at
er
ia
le
m
, 
et
 i
de
o 
in
 h
ac
 o
ra
tio
ne
, 
‘C
at
on
is
 
cu
rr
it’
, n
on
 a
cc
ip
itu
r l
y 
‘C
at
on
oi
s’
 m
at
er
ia
lit
er
 se
d 
pe
rs
on
al
ite
r. 
 
 
 
A
d 
al
iu
d 
es
t d
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 e
st
 in
co
ng
ru
a,
 ‘C
at
on
is
 e
st
’, 
qu
ia
 h
ic
 n
ih
il 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r 
qu
od
 p
os
si
t v
er
bo
 r
ed
de
re
 s
up
po
si
tu
m
, 
ne
c 
se
qu
itu
r, 
‘C
at
on
is
 e
st
 e
ns
, e
rg
o 
C
at
on
is
 e
st
’, 
qu
ia
 i
n 
is
ta
, 
‘C
at
on
is
 e
st
 e
ns
’, 
ve
rb
o 
re
dd
itu
r 
su
pp
os
itu
m
, 
se
d 
in
 i
st
a,
 
‘C
at
on
is
 e
st
’, 
ni
hi
l 
po
ni
tu
r 
qu
od
 p
os
si
t 
re
dd
er
e 
su
pp
os
itu
m
 
ve
rb
o.
 
 
 
 
 
 
<C
ap
itu
lu
m
 3
: D
e 
V
er
bo
> 
 
<C
ha
pt
er
 3
: O
n 
V
er
bs
> 
 
 
 
V
er
bu
m
 a
ut
em
 q
uo
d 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
 e
st
 t
em
pu
s, 
cu
iu
s 
pr
iu
s 
ni
hi
l s
eo
rs
um
 si
gn
ifi
ca
t, 
et
 e
st
 se
m
pe
r 
eo
ru
m
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 
pr
ae
di
ca
nt
ur
 n
ot
a.
  
 
 
 
 
 
H
ae
c 
es
t 
se
cu
nd
a 
pa
rs
 
pr
in
ci
pa
lis
 
hu
iu
s 
ca
pi
tu
li,
 
in
 
qu
a 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 d
et
er
m
in
at
 d
e 
ve
rb
o,
 e
t c
on
tin
et
 tr
es
 p
ar
tic
ul
as
. I
n 
pr
im
a 
po
ni
t 
et
 d
ec
la
ra
t 
di
ff
in
iti
on
em
 v
er
bu
. 
In
 s
ec
un
da
 i
bi
, 
N
on
 c
ur
ri
t a
ut
em
, e
xc
lu
di
t q
ua
ed
am
 a
 ra
tio
ne
 v
er
bi
 q
ua
e 
no
n 
su
nt
 v
er
ba
 li
be
t a
pp
ar
ea
nt
 v
er
ba
. I
n 
te
rti
a 
ib
i, 
ip
sa
 q
ua
ed
am
, 
po
ni
t q
ua
ed
am
 c
on
ve
ni
en
tia
m
 q
ua
e 
es
t i
nt
er
 n
om
en
 e
t v
er
bu
m
. 
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In
 p
rim
a 
ig
itu
r p
ar
tic
ul
a 
po
ni
t d
iff
in
iti
on
em
 v
er
bi
, d
ic
en
s 
qu
od
 
ve
rb
um
 e
st
 i
llu
d 
qu
od
 c
on
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
te
m
pu
s 
cu
iu
s 
pa
rs
 e
xt
ra
 
ni
hi
l 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t, 
et
 s
em
pe
r 
es
t 
no
ta
 e
or
um
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 
pr
ae
di
ca
nt
ur
. I
n 
ha
c 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
no
n 
po
ni
tu
r 
vo
x 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
, 
se
d 
su
bi
nt
el
lig
itu
r 
ex
 d
iff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
, 
qu
ia
 
co
m
m
un
e 
es
t 
no
m
in
i 
et
 v
er
bo
 q
uo
d 
si
t 
vo
x 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
a 
ad
 
pl
ac
itu
m
. 
U
nd
e 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 b
re
vi
te
r 
pr
oc
ed
en
s 
re
lin
qu
it 
ea
 
qu
ae
 s
un
t c
om
m
ui
a 
no
m
in
i e
t v
er
bo
 in
te
lle
ct
ui
 le
ge
nt
is
 e
x 
hi
s 
qu
ae
 d
ix
er
at
 i
n 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
. A
lia
m
 t
am
en
 p
ar
tic
ul
am
 
no
m
in
i 
et
 v
er
bo
 c
om
m
un
em
 p
os
ita
m
 i
n 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
, 
cu
iu
s 
nu
lla
 p
ar
s, 
et
 c
et
er
a,
 p
on
it 
hi
c 
qu
am
vi
s 
si
t 
su
pe
riu
s 
po
si
ta
 i
n 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
, 
cu
iu
s 
ca
us
a 
es
t 
qu
ia
 v
er
bu
m
 
m
ai
or
em
 h
ab
et
 c
on
ve
nt
en
tia
m
 c
um
 o
ra
tio
ne
 q
ua
m
 n
om
en
, q
ui
a 
ve
rb
um
 
im
po
rta
t 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
m
 
pe
r 
qu
am
 
pe
rf
ic
itu
r 
et
 
co
ns
tit
ui
tu
r 
or
at
io
. I
de
o 
m
ag
is
 v
id
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 s
it 
or
at
io
 
et
 q
uo
d 
pa
rs
 e
iu
s 
pe
r s
e 
al
iq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t q
ua
m
 n
om
en
, e
t i
de
o 
ha
nc
 
<k
6r
a>
 
pa
rti
cu
la
m
 
po
ni
t 
qu
ae
 
fu
it 
pr
iu
s 
po
st
ia
 
in
 
di
ff
in
iti
on
e 
no
m
in
is
. 
 
 
 
D
ic
o 
au
te
m
 q
uo
d 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
 t
em
pu
s, 
ut
 c
ur
su
s 
qu
id
em
 
no
m
en
 e
st
. 
C
ur
ri
t 
ve
ro
 e
st
 v
er
bu
m
. 
C
on
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
en
im
 
nu
nc
 e
ss
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ex
pl
an
at
 h
an
c 
di
ff
in
iti
on
em
 v
er
bi
, 
et
 p
rim
o 
de
cl
ar
at
 h
an
c 
di
ff
in
iti
on
em
 v
er
bi
, s
ci
lic
et
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 c
on
si
gn
ifi
ca
t t
em
pu
s, 
et
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
oc
to
 h
ui
us
 l
ib
ri,
 q
ua
e 
pr
ob
at
ur
 s
ic
. 
Id
 
qu
od
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ce
rta
m
 
di
ff
er
en
tia
m
 
te
m
po
ris
 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
 
te
m
pu
s. 
V
er
bu
m
 c
on
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ce
rta
m
 d
iff
er
en
tia
m
 t
em
po
ris
. 
Er
go
, 
et
 
ce
te
ra
. 
M
ai
or
 
es
t 
no
ta
, 
et
 
m
in
or
 
de
cl
ar
at
ur
 
pe
r 
di
ff
er
en
tia
m
 in
te
r n
om
en
 e
t v
er
bu
m
 q
ua
e 
id
em
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t. 
Se
d 
di
ff
er
en
t 
ta
m
en
 i
n 
ho
c,
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
id
em
 c
on
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
, 
qu
ia
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ve
rb
um
 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
 t
em
pu
s, 
et
 
no
m
en
 
no
n 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
 
te
m
pu
s. 
U
nd
e 
de
cl
ar
at
ur
 
si
c.
 
Ill
ud
 
in
es
t 
ve
rb
o 
pe
r 
qu
od
 
di
st
in
gu
itu
r 
a 
no
m
in
e,
 
se
d 
pe
r 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
ar
e 
ce
rta
m
 
di
ff
er
en
tia
m
 t
em
po
ris
 v
er
bu
m
 d
is
tin
gu
itu
r 
a 
no
m
in
e.
 Q
uo
d 
pa
te
t 
ex
em
pl
ar
ite
r 
si
c.
 ‘
C
ur
rit
’ 
qu
od
 e
st
 v
er
bu
m
, 
et
 ‘
cu
rs
us
’ 
qu
od
 e
st
 n
om
en
 id
em
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t, 
se
d 
di
ff
er
un
t p
er
 h
oc
, q
uo
d 
‘c
ur
rit
’ 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
 n
un
c 
es
se
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
ce
rta
 d
iff
er
en
tia
 
te
m
po
ris
, 
et
 
‘c
ur
su
s’
 
no
n 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
 
nu
nc
 
es
se
, 
ne
c 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
 
al
iq
ua
m
 
di
ff
er
en
tia
m
 
te
m
po
ris
. 
‘C
ur
rit
’ 
na
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ta
le
m
 
m
ot
um
 
an
im
al
is
 
ut
 
m
en
su
ra
tu
r 
te
m
po
re
 
pr
ae
se
nt
i, 
se
d 
‘c
ur
su
s’
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 h
ui
us
m
od
i 
m
ot
um
 n
on
 u
t 
m
en
su
ra
tu
r 
al
iq
ua
 d
iff
er
en
tia
 t
em
po
ris
, 
se
d 
ut
 a
bs
tra
hi
tu
r 
ab
 
om
ni
 d
iff
er
en
tia
 t
em
po
ris
. 
C
um
 n
am
 i
nt
el
lig
o 
cu
rs
um
, 
no
n 
m
ag
is
 
in
te
lli
go
 
cu
rs
um
 
ut
 
m
en
su
ra
tu
r 
te
m
po
ri 
pr
ae
se
nt
i, 
sc
ili
ce
t u
t n
un
c 
pr
ae
se
nt
al
ite
r 
si
t q
ua
m
 u
t m
en
su
ra
tu
r 
te
m
po
re
 
pr
ae
te
rit
o,
 s
ci
lic
et
 u
t f
ie
ba
t, 
ve
l u
t m
en
su
ra
tu
r 
te
m
po
re
 f
ut
ur
o,
 
sc
ili
ce
t f
ie
t i
n 
fu
tu
ro
. P
er
 h
oc
 p
at
et
 q
uo
d 
‘c
ur
rit
’ n
on
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 
te
m
pu
s, 
se
d 
cu
m
 te
m
po
re
, q
ui
a 
‘c
ur
rit
’ s
ig
ni
fic
at
 d
et
er
m
in
at
um
 
m
ot
um
 i
ne
ss
e 
an
im
al
i, 
qu
i 
m
ot
us
 n
on
 e
st
 t
em
pu
s, 
se
d 
da
t 
in
te
lli
ge
re
 c
er
ta
m
 d
iff
er
en
tia
m
 t
em
po
ris
 m
en
su
ra
nt
em
 s
uu
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
m
, e
t h
ui
us
m
od
i m
ot
um
. P
at
et
 e
tia
m
 q
uo
d 
‘d
ie
s’
 e
t 
‘n
ox
’ 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
cu
m
 
te
m
po
re
, 
qu
am
vi
s 
si
gn
ifi
ce
nt
 
te
m
pu
s, 
qu
ia
 n
on
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t s
ua
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
a 
pr
ou
t m
en
su
ra
nt
ur
 
al
iq
ua
 c
er
ta
 d
iff
er
en
tia
 t
em
po
ris
, 
se
d 
pr
ou
t 
ab
st
ra
hu
nt
ur
 a
b 
om
ni
 te
m
po
re
. P
ot
ui
t e
ni
m
 d
ie
s 
fie
ri 
ve
l n
un
c 
ve
l i
n 
fu
tu
ro
, e
t 
po
tu
it 
fie
ri 
et
 fi
eb
at
 in
 fu
tu
ro
. 
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Et
 s
em
pe
r 
eo
ru
m
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 d
ic
un
tu
r 
[n
ot
a 
[e
st
, 
ut
 
eo
ru
m
 
qu
ae
 
di
cu
nt
ur
 
de
 
su
bi
ec
to
 
ve
l 
in
 
su
bi
ec
to
 
su
nt
]2
83
]2
84
 
. 
A
nd
 i
t 
is
 a
lw
ay
s 
a 
m
ar
k 
of
 t
ho
se
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
of
 
an
ot
he
r,
 a
s 
of
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 o
r 
ar
e 
in
 
a 
su
bj
ec
t 
 
 
 
A
lia
m
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
um
 [
po
ni
t]2
85
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 s
em
pe
r 
es
t 
no
ta
 e
or
um
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 d
ic
un
tu
r 
[e
t]2
86
 d
ec
la
ra
t 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
, e
t h
ae
c 
es
t c
on
cl
us
io
 n
ov
em
 h
ui
us
 li
br
i, 
[q
ua
e]
28
7  
es
t 
pr
ob
at
ur
 s
ic
. 
V
er
bu
m
 s
em
pe
r 
es
t 
no
ta
 e
or
um
 q
ua
e 
de
 
{a
lte
ro
 d
ic
un
tu
r, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
de
 s
ub
ie
ct
o,
 q
ui
a 
ve
rb
um
 e
st
 d
e 
nu
m
er
o 
eo
ru
m
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 i
n 
su
bi
ec
to
}2
88
. 
Se
d 
ta
m
 i
lla
 q
ua
e 
{d
ic
un
tu
r 
de
 s
ub
ie
ct
o}
28
9  
qu
am
 il
la
 q
ua
e 
{s
un
t i
n 
su
bi
ec
to
}2
90
 
 
di
cu
nt
ur
 d
e 
al
te
ro
.  
Er
go
, e
t c
et
er
a.
 
A
ris
to
tle
 m
ak
es
 a
no
th
er
 p
oi
nt
, n
am
el
y 
th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 a
lw
ay
s 
a 
m
ar
k 
of
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
, a
nd
 th
is
 is
 th
e 
ni
nt
h 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 o
f t
hi
s 
bo
ok
, w
hi
ch
 is
 p
ro
ve
d 
in
 th
is
 w
ay
. 
A
 v
er
b 
is
 a
lw
ay
s 
a 
m
ar
k 
of
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
, 
na
m
el
y 
of
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
, o
r o
f t
ho
se
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 in
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
. B
ut
 
ju
st
 a
s 
th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
, 
so
 t
oo
 t
ho
se
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 i
n 
a 
su
bj
ec
t 
ar
e 
sa
id
 o
f 
an
ot
he
r. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 e
tc
. 
 
 
 
Sc
ie
nd
um
 <
es
t>
29
1  
qu
od
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 {
pr
o}
29
2  
{e
a}
29
3  
qu
ae
 
di
cu
nt
ur
 
de
 
su
bi
ec
to
 
in
te
lli
gi
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
ta
 
es
se
nt
ia
lia
, 
et
 
{p
ro
}2
94
 {
is
ta
}2
95
 
 q
ua
e 
su
nt
 i
n 
su
bi
ec
to
 i
nt
el
lig
it 
pr
ae
di
ca
ta
 
ac
ci
de
nt
al
ia
. E
x 
is
to
 lo
co
 p
ot
es
t n
ot
ar
i q
uo
d 
re
s 
ex
tra
 a
ni
m
am
 
si
cu
t d
ec
la
ra
tu
m
 e
st
 s
up
ra
 p
rin
ci
pi
um
 l
ib
ri 
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
to
ru
m
 
es
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
co
m
po
ni
tu
r 
ex
 
O
ne
 m
us
t k
no
w
n 
th
at
 b
y 
th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 sa
id
 o
f a
 su
bj
ec
t 
A
ris
to
tle
 m
ea
ns
 e
ss
en
tia
l 
pr
ed
ic
at
es
, 
an
d 
by
 t
ho
se
 w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
in
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 h
e 
m
ea
ns
 a
cc
id
en
ta
l p
re
di
ca
te
s. 
Fr
om
 th
is
, 
it 
ca
n 
be
 k
no
w
n 
th
at
 a
 th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
, a
s 
w
as
 s
ta
te
d 
ab
ov
e 
in
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 th
e 
Ca
te
go
ri
es
, i
s a
 p
re
di
ca
te
, a
nd
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
s 
co
m
po
se
d 
ou
t o
f t
hi
ng
s 
ou
ts
id
e 
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A
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ic
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r u
t d
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su
bi
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 q
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 su
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B
 
28
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re
bu
s 
ex
tra
 a
ni
m
am
 <
si
cu
t 
de
cl
ar
at
um
 e
st
 s
up
ra
 p
rin
ci
pi
um
 
lib
ri 
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
to
ru
m
>2
96
. 
<E
t>
29
7  
is
tu
d 
ta
m
en
 n
on
 e
st
 a
d 
pr
op
os
itu
m
, q
ui
a 
no
ta
 in
 p
ro
po
si
to
 n
on
 a
cc
ip
itu
r p
ro
 s
ig
no
, s
ed
 
<a
cc
ip
itu
r>
29
8  
pr
o 
no
tif
ic
an
te
, 
ut
 
po
st
ea
 
{d
ic
et
ur
}2
99
.  
{N
am
}3
00
 s
i 
ve
rb
um
 {
es
t}
30
1  
no
ta
 e
or
um
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 
pr
ed
ic
an
tu
r, 
et
 [
si
]3
02
 v
er
bu
m
 n
on
 e
st
 n
ot
a 
ni
si
 s
ui
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
i, 
se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
um
 v
er
bi
 p
re
di
ca
tu
r, 
se
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
m
 
ve
rb
i 
es
t 
re
s 
ex
tra
 a
ni
m
am
. 
Er
go
 v
id
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
re
s 
ex
tra
 
an
im
am
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
. 
 A
lit
er
 d
ic
un
t 
al
iq
ui
, 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 i
n 
{q
ua
le
m
}3
03
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 p
re
di
ca
tu
r, 
et
 h
oc
 d
ic
un
t 
pr
op
te
r 
{i
st
ud
}3
04
 d
ic
tu
m
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
i 
hi
c:
 v
er
bu
m
 e
st
 s
em
pe
r 
no
ta
 
eo
ru
m
 q
ua
e 
[d
e 
al
te
ro
 p
re
di
ca
nt
ur
]3
05
, 
et
 c
et
er
a,
 e
t 
et
ia
m
 
qu
ia
 A
ris
to
te
le
s 
<i
nf
ra
>3
06
 i
n 
is
to
 c
ap
itu
lo
 d
ic
it 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 
in
fin
itu
m
 s
em
pe
r 
de
 a
liq
uo
 e
st
, 
se
d 
no
n 
<e
st
>3
07
 a
lit
er
 d
e 
al
iq
uo
 n
is
i 
<q
ui
a>
30
8  
ta
nq
ua
m
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
. E
rg
o 
ve
rb
um
 in
fin
itu
m
 e
st
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 <
et
 e
ad
em
 ra
tio
ne
 v
el
 m
ai
or
i 
ve
rb
um
 f
in
itu
m
 e
st
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
>3
09
th
e 
so
ul
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
at
 i
s 
no
t 
re
le
va
nt
 t
o 
th
is
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
cl
ai
m
, b
ec
au
se
 a
 m
ar
k 
in
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
s 
no
t t
ak
en
 fo
r a
 s
ig
n,
 
bu
t f
or
 a
 m
ar
k,
 a
s 
w
ill
 b
e 
se
en
 la
te
r. 
Fo
r i
f a
 v
er
b 
is
 a
 m
ar
k 
of
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
, a
nd
 if
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 n
ot
 
a 
m
ar
k 
of
 a
ny
th
in
g 
ex
ce
pt
 it
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
, i
t f
ol
lo
w
s 
th
at
 th
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
 o
f 
a 
ve
rb
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d.
 B
ut
 th
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
 o
f 
a 
ve
rb
 is
 a
 th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
. T
he
re
fo
re
, i
t s
ee
m
s 
th
at
 a
 
th
in
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
th
e 
so
ul
 i
s 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
. 
So
m
e 
sa
y 
ot
he
rw
is
e,
 
th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
in
 e
ve
ry
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d,
 a
nd
 t
he
y 
sa
y 
th
is
 o
n 
ac
co
un
t o
f 
th
at
 d
ic
tu
m
 o
f 
A
ris
to
tle
 h
er
e:
 a
 v
er
b 
is 
al
w
ay
s a
 m
ar
k 
of
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
, 
et
c.
, a
nd
 a
ls
o 
be
ca
us
e 
A
ris
to
tle
 in
 th
is
 c
ha
pt
er
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 a
n 
in
fin
iti
ve
 v
er
b 
is
 a
lw
ay
s 
of
 a
no
th
er
, b
ut
 to
 b
e 
of
 a
no
th
er
 is
 
no
th
in
g 
fo
r 
it 
be
 e
xc
ep
t 
as
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
 o
f 
a 
su
bj
ec
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 a
n 
in
fin
iti
ve
 v
er
b 
is
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
. 
H
en
ce
 t
ho
se
 
w
ho
 h
ol
d 
th
at
 p
os
iti
on
 s
ay
 th
at
 in
 th
is
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
‘A
 h
um
an
 
is
 a
n 
an
im
al
’, 
th
is
 w
ho
le
 th
in
g,
 ‘i
s a
n 
an
im
al
’, 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d.
 
. U
nd
e 
si
c 
di
ce
nt
es
 d
ic
un
t 
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qu
od
 in
 {
ha
c}
31
0  
pr
op
os
iti
on
e,
 ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t a
ni
m
al
’, 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
ho
c 
to
tu
m
, 
‘e
st
 
an
im
al
’. 
U
nd
e 
di
cu
nt
 
qu
od
 
in
 
om
ni
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
ve
rb
um
 e
st
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 v
el
 p
ar
s p
ra
ed
ic
at
i. 
Po
te
st
 
<e
tia
m
>3
11
 
ad
du
ci
 
pr
o 
ei
s 
ill
ud
 
di
ct
um
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
i, 
{s
ec
un
du
s}
31
2  
Pe
rih
er
m
en
ei
as
, 
qu
an
do
 e
st
 t
er
tiu
m
 a
di
ac
en
s 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
. 
[D
up
lic
ite
r 
{d
an
tu
r 
op
in
io
ne
s}
31
3 ]
31
4  
ex
 q
uo
 
po
te
st
 a
cc
ip
i q
uo
d 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, ‘
es
t’,
 s
em
pe
r 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r, 
ve
l 
se
cu
nd
um
 a
di
ac
en
s v
el
 te
rti
um
. S
ed
 si
ne
 d
ub
io
 si
c 
di
ce
nt
es
 n
on
 
in
te
lli
gu
nt
 lo
gi
ca
m
 A
ris
to
te
lis
, {
ne
c}
31
5  e
a 
qu
ae
 a
 lo
gi
ci
s s
ol
en
t 
di
ci
. 
 
A
ris
to
te
le
s 
<e
ni
m
>3
16
, 
in
 
pr
in
ci
pi
o 
pr
im
o 
pr
io
ru
m
, 
os
te
nd
en
s q
ua
e 
su
nt
 p
ar
te
s <
or
at
io
nu
m
 e
t>
31
7  p
ro
po
si
tio
nu
m
 e
x 
qu
ib
us
 f
iu
nt
 s
yl
lo
gi
sm
i 
[e
t]3
18
 c
on
cl
us
io
ne
s 
{i
n}
31
9  
te
rm
in
is
 
di
ff
in
it 
te
rm
in
um
, d
ic
en
s 
Te
rm
in
um
 d
ic
o 
in
 q
ua
e 
re
so
lv
itu
r 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 
et
 
st
at
im
 
{i
nn
ui
t 
di
vi
si
on
em
}3
20
 
te
rm
in
i, 
[d
ic
en
s]
32
1  
ut
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
et
 
de
 
qu
o 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r,
 
hi
s 
ap
po
si
to
 v
el
 d
iv
isi
o 
es
se
 v
el
 n
on
 e
ss
e,
 p
er
 h
oc
 in
te
lli
ge
ns
 u
t 
pa
te
t 
ex
 
{m
an
ife
st
at
io
ne
}3
22
 
se
rm
on
is
 
qu
od
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 
pa
rte
s s
un
t p
re
di
ca
tu
m
 e
t [
{i
d}
32
3  d
e 
qu
o 
pr
ed
ic
at
ur
, s
ci
lic
et
]3
24
H
en
ce
 t
he
y 
sa
y 
th
at
 i
n 
ev
er
y 
st
at
em
en
t, 
th
e 
ve
rb
 i
s 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
or
 is
 p
ar
t o
f 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e.
 T
ha
t d
ic
tu
m
 o
f 
A
ris
to
tle
 
fr
om
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 c
ha
pt
er
 o
f t
he
 P
er
ih
em
er
m
en
ei
as
 –
  w
he
n 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
is
 a
 te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
en
s –
 c
an
 b
e 
us
ed
 b
y 
th
em
, 
fr
om
 w
hi
ch
 th
is
 v
er
b,
 is
’, 
ca
n 
al
w
ay
s 
be
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d 
to
 b
e 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
– 
ei
th
er
 
a 
se
cu
nd
um
 
ad
ia
ce
ns
 
or
 
a 
te
rt
iu
m
 
ad
ia
ce
ns
. B
ut
 w
ith
ou
t a
 d
ou
bt
 th
os
e 
w
ho
 h
ol
d 
th
is
 p
os
iti
on
 
do
 n
ot
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
e 
lo
gi
c 
of
 A
ris
to
tle
, 
no
r 
ar
e 
th
ey
 
ac
cu
st
om
ed
 to
 s
pe
ak
 a
bo
ut
 th
os
e 
th
in
gs
 w
hi
ch
 fo
llo
w
 fr
om
 
th
at
 lo
gi
c.
 A
ris
to
tle
, d
is
cu
ss
in
g 
at
  t
he
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 o
f t
he
 fi
rs
t 
bo
ok
 o
f 
th
e 
Pr
io
r 
An
al
yt
ic
s 
th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 p
ar
ts
 o
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t, 
fr
om
 
w
hi
ch
 
sy
llo
gi
sm
s 
an
d 
co
nc
lu
si
on
s 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 a
t 
th
ei
r 
m
os
t 
ba
si
c,
 A
ris
to
tle
 d
ef
in
e 
te
rm
s, 
sa
yi
ng
 I
 c
al
l 
a 
te
rm
 t
ha
t 
in
to
 w
hi
ch
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
is 
re
so
lv
ed
, 
an
d 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 h
e 
se
ts
 o
ut
 t
he
 d
iv
is
io
n 
of
 a
 
te
rm
, 
sa
yi
ng
 t
ha
t 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
an
d 
ab
ou
t 
w
hi
ch
 i
t 
is 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
, 
to
 t
ho
se
 b
ei
ng
 o
r 
no
n-
be
in
g 
is
 a
pp
os
ed
 o
r 
di
vi
de
d,
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
is
 th
in
ki
ng
, a
s 
it 
se
em
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
cl
ar
ity
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su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
<e
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
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m
>3
25
, 
et
 
ho
c 
ve
rb
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, 
‘e
st
’, 
af
fir
m
at
um
 
ve
l 
ne
ga
tu
m
. 
U
nd
e 
pr
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af
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}3
26
 
<t
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27
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m
 
pr
ed
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ad
 c
on
<k
6r
b>
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en
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m
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ra
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ne
m
}3
28
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{I
n}
32
9  p
rim
o 
pr
io
ru
m
 u
bi
 d
oc
et
 s
yl
lo
gi
za
re
, d
ic
it 
qu
od
 m
ed
iu
s 
te
rm
in
us
 i
n 
pr
im
a 
fig
ur
a 
es
t 
ill
ud
 q
uo
d 
su
bi
ci
tu
r 
in
 m
ai
or
i 
et
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
in
 
m
in
or
i, 
et
 
in
 
se
cu
nd
a 
fig
ur
a 
<m
ed
iu
m
>3
30
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
in
 
ut
ra
qu
e 
pr
ae
m
is
sa
ru
m
, 
et
 
in
 
te
rti
a 
fig
ur
a 
[m
ed
iu
m
]3
31
 s
ub
ic
itu
r 
in
 u
tra
qu
e 
pr
ae
m
is
sa
ru
m
. S
ed
 i
n 
pr
im
a 
fig
ur
a 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, ‘
es
t’,
 {
ne
c}
33
2  
es
t 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 {
ne
c}
33
3  
es
t 
pa
rte
s 
su
bi
ec
ti 
in
 m
ai
or
i, 
si
c 
sy
llo
gi
za
nd
o 
‘o
m
ni
s 
ho
m
o 
es
t 
an
im
al
, 
om
ne
 r
is
ib
ile
 e
st
 h
om
o,
 e
rg
o’
 {
et
 c
et
er
a}
33
4 , 
er
go
 i
n 
m
in
or
i, 
{s
ci
lic
et
 i
n 
ha
c}
33
5 , 
‘o
m
ne
 r
is
ib
ile
 e
st
 h
om
o’
, 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
 ‘
es
t’ 
{n
ec
}3
36
 e
st
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 n
ec
 p
ar
s 
pr
ae
di
ca
ti.
 
C
on
fir
m
at
ur
, 
qu
ia
 s
i 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
 ‘
es
t’ 
es
se
t 
pa
rs
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
i 
<v
el
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
>3
37
of
 t
he
 w
or
ds
, 
th
at
 t
he
 p
ar
ts
 o
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t 
ar
e 
(1
) 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
an
d 
(2
) 
th
at
 a
bo
ut
 w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d,
 n
am
el
y 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
an
d 
(3
) t
hi
s v
er
b,
 ‘i
s’
, e
ith
er
 a
s a
n 
af
fir
m
at
iv
e 
or
 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e.
 H
en
ce
 b
ei
ng
 o
r 
no
n-
be
in
g 
is
 a
pp
os
ed
 t
o 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
an
d 
to
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
th
at
 is
, t
hi
s 
ve
rb
, ‘
is
’, 
w
he
th
er
 
af
fir
m
at
iv
e 
or
 n
eg
at
iv
e,
 is
 a
pp
os
ed
 to
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
an
d 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
w
he
n 
es
ta
bl
is
hi
ng
 a
 st
at
em
en
t. 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 
bo
ok
 o
f 
th
e 
Pr
io
r 
An
al
yt
ic
s, 
w
he
re
 A
ris
to
tle
 te
ac
he
s 
us
 to
 
sy
llo
gi
ze
, h
e 
sa
ys
 th
at
 th
e 
m
id
dl
e 
te
rm
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 fi
gu
re
 is
 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t i
n 
th
e 
m
aj
or
 a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
in
 
th
e 
m
in
or
, 
an
d 
in
 t
he
 s
ec
on
d 
fig
ur
e 
it 
is
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
 i
n 
bo
th
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
em
is
es
, a
nd
 in
 th
e 
th
ird
 f
ig
ur
e 
th
e 
m
id
dl
e 
is
 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
in
 b
ot
h 
pr
em
is
es
. 
B
ut
 i
n 
th
e 
fir
st
 f
ig
ur
e,
 t
hi
s 
ve
rb
, ‘
is
’, 
is
 n
ei
th
er
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t n
or
 is
 it
 p
ar
t o
f 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
in
 th
e 
m
aj
or
 p
re
m
is
e,
 s
o 
by
 s
yl
lo
gi
zi
ng
 ‘E
ve
ry
 h
um
an
 is
 a
n 
an
im
al
, 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 
ca
pa
bl
e 
of
 
la
ug
ht
er
 
is
 
a 
hu
m
an
, 
th
er
ef
or
e’
, 
et
c.
, 
th
er
ef
or
e 
in
 t
he
 m
in
or
 (
na
m
el
y 
in
 t
hi
s, 
, 
in
 o
m
ni
 b
on
o 
sy
llo
gi
zm
o 
va
ria
re
tu
r 
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et
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B
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A
, B
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ite
m
’: 
A
, B
 
33
0  A
 
33
1  B
 
33
2  ‘
no
n’
: B
 
33
3  ‘
ne
qu
e’
: B
 
33
4  ‘
‘o
m
ni
s r
is
ib
ile
 e
st
 a
ni
m
al
’’
: B
 
33
5  ‘
ut
 in
 is
ta
’: 
A
; ‘
sc
ili
ce
t i
n 
is
ta
’: 
B
 
33
6  ‘
no
n’
: B
 
33
7  B
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m
ed
iu
m
, 
[e
t]
33
8  
qu
ia
 a
liu
d 
fo
re
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 i
n 
m
in
or
i 
qu
am
 
fu
it 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 in
 m
ai
or
. I
n 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
ne
 {
er
go
}3
39
‘E
ve
ry
 h
um
an
 is
 a
n 
an
im
al
’)
, t
hi
s 
ve
rb
, ‘
is
’, 
is
 n
ei
th
er
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
no
r 
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
. 
Th
is
 i
s 
co
nf
irm
ed
, 
be
ca
us
e 
if 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
w
er
e 
a 
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
, 
in
 
ev
er
y 
co
rr
ec
tly
-f
or
m
ed
 s
yl
lo
gi
sm
, 
th
e 
m
id
dl
e 
te
rm
 w
ou
ld
 
be
 v
ar
ie
d,
 b
ec
au
se
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 e
ls
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
in
 
th
e 
m
in
or
 p
re
m
is
e 
th
an
 w
as
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
 i
n 
th
e 
m
aj
or
 
pr
em
is
e.
 T
he
re
fo
re
 i
n 
a 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 h
ig
he
st
 s
or
t, 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 o
nl
y 
in
 th
e 
fir
st
 f
ig
ur
e,
 th
er
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
fa
lla
cy
 
of
 a
cc
id
en
t, 
w
hi
ch
 a
ny
 g
oo
d 
lo
gi
ci
an
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
m
is
ta
ke
 o
f s
ay
in
g.
 
 p
ot
is
si
m
a 
qu
ae
 s
ol
um
 s
it 
in
 p
rim
a 
fig
ur
a 
es
se
t 
fa
lla
ci
a 
ac
ci
de
nt
is
, q
uo
d 
bo
ni
 lo
gi
ci
 n
on
 so
le
nt
 d
ic
er
e.
 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 s
em
pe
r 
<i
n>
34
0  
ex
em
pl
ifi
ca
nd
o 
de
 s
ub
ie
ct
o 
et
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
o 
{i
n 
ca
pi
tu
lo
}3
41
 u
bi
 o
st
en
di
t q
uo
d 
co
ni
ug
at
io
ne
s 
{s
un
t}
34
2
 
 in
ut
ile
s, 
po
ni
t t
al
es
 te
rm
in
os
 ‘
ho
m
o 
an
im
al
’, 
‘e
qu
us
 
an
im
al
’, 
‘h
om
o 
la
pi
s’
 
et
 
hu
iu
sm
od
i. 
Pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
er
go
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
 e
st
 h
ui
us
m
od
i t
er
m
in
us
, a
ni
m
al
 v
el
 h
om
o,
 la
pi
s, 
eq
uu
s, 
et
 s
im
ili
a,
 e
t p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, ‘
es
t’,
 n
on
 e
st
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 n
ec
 p
ar
s p
ra
ed
ic
at
i. 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 w
he
n 
di
sc
us
si
ng
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
in
 
th
e 
ch
ap
te
r 
[in
 
th
e 
Rh
et
or
ic
] 
w
he
re
 
he
 
m
en
tio
ns
 
th
at
 
co
nj
un
ct
io
ns
 a
re
 p
oi
nt
le
ss
, A
ris
to
tle
 a
lw
ay
s 
in
di
ca
te
s 
th
es
e 
so
rts
 o
f 
te
rm
s:
 ‘
hu
m
an
 a
ni
m
al
’, 
‘h
or
se
 a
ni
m
al
’, 
‘h
um
an
 
st
on
e’
 a
nd
 p
re
di
ca
te
s 
of
 th
at
 s
or
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 a
 te
rm
 o
f 
th
is
 
so
rt,
 ‘
an
im
al
’ 
or
 ‘
hu
m
an
’, 
‘s
to
ne
’, 
‘h
or
se
’ 
an
d 
so
 o
n 
is
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
of
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘i
s’
, i
s 
no
t a
 p
re
di
ca
te
 n
or
 p
ar
t o
f a
 p
re
di
ca
te
. 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 <
in
>3
43
 e
od
em
 p
rim
o 
pr
io
ru
m
 d
ic
it 
co
nv
er
si
on
em
 i
n 
te
rm
in
is
 e
ss
e 
qu
an
do
 {
de
 s
ub
ie
ct
o 
si
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
}3
44
 
 e
t 
e 
co
nv
er
so
, 
se
d 
si
 v
er
bu
m
 s
em
pe
r 
es
se
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 v
el
 p
ar
s 
pr
ae
di
ca
ti 
nu
nq
ua
m
 
fie
re
t 
in
 
co
nv
er
si
on
e 
{d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
fir
st
 b
oo
k 
of
 th
e 
Pr
io
r 
An
al
yt
ic
s, 
he
 
sa
ys
 th
at
 a
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
in
 te
rm
s 
is
 w
he
n 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
is
 o
f a
 
su
bj
ec
t, 
an
d 
co
nv
er
se
ly
, 
bu
t 
if 
a 
ve
rb
 w
er
e 
al
w
ay
s 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
or
 p
ar
t 
of
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
, 
th
en
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
 w
ou
ld
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34
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et
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34
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nt
’: 
B
 
34
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34
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de
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ed
ic
at
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si
t s
ub
ie
ct
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’: 
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pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
}3
45
 [
{n
ec
}3
46
 e
x 
co
nv
er
so
]3
47
, 
qu
ia
 v
er
bu
m
 n
on
 
es
t 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
{n
ec
}3
48
 
pa
rs
 
su
bi
ec
ti,
 
et
 
pe
r 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 
nu
nq
ua
m
 fi
er
et
 c
on
ve
rs
io
 in
 te
rm
in
is
.  
U
nd
e 
si
 is
ta
 p
ro
po
si
tio
, 
‘q
ui
da
m
 h
om
o 
es
t 
an
im
al
’, 
co
nv
er
ta
tu
r 
si
c,
 ‘
er
go
 q
uo
dd
am
 
an
im
al
 e
st
 h
om
o’
, 
hi
c 
no
n 
es
t 
co
nv
er
si
o 
in
 e
is
de
m
 t
er
m
in
is
, 
qu
ia
 ‘h
om
o’
 su
bi
ci
tu
r i
n 
pr
im
a 
et
 ‘<
es
t>
34
9  a
ni
m
al
’ p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
, 
in
 se
cu
nd
a 
‘a
ni
m
al
’ s
ub
ic
itu
r e
t ‘
<e
st
>3
50
 h
om
o’
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
, e
t 
ita
 i
n 
ha
c 
co
nv
er
si
on
e 
fo
re
nt
 q
ua
ttu
or
 t
er
m
in
i, 
[s
ci
lic
et
]3
51
 
‘h
om
o’
, ‘
es
t a
ni
m
al
’, 
‘e
st
 h
om
o’
, ‘
an
im
al
’. 
 C
on
fir
m
at
ur
 q
ui
a 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 
di
vi
di
t 
te
rm
in
um
 
in
 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
et
 
<i
n>
35
2
ne
ve
r b
e 
co
nv
er
te
d 
in
to
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
no
r c
on
ve
rs
el
y,
 b
ec
au
se
 
th
e 
ve
rb
 i
s 
no
t 
a 
su
bj
ec
t 
no
r 
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 t
he
re
 w
ou
ld
 n
ev
er
 b
e 
a 
co
nv
er
si
on
 i
n 
te
rm
s. 
H
en
ce
, i
f t
hi
s 
st
at
em
en
t, 
‘A
 c
er
ta
in
 h
um
an
 is
 a
n 
an
im
al
’, 
is
 
co
nv
er
te
d 
in
 t
hi
s 
w
ay
, 
‘T
he
re
fo
re
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 a
ni
m
al
 i
s 
hu
m
an
’, 
he
re
 th
er
e 
is
 n
ot
 a
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
in
to
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
te
rm
s, 
be
ca
us
e 
‘h
um
an
’ i
s 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t i
n 
th
e 
fir
st
 a
nd
 ‘i
s 
an
im
al
’ i
s 
its
 p
re
di
ca
te
, a
nd
 in
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 ‘
an
im
al
’ 
is
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t a
nd
 
‘is
 h
um
an
’ 
is
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 a
nd
 s
o 
in
 th
is
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
th
er
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
fo
ur
 t
er
m
s, 
na
m
el
y 
‘h
um
an
’, 
‘is
 a
n 
an
im
al
’, 
‘is
 
hu
m
an
’, 
‘a
ni
m
al
’. 
Th
is
 i
s 
co
nf
irm
ed
, 
be
ca
us
e 
A
ris
to
tle
 
di
vi
de
s t
er
m
s 
in
to
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e.
 T
he
re
fo
re
 a
 
co
nv
er
si
on
 in
 te
rm
s 
is
 w
he
n 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
is
 o
f a
 s
ub
je
ct
, a
nd
 
co
nv
er
se
ly
. 
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
. 
 
C
on
ve
rs
io
 
er
go
 
in
 
te
rm
in
is
 
es
t 
qu
an
do
 
de
 
su
bi
ec
to
 si
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 e
t e
 c
on
ve
rs
o.
 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 s
ec
un
du
m
 i
st
am
 o
pi
ni
on
em
, 
nu
nq
ua
m
 p
ra
ed
ic
ar
et
ur
 p
er
 
se
 s
up
er
iu
s 
de
 [p
ar
te
]3
53
 <
se
>3
54
 
 in
fe
rio
ri.
  N
am
 in
 is
ta
, ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t a
ni
m
al
’, 
pr
ae
di
ca
re
tu
r ‘
es
t a
ni
m
al
’. 
C
um
 e
st
 a
ni
m
al
 n
on
 s
it 
ge
nu
s 
ho
m
in
is
, 
se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 i
n 
is
ta
 n
on
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
 p
er
 s
e 
su
pe
riu
s d
e 
pe
r s
e 
in
fe
rio
ri,
 e
t e
ad
em
 ra
tio
ne
 n
ec
 in
 a
liq
ua
 a
lia
. 
A
ga
in
, a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
at
 o
pi
ni
on
, a
 s
up
er
io
r c
ou
ld
 n
ev
er
 b
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 p
er
 s
e 
of
 it
s 
in
fe
rio
r. 
Fo
r i
n 
th
is
, ‘
A
 h
um
an
 is
 a
n 
an
im
al
’, 
‘is
 a
n 
an
im
al
’ 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
. S
in
ce
 “
is
 a
n 
an
im
al
” 
is
 n
ot
 t
he
 g
en
us
 o
f 
hu
m
an
, i
t 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 i
n 
th
is
 
ca
se
 a
 s
up
er
io
r p
er
 se
 is
 n
ot
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 a
n 
in
fe
rio
r p
er
 se
, 
an
d 
by
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
ac
co
un
t n
ot
 in
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 c
as
e 
ei
th
er
. 
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Ite
m
 q
ua
er
o 
ut
ru
m
 g
en
us
 p
os
si
t p
ra
ed
ic
ar
i d
e 
sp
ec
ie
m
 v
el
 n
on
.  
Si
 
si
c,
 
cu
m
 
an
im
al
 
si
t 
ge
nu
s 
ho
m
in
is
, 
se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 
in
 
{a
liq
ua
}3
55
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e,
 
[‘
ho
m
o 
es
t 
an
im
al
’,]
35
6  
‘a
ni
m
al
’ 
po
te
st
 
es
se
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, 
et
 
<i
ta
>3
57
 
no
n 
se
m
pe
r 
es
t 
{n
ec
es
sa
riu
m
}3
58
 v
er
bu
m
 {
pr
ae
di
ca
ri}
35
9 . 
 S
i {
di
ci
tu
r}
36
0  q
uo
d 
ge
nu
s 
no
n 
pe
r s
e 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r, 
se
d 
cu
m
 v
er
bo
, i
ta
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 
es
t p
ar
s 
pr
ae
di
ca
ti,
 is
tu
d 
es
t c
on
tra
 s
ci
en
tia
m
 q
ua
m
 {
tra
di
t}
36
1  
A
ris
to
te
li 
de
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
is
 p
rim
o 
{t
op
ic
a}
36
2 , 
ub
i p
on
it 
qu
at
tu
or
 
es
se
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
a,
 s
ci
lic
et
 g
en
us
, 
{d
iff
er
en
tia
}3
63
, 
pr
op
riu
m
 e
t 
ac
ci
de
ns
. 
 
Si
 
hi
c 
op
in
io
 
{e
ss
et
}3
64
 
ve
ra
, 
nu
llu
m
 
is
to
ru
m
 
{e
ss
et
}3
65
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
. 
 I
te
m
 i
st
ud
 e
st
 c
on
tra
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
um
, 
pr
im
o 
{p
os
te
rio
re
}3
66
, u
bi
 v
ul
t 
qu
od
 g
en
us
 e
t 
{d
iff
er
en
tia
}3
67
 
pr
ae
di
ca
nt
ur
 p
er
 s
e 
de
 s
pe
ci
em
 [
et
 h
oc
]3
68
 [
in
]3
69
 
 p
rim
o 
m
od
o 
di
ce
nd
i p
er
 se
.  
 
A
ga
in
, I
 a
sk
 w
he
th
er
 a
 g
en
us
 c
an
 b
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 o
f a
 s
pe
ci
es
 
or
 n
ot
. 
If
 i
t 
ca
n,
 s
in
ce
 a
ni
m
al
 i
s 
th
e 
ge
nu
s 
of
 h
um
an
, 
it 
fo
llo
w
s 
th
at
 i
n 
th
is
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
‘A
 h
um
an
 i
s 
an
 a
ni
m
al
’, 
‘a
ni
m
al
’ c
an
 b
e 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 a
nd
 it
 is
 n
ot
 a
lw
ay
s n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
fo
r t
he
 v
er
b 
to
 b
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
. I
f i
t i
s 
sa
id
 th
at
 a
 g
en
us
 is
 n
ot
 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 p
er
 se
, b
ut
 w
ith
 a
 v
er
b,
 s
o 
th
at
 th
e 
ve
rb
 is
 p
ar
t o
f 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 
th
at
 
is
 
co
nt
ra
ry
 
to
 
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ha
nd
ed
 d
ow
n 
fr
om
 A
ris
to
tle
, f
ro
m
 th
e 
ch
ap
te
r o
n 
pr
ed
ic
at
es
 
fr
om
 th
e 
fir
st
 b
oo
k 
of
 th
e 
To
pi
cs
, w
he
re
 h
e 
cl
ai
m
s 
th
at
 fo
ur
 
th
in
gs
 a
re
 p
re
di
ca
te
d,
 n
am
el
y 
a 
ge
nu
s, 
a 
di
ffe
re
nt
ia
, 
a 
pr
op
ri
um
 a
nd
 a
n 
ac
ci
de
nt
. I
f t
he
 p
re
se
nt
 o
pi
ni
on
 w
er
e 
tru
e,
 
no
ne
 o
f t
ho
se
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e.
 T
ha
t i
s 
al
so
 c
on
tra
ry
 to
 
w
ha
t 
A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
in
 t
he
 f
irs
t 
bo
ok
 o
f 
th
e 
Po
st
er
io
r 
An
al
yt
ic
s, 
w
he
re
 h
e 
m
ea
ns
 th
at
 a
 g
en
us
 a
nd
 a
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 a
re
 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 p
er
 s
e 
of
 a
 s
pe
ci
es
, a
nd
 th
is
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 m
od
e 
of
 
sp
ea
ki
ng
 p
er
 se
. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
35
5  ‘
ill
a’
: B
 
35
6  A
 
35
7  A
, B
 
35
8  ‘
ne
ce
ss
e’
: B
 
35
9  ‘
es
se
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
’: 
B
 
36
0  ‘
de
tu
r’
: B
 
36
1  ‘
tra
di
di
t’:
 B
 
36
2  ‘
to
pi
co
ru
m
’: 
A
, B
 
36
3  ‘
di
ff
er
en
tia
m
’: 
B
 
36
4  ‘
fo
re
t’:
 A
 
36
5  ‘
fo
re
t’:
 A
 
36
6  ‘
po
st
er
io
ru
m
’: 
A
, B
 
36
7  ‘
di
ff
er
en
tia
m
’: 
B
 
36
8  B
 
36
9  A
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Ite
m
 
in
 
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
tis
 
di
ci
t 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 
qu
od
 
qu
an
do
 
al
te
ru
m
 d
e 
al
te
ro
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
, 
qu
ic
qu
id
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
 d
e 
pr
ae
di
ca
to
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
<e
tia
m
>3
70
 
de
 
su
bi
ec
to
, 
qu
od
 
in
te
lli
gi
tu
r i
n 
pr
ed
ic
at
io
ne
 e
ss
en
tia
li,
 u
t s
i h
om
o 
es
t a
ni
m
al
, a
nd
 
an
im
al
 e
st
 s
ub
ie
ct
a,
 h
om
o 
es
t 
su
bi
ec
ta
. 
 I
llu
d 
er
go
 q
uo
d 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r i
n 
is
ta
, ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t a
ni
m
al
’, 
su
bi
ci
tu
r  
in
 il
la
, ‘
an
im
al
 
es
t 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
’. 
A
lit
er
 
re
gu
la
 
no
n 
va
le
re
t 
si
 
ill
ud
 
qu
od
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
in
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
io
ne
 e
ss
en
tia
li 
no
n 
po
ss
et
 s
ub
ic
i 
in
 
<a
lia
>3
71
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
io
ne
 e
ss
en
tia
li,
 {
ut
}3
72
 i
n 
is
ta
, 
‘a
ni
m
al
 e
st
 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
’, 
ni
hi
l 
su
bi
ci
tu
r 
ni
si
 i
st
e 
te
rm
in
us
, ‘
an
im
al
’, 
et
 h
oc
 
es
t p
er
 s
e 
no
tu
m
 {
ex
pe
rti
s}
37
3  
in
 lo
gi
ca
.  
N
ec
 o
po
rte
t a
m
pl
iu
s 
ci
rc
a 
is
ta
m
 o
pi
ni
on
em
 m
or
ar
i, 
eo
 q
uo
d 
ci
rc
a 
<t
ria
>3
74
 p
rim
a 
pr
in
ci
pi
a 
<p
rin
ci
pi
al
ia
>3
75
 
lo
gi
ca
e 
{m
ax
im
um
}3
76
 
 
co
nt
in
et
 
er
ro
re
m
 e
t 
de
st
ru
it 
ar
te
m
 s
yl
lo
gi
za
nd
i 
et
 a
rte
m
 d
em
on
st
ra
nd
i, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
ar
te
m
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
s 
co
nv
er
te
nd
i, 
si
ne
 q
ui
bu
s 
nu
lla
 sc
ie
nt
ia
 p
ot
es
t h
ab
er
i. 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 in
 th
e 
Ca
te
go
ri
es
, A
ris
to
tle
 sa
ys
 th
at
 w
he
n 
on
e 
is
 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 o
f 
an
ot
he
r,
 w
ha
te
ve
r 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 t
he
 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
is 
al
so
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t. 
Th
is
 c
on
ce
rn
s 
es
se
nt
ia
l p
re
di
ca
tio
n,
 s
uc
h 
as
 if
 a
 h
um
an
 is
 a
n 
an
im
al
, a
nd
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 ‘a
ni
m
al
’, 
it 
ca
n 
be
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
of
 
‘h
um
an
’. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 i
n 
th
is
, 
‘A
 
hu
m
an
 i
s 
an
 a
ni
m
al
’, 
is
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 i
n 
th
is
, ‘
A
n 
an
im
al
 i
s 
a 
su
bs
ta
nc
e’
. O
th
er
w
is
e 
th
e 
ru
le
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 h
ol
d 
if 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
in
 a
n 
es
se
nt
ia
l p
re
di
ca
tio
n 
is
 n
ot
 a
bl
e 
to
 b
e 
a 
su
bj
ec
t 
in
 
an
ot
he
r 
es
se
nt
ia
l 
pr
ed
ic
at
io
n.
 
B
ut
 
in
 
th
is
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
‘A
n 
an
im
al
 is
 a
 su
bs
ta
nc
e’
, n
ot
hi
ng
 is
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
ex
ce
pt
 th
is
 te
rm
, ‘
an
im
al
’, 
an
d 
th
is
 is
 k
no
w
n 
pe
r s
e 
by
 th
os
e 
w
ho
 a
re
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 in
 lo
gi
c.
 N
or
 n
ee
d 
w
e 
de
la
y 
an
ym
or
e 
on
 t
hi
s 
op
in
io
n,
 b
ec
au
se
, r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 t
he
 f
irs
t 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
lo
gi
c,
 it
 c
on
ta
in
s 
a 
cl
ea
r e
rr
or
, t
he
re
by
 d
es
tro
yi
ng
 th
e 
ar
t o
f 
sy
llo
gi
zi
ng
 a
nd
 th
e 
ar
t o
f 
de
m
on
st
ra
tin
g,
 a
nd
 c
on
se
qu
en
tly
 
th
e 
ar
t 
of
 c
on
ve
rti
ng
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
, 
w
ith
ou
t 
w
hi
ch
 w
e 
co
ul
d 
no
t h
av
e 
an
y 
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c 
kn
ow
le
dg
e.
 
 
 
 
{S
i}
37
7  
di
ce
re
t 
fo
rte
 
{a
liq
ui
s}
37
8  
ca
vi
lla
to
ru
m
 
qu
od
 
in
 
<o
m
ni
>3
79
 
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 in
 q
ua
 p
re
di
ca
tu
m
 e
st
 te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
If
 p
er
ha
ps
 o
ne
 o
f 
th
os
e 
rid
ic
ul
ou
s 
pe
rs
on
s 
w
er
e 
to
 s
ay
 th
at
 
in
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
is
 a
 te
rt
iu
m
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
37
0  B
 
37
1  B
 
37
2  ‘
se
d’
: A
, B
 
37
3  ‘
ex
pe
rti
bu
s’
: B
 
37
4  B
 
37
5  B
 
37
6  ‘
m
an
ife
st
um
’: 
A
, B
 
37
7  ‘
se
d’
: B
 
37
8  ‘
al
iu
s’
: B
 
 
  
441 
es
t 
{d
up
le
x 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
}3
80
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 t
ot
al
e 
et
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
pa
rti
al
e.
 
 
Pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
to
ta
le
 
es
t 
to
tu
m
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 a
gg
re
ga
tu
m
 e
x 
ve
rb
o 
et
 e
x 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
nt
e 
ve
rb
um
.  
Pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
<v
er
o>
38
1  
pa
rti
al
e 
es
t 
ill
ud
 
qu
od
 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
t 
ve
rb
um
.  
U
nd
e 
in
 is
ta
, ‘
ho
m
o 
es
t a
ni
m
al
’, 
<l
i>
38
2  
‘e
st
 a
ni
m
al
’ 
es
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 t
ot
al
e,
 <
et
 l
i>
38
3
th
er
e 
ar
e 
tw
o 
pr
ed
ic
at
es
, n
am
el
y 
th
e 
to
ta
l p
re
di
ca
te
 a
nd
 th
e 
pa
rti
al
 p
re
di
ca
te
. T
he
 to
ta
l p
re
di
ca
te
 is
 th
e 
w
ho
le
 p
re
di
ca
te
 
ag
gr
eg
at
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
ve
rb
 a
nd
 fr
om
 th
e 
th
in
g 
sp
ec
ify
in
g 
th
e 
ve
rb
. T
he
 p
ar
tia
l p
re
di
ca
te
 is
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 s
pe
ci
fie
s 
th
e 
ve
rb
. 
H
en
ce
, i
n 
th
is
, ‘
A
 h
um
an
 is
 a
n 
an
im
al
’, 
‘is
 a
n 
an
im
al
’ i
s 
th
e 
to
ta
l p
re
di
ca
te
, a
nd
 ‘a
ni
m
al
’ i
s t
he
 p
ar
tia
l p
re
di
ca
te
. 
 ‘
an
im
al
’ 
es
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
pa
rti
al
e.
 
 
 
 
C
on
tra
, 
se
cu
nd
um
 
ho
c 
in
 
om
ni
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
in
 
qu
a 
{p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
}3
84
 [
‘e
st
’]
38
5  
te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
pr
ae
di
ca
re
nt
ur
 v
el
 
en
un
ci
ar
en
tu
r 
pl
ur
a 
de
 u
no
 v
el
 p
lu
ra
 d
e 
pl
ur
ib
us
, q
ui
a 
ce
rtu
s 
es
t q
uo
d 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 e
nu
nc
ia
tu
r d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
, e
t p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
si
 
{s
un
t}
38
6  
pl
ur
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
a 
et
 
un
um
 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
, 
pl
ur
a 
en
un
ci
an
tu
r 
de
 
un
o,
 
et
 
si
c 
om
ni
s 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
in
 
qu
a 
<p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
>3
87
 {
es
t}
38
8
 
 t
er
tiu
m
 a
di
ac
en
s 
fo
re
t 
pl
ur
es
, q
uo
d 
es
t i
nc
on
ve
ni
en
s. 
O
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ry
, 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
th
is
 
po
si
tio
n 
in
 
ev
er
y 
st
at
em
en
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 a
 te
rt
iu
m
 a
di
ac
en
s 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d,
 m
an
y 
th
in
gs
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 o
r 
sa
id
 o
f 
on
e,
 o
r 
m
an
y 
of
 
m
an
y,
 b
ec
au
se
 it
 is
 c
er
ta
in
 th
at
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
is
 s
ai
d 
of
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 if
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
m
an
y 
pr
ed
ic
at
es
 a
nd
 
on
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
m
an
y 
ar
e 
sa
id
 o
f o
ne
, a
nd
 so
 e
ve
ry
 st
at
em
en
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
re
 i
s 
a 
te
rt
iu
m
 a
di
ac
en
s 
th
er
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
an
y 
st
at
em
en
ts
, w
hi
ch
 is
 p
ro
bl
em
at
ic
. 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 e
t s
ub
ie
ct
um
 d
ic
un
tu
r e
xt
re
m
a 
pr
op
os
iti
on
is
, 
se
d 
un
iu
s 
di
vi
si
on
is
 
su
nt
 
ta
m
en
 
du
o 
ex
tre
m
a.
 
 
Er
go
 
in
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
un
a 
es
t 
ta
m
en
 
un
um
 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
et
 
un
um
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
. 
 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
 a
nd
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
 a
re
 c
al
le
d 
th
e 
ex
tre
m
es
 o
f 
a 
st
at
em
en
t, 
bu
t t
he
y 
ar
e 
tw
o 
ex
tre
m
es
 o
f 
on
e 
di
vi
si
on
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 i
n 
on
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
th
er
e 
is
 o
ne
 s
ub
je
ct
 
an
d 
on
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e.
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
37
9  A
 
38
0  ‘
du
pl
ic
ite
r’
: B
 
38
1  B
 
38
2  B
 
38
3  B
 
38
4  ‘
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
’: 
B
 
38
5  A
 
38
6  ‘
si
nt
’: 
A
 
38
7  B
 
38
8  ‘
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r’
: A
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Ite
m
 [
si
]3
89
 {
pa
rte
s}
39
0  
pr
ae
di
ca
ti 
{d
eb
et
}3
91
 d
ic
i 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
pa
rti
al
e,
 t
un
c 
lit
te
ra
e 
et
 s
yl
la
ba
e 
qu
ae
 s
un
t 
pa
rte
s 
pr
ae
di
ca
ti 
to
ta
lis
 f
or
en
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
ta
 p
ar
tia
lia
, 
et
 s
ic
 i
n 
om
ni
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 
{f
or
en
t}
39
2  
pl
ur
a 
ex
tre
m
a 
{v
el
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
a 
qu
am
 d
uo
}3
93
. D
ic
o 
er
go
 q
uo
d 
in
 o
m
ni
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 <
k6
va
> 
ca
th
eo
go
ric
a 
in
 q
ua
 
{p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 e
st
}3
94
 t
er
tiu
m
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
ill
ud
 q
uo
d 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
t 
ve
rb
um
 q
uo
d 
es
t c
op
ul
a 
es
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
, e
t 
ve
rb
um
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
co
pu
la
 {
ne
c}
39
5
 
 e
st
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 n
ec
 p
ar
s 
pr
ae
di
ca
ti,
 n
ec
 e
st
 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 n
ec
 p
ar
s s
ub
ie
ct
i. 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 i
f 
th
e 
pa
rts
 o
f 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
ou
gh
t 
to
 b
e 
ca
lle
d 
a 
pa
rti
al
 p
re
di
ca
te
, t
he
n 
le
tte
rs
 a
nd
 s
yl
la
bl
es
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 p
ar
ts
 
of
 th
e 
to
ta
l p
re
di
ca
te
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
pa
rti
al
 p
re
di
ca
te
s, 
an
d 
so
 in
 
ev
er
y 
st
at
em
en
t 
th
er
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
or
e 
th
an
 t
w
o 
pr
ed
ic
at
es
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
I s
ay
 th
at
 in
 e
ve
ry
 c
at
eg
or
ic
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
is
 a
 te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 s
pe
ci
fie
s 
th
e 
ve
rb
 i
s 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 a
nd
 t
he
 v
er
b 
(w
hi
ch
 i
s 
a 
co
pu
la
) 
ne
ith
er
 is
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
no
t i
s 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 n
or
 is
 it
 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t n
or
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 su
bj
ec
t. 
 
 
 
A
d 
au
ct
or
ita
te
s 
in
 c
on
tra
riu
m
. 
A
d 
pr
im
am
 c
um
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 
di
ci
t 
qu
od
 
ve
rb
um
 
se
m
pe
r 
es
t 
no
ta
 
eo
ru
m
, 
et
 
ce
te
ra
, 
di
ce
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
ex
 h
ac
 a
uc
to
rit
at
e 
se
qu
itu
r 
op
po
si
tu
m
 i
lli
us
 
op
in
io
ni
s, 
{q
ui
a}
39
6  
ni
hi
l 
es
t 
no
ta
 s
ui
 i
ps
iu
s. 
Si
 e
rg
o 
ve
rb
um
 
{s
it}
39
7  
no
ta
 e
or
um
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 d
ic
un
tu
r, 
se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 
ve
rb
um
 n
on
 e
st
 il
lu
d 
qu
od
 d
e 
al
te
ro
 d
ic
itu
r, 
et
 p
er
 c
on
se
qu
en
s 
ve
rb
um
 n
on
 e
st
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
. U
nd
e 
eo
 i
ps
o 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 e
st
 
no
ta
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
i, 
se
qu
itu
r 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 n
on
 e
st
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
. 
D
ic
o 
ig
itu
r 
qu
od
 ‘
no
ta
’ 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r 
 m
ul
tip
lic
ite
r, 
{s
ed
}3
98
 
 i
n 
pr
op
os
ito
 a
cc
ip
itu
r 
‘n
ot
a’
 
pr
o 
eo
 
qu
od
 
no
tif
ic
at
. 
V
er
bu
m
 
To
 t
he
 a
ut
ho
rit
at
iv
e 
te
xt
s 
in
 c
on
tra
st
. 
To
 t
he
 f
irs
t, 
w
he
n 
A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 m
ar
k 
of
 th
os
e,
 e
tc
., 
w
e 
sh
ou
ld
 
sa
y 
th
at
 f
ro
m
 t
hi
s 
au
th
or
ity
 t
he
 o
pp
os
ite
 o
f 
th
at
 o
pi
ni
on
 
fo
llo
w
s, 
be
ca
us
e 
no
th
in
g 
is
 a
 m
ar
k 
of
 it
se
lf.
 T
he
re
fo
re
 if
 a
 
ve
rb
 is
 a
 m
ar
k 
of
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
, i
t f
ol
lo
w
s 
th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 n
ot
 t
ha
t 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
sa
id
 o
f 
an
ot
he
r, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 t
he
 v
er
b 
is
 n
ot
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
I 
sa
y 
th
at
 ‘m
ar
k’
 is
 ta
ke
n 
in
 m
an
y 
w
ay
s, 
bu
t i
n 
th
is
 c
as
e 
‘m
ar
k’
 is
 
ta
ke
n 
fo
r 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
 v
er
b 
m
ar
ks
. 
A
ls
o 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 i
n 
ev
er
y 
st
at
em
en
t j
oi
ns
 to
ge
th
er
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
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pa
rs
’: 
B
 
39
1  ‘
de
be
at
’: 
A
, B
 
39
2  ‘
es
se
nt
’: 
A
 
39
3  ‘
qu
am
 d
uo
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
a’
: A
, B
 
39
4  ‘
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r’
: A
 
39
5  ‘
no
n’
: B
 
39
6  ‘
qu
am
’: 
A
, B
 
39
7  ‘
es
t’:
 B
 
39
8  ‘
et
’: 
A
 
 
  
443 
{e
tia
m
}3
99
m
ar
ks
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
, w
hi
ch
 is
 m
an
ife
st
ly
 c
le
ar
 in
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 w
hi
ch
 c
on
ta
in
 a
dj
ec
tiv
al
 v
er
bs
. 
 q
uo
d 
in
 o
m
ni
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 c
op
ul
at
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 c
um
 
su
bi
ec
to
 n
ot
ifi
ca
t q
uo
d 
es
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
, q
uo
d 
m
an
ife
st
e 
pa
te
t 
in
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ni
bu
s i
n 
qu
ib
us
 p
on
un
tu
r v
er
ba
 a
di
ec
tiv
a.
 
 
 
 
A
d 
ho
c 
{n
am
}4
00
, 
qu
od
 
co
gn
os
ca
m
us
 
{q
uo
d}
40
1  
es
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
in
 
ta
lib
us
 
pr
op
os
ito
ni
bu
s, 
re
so
lv
im
us
 
ve
rb
um
 
ad
ie
ct
iv
um
 i
n 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
 <
’s
um
’, 
‘e
s’
, 
et
>4
02
 ‘
es
t’,
 e
t 
in
 
pr
in
ci
pi
um
 e
iu
sd
em
 t
em
po
ris
 e
t 
ei
us
de
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
io
ni
s, 
et
 
fa
ct
a 
re
so
lu
tio
ne
 c
og
no
sc
im
us
 {
qu
od
}4
03
 e
st
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
, q
ui
a 
ill
ud
 
qu
od
 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
t 
{v
er
bu
m
}4
04
 
 
fa
ct
a 
re
so
lu
tio
ne
 
es
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, e
t i
ta
 v
er
bu
m
 n
ot
ifi
ca
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
. 
Fo
r 
fr
om
 th
is
, t
ha
t w
e 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 w
ha
t i
s 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
in
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 w
ith
 a
dj
ec
tiv
al
 v
er
bs
, 
w
e 
re
so
lv
e 
an
 a
dj
ec
tiv
al
 
ve
rb
 i
nt
o 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
an
d 
in
to
 a
 p
ar
tic
ip
le
 o
f 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
tim
e 
an
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tio
n,
 a
nd
, h
av
in
g 
m
ad
e 
th
at
 re
so
lu
tio
n,
 w
e 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 t
ha
t 
it 
is
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 
sp
ec
ifi
es
 th
e 
ve
rb
 in
 th
e 
re
so
lu
tio
n 
is
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 a
nd
 s
o 
th
e 
ve
rb
 m
ar
ks
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e.
 
 
 
 
C
on
tra
, 
si
 v
er
bu
m
 s
it 
no
ta
 s
ol
um
 q
ui
a 
no
tif
ic
at
, 
[tu
nc
]4
05
 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
ve
rb
i 
no
n 
co
m
pe
te
re
t 
om
ni
 v
er
bo
, 
qu
ia
 n
on
 o
m
ne
 
ve
rb
um
 
no
tif
ic
at
, 
se
d 
so
lu
m
 
ve
rb
um
 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
um
 
qu
od
 
co
pu
la
t 
{s
ub
ie
ct
um
 
cu
m
 
pr
ed
ic
at
o}
40
6 . 
Se
d 
ho
c 
es
t 
in
co
nv
en
ie
s, 
qu
ia
 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
ve
rb
i 
{d
eb
et
}4
07
 
 
om
ni
 
ve
rb
i 
co
m
pe
te
re
. 
O
ne
 m
ig
ht
 o
bj
ec
t t
ha
t, 
if 
a 
ve
rb
 is
 a
 m
ar
k 
on
ly
 o
f 
w
ha
t i
t 
m
ar
ks
, t
he
n 
th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f 
a 
ve
rb
 w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 a
pp
ly
 to
 a
ll 
ve
rb
s, 
be
ca
us
e 
no
t e
ve
ry
 v
er
b 
m
ar
ks
, b
ut
 o
nl
y 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
al
 
ve
rb
s 
jo
in
 t
og
et
he
r 
a 
su
bj
ec
t 
w
ith
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
. 
B
ut
 t
hi
s 
is
 
in
co
ns
is
te
nt
, b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f a
 v
er
b 
ou
gh
t t
o 
ap
pl
y 
to
 a
ll 
ve
rb
s. 
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9  ‘
en
im
’: 
B
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0  ‘
au
te
m
’: 
A
 
40
1  ‘
qu
id
’: 
A
 
40
2  B
 
40
3  ‘
qu
id
’: 
A
 
40
4  ‘
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, ‘
es
t’,
 fa
ct
a’
: A
 
40
5  A
 
40
6  ‘
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 su
bi
ec
to
’: 
A
 
40
7  ‘
de
be
re
t’:
 A
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Ite
m
 s
ic
ut
 p
er
 r
es
ol
ut
io
ne
m
 v
er
bi
 c
og
no
sc
itu
r 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, i
ta
 
{e
t}
40
8
 
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
.  
Er
go
 v
er
bu
m
 n
on
 e
st
 m
ag
is
 n
ot
a 
pr
ae
di
ca
ti 
qu
am
 su
bi
ec
ti,
 c
ui
us
 o
pp
os
itu
m
 v
id
et
ur
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 v
el
le
. 
Li
ke
w
is
e,
 j
us
t 
as
 t
hr
ou
gh
 t
he
 r
es
ol
ut
io
n 
of
 a
 v
er
b 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
is
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d,
 s
o 
to
o 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 a
 
ve
rb
 is
 n
ot
 m
or
e 
gr
ea
tly
 a
 m
ar
k 
of
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
th
an
 o
f t
he
 
su
bj
ec
t, 
w
hi
ch
 w
hi
ch
 s
ee
m
s 
to
 b
e 
th
e 
op
po
si
te
 o
f 
w
ha
t 
A
ris
to
tle
 in
te
nd
s. 
 
 
 
A
d 
pr
im
um
 i
st
or
um
 d
ic
en
du
m
 [
es
t]4
09
 q
uo
d 
om
ne
 v
er
bu
m
 
ve
rb
er
al
ite
r 
su
m
pt
um
 
es
t 
no
ta
 
eo
ru
m
 
qu
ae
 
de
 
al
te
ro
 
{d
ic
un
tu
r}
41
0 , 
et
 
ho
c 
[e
st
]4
11
 
ve
l 
se
cu
nd
um
 
se
 
ut
 
ve
rb
a 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
a,
 v
el
 {
ra
tio
ne
 i
nc
lu
si
 i
n 
ei
s}
41
2  
ut
 v
er
ba
 a
di
ec
tiv
a 
<v
er
ba
lit
er
 su
m
pt
a>
41
3 . 
U
nd
e 
ve
rb
a 
ad
ie
ct
iv
a 
ve
rb
al
ite
r s
um
pt
a 
ra
tio
ne
 v
er
bo
ru
m
 s
ub
st
an
tiv
or
um
 e
is
 i
nc
lu
so
ru
m
 s
un
t 
no
ta
e 
pr
ae
di
ca
to
ru
m
 e
t 
ve
rb
a 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
a,
 u
t 
ha
ec
 v
er
ba
 ‘
es
t’,
 ‘
fu
it’
 
[e
t]4
14
 
‘e
rit
’, 
su
nt
 
se
cu
nd
um
 
se
 
no
ta
e 
[ip
so
ru
m
]4
15
 
pr
ae
di
ca
to
ru
m
 
<q
ui
a 
se
cu
nd
um
 
se
 
di
cu
nt
 
in
 
co
gn
iti
on
i 
pr
ae
di
ca
m
en
to
ru
m
>4
16
 
. 
To
 th
e 
fir
st
 o
f t
he
se
, i
t m
us
t b
e 
sa
id
 th
at
 e
ve
ry
 v
er
b 
ta
ke
n 
up
 
ve
rb
al
ly
 is
 a
 m
ar
k 
of
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
, a
nd
 
th
is
 is
 e
ith
er
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 it
se
lf,
 a
s 
w
ith
 a
 s
ub
st
an
tiv
al
 v
er
b,
 
or
 b
y 
re
as
on
 o
f 
its
 in
cl
us
io
n 
in
 th
em
, a
s 
w
ith
 a
n 
ad
je
ct
iv
al
 
ve
rb
. 
H
en
ce
 a
dj
ec
tiv
al
 v
er
bs
 t
ak
en
 v
er
ba
lly
, 
by
 r
ea
so
n 
of
 
th
e 
in
cl
us
io
n 
of
 s
ub
st
an
tiv
al
 v
er
bs
 in
 th
em
, a
re
 m
ar
ks
 o
f t
he
 
pr
ed
ic
at
es
, s
o 
th
at
 th
es
e 
ve
rb
s 
– 
‘is
’, 
‘w
as
’ 
an
d 
‘w
ill
 b
e’
 –
 
ar
e 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
em
se
lv
es
 m
ar
ks
 o
f t
ho
se
 p
re
di
ca
te
s. 
 
 
 
A
d 
al
iu
d 
di
co
 u
t 
m
ih
i 
vi
de
tu
r 
qu
od
 {
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
 ‘
es
t’ 
es
t 
ita
}4
17
 
pr
in
ci
pi
um
 
no
tif
ic
an
di
 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
si
cu
t 
pr
ed
ic
at
um
. 
{U
nd
e}
41
8
 
 p
er
 h
oc
 q
uo
d 
al
iq
ui
d 
co
ns
tru
itu
r c
um
 v
er
bo
 e
x 
pa
rte
 
To
 th
e 
ot
he
r, 
I s
ay
, a
s 
se
em
s 
cl
ea
r t
o 
m
e,
 th
at
 th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘i
s’
, 
is
 a
 p
rin
ci
pl
e 
of
 m
ar
ki
ng
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
 j
us
t 
as
 m
uc
h 
as
 t
he
 
pr
ed
ic
at
e.
 H
en
ce
 o
n 
ac
co
un
t 
of
 t
hi
s, 
th
at
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 i
s 
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8  ‘
pe
r r
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ol
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ne
m
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og
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ub
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: A
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et
ia
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B
 
40
9  B
 
41
0  ‘
pr
ae
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ca
tu
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: B
 
41
1  A
, B
 
41
2  ‘
se
cu
nd
um
 a
liq
ui
d 
in
cl
us
um
’: 
B
 
41
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41
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41
5  A
 
41
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41
7  ‘
ve
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um
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st
’: 
A
 
41
8  ‘
qu
ia
’: 
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an
te
 c
og
no
sc
itu
r 
qu
od
 i
llu
d 
es
t 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 v
el
 s
e 
te
ne
ns
 e
x 
pa
rte
 s
ub
ie
ct
i 
si
cu
t 
pe
r 
ho
c 
qu
od
 a
liq
ui
d 
co
ns
tru
itu
r 
<c
um
 
ve
rb
o>
41
9  
a 
pa
rte
 p
os
t c
og
no
sc
itu
r 
qu
od
 il
lu
d 
es
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 
ve
l 
se
 
te
ne
ns
 
ex
 
pa
rte
 
pr
ae
di
ca
ti.
 
Et
 
cu
m
 
di
ci
tu
r 
qu
od
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 d
ic
it 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 e
st
 n
ot
a 
pr
ae
di
ca
ti 
et
 n
on
 
su
bi
ec
ti,
 d
ic
o 
qu
od
 c
um
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 d
ic
it 
ve
rb
um
 e
ss
e 
no
ta
m
 
eo
ru
m
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 d
ic
un
tu
r,
 ta
ng
itu
r t
am
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 q
ua
m
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, 
{q
ui
a 
si
}4
20
 
di
ci
tu
r 
al
iq
ui
d 
di
ci
 
de
 
al
te
ro
 
ta
ng
un
tu
r 
du
o,
 
[s
ci
lic
et
 
ill
ud
 
qu
od
 
di
ci
tu
r,]
42
1
co
ns
tru
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
ve
rb
 a
s 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 c
om
in
g 
be
fo
re
 it
, i
t i
s 
un
de
rs
to
od
 th
at
 th
at
 is
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
 o
r 
ho
ld
s 
its
el
f 
fr
om
 a
 p
ar
t 
of
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
ju
st
 a
s 
on
 a
cc
ou
nt
 o
f 
th
is
, t
ha
t s
om
et
hi
ng
 is
 
co
ns
tru
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
ve
rb
 a
s 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 c
om
in
g 
af
te
r 
it,
 it
 is
 
kn
ow
n 
th
at
 it
 is
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
 o
r 
ho
ld
s 
its
el
f 
fr
om
 th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e.
 A
nd
 w
he
n 
it 
is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 a
 
ve
rb
 i
s 
a 
m
ar
k 
of
 t
ho
se
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
, 
it 
at
ta
ch
es
 j
us
t 
as
 m
uc
h 
to
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
 a
s 
to
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
, 
be
ca
us
e 
if 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 is
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
 it
 to
uc
he
s 
on
 tw
o 
th
in
gs
, n
am
el
y 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 is
 s
ai
d,
 n
am
el
y 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 a
nd
 
th
at
 a
bo
ut
 w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 s
ai
d,
 n
am
el
y 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t. 
H
en
ce
 w
he
n 
it 
is
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 a
 m
ar
k 
of
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
of
 
an
ot
he
r,
 it
 is
 d
en
ot
ed
 th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 a
 p
rin
ci
pl
e 
of
 th
in
ki
ng
 
on
e 
of
 a
no
th
er
, 
na
m
el
y 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
of
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 it
 is
 a
 p
rin
ci
pl
e 
of
 th
in
ki
ng
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t 
as
 m
uc
h 
as
 a
bo
ut
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
. 
Fo
r 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 c
an
no
t 
be
 
th
ou
gh
t t
o 
be
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
 u
nl
es
s 
th
at
 a
bo
ut
 w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 
sa
id
 is
 th
ou
gh
t j
us
t a
s t
ha
t w
hi
ch
 is
 sa
id
.  
 
sc
ili
ce
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, e
t i
llu
d 
de
 q
uo
 d
ic
itu
r, 
sc
ili
ce
t s
ub
ie
ct
um
.  
U
nd
e 
cu
m
 d
ic
itu
r 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 e
st
 n
ot
a 
eo
ru
m
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 
di
cu
nt
ur
, d
en
ot
at
ur
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 e
st
 p
rin
ci
pi
um
 c
og
no
sc
en
di
 
al
te
ru
m
 d
e 
al
te
ro
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
, 
et
 p
er
 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 e
st
 p
rin
ci
pi
um
 c
og
no
sc
en
di
 t
am
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 q
ua
m
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
. N
on
 e
ni
m
 p
ot
es
t 
co
gn
os
ci
 a
liq
ui
d 
di
ci
 d
e 
al
te
ro
 
ni
si
 c
og
no
sc
at
ur
 t
am
 i
llu
d 
qu
od
 d
ic
itu
r 
qu
am
 i
llu
d 
de
 q
uo
 
di
ci
tu
r. 
 
 
 
 
[E
t]4
22
 s
i q
ui
s 
qu
ae
re
re
t u
tru
m
 v
er
bu
m
 m
ag
is
 s
e 
te
ne
at
 {
ex
}4
23
 
pa
rte
 {
su
bi
ec
ti}
42
4  
{q
ua
m
}4
25
 e
x 
pa
rte
 {
pr
ae
di
ca
ti}
42
6
 
, 
di
co
 
qu
od
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
er
 d
ic
i p
ot
es
t q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 s
ub
st
an
tiv
um
 q
uo
d 
co
pu
la
t s
ub
ie
ct
um
 c
um
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
o 
no
n 
m
ag
is
 s
e 
te
ne
t e
x 
pa
rte
 
A
nd
 if
 s
om
eo
ne
 w
er
e 
to
 a
sk
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
ve
rb
 m
or
e 
gr
ea
tly
 
ho
ld
s 
its
el
f 
on
 th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t o
r 
on
 th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 
I 
sa
y 
th
at
 
it 
pr
ob
ab
ly
 
ca
n 
be
 
sa
id
 
th
at
 
a 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
al
 v
er
b 
w
hi
ch
 j
oi
ns
 t
og
et
he
r 
a 
su
bj
ec
t 
w
ith
 a
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su
bi
ec
ti 
qu
am
 e
x 
pa
rte
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
i, 
se
d 
es
t 
m
ed
iu
m
 i
nt
er
 i
lla
, 
no
n 
m
ag
is
 c
on
ve
ni
en
s 
cu
m
 u
no
 q
ua
m
 c
um
 {
al
io
}4
27
. 
V
er
ba
 
ve
ro
 
ad
ie
ct
iv
a 
qu
ae
 
re
so
lu
bi
lia
 
<s
un
t>
42
8  
in
 
ve
rb
um
 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
um
 e
t 
su
um
 p
ar
tic
ip
iu
m
 r
at
io
ne
 p
ar
tic
ip
ii 
{i
n 
ei
s 
in
cl
us
it}
42
9  
m
ag
is
 s
e 
te
ne
nt
 e
x 
pa
rte
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
i q
ua
m
 e
x 
pa
rte
 
su
bi
ec
ti,
 q
ui
a 
pa
rti
ci
pi
um
 t
al
i 
ve
rb
i 
es
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 v
el
 p
ar
s 
pr
ae
di
ca
ti.
 R
at
io
ne
 ta
m
en
 c
op
ul
ae
 n
on
 m
ag
is
 s
e 
te
ne
t e
x 
pa
rte
 
pr
ae
di
ca
ti 
qu
am
 e
x 
pa
rte
 s
ub
ie
ct
i. 
U
nd
e 
qu
od
 c
om
m
un
ite
r 
di
ci
tu
r, 
qu
od
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 s
e 
ha
be
t 
pe
r 
m
od
um
 f
or
m
ae
 e
t 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 p
er
 m
od
um
 m
at
er
ia
e,
 e
st
 d
ic
tu
m
 m
ag
is
tra
le
 n
on
 
co
nt
in
en
s 
ve
rit
at
em
, 
qu
ia
 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
et
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
in
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
ca
th
eg
or
em
a 
su
nt
 p
ar
te
s 
m
at
er
ia
le
s 
et
 v
er
bu
m
 
qu
od
 e
st
 c
op
ul
a 
es
t p
ar
s 
fo
rm
al
is
, u
bi
 a
lib
i d
ic
itu
r <
ab
 e
o 
qu
od
 
pr
op
os
iti
o 
de
 in
es
se
 h
ab
et
 su
am
 u
ni
ta
te
m
>4
30
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
do
es
 n
ot
 h
ol
d 
its
el
f 
m
or
e 
so
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 
su
bj
ec
t t
ha
n 
on
 th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 b
ut
 it
 is
 a
 m
id
dl
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
em
, 
no
 m
or
e 
su
ite
d 
to
 o
ne
 t
ha
n 
to
 t
he
 o
th
er
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
ad
je
ct
iv
al
 v
er
bs
, 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 r
es
ol
va
bl
e 
in
to
 a
 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
al
 v
er
b 
an
d 
its
 o
w
n 
pa
rti
ci
pl
e,
 b
y 
re
as
on
 o
f 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pl
e 
in
 i
t, 
ho
ld
 m
or
e 
so
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
 
th
an
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pl
e 
of
 
su
ch
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
 o
r 
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 t
o 
th
e 
co
pu
la
 i
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 i
t, 
it 
no
 
m
or
e 
ho
ld
s 
its
el
f 
on
 t
he
 p
ar
t 
of
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
 t
ha
n 
on
 t
he
 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t. 
H
en
ce
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 is
 c
om
m
on
ly
 sa
id
, t
ha
t 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
ho
ld
s 
its
el
f t
hr
ou
gh
 th
e 
m
od
e 
of
 fo
rm
, a
nd
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t t
hr
ou
gh
 th
e 
m
od
e 
of
 m
at
te
r, 
is
 a
 c
om
m
on
 d
oc
tri
ne
 
w
hi
ch
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
co
nt
ai
n 
th
e 
tru
th
, b
ec
au
se
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
 a
nd
 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
in
 a
 c
at
eg
or
ic
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
ar
e 
th
e 
m
at
er
ia
l 
pa
rts
 a
nd
 th
e 
ve
rb
, w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e 
co
pu
la
, i
s 
th
e 
fo
rm
al
 p
ar
t, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 e
ls
ew
he
re
.  
.  
 
 
 
Q
ui
da
m
 
ta
m
en
 
di
cu
nt
 
qu
od
 
qu
am
vi
s 
ve
rb
um
 
co
pu
la
ns
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 c
um
 s
ub
ie
ct
o 
{n
ec
}4
31
 s
it 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 n
ec
 p
ar
s 
pr
ae
di
ca
ti,
 ta
m
en
 m
ag
is
 s
e 
te
ne
t e
x 
pa
rte
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 q
ua
m
 e
x 
pa
rte
 s
ub
ie
ct
i, 
qu
ia
 v
er
bu
m
 q
uo
d 
es
t c
op
ul
a 
in
te
r 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
et
 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
es
t 
m
ed
iu
m
 
re
sp
ic
ie
ns
 
in
te
r 
ill
a 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
ta
nq
ua
m
 
te
rm
in
um
 
a 
qu
o,
 
<e
t>
43
2
 
 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 
ta
nq
ua
m
 
te
rm
in
um
 a
d 
qu
em
, 
se
d 
m
ed
iu
m
 i
nt
er
 t
er
m
in
um
 a
 q
uo
 e
t 
H
ow
ev
er
, s
om
e 
sa
y 
th
at
 a
lth
ou
gh
 th
e 
ve
rb
 jo
in
in
g 
to
ge
th
er
 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t i
s 
ne
ith
er
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
 n
or
 p
ar
t 
of
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 s
til
l i
t m
or
e 
so
 h
ol
ds
 it
se
lf 
on
 th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
th
an
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
be
ca
us
e 
a 
ve
rb
 
w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e 
co
pu
la
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
an
d 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t i
s 
a 
m
ed
iu
m
, a
im
in
g,
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
os
e,
 a
t t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
 a
s 
its
 te
rm
 
fr
om
 w
hi
ch
, a
nd
 a
t t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
 a
s 
its
 te
rm
 to
 w
hi
ch
. B
ut
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447 
te
rm
in
um
 a
d 
qu
em
 m
ag
is
 s
e 
te
ne
t 
ex
 p
ar
te
 t
er
m
in
i 
ad
 q
ue
m
 
<q
ua
m
 e
x 
pa
rte
 te
rm
in
i a
 q
uo
>4
33
, u
t p
at
et
 e
x 
qu
in
qu
e 
ph
ys
ic
a,
 
ub
i 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 
di
ci
t 
qu
od
 
m
ot
us
 
qu
i 
es
t 
m
ed
iu
m
 
in
te
r 
te
rm
in
um
 a
 q
uo
 e
t 
te
rm
in
um
 a
d 
qu
em
 m
ag
is
 e
st
 [
de
 n
at
ur
a 
te
rm
in
i 
ad
 q
ue
m
 q
ua
m
]4
34
 d
e 
na
tu
ra
 t
er
m
in
i 
a 
qu
o,
 e
t 
si
c 
ve
rb
um
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
m
ed
iu
m
 i
nt
er
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 e
t 
su
bi
ec
tu
m
 
m
ag
is
 s
e 
te
ne
t e
x 
pa
rte
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
i q
ua
m
 e
x 
pa
rte
 s
ub
ie
ct
i. 
Is
tu
d 
ta
m
en
 n
ih
il 
co
nc
lu
di
t, 
qu
ia
 p
ro
po
si
tio
 n
on
 e
st
 m
o<
k6
rb
>t
us
 
{n
eq
ue
}4
35
th
e 
m
ed
iu
m
 b
et
w
ee
n 
a 
te
rm
 f
ro
m
 w
hi
ch
 a
nd
 a
 t
er
m
 t
o 
w
hi
ch
 m
or
e 
so
 h
ol
ds
 it
se
lf 
on
 th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
te
rm
 to
 w
hi
ch
, 
as
 i
s 
cl
ea
r 
fr
om
 t
he
 f
ift
h 
bo
ok
 o
f 
th
e 
Ph
ys
ic
s, 
w
he
re
 
A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 a
 m
ot
io
n 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 m
ed
iu
m
 b
et
w
ee
n 
a 
te
rm
 f
ro
m
 w
hi
ch
 a
nd
 a
 te
rm
 to
 w
hi
ch
 is
 m
or
e 
so
 f
ro
m
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 te
rm
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
an
 fr
om
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 te
rm
 
fr
om
 w
hi
ch
. I
n 
th
is
 w
ay
, t
he
n,
 a
 v
er
b 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
a 
m
ed
iu
m
 
be
tw
ee
n 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
an
d 
a 
su
bj
ec
t 
m
or
e 
so
 h
ol
ds
 i
ts
el
f 
on
 
th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
 t
ha
n 
on
 t
he
 p
ar
t 
of
 t
he
 s
ub
je
ct
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, o
ne
 s
ho
ul
d 
no
t i
nf
er
 th
is
, b
ec
au
se
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t i
s 
no
t a
 m
ot
io
n 
no
r a
 m
ut
at
io
n 
of
 a
 su
bj
ec
t i
nt
o 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e.
 
 m
ut
at
io
 a
 su
bi
ec
to
 in
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
. 
 
 
 
A
d 
se
cu
nd
am
 a
uc
to
rit
at
em
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
i 
di
ce
nt
is
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 
se
m
pe
r 
es
t 
de
 a
lte
ro
 [
ta
nq
ua
m
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
]4
36
, 
di
co
 q
uo
d 
ve
ru
m
 e
st
, s
ed
 n
on
 e
st
 s
em
pe
r 
de
 a
lte
ro
 ta
nq
ua
m
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 
de
 s
ub
ie
ct
o,
 s
ed
 q
ui
a 
ve
rb
um
 v
er
ba
lit
er
 s
um
pt
um
 s
ec
un
du
m
 
or
di
ne
m
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
ni
s 
nu
nq
ua
m
 p
ot
es
t 
es
se
 p
rin
ci
pi
um
 i
n 
{o
rd
in
e}
43
7 , 
se
d 
se
m
pe
r 
pr
ae
su
pp
on
it 
al
iq
ui
d 
pr
ae
ce
de
ns
 
se
cu
nd
um
 o
rd
in
em
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
ni
s. 
<I
de
o 
di
ci
t 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 s
em
pe
r 
es
t 
al
te
ro
, q
ui
a 
se
m
pe
r 
pr
ae
su
pp
on
it 
ad
 
pr
ae
ce
de
ns
 
se
cu
nd
um
 
or
di
ne
m
 
co
ns
tru
ct
io
ni
s.>
43
8  
U
nd
e 
ve
rb
um
 s
em
pe
r 
es
t 
de
 a
liq
uo
 p
ra
ec
ed
en
te
 i
ps
um
 s
ec
un
du
m
 
{c
on
st
ru
ct
io
ne
m
}4
39
, 
et
 
si
c 
{o
po
rte
t}
44
0
 
 
in
te
lli
gi
 
{i
st
ud
 
To
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 a
ut
ho
rit
at
iv
e 
te
xt
 o
f 
A
ris
to
tle
, w
he
n 
he
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 a
lw
ay
s 
of
 a
no
th
er
, I
 s
ay
 th
at
 th
is
 is
 tr
ue
, b
ut
 it
 
is
 n
ot
 a
lw
ay
s 
of
 a
no
th
er
 a
s 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
of
 a
 s
ub
je
ct
. R
at
he
r, 
th
is
 is
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
ta
ke
n 
ve
rb
al
ly
, a
cc
or
di
ng
 
to
 th
e 
or
de
r o
f c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n,
 c
an
 n
ev
er
 b
e 
fir
st
 in
 th
at
 o
rd
er
, 
bu
t a
lw
ay
s p
re
su
pp
os
es
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 p
re
ce
di
ng
 it
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
th
e 
or
de
r 
of
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n.
 H
en
ce
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 a
lw
ay
s 
of
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
it 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
th
e 
or
de
r 
of
 
co
ns
tru
ct
io
n,
 a
nd
 in
 th
is
 w
ay
 it
 is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
at
 d
ic
tu
m
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
co
m
m
on
ly
 s
ai
d,
 t
ha
t 
a 
ve
rb
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
m
od
e 
of
 a
ct
io
n 
an
d 
of
 g
oi
ng
 o
ut
 f
ro
m
 o
ne
 a
nd
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448 
di
ct
um
}4
41
 q
uo
d 
co
m
m
un
ite
r 
di
ci
tu
r 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 
pe
r m
od
um
 a
ct
io
ni
s 
et
 e
gr
ed
ie
nt
is
 {
ab
}4
42
 a
lte
ro
 e
t i
nh
ae
re
nt
is
 
al
ic
ui
 a
lte
ri.
  
H
oc
 {
na
m
}4
43
 i
de
o 
di
ci
tu
r, 
{q
ui
a}
44
4  
ve
rb
um
 
se
m
pe
r 
pr
ae
su
pp
on
it 
al
iq
ui
d 
<i
n 
or
at
io
ne
 s
ec
un
du
m
 o
rd
in
em
 
co
ns
tru
ct
io
ni
s 
no
n 
qu
ia
 v
er
bu
m
 r
ea
lit
er
 e
gr
ed
ia
tu
r 
ve
l r
ea
lit
er
 
in
ha
er
ea
t, 
se
d 
qu
ia
 
ve
rb
um
 
pr
ae
su
pp
on
it 
al
iq
uo
d>
44
5  
pr
ae
ce
de
ns
, s
ic
ut
 a
ct
io
 p
ra
es
up
po
ni
t a
ge
ns
 e
t e
gr
ed
ie
ns
 il
lu
d 
a 
qu
o 
eg
re
di
tu
r, 
et
 in
ha
er
en
s i
llu
d 
cu
i i
nh
er
et
. E
t s
i {
al
le
ge
tu
r}
44
6  
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 s
em
pe
r 
di
ci
tu
r 
de
 a
lte
ro
 u
t 
de
 s
ub
ie
ct
o 
et
 p
er
 
co
ns
eq
ue
ns
 e
st
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
, d
ic
en
du
m
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
in
 t
ex
tu
 n
on
 
in
ve
ni
tu
r q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 d
ic
itu
r d
e 
al
te
ro
 [u
t d
e 
su
bi
ec
to
]4
47
, s
ed
 
qu
od
 e
st
 d
e 
al
te
ro
. S
i t
am
en
 in
ve
ni
re
tu
r q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 d
ic
itu
r d
e 
al
te
ro
, e
x 
ho
c 
no
n 
se
qu
er
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 e
ss
et
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
, 
qu
ia
 e
ss
e 
ve
l 
di
ci
 d
e 
al
te
ro
 i
nt
el
lig
itu
r 
du
pl
ic
ite
r, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
im
m
ed
ia
nt
e 
<v
el
 m
ed
ia
nt
e>
44
8 , 
et
 s
ic
 v
er
bu
m
 e
st
 d
e 
al
te
ro
 e
t 
di
ci
tu
r d
e 
al
te
ro
, a
lio
 m
od
o 
m
ed
ia
nt
e,
 s
ci
lic
et
 m
ed
ia
nt
e 
co
pu
la
. 
{Q
uo
d}
44
9  p
rim
o 
<m
od
o 
qu
od
>4
50
 e
st
 v
el
 d
ic
itu
r d
e 
al
te
ro
 n
on
 
es
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
, s
ed
 q
uo
d 
se
cu
nd
o 
m
od
o 
di
ci
tu
r d
e 
al
te
ro
 <
es
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
>4
51
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
m
ed
ia
nt
e 
ve
rb
o 
qu
od
 
co
pu
la
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 c
um
 su
bi
ec
to
, <
id
eo
>4
52
in
he
rin
g 
in
 a
no
th
er
. 
Th
at
 d
ic
tu
m
 i
s 
th
er
ef
or
e 
sa
id
 f
or
 t
hi
s 
re
as
on
, 
be
ca
us
e 
a 
ve
rb
 a
lw
ay
s 
pr
es
up
po
se
s 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 i
n 
sp
ee
ch
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 t
o 
th
e 
or
de
r 
of
 t
he
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
of
 a
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
no
t b
ec
au
se
 a
 v
er
b 
re
al
ly
 g
oe
s 
ou
t o
f 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
or
 
re
al
ly
 
in
he
re
s 
in
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
, 
bu
t 
be
ca
us
e 
a 
ve
rb
 
pr
es
up
po
se
s 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
it,
 
ju
st
 
as
 
an
 
ac
tio
n 
pr
es
up
po
se
s 
an
 a
ge
nt
 a
nd
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 g
oi
ng
 o
ut
 p
re
su
pp
os
es
 
th
at
 f
ro
m
 w
hi
ch
 i
t 
go
es
 o
ut
, 
an
d 
so
m
e 
in
he
rin
g 
th
in
g 
pr
es
up
po
se
s t
ha
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 it
 in
he
re
s. 
A
nd
 if
 it
 is
 a
lle
ge
d 
th
at
 
a 
ve
rb
 i
s 
al
w
ay
s 
sa
id
 o
f 
an
ot
he
r 
as
 o
f 
a 
su
bj
ec
t, 
an
d 
co
ns
eq
ue
nt
ly
 is
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
, i
t m
us
t b
e 
sa
id
 th
at
 in
 th
is
 te
xt
 
of
 A
ris
to
tle
, o
ne
 d
oe
s 
no
t f
in
d 
hi
m
 s
ay
in
g 
th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 sa
id
 
of
 a
no
th
er
, 
bu
t 
m
er
el
y 
th
at
 i
s 
of
 a
no
th
er
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
if 
it 
w
er
e 
di
sc
ov
er
ed
 in
 th
is
 te
xt
 th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
, 
fr
om
 t
hi
s 
it 
w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 f
ol
lo
w
 t
ha
t 
a 
ve
rb
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 t
o 
be
, 
or
 t
o 
be
 s
ai
d,
 o
f 
an
ot
he
r 
is
 
un
de
rs
to
od
 i
n 
tw
o 
w
ay
s, 
na
m
el
y 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 (
an
d 
in
 t
hi
s 
w
ay
 a
 v
er
b 
is
 o
f 
an
ot
he
r 
an
d 
is
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
) 
an
d 
m
ed
ia
te
ly
, n
am
el
y 
by
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
co
pu
la
. W
ha
t i
s, 
or
 is
 s
ai
d,
 o
f a
no
th
er
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 w
ay
 is
 n
ot
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
, b
ut
 
 il
lu
d 
es
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
. 
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A
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de
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en
im
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A
, B
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od
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B
 
44
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, B
 
44
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449 
w
ha
t 
is
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
 i
n 
th
e 
se
co
nd
 w
ay
, n
am
el
y 
by
 t
he
 
m
ed
ia
tio
n 
of
 a
 v
er
b 
w
hi
ch
 jo
in
s 
to
ge
th
er
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
w
ith
 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t, 
is
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
. 
 
 
 
A
d 
te
rti
um
 a
uc
to
rit
at
em
, 
cu
m
 d
ic
it 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
te
rt
iu
m
 a
di
ac
en
s 
pr
ed
ic
at
um
, 
et
 c
et
er
a,
 d
ic
en
du
m
 <
es
t>
45
3  
se
cu
nd
um
 
in
te
nt
io
ne
m
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
i, 
[q
ui
a]
45
4  
in
 
{i
lla
}4
55
 
au
ct
or
ita
te
 {
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
}4
56
 ‘
es
t’ 
te
ne
tu
r 
m
at
er
lia
lit
er
, e
t 
no
n 
te
ne
tu
r n
om
in
at
iv
e 
se
d 
da
tiv
e.
  E
t e
st
 s
en
su
s 
[q
uo
d]
45
7  q
ua
nd
o 
te
rti
um
 
ad
ia
ce
ns
 
hu
ic
 
ve
rb
o 
‘e
st
’ 
es
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
, 
tu
nc
 
du
pl
ic
ite
r 
di
cu
nt
ur
 
{o
pp
os
iti
on
es
}4
58
, 
et
 
ce
te
ra
. 
 
U
nd
e 
in
 
pr
op
os
ito
 h
oc
 v
er
bu
m
 ‘
es
t’ 
no
n 
re
dd
it 
su
pp
os
iti
on
um
 h
ui
c 
ve
rb
o 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r, 
se
d 
ho
c 
qu
od
 d
ic
o 
te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
en
s 
re
dd
it 
ei
 
su
pp
os
itu
m
 e
t 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
 ‘
es
t’ 
te
ne
tu
r 
da
tiv
e.
 U
nd
e 
si
c 
{d
ic
en
do
}4
59
, 
‘h
om
o 
es
t 
an
im
al
’, 
is
te
 t
er
m
in
us
 ‘
an
im
al
’ 
es
t 
te
rti
um
 
ad
ia
ce
ns
 
in
 
[h
ac
]4
60
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e,
 
et
 
{a
di
ac
et
 
et
 
ad
ic
itu
r}
46
1  h
ui
c 
ve
rb
o 
‘e
st
’, 
et
 n
on
 s
ol
um
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 a
di
ac
et
 
ve
rb
o 
se
d 
et
ia
m
 v
er
bu
m
 a
di
ac
et
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
o.
 U
nd
e 
in
 i
st
a,
 
‘h
om
o 
es
t 
an
im
al
’, 
‘a
ni
m
al
’ 
ad
ia
ce
t 
hu
ic
 v
er
bo
 ‘
es
t’ 
et
 h
oc
 
ve
rb
um
 
‘e
st
’ 
ad
ia
ce
t 
‘a
ni
m
al
i’,
 
qu
ia
 
ut
ru
m
qu
e 
{a
di
ci
tu
r 
al
te
ri}
46
2
 
. 
To
 t
he
 t
hi
rd
 a
ut
ho
rit
at
iv
e 
te
xt
, w
he
n 
A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
as
 t
he
 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
is 
a 
te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
ie
ns
, 
et
c.
, 
th
at
 t
ex
t 
ne
ed
s 
to
 
ex
pl
ai
ne
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
in
te
nt
io
n 
of
 A
ris
to
tle
, b
ec
au
se
 in
 
th
at
 a
ut
ho
rit
at
iv
e 
te
xt
, t
hi
s 
ve
rb
, ‘
is
’, 
is
 h
el
d 
m
at
er
ia
lly
, a
nd
 
it 
is
 n
ot
 h
el
d 
no
m
in
at
iv
el
y 
bu
t 
da
tiv
el
y.
 A
nd
 t
he
 s
en
se
 i
s 
th
at
 w
he
n 
th
e 
te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
ie
ns
 t
o 
th
is
 v
er
b 
‘is
’, 
is
 t
he
 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 t
he
n 
ap
po
si
te
s 
ar
e 
sp
ok
en
 o
f 
in
 t
w
o 
w
ay
s, 
et
c.
 
H
en
ce
 in
 th
e 
pr
es
en
t c
as
e,
 th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘i
s’
, d
oe
s n
ot
 a
ss
ig
n 
th
e 
su
pp
os
it 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
 o
f 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 b
ut
 t
ha
t 
w
hi
ch
 I
 c
al
l 
th
e 
te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
en
s 
as
si
gn
s 
th
e 
su
pp
os
it 
to
 i
t, 
an
d 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 
‘is
’, 
is
 ta
ke
n 
da
tiv
el
y.
 H
en
ce
, w
he
n 
sa
yi
ng
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 is
 a
n 
an
im
al
’, 
th
is
 te
rm
, ‘
an
im
al
’, 
is
 th
e 
te
rt
iu
m
 a
di
ac
en
s 
in
 th
at
 
st
at
em
en
t, 
an
d 
it 
ad
jo
in
s 
an
d 
is
 a
dj
oi
ne
d 
to
 t
hi
s 
ve
rb
 ‘
is
’, 
an
d 
no
t o
nl
y 
do
es
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e 
ad
jo
in
 th
e 
ve
rb
 b
ut
 th
e 
ve
rb
 
al
so
 a
dj
oi
ns
 t
he
 p
re
di
ca
te
. 
H
en
ce
, 
in
 t
hi
s 
st
at
em
en
t, 
‘A
 
hu
m
an
 i
s 
an
 a
ni
m
al
’, 
‘a
ni
m
al
’ 
ad
jo
in
s 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
an
d 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
ad
jo
in
s 
‘a
ni
m
al
’, 
be
ca
us
e 
ea
ch
 i
s 
jo
in
ed
 t
o 
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: A
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th
e 
ot
he
r. 
 
 
 
[S
ed
]4
63
 a
dh
uc
 d
ub
ita
tu
r, 
qu
ia
 n
on
 v
id
et
ur
 [
ve
ru
m
]4
64
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 s
em
pe
r 
es
t 
no
ta
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
i, 
qu
ia
 q
ua
nd
oq
ue
 s
ub
ic
itu
r 
ve
rb
um
 u
t 
pa
te
t 
hi
c,
 ‘
le
ge
re
 e
st
 b
on
um
’, 
au
t 
hi
c,
 ‘
le
go
 e
st
 
ve
rb
um
’. 
 D
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
si
c 
{d
ic
en
do
}4
65
 ‘l
eg
er
e 
es
t b
on
um
’, 
ve
l ‘
le
go
 e
st
 v
er
bu
m
’, 
no
n 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r l
y 
‘le
ge
re
’ v
er
ba
lit
er
, q
ui
a 
no
n 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r 
[p
er
 
m
od
um
 
ve
rb
i 
se
d]
46
6  
pe
r 
m
od
um
 
{s
pe
ci
fic
at
iv
um
}4
67
 v
er
bi
, 
cu
m
 n
on
 a
cc
ip
ia
tu
r 
pe
r 
m
od
um
 
eg
re
di
en
tis
 
ve
l 
flu
en
tis
 
ab
 
al
io
, 
ho
c 
es
t, 
pe
r 
m
od
um
 
pr
ae
su
pp
on
en
tis
 a
liq
ui
d 
se
cu
nd
um
 o
rd
in
em
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
ni
s, 
se
d 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r p
ro
 re
 v
er
bi
 <
se
u 
pr
o 
no
m
in
e>
46
8 . 
Id
em
 {
na
m
}4
69
 e
st
 
di
ce
re
 ‘
le
ge
re
 e
st
 b
on
um
’ 
et
 <
di
ce
re
>4
70
 ‘
le
ct
io
 e
st
 b
on
a’
, 
ve
ru
m
ta
m
en
 s
ic
 {
di
ce
nd
o}
47
1  
‘le
ge
re
 e
st
 b
on
um
’, 
ly
 ‘
le
ge
re
’ 
es
t 
ve
rb
um
 e
t 
ha
be
t 
m
od
um
 {
sp
ec
ifi
ca
nd
i}
47
2  
ve
rb
i, 
se
d 
no
n 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r 
su
b 
{i
st
a}
47
3  
ra
tio
ne
. 
Si
c 
et
ia
m
 {
di
ce
nd
o}
47
4  
‘c
ur
rit
 
es
t 
ve
rb
um
’, 
ly
 ‘
cu
rr
it’
 e
st
 v
er
bu
m
, 
se
d 
no
n 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r 
pe
r 
m
od
um
 v
er
bi
, 
ne
c 
<a
cc
ip
itu
r>
47
5
 
 p
ro
 s
ig
nf
ic
at
o 
ve
rb
i, 
se
d 
B
ut
 s
til
l t
he
re
 is
 a
 d
ou
bt
, b
ec
au
se
 it
 d
oe
s 
no
t s
ee
m
 tr
ue
 th
at
 
a 
ve
rb
 is
 a
lw
ay
s t
he
 m
ar
k 
of
 a
 p
re
di
ca
te
, b
ec
au
se
 so
m
et
im
es
 
a 
ve
rb
 is
 a
 su
bj
ec
t, 
as
 is
 c
le
ar
 in
 th
is
 c
as
e,
 ‘T
o 
re
ad
 is
 g
oo
d’
, 
or
 in
 th
is
 c
as
e,
 ‘R
ea
d 
is
 a
 v
er
b’
. I
t m
us
t b
e 
sa
id
 th
at
, i
n 
th
is
 
ca
se
, b
y 
‘T
o 
re
ad
 is
 g
oo
d’
 o
r 
‘R
ea
d 
is
 a
 v
er
b’
, ‘
to
 r
ea
d’
 is
 
no
t b
ei
ng
 u
se
d 
ve
rb
al
ly
, b
ec
au
se
 it
 is
 n
ot
 u
se
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
m
od
e 
of
 a
 v
er
b 
bu
t t
hr
ou
gh
 th
e 
m
od
e 
of
 th
e 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 
a 
ve
rb
, s
in
ce
 i
t 
is
 n
ot
 u
se
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
m
od
e 
of
 g
oi
ng
 o
r 
flo
w
in
g 
ou
t 
fr
om
 a
no
th
er
, 
th
at
 i
s, 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
m
od
e 
of
 
pr
es
up
po
si
ng
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
th
e 
or
de
r 
of
 
co
ns
tru
ct
io
n,
 b
ut
 i
t 
is
 u
se
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
 o
f 
th
e 
ve
rb
. 
Fo
r 
it 
is
 t
he
 s
am
e 
th
in
g 
to
 s
ay
 ‘
To
 r
ea
d 
is
 g
oo
d’
 a
nd
 
‘R
ea
di
ng
 is
 g
oo
d’
, t
ho
ug
h 
in
 th
is
 c
as
e,
 b
y 
sa
yi
ng
 ‘T
o 
re
ad
 is
 
go
od
’, 
‘to
 re
ad
’ i
s 
a 
ve
rb
 a
nd
 h
as
 th
e 
m
od
e 
of
 s
pe
ci
fy
in
g 
a 
ve
rb
, 
bu
t 
it 
is
 n
ot
 u
se
d 
as
 a
 v
er
b.
 A
ls
o 
in
 t
hi
s 
ca
se
, 
by
 
sa
yi
ng
 ‘R
un
s i
s a
 v
er
b’
, ‘
ru
ns
’ i
s a
 v
er
b,
 b
ut
 it
 is
 n
ot
 u
se
d 
as
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451 
ac
ci
pi
tu
r 
m
at
er
ia
lit
er
. U
nd
e 
ve
rb
um
 a
cc
ep
tu
m
 {
in
}4
76
ve
rb
, 
no
r 
fo
r 
th
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
te
 o
f 
a 
ve
rb
, 
bu
t 
it 
is
 u
se
d 
m
at
er
ia
lly
. H
en
ce
 a
 v
er
b 
us
ed
 w
ith
 t
he
 f
or
ce
 o
f 
a 
ve
rb
 i
s 
al
w
ay
s 
th
e 
m
ar
k 
of
 th
os
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
of
 a
no
th
er
, e
ith
er
 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 it
se
lf 
or
 b
y 
re
as
on
 o
f a
n 
in
cl
us
io
n 
in
 it
, a
s 
w
as
 
sa
id
 a
bo
ve
. 
 v
i v
er
bi
 
se
m
pe
r e
st
 n
ot
a 
eo
ru
m
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 d
ic
un
tu
r v
el
 se
cu
nd
um
 se
 
ve
l r
at
io
ne
 in
cl
us
i i
n 
eo
, u
t s
up
ra
 d
ic
tu
m
 e
st
. 
 
 
 
N
on
 
cu
rr
it 
au
te
m
 
et
 
no
n 
la
bo
ra
t 
no
n 
ve
rb
um
 
di
co
. 
C
on
si
gn
ifi
ca
t q
ui
de
m
 te
m
pu
s 
et
 s
em
pe
r 
de
 a
liq
uo
 e
st
 n
ot
a.
 
D
iff
er
en
tia
e 
au
te
m
 h
ui
c 
no
m
en
 n
on
 e
st
 im
po
si
tu
m
, s
ed
 s
it 
in
fin
itu
m
 v
er
bu
m
. 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ae
c 
es
t s
ec
un
da
 p
ar
tic
ul
a 
se
cu
nd
ae
 p
ar
tis
 h
ui
us
 c
ap
itu
li 
in
 q
ua
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 e
xc
lu
di
t 
qu
ae
da
m
 a
 r
at
io
ne
 v
er
bi
 q
ua
e 
ap
pa
re
nt
 
es
se
 v
er
ba
 e
t 
no
n 
su
nt
 v
er
ba
, 
et
 d
uo
 s
un
t 
qu
ae
 e
xc
lu
di
t 
a 
ra
tio
ne
 v
er
bi
, s
ci
lic
et
 v
er
bu
m
 in
fin
itu
m
 e
t o
bl
iq
uu
m
. E
t p
rim
o 
ex
cl
ud
it 
ve
rb
um
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 a
 r
at
io
ne
 v
er
bi
, 
na
rr
an
s 
de
 v
er
bo
 
in
fin
ito
 c
ui
us
 p
rin
ci
pi
um
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 n
on
 e
st
 
ve
rb
um
. S
ec
un
du
m
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
du
o 
su
pe
riu
s 
po
si
ta
 in
 d
iff
in
iti
on
e 
ve
rb
i c
on
ve
ni
un
t v
er
bo
 in
fin
ito
, s
ci
lic
et
 c
on
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
 te
m
pu
s, 
et
 e
ss
e 
no
ta
 e
or
um
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 d
ic
un
tu
r. 
Te
rti
um
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
hu
iu
sm
od
i d
ic
tio
ne
s c
ui
us
m
od
i s
un
t, 
‘n
on
 c
ur
ro
’, 
‘n
on
 la
bo
ra
t’,
 
no
n 
su
nt
 v
er
ba
, e
t n
on
 e
st
 e
is
 n
om
en
 im
po
si
tu
m
, s
ed
 e
is
 n
om
en
 
im
po
ni
t, 
di
ce
ns
 
si
t 
no
m
en
 
in
fin
itu
m
, 
ho
c 
es
t, 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
di
ct
io
ni
bu
s, 
‘n
on
 c
ur
rit
’, 
‘n
on
 l
ab
or
at
’, 
im
po
ni
tu
r 
ho
c 
no
m
en
 
co
m
m
un
e,
 sc
ili
ce
t h
oc
 n
om
en
, ‘
ve
rb
um
 in
fin
itu
m
’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ic
 d
ub
ita
tu
r 
qu
ia
 s
ec
un
du
m
 i
am
 d
ic
ta
 v
id
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 
in
fin
itu
m
 si
t v
er
bu
m
, q
ui
a 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
ve
rb
i s
ib
i c
om
pe
tit
, s
ci
lic
et
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co
ns
ig
ni
fic
ar
e 
te
m
pu
s, 
et
 c
et
er
a.
 D
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
qu
od
 d
iff
in
iti
o 
ve
rb
i 
pr
iu
s 
po
si
ta
 c
om
pe
tit
 t
am
 v
er
<l
1r
a>
bi
s 
in
fin
iti
s 
qu
am
 v
er
bi
s 
fin
iti
s, 
se
d 
ill
a 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
no
n 
fu
it 
pr
op
ria
 
et
 p
er
fe
ct
a 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
ve
rb
i, 
se
d 
es
t 
di
ff
in
iti
o 
co
m
m
un
is
 v
er
bo
 
fin
ito
 e
t 
in
fin
ito
. 
In
 d
iff
in
iti
on
e 
pe
rf
ec
ta
 d
eb
en
t 
po
ni
 i
st
ae
 
pa
rti
cu
la
e 
du
ae
, 
fin
ita
 e
t 
re
ct
a,
 e
t 
pe
r 
ha
s 
pa
rti
cu
la
s 
di
ff
er
t 
ve
rb
um
 a
 v
er
bo
 in
fin
ito
, e
t a
 v
er
bo
 o
bl
iq
uo
. 
 
 
 
In
te
lli
ge
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 in
fin
itu
m
 n
on
 si
gn
ifi
ca
t p
as
si
on
em
 
ve
l 
ac
tio
ne
m
, 
se
d 
m
ag
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 p
riv
at
io
ne
m
 a
ct
io
ni
s 
ve
l 
pa
ss
io
ni
s, 
et
 i
de
o 
ve
rb
um
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 c
on
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
te
m
pu
s, 
et
 
no
n 
so
lu
m
 a
ct
io
 v
el
 p
as
si
o 
m
en
su
ra
nt
ur
 t
em
po
re
, 
se
d 
et
ia
m
 
pr
iv
at
io
 a
ct
io
ni
s 
et
 p
as
si
on
is
 m
en
su
ra
nt
ur
 te
m
po
re
, u
t p
at
et
 e
x 
qu
at
to
r p
hy
si
ca
, u
bi
 d
ic
it 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 q
uo
d 
te
m
pu
s 
no
n 
so
lu
m
 
es
t m
en
su
ra
 m
ot
us
, s
ed
 e
t m
en
su
ra
 ta
m
 m
ot
us
 q
ua
m
 q
ui
et
is
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sc
ie
nd
um
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 in
fin
itu
m
 e
st
 n
ot
a 
eo
ru
m
 q
ua
e 
de
 
al
te
ro
 d
ic
un
tu
r 
ra
tio
ne
 v
er
bi
 s
ub
st
an
tiv
i 
su
bi
nt
el
le
ct
i 
in
 v
er
bo
 
in
fin
ito
. U
nd
e 
id
em
 e
st
 d
ic
er
e 
‘S
oc
ra
te
s 
no
n 
cu
rr
it’
, s
ec
un
du
m
 
qu
od
 ‘
no
n 
cu
rr
it’
 e
st
 v
er
bu
m
 i
nf
in
itu
m
, 
qu
an
tu
m
 e
st
 d
ic
er
e 
‘S
oc
ra
te
s e
st
 n
on
 c
ur
re
ns
’. 
 
 
 
 
 
Q
uo
ni
am
 s
im
ili
te
r 
in
 q
uo
lib
et
 e
st
 v
el
 q
uo
d 
es
t v
el
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
es
t. 
 
 
 
 
 
N
ar
ra
tis
 p
ra
ed
ic
tis
 d
e 
ve
rb
o 
in
fin
ito
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 p
ro
ba
t 
qu
od
 
ve
rb
um
 in
fin
itu
m
 n
on
 e
st
 v
er
bu
m
, e
t h
ae
c 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
es
t d
ec
em
 
hu
iu
s 
lib
ri,
 q
ua
e 
pr
ob
at
ur
 s
ic
. I
llu
d 
qu
od
 e
qu
al
ite
r 
in
es
t e
i v
el
 
ill
i q
uo
d 
es
t, 
et
 e
i q
uo
d 
no
n 
es
t, 
no
n 
es
t v
er
bu
m
, s
ed
 v
er
bu
m
 
in
fin
itu
m
 in
es
t e
qu
al
ite
r e
i q
uo
d 
es
t, 
et
 e
i q
uo
d 
no
n 
es
t. 
Er
go
, e
t 
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ce
te
ra
. D
e 
is
ta
 ra
tio
ne
 p
on
itu
r m
in
or
 in
 li
tte
ra
, m
ai
or
 d
ec
la
ra
tu
r 
si
c.
 O
m
ne
 v
er
bu
m
 p
ro
pr
ie
 s
um
pt
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 a
ct
io
ne
m
 e
t 
pa
ss
io
ne
m
, 
ve
l 
pe
r 
m
od
um
 a
ct
io
ni
s 
et
 p
as
si
on
is
, 
se
u 
pe
r 
m
od
um
 fl
ux
us
 e
t f
ie
ri 
eo
 m
od
o 
qu
o 
di
ct
um
 e
st
. S
ed
 h
ui
us
m
od
i 
no
n 
co
nv
en
iu
nt
 n
on
 e
nt
i s
ed
 s
ol
um
 in
su
nt
 e
nt
i. 
Et
 m
in
or
 p
at
et
, 
na
m
 ‘
no
n 
cu
rr
it’
, q
uo
d 
es
t v
er
bu
m
 in
fin
itu
m
, i
ne
st
 e
nt
i e
t n
on
 
en
ti.
 N
am
 d
e 
So
cr
at
e 
se
de
nt
e 
ve
ru
m
 e
st
 d
ic
er
e 
qu
od
 n
on
 c
ur
rit
, 
et
 d
e 
C
ae
sa
re
 m
or
tu
o 
ve
ru
m
 e
st
 d
ic
er
e 
qu
od
 n
on
 c
ur
rit
. H
ae
c 
na
m
 e
st
 v
er
a,
 ‘
C
ae
sa
r 
no
n 
cu
rr
it’
. E
x 
is
tis
 p
at
et
 e
rr
or
 is
to
ru
m
 
qu
i 
di
cu
nt
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 n
on
 m
an
et
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 i
n 
or
at
io
ne
, 
se
d 
in
 o
ra
tio
ne
 p
os
itu
m
 e
st
 p
ur
e 
ne
ga
tiv
um
 e
t 
no
n 
in
fin
itu
m
, 
et
 h
ae
c 
di
cu
nt
ur
 d
e 
in
te
nt
io
ne
 B
oe
th
ii 
su
pe
r 
hu
nc
 
pa
ss
um
, q
ui
 d
ic
it 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 p
os
itu
m
 i
n 
or
at
io
ne
 
no
n 
di
ff
er
t 
a 
ve
rb
o 
pu
re
 
ne
ga
tiv
o.
 
Is
tu
d 
ta
m
en
 
es
t 
m
an
ife
st
is
si
m
e 
fa
ls
um
, 
et
 c
on
tra
 i
nt
en
tio
ne
m
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
i 
et
 
B
oe
th
iu
s. 
D
ic
it 
na
m
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 
qu
od
 
ve
rb
um
 
in
fin
itu
m
 
si
m
ili
te
r, 
ho
c 
es
t, 
eq
ua
lit
er
 i
ne
st
 e
i 
qu
od
 e
t 
ei
 q
uo
d 
no
n,
 s
ed
 
no
n 
in
es
t a
lio
 m
od
o 
qu
am
 s
ic
ut
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 in
es
t s
ub
ie
ct
o 
ni
si
 
in
 o
ra
tio
ne
. N
on
 e
ni
m
 in
es
t s
ic
ut
 a
cc
id
en
s 
in
es
t s
ub
ie
ct
o,
 q
ui
a 
no
n 
en
ti 
nu
llu
m
 a
cc
id
en
s 
in
es
t 
ne
c 
si
cu
t 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
m
 i
ne
st
 
su
bi
ec
to
 n
is
i 
in
 o
ra
tio
ne
. 
Er
go
 v
er
bu
m
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 i
n 
ra
tio
ne
 
m
an
et
 i
nf
in
itu
m
. 
Si
m
ili
te
r 
di
ci
t 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 
in
fin
itu
m
 s
em
pe
r 
es
t 
no
ta
 e
or
um
 q
ua
e 
de
 a
lte
ro
 d
ic
un
tu
r, 
et
 
di
ci
t q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 in
fin
itu
m
 s
em
pe
r 
es
t d
e 
al
iq
uo
 s
ed
 n
on
 e
st
 
de
 a
liq
uo
 n
ec
 e
st
 n
ot
a 
eo
ru
m
, q
ua
e 
di
cu
nt
ur
 d
e 
al
iq
uo
 n
is
i i
n 
or
at
io
ne
. 
Er
go
 o
m
ne
 v
er
bu
m
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 i
n 
or
at
io
ne
 m
an
et
 
in
fin
itu
m
. 
 
 
 
Ite
m
 B
oe
tiu
s 
di
ci
t 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
 d
e 
eo
 
qu
od
 e
st
 e
t d
e 
eo
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
es
t, 
se
d 
ni
hi
l p
ra
ed
ic
ar
e 
ni
si
 q
uo
d 
m
an
et
 in
 o
ra
tio
ne
. I
gi
tu
r 
ve
rb
um
 in
fin
itu
m
 m
an
et
 in
fin
itu
m
 in
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or
at
io
ne
. 
 
 
 
Is
tu
d 
co
nf
irm
at
ur
 p
er
 t
re
s 
ra
tio
ne
. 
Pr
im
o 
si
c.
 P
ar
tic
ip
iu
m
 
in
fin
itu
m
 p
ot
es
t m
an
er
e 
in
fin
itu
m
 in
 o
ra
tio
ne
, u
t p
at
et
 d
ic
en
do
 
‘S
oc
ra
te
s 
es
t 
no
n 
cu
rr
en
s’
, 
se
d 
ve
rb
um
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 r
es
ol
vi
tu
r 
si
cu
t 
et
 q
uo
dl
ib
et
 a
liu
d 
ve
rb
um
 i
n 
su
um
 p
ar
tic
ip
iu
m
 e
iu
sd
em
 
te
m
po
ris
 e
t e
iu
s 
de
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
io
ni
s 
ta
m
qu
am
 in
 s
uo
 c
on
ve
rti
bi
li.
 
Id
em
 n
am
 e
st
 d
ic
er
e 
‘S
or
at
es
 n
on
 c
ur
rit
’, 
et
 ‘[
So
cr
at
es
] e
st
 n
on
 
cu
rr
en
s’
, s
ec
un
du
m
 q
uo
d 
‘n
on
 c
ur
rit
’ e
st
 v
er
bu
m
 in
fin
itu
m
, s
ed
 
‘e
st
 n
on
 c
ur
re
ns
’ m
an
et
 in
fin
itu
m
 in
 o
ra
tio
ne
. E
rg
o 
‘n
on
 c
ur
rit
’ 
se
cu
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
es
t v
er
bu
m
 in
fin
itu
m
 m
an
et
 in
 o
ra
tio
ne
. U
nd
e 
de
 q
uo
cu
m
qu
e 
di
ci
tu
r u
nu
m
 c
on
ve
rti
bi
liu
m
 d
e 
eo
de
m
 d
ic
itu
r e
t 
re
liq
uu
m
, s
ed
 c
on
ve
rti
bi
le
 c
um
 v
er
bo
 in
fin
ito
 m
an
et
 in
 o
ra
tio
ne
 
et
 v
er
e 
at
tri
bu
itu
r 
su
bi
ec
to
. 
Er
go
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 v
er
bu
m
 m
an
et
 i
n 
or
at
io
ne
, 
et
 v
er
e 
at
tri
bu
itu
r 
su
bi
ec
to
 c
um
 s
uu
m
 c
on
ve
rti
bi
le
 
ve
re
 a
ttr
ib
ui
tu
r. 
 
 
 
 
 
Id
em
 p
ro
ba
tu
r 
si
c.
 O
m
ni
s 
pa
rs
 o
ra
tio
ni
s 
m
an
et
 i
n 
or
at
io
ne
 
cu
iu
s 
es
t 
pa
rs
, 
se
d 
ve
rb
um
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 e
st
 p
ar
s 
or
at
io
ni
s. 
Er
go
 
ve
rb
um
 in
fin
itu
m
 m
an
et
 in
 o
ra
tio
ne
 in
fin
itu
m
. M
ai
or
 p
at
et
, e
t 
m
in
or
 d
ec
la
ra
tu
r, 
qu
ia
 ‘
no
n 
cu
rr
en
s’
 e
st
 p
ar
tic
ip
iu
m
. 
Ig
itu
r 
de
sc
en
di
t 
ab
 a
liq
uo
 v
er
bo
 f
in
ito
 v
el
 i
nf
in
ito
, 
qu
od
 e
st
 p
ar
s 
or
at
io
ni
s, 
se
d 
no
n 
de
sc
en
di
t 
ni
si
 a
b 
ho
c 
ve
rb
o,
 ‘
no
n 
cu
rr
it’
, 
‘n
on
 c
ur
ro
’, 
‘n
on
 c
ur
ris
’, 
qu
od
 e
st
 v
er
bu
m
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 e
t 
pa
rs
 
or
at
io
ni
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Et
 c
on
fir
m
at
ur
, q
ui
a 
ni
si
 v
er
bu
m
 in
fin
itu
m
 e
ss
et
 p
ar
s 
or
at
io
ni
s 
se
qu
er
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 in
fin
itu
m
 a
d 
ni
hi
l e
ss
et
 u
til
e,
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
in
co
nv
en
ie
ns
. 
C
on
ce
do
 e
rg
o 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 p
ot
es
t 
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m
an
er
e 
ve
rb
um
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 i
n 
or
at
io
ne
. 
Et
 a
d 
ill
ud
 q
uo
d 
di
ci
 
B
oe
th
iu
s, 
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 i
nf
in
itu
m
 i
n 
or
at
io
ne
 p
os
itu
m
 n
on
 
di
ff
er
t a
 v
er
bo
 p
ur
e 
ne
ga
tiv
o,
 is
tu
d 
si
c 
in
te
lli
go
 q
uo
d 
or
at
io
 in
 
qu
a 
po
ni
tu
r 
ve
rb
um
 
in
fin
itu
m
 
qu
an
tu
m
 
ad
 
ve
rit
at
em
 
et
 
fa
ls
ita
te
m
 n
on
 d
iff
er
t a
b 
or
at
io
ne
 in
 q
ua
 p
on
itu
r 
ve
rb
um
 p
ur
e 
ne
ga
tiv
um
, e
t 
ho
c 
pa
te
t i
n 
si
m
pl
ic
ib
us
 s
ec
un
du
m
 i
nt
el
le
ct
um
. 
V
er
bi
 ta
m
 s
ub
ie
ct
um
 q
ua
m
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 e
st
 te
rm
in
us
 s
im
pl
ex
. 
In
 i
lli
s 
na
m
 n
eg
at
iv
a 
de
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
o 
in
fin
ito
 e
t 
af
fir
m
at
iv
a 
de
 
in
fin
ito
 c
on
ve
rtu
nt
ur
, u
t p
at
eb
it 
in
 p
rim
o 
se
cu
nd
i l
ib
ri.
 I
n 
al
iis
 
ta
m
en
, 
ut
 i
n 
co
m
po
si
tis
, 
qu
an
tu
m
 a
d 
ve
rit
at
em
 e
t 
fa
ls
ita
te
m
 
di
ff
er
un
t 
af
fir
m
at
iv
a 
de
 
pr
ae
te
rit
o 
in
fin
ito
 
et
 
ne
ga
tiv
a 
de
 
pr
ae
te
rit
o 
fin
ito
. I
st
a 
na
m
 e
st
 v
er
a,
 ‘
C
hi
m
er
a 
al
ba
 n
on
 c
ur
rit
’, 
ut
 e
st
 p
ur
e 
ne
ga
tiv
a,
 e
t e
st
 fa
ls
a 
se
cu
nd
um
 q
uo
d 
no
n 
cu
rr
it 
es
t 
ve
rb
um
 in
fin
itu
m
, q
ui
a 
tu
nc
 e
st
 s
en
su
s 
qu
od
 c
hi
m
er
a 
al
ba
 e
st
 
no
n 
cu
rr
en
s, 
et
 h
ae
c 
es
t f
al
sa
 p
ro
pt
er
 a
ff
irm
at
io
ne
m
 q
ua
m
 p
on
it 
im
pl
ic
ite
, s
ed
 n
on
 e
st
 s
ic
 in
 n
eg
at
iv
is
, q
ui
a 
pu
re
 n
eg
at
iv
ae
 n
on
 
po
nu
nt
 a
ff
irm
at
io
ne
m
. 
 
 
 
Se
d 
du
bi
ta
tu
r 
qu
am
 i
st
a 
pr
op
os
iti
o,
 ‘
So
cr
at
es
 n
on
 c
ur
rit
’, 
ve
l 
ill
a,
 ‘
C
hi
m
er
a 
no
n 
cu
rr
it’
, 
no
n 
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
m
er
e 
ne
ga
tiv
a,
 u
t 
vi
de
tu
r. 
D
ic
en
du
m
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 o
ra
tio
, ‘
So
cr
at
es
 n
on
 c
ur
rit
’, 
es
t 
m
ul
tip
le
x 
se
cu
nd
um
 a
cc
en
tu
m
 e
o 
qu
o 
‘n
on
 c
ur
rit
’ 
po
te
st
 e
ss
e 
un
a 
di
ct
io
 v
el
 p
lu
re
s 
di
ct
io
ne
s. 
Pr
im
o 
es
t 
m
er
e 
af
fir
m
at
iv
a,
 
qu
ia
 s
en
su
s 
es
t i
st
e,
 ‘S
oc
ra
te
s 
es
t n
on
 c
ur
re
ns
’. 
Se
cu
nd
o 
m
od
o 
es
t 
m
er
e 
ne
ga
tiv
a,
 
qu
am
vi
s 
de
 
vi
rtu
te
 
se
rm
on
is
 
no
n 
di
st
in
gu
en
du
m
 s
it,
 e
t 
ho
c 
qu
ia
 q
uo
 a
d 
ve
rit
at
em
 e
t 
fa
ls
ita
te
m
 
se
ns
us
 n
on
 d
iff
er
un
t i
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tio
ni
bu
s, 
ut
 d
ic
tu
m
 e
st
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Si
m
ilt
er
 a
ut
em
 c
ur
re
t 
ve
l 
cu
rr
eb
at
 n
on
 v
er
bu
m
 e
st
 s
ed
 
ca
su
s 
ve
rb
i. 
D
iff
er
t 
au
te
m
 a
 v
er
bo
 q
ua
m
 h
oc
 p
ra
es
en
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t t
em
pu
s, 
ill
a 
ve
ro
 q
uo
d 
co
m
pl
ec
tit
ur
. 
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N
un
c 
ex
cl
ud
it 
ve
rb
a 
ob
liq
ua
 a
 ra
tio
ne
 v
er
bi
, u
t v
er
ba
 p
ra
et
er
iti
 
et
 f
ut
ur
i t
em
po
ris
, e
t d
ic
it 
qu
od
 h
ui
us
m
od
i v
er
ba
 o
bl
iq
ua
 n
on
 
su
nt
 v
er
ba
, 
et
 h
oc
 p
ro
ba
t 
pe
r 
ho
c 
qu
od
 d
ic
it,
 D
iff
er
t 
au
te
m
 
ve
rb
um
, 
pe
r 
di
ff
er
en
tia
m
 i
nt
er
 v
er
bu
m
 e
t 
ve
rb
um
 o
bl
iq
uu
m
. 
U
nd
e 
pr
ob
at
ur
 q
ui
a 
ve
rb
a 
pr
ae
te
rit
i t
em
po
ris
 e
t f
ut
ur
i n
on
 s
un
t 
ve
rb
a,
 e
t h
ae
c 
es
t u
nd
ec
im
 c
on
cl
us
io
 h
ui
us
 li
br
i, 
qu
ae
 p
ro
ba
tu
r 
si
c.
 
O
m
ne
 
ve
rb
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
te
m
po
ris
 
pr
ae
se
ns
, 
qu
ia
 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
 a
ct
io
ne
m
 v
el
 p
as
si
on
em
 f
ie
ri 
in
 p
ra
es
en
ti.
 S
ed
 
ve
rb
a 
pr
ae
te
rit
i 
et
 f
ut
ur
i 
te
m
po
ris
 n
on
 c
on
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 t
em
pu
s 
pr
ae
se
ns
, q
ui
a 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
ct
io
ne
m
 n
ec
 p
as
si
on
em
 fi
er
i i
n 
pr
ae
se
nt
i, 
se
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
ct
io
ne
m
 v
el
 p
as
si
on
em
 f
ui
ss
e 
ve
l 
fo
rte
 e
ss
e.
 E
rg
o,
 e
t 
ce
te
ra
. 
D
e 
is
ta
 r
at
io
ne
, 
pr
im
o 
po
ni
tu
r 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
cu
m
 d
ic
it,
 S
im
ili
te
r 
cu
rr
et
 e
t 
cu
rr
eb
at
. 
Pr
im
o 
po
ni
tu
r 
un
a 
pa
rs
 m
in
or
is
 c
um
 d
ic
itu
r 
D
iff
er
t 
au
te
m
. S
ec
un
do
 
po
ni
tu
r 
al
ia
 p
ar
s 
m
in
or
is
 c
um
 d
ic
it 
qu
od
 i
st
a,
 s
ci
lic
et
 v
er
ba
 
pr
ae
te
rit
i e
t f
ut
ur
i t
em
po
ris
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t i
lla
 q
ua
e 
co
m
pl
ec
tu
nt
ur
, 
ho
c 
es
t, 
qu
ae
 
in
cl
ud
un
t 
te
m
pu
s 
pr
ae
se
ns
, 
et
 
di
ci
tu
r 
in
 
ha
bi
tu
di
ne
 a
d 
pr
ae
se
ns
. 
D
ic
itu
r 
au
te
m
 p
ra
et
er
itu
m
 q
uo
d 
fu
it 
pr
ae
se
ns
, e
t a
liq
ui
d 
di
ci
tu
r f
ut
ur
um
 q
uo
d 
er
it 
pr
ae
se
ns
. 
 
 
 
 
 
N
ot
an
du
m
 e
st
 h
ic
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 v
ar
ia
tu
r 
pe
r 
te
m
po
ra
, m
od
os
, 
nu
m
er
os
, e
t p
er
so
na
s. 
V
ar
ia
tio
 q
ua
e 
es
t s
ec
un
du
m
 n
um
er
um
 e
t 
pe
rs
on
am
 n
on
 c
on
st
itu
it 
ca
su
s 
ve
rb
i, 
se
d 
va
ria
tio
 s
ec
un
du
m
 
m
od
os
 e
t t
em
po
ra
 c
on
st
itu
it 
ca
su
s v
er
bi
, c
ui
us
 ra
tio
ne
 e
st
 q
ua
m
 
ve
rb
um
 p
ro
pr
ie
 d
ic
tu
m
 c
on
st
itu
it 
ac
tio
ne
m
 e
t 
pa
ss
io
ne
m
 i
n 
ac
tu
 p
ra
es
en
ta
lit
er
, 
qu
od
 s
im
pl
ic
ite
r 
es
t 
ag
er
e 
et
 p
at
i. 
M
od
o 
so
la
 il
la
 v
ar
ia
tio
 q
ua
e 
es
t e
x 
pa
rte
 a
ct
io
ni
s 
ve
l p
as
si
on
is
 c
as
um
 
co
ns
tit
ui
t. 
Id
eo
 v
er
bu
m
 p
ra
et
er
iti
 e
t f
ut
ur
i t
em
po
ris
, e
t s
im
ili
te
r 
ve
rb
um
 im
pe
ra
tiv
i e
t o
pt
at
iv
i m
od
i d
ic
un
tu
r 
ca
su
s 
ve
rb
i, 
qu
ia
 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
ct
io
ne
m
 v
el
 p
as
si
on
em
 f
ie
ri 
in
 p
ra
es
en
ti.
 S
ed
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va
ria
tio
 e
x 
pa
rte
 a
ct
io
ni
s 
se
cu
nd
um
 n
um
er
um
 e
t p
er
so
na
m
 n
on
 
es
t e
x 
pa
rte
 a
ct
io
ni
s 
ve
l p
as
si
on
is
 s
ed
 e
x 
pa
rte
 s
ub
ie
ct
i, 
et
 id
eo
 
ta
lis
 v
ar
ia
tio
 n
on
 c
on
st
itu
it 
ca
su
m
 v
er
bi
. 
 
 
 
Se
d 
hi
c 
du
bi
ta
tu
r, 
qu
ia
 v
id
et
ur
 q
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 p
ra
et
er
iti
 v
el
 
fu
tu
ri 
te
m
po
ris
 s
it 
ve
rb
um
, 
qu
ia
 o
m
ni
s 
or
at
io
 v
er
a 
ve
l 
fa
ls
a 
co
ns
ta
t 
ex
 n
om
in
e 
et
 v
er
bo
, 
se
d 
ex
 n
om
in
e 
re
ct
o 
et
 v
er
bo
 
pr
ae
te
rit
i 
te
m
po
ris
 v
el
 f
ut
ur
i 
co
ns
tit
ui
tu
r 
or
at
io
 v
er
um
 v
el
 
fa
ls
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
s, 
ut
 p
at
et
 d
e 
hu
iu
sm
od
i o
ra
tio
ni
bu
s, 
‘C
ae
sa
r 
fu
it’
, 
‘A
nt
ic
hr
is
tu
s 
er
it’
. 
Er
go
 
hu
iu
sm
od
i 
or
at
io
ne
s 
co
ns
tiu
un
tu
r 
ex
 n
om
in
e 
et
 v
er
bo
 s
ed
 n
on
 c
on
st
itu
un
tu
r 
ni
si
 e
x 
no
m
in
e 
et
 v
er
bo
 p
ra
et
er
iti
 v
el
 f
ut
ur
i t
em
po
ris
. E
rg
o,
 e
t c
et
er
a.
 
D
ic
en
du
m
 
qu
od
 
in
 
ve
rb
o 
pr
ae
te
rit
i 
ve
l 
fu
tu
ri 
te
m
po
ris
 
in
te
lli
gi
tu
r 
ve
rb
um
 p
ra
es
en
tis
 t
em
po
ris
. 
Id
em
 e
st
 n
am
 d
ic
er
e 
‘C
ae
sa
r 
fu
it’
, 
et
 ‘
C
ae
sa
r 
es
t 
pr
ae
te
rit
i’,
 e
t 
id
em
 e
st
 d
ic
er
e 
‘A
ni
tc
hr
is
t e
rit
’ e
t ‘
A
nt
ic
hr
is
tu
s 
es
t f
ut
ur
us
’, 
et
 id
eo
 e
x 
no
m
in
e 
et
 v
er
bo
 p
ra
et
er
iti
 v
el
 f
ut
ur
i 
te
m
po
ris
 c
on
st
itu
itu
r 
or
at
io
ne
m
 
ve
ru
m
 
ve
l 
fa
ls
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ns
 
ra
tio
ne
 
ve
rb
i 
re
ct
i, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
pr
as
en
tis
 te
m
po
ris
 s
ub
in
te
lle
ct
ui
, s
ed
 e
x 
no
m
in
e 
ob
liq
uo
 e
t e
x 
ve
rb
o 
re
ct
o 
no
n 
co
ns
tit
ui
tu
r 
or
at
io
ne
m
 v
er
bu
m
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ns
, 
qu
ia
 i
n 
no
m
in
e 
ob
liq
uo
 n
on
 i
nt
el
lig
itu
r 
no
m
en
 
re
ct
um
, s
ic
ut
 in
 v
er
bo
 o
bl
iq
uo
 in
te
lli
gi
tu
r v
er
bu
m
 re
ct
um
. I
st
is
 
ex
cl
us
is
 a
 ra
tio
ne
 v
er
bi
, s
ci
lic
et
 v
er
bo
 in
fin
ito
 e
t v
er
bo
 o
bl
iq
uo
, 
pa
te
t 
qu
od
 o
po
rte
t 
ad
de
re
 d
iff
in
iti
on
i 
ve
rb
i 
su
pe
riu
s 
po
si
ta
e 
is
ta
s 
pa
rti
cu
la
s, 
fin
ita
 
et
 
re
ct
a,
 
pe
r 
qu
as
 
a 
ra
tio
ne
 
ve
rb
i 
ex
cl
ud
un
tu
r v
er
bu
m
 o
bl
iq
uu
m
 e
t v
er
bu
m
 in
fin
itu
m
. E
t h
ae
c 
es
t 
in
te
nt
io
 B
oe
th
ii,
 d
ic
en
tis
 h
ic
 q
uo
d 
ha
ec
 e
st
 d
iff
in
iti
o 
ve
rb
i: 
ve
rb
um
 e
st
 v
ox
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
iv
a 
ad
 p
la
ci
tu
m
 c
um
 te
m
po
re
, c
ui
us
 
nu
lla
 p
ar
s s
ig
ni
fic
at
 e
xt
ra
 se
pa
ra
ta
 fi
ni
ta
 e
t r
ec
ta
. 
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Ip
sa
 q
ui
de
m
 s
ec
un
du
m
 s
e 
[d
ic
ta
 v
er
ba
 n
om
in
a 
su
nt
 e
t 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
liq
ui
d.
 C
on
st
itu
it 
en
im
 in
te
lle
ct
um
 q
ui
 d
ic
it 
et
 
qu
i 
au
di
t 
qu
ie
sc
it.
 
Se
d 
si
 
es
t 
ve
l 
no
n 
es
t 
no
nd
um
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t]
47
7
 
. 
In
de
ed
 th
os
e 
ve
rb
s 
sp
ok
en
 b
y 
th
em
se
lv
es
 a
re
 n
am
es
 a
nd
 
si
gn
ify
 s
om
et
hi
ng
. 
Fo
r 
he
 w
ho
 s
pe
ak
s 
es
ta
bl
is
he
s 
an
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g,
 a
nd
 h
e 
w
ho
 l
is
te
ns
 a
rr
es
ts
 h
is 
in
te
lle
ct
. 
Bu
t i
t d
oe
s n
ot
 y
et
 si
gn
ify
 if
 it
 is
 o
r 
is
 n
ot
. 
 
 
 
H
ae
c 
es
t {
se
cu
nd
a}
47
8  
pa
rti
cu
la
 s
ec
un
da
e 
pa
rti
s 
pr
in
ci
pa
lis
, i
n 
qu
a 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 p
on
it 
qu
ae
da
m
 c
on
ve
ni
en
tia
m
 q
ua
e 
es
t 
in
te
r 
no
m
en
 
et
 
ve
r<
l1
va
>b
um
. 
<E
t>
47
9  
pr
im
o 
na
rr
at
 
qu
od
 
{n
om
en
}4
80
 e
t 
{v
er
bu
m
}4
81
 h
ab
en
t 
co
nv
en
ie
nt
ia
m
 a
di
nv
ic
em
, 
di
ce
ns
 q
uo
d 
ip
sa
, s
ci
lic
et
 v
er
ba
 se
cu
nd
um
 se
 d
ic
ta
, {
sc
ili
ce
t}
48
2  
se
or
su
m
 a
cc
ep
ta
, 
<s
un
t 
no
m
in
a,
 h
oc
 e
st
,>
48
3  
su
nt
 s
im
ili
a 
no
m
in
ib
us
. <
Et
 i
st
o>
48
4  
na
rr
at
o 
ho
c 
po
ni
t 
du
as
 c
on
ve
ni
en
tia
s 
in
te
r 
no
m
en
 e
t 
ve
rb
um
. 
Pr
im
a 
es
t 
qu
od
 s
ic
ut
 n
om
en
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 a
liq
ui
d,
 {
ita
}4
85
 v
er
bu
m
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 
al
iq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t. 
Se
cu
nd
a 
co
nv
en
ie
nt
ia
 e
st
 q
uo
d 
si
cu
t n
om
en
 
pe
r 
se
 s
um
pt
um
 {
ne
c}
48
6  
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ve
ru
m
 n
ec
 f
al
su
m
, 
si
c 
ve
rb
um
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 {
ne
c}
48
7  s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
 n
ec
 fa
ls
um
. 
Et
 
is
ta
s 
co
nv
en
ie
nt
ia
s 
pr
ob
at
, 
[e
t]4
88
 
 
pr
im
o 
pr
ob
at
 
qu
od
 
ve
rb
um
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 a
liq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t, 
et
 h
ae
c 
es
t 
Th
is
 i
s 
th
e 
se
co
nd
 s
ub
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 s
ec
on
d 
pa
rt 
of
 t
he
 f
irs
t 
bo
ok
, i
n 
w
hi
ch
 A
ris
to
tle
 s
et
s 
ou
t a
 c
er
ta
in
 fe
at
ur
e 
co
m
m
on
 
to
 n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 v
er
bs
. F
irs
t 
he
 t
el
ls
 u
s 
th
at
 n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 v
er
bs
 
ha
ve
 a
 s
im
ila
rit
y 
w
ith
 o
ne
 a
no
th
er
, 
sa
yi
ng
 t
ha
t 
th
os
e,
 
na
m
el
y 
ve
rb
s 
sp
ok
en
 
by
 
th
em
se
lv
es
, 
th
at
 
is
, 
ta
ke
n 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
, 
ar
e 
si
m
ila
r 
to
 
no
un
s. 
H
av
in
g 
to
ld
 
us
 
th
is
, 
A
ris
to
tle
 s
et
s 
ou
t t
w
o 
fe
at
ur
es
 c
om
m
on
 to
 b
ot
h 
no
un
s 
an
d 
ve
rb
s. 
Th
e 
fir
st
 i
s 
th
at
, j
us
t 
as
 n
ou
ns
 t
ak
en
 b
y 
th
em
se
lv
es
 
si
gn
ify
 s
om
et
hi
ng
, s
o 
to
o 
ve
rb
s 
ta
ke
n 
by
 th
em
se
lv
es
 s
ig
ni
fy
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
. 
Th
e 
se
co
nd
 c
om
m
on
 f
ea
tu
re
 i
s 
th
at
, 
ju
st
 a
s 
no
un
s 
ta
ke
n 
by
 t
he
m
se
lv
es
 s
ig
ni
fy
 n
ei
th
er
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
no
r 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, 
so
 t
oo
 v
er
bs
 t
ak
en
 b
y 
th
em
se
lv
es
 
si
gn
ify
 n
ei
th
er
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 tr
ue
 n
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 fa
ls
e.
 A
nd
 h
e 
pr
ov
es
 th
at
 n
ou
ns
 a
nd
 v
er
bs
 s
ha
re
 th
es
e 
fe
at
ur
es
.  
H
e 
fir
st
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co
nc
lu
si
o 
du
od
ec
im
 h
ui
us
 l
ib
ri,
 [
qu
ae
]4
89
 p
ro
ba
tu
r 
si
c.
 I
llu
d 
qu
od
 e
st
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 e
t 
co
ns
tit
ui
t 
in
te
lle
ct
um
 p
er
 s
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t a
liq
ui
d,
 q
uo
d 
pa
te
t, 
qu
ia
 d
e 
ra
tio
ne
 v
oc
is
 <
pe
r s
e>
49
0  
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e 
es
t 
co
ns
tit
ue
re
 i
nt
el
le
ct
um
. 
Se
d 
ve
rb
um
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 c
on
st
itu
it 
in
te
lle
ct
um
. Q
uo
d 
pa
te
t, 
qu
ia
 il
le
 q
ui
 a
ud
it 
ve
rb
um
 
pe
r 
se
 
su
m
pt
um
 
pr
of
er
ri 
al
iq
ui
d 
in
te
lli
gi
t, 
qu
ia
 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 
ei
us
 
qu
ie
sc
it,
 
ho
c 
es
t, 
co
ns
tit
ui
tu
r. 
Q
uo
d 
in
te
lli
ge
nd
um
 [
es
t]4
91
 q
ua
nt
um
 e
st
 a
d 
pr
im
am
 o
pe
ra
tio
ne
m
 
in
te
lle
ct
us
, 
qu
ae
 
es
t 
co
nc
ep
tio
 
al
ic
ui
us
 
si
m
pl
ic
is
. 
[U
nd
e 
in
te
lle
ct
us
 {
qu
i 
au
di
t}
49
2  
ve
rb
um
 p
er
 s
e 
pr
ol
at
am
 c
on
st
itu
itu
r 
qu
an
tu
m
 
ad
 
pr
im
am
 
op
er
at
io
ne
m
 
in
te
lle
ct
us
, 
qu
ae
 
es
t 
si
m
pl
ic
iu
m
 a
pp
re
he
ns
io
]4
93
, 
no
n 
au
te
m
 q
ua
nt
um
 {
te
rti
am
}4
94
pr
ov
es
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
ve
rb
 t
ak
en
 b
y 
its
el
f 
si
gn
ifi
es
 s
om
et
hi
ng
, 
an
d 
th
is
 is
 c
on
cl
us
io
n 
tw
el
ve
 o
f t
hi
s 
bo
ok
, w
hi
ch
 is
 p
ro
ve
d 
in
 th
is
 w
ay
. T
ha
t w
hi
ch
 is
 ta
ke
n 
by
 it
se
lf 
an
d 
es
ta
bl
is
he
s 
an
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
pe
r 
se
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
so
m
et
hi
ng
, 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
cl
ea
r, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
ac
co
un
t 
of
 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
tiv
e 
ut
te
ra
nc
e 
is
 
to
 
es
ta
bl
is
h 
an
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
. 
B
ut
 a
 v
er
b 
ta
ke
n 
by
 i
ts
el
f 
es
ta
bl
is
he
s 
an
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
. T
hi
s 
is
 c
le
ar
, b
ec
au
se
 h
e 
w
ho
 
he
ar
s 
a 
ve
rb
 
ut
te
re
d 
by
 
its
el
f 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
s 
so
m
et
hi
ng
, 
be
ca
us
e 
hi
s 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
re
st
s, 
th
at
 is
, i
s 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d.
 T
hi
s 
ha
s 
be
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d 
w
ith
 r
eg
ar
d 
to
 th
e 
fir
st
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
th
e 
co
nc
ep
tio
n 
of
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 s
im
pl
e.
 
H
en
ce
, 
in
 h
ea
rin
g 
a 
ve
rb
 b
y 
its
el
f, 
an
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 i
s 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 th
e 
fir
st
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 s
im
pl
e 
ap
pr
eh
en
si
on
, n
ot
 h
ow
ev
er
 w
ith
 r
eg
ar
d 
to
 
th
e 
se
co
nd
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
, w
hi
ch
 is
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
an
d 
di
vi
si
on
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
a 
ve
rb
 t
ak
en
 b
y 
its
el
f 
si
gn
ifi
es
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
.  
 
op
er
at
io
ne
m
 i
nt
el
le
ct
us
, q
ua
e 
es
t 
co
m
po
si
tio
 e
t 
di
vi
si
o.
 I
gi
tu
r 
ve
rb
um
 p
er
 se
 su
m
pt
um
 a
liq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t. 
 
 
 
{N
eq
ue
 e
ni
m
 ‘e
ss
e’
 s
ig
nu
m
 e
st
 r
ei
 v
el
 ‘n
on
 e
ss
e’
, n
ec
 s
i h
oc
 
ip
su
m
 
es
t 
pu
ru
m
 
di
xe
ri
s;
 
ip
su
m
 
qu
id
em
 
ni
hi
l 
es
t, 
co
ns
ig
ni
fic
at
 a
ut
em
 q
ua
m
da
m
 c
om
po
si
tio
ne
m
 q
ua
m
 s
in
e 
co
m
po
si
tis
 n
on
 e
st
 in
te
lli
ge
re
}4
95
 
. 
Fo
r 
‘t
o 
be
’ o
r 
‘t
o 
no
t b
e’
 is
 n
ot
 a
 s
ig
n 
of
 a
 th
in
g,
 n
or
  i
f 
yo
u 
cl
ea
rl
y 
sa
y 
th
is
, 
‘is
’. 
In
de
ed
 i
t 
is 
no
th
in
g,
 b
ut
 i
t 
co
ns
ig
ni
fie
s 
a 
ce
rt
ai
n 
co
m
po
sit
io
n 
w
hi
ch
 
ca
nn
ot
 
be
 
un
de
rs
to
od
 w
ith
ou
t i
ts
 c
om
po
si
te
s. 
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Se
cu
nd
a 
co
nv
en
ie
nt
ia
 {
pa
te
t}
49
6 , 
sc
ili
ce
t q
uo
d 
si
cu
t n
om
en
 p
er
 
se
 s
um
pt
um
 {
ne
c}
49
7  
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 f
as
lu
m
, 
{s
im
ilt
er
 
et
}4
98
 v
er
bu
m
 <
pe
r 
se
 s
um
pt
um
 n
ec
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
 n
ec
 
fa
ls
um
>4
99
, 
et
 
ho
c 
pr
ob
at
 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
, 
et
 
es
t 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
{t
re
de
ci
m
}5
00
 h
ui
us
 l
ib
ri,
 <
sc
ili
ce
t>
50
1  
qu
od
 v
er
bu
m
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 n
ec
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
 n
ec
 f
al
su
m
. 
<E
t 
ha
ec
 e
st
 
co
nc
lu
si
o 
tre
de
ci
m
.>
50
2  
Pr
ob
at
ur
 p
er
 l
oc
um
 a
 m
ai
or
i 
si
c.
 S
i 
al
iq
uo
d 
ve
rb
um
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 {
si
gn
ifi
ca
t}
50
3  
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 
fa
ls
um
, h
oc
 m
ax
im
e 
fo
re
t v
er
um
 d
e 
ho
c 
ve
rb
o,
 ‘
es
t’,
 q
uo
d 
es
t 
<v
er
bu
m
>5
04
 s
ub
st
an
tiv
um
 in
cl
us
um
 in
 o
m
ni
 v
er
bo
 a
di
ec
tiv
o.
 
Se
d 
ho
c 
ve
rb
o,
 ‘e
st
’, 
pe
r s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 {
ne
c}
50
5  s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
 
ne
c 
fa
ls
um
 e
st
, <
N
am
, u
t d
ic
it 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
, s
i h
oc
 v
er
bu
m
 e
st
 
pu
ru
m
 d
ix
er
is
 n
eq
ue
 v
er
um
 n
eq
ue
 fa
ls
um
 e
st
,>
50
6  h
oc
 e
st
, s
i 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, ‘
es
t’,
 p
ro
fe
ra
tu
r 
{s
in
e 
ve
rb
o 
ad
ie
ct
iv
o,
 e
t 
pe
r 
se
 
ne
c 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t v
er
um
 n
ec
 fa
ls
um
}5
07
. N
am
, u
t d
ic
it 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
, 
<s
i>
50
8  
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, ‘
es
t’,
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 c
om
po
si
tio
ne
m
 q
ua
m
da
m
 
qu
am
 s
in
e 
{e
xt
re
m
is
}5
09
 
 n
on
 e
st
 i
nt
el
lig
er
e 
ta
m
qu
am
 a
liq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ns
 v
er
um
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
. U
nd
e 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, ‘
es
t’,
 c
um
 s
it 
Th
e 
se
co
nd
 c
om
m
on
 fe
at
ur
e 
is
 c
le
ar
, n
am
el
y 
th
at
 ju
st
 a
s 
th
e 
no
un
 t
ak
en
 b
y 
its
el
f 
si
gn
ifi
es
 n
ei
th
er
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
no
r 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, l
ik
ew
is
e 
th
e 
ve
rb
 ta
ke
n 
by
 it
se
lf 
si
gn
ifi
es
 
ne
ith
er
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, 
an
d 
th
is
 i
s 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 t
hi
rte
en
 o
f 
th
is
 b
oo
k:
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
ve
rb
 t
ak
en
 b
y 
its
el
f 
ne
ith
er
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
no
r 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
fa
ls
e.
 T
hi
s 
is
 p
ro
ve
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
an
 a
rg
um
en
t f
ro
m
 th
e 
gr
ea
te
r, 
in
 th
is
 w
ay
. I
f s
om
e 
ve
rb
 ta
ke
n 
by
 it
se
lf 
si
gn
ifi
es
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 
tru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, t
ha
t w
ou
ld
 b
e 
tru
e 
m
os
t o
f 
al
l f
or
 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
th
e 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
ve
rb
 i
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 
ev
er
y 
ad
je
ct
iv
al
 v
er
b.
 B
ut
 t
hi
s 
ve
rb
, 
‘is
’, 
ta
ke
n 
by
 i
ts
el
f 
si
gn
ifi
es
 n
ei
th
er
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 tr
ue
 n
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 fa
ls
e,
 th
at
 is
, 
if 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
is
 u
tte
re
d 
w
ith
ou
t 
an
 a
dj
ec
tiv
al
 v
er
b,
 i
t 
do
es
 n
ot
 b
y 
its
el
f s
ig
ni
fy
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 tr
ue
 o
r s
om
et
hi
ng
 fa
ls
e.
 
Fo
r, 
as
 A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s, 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 c
er
ta
in
 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
w
hi
ch
, 
w
ith
ou
t 
its
 
co
m
po
si
te
s, 
ca
nn
ot
 
be
 
un
de
rs
to
oo
d 
to
 b
e 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 s
ig
ni
fy
in
g 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
. 
H
en
ce
 t
hi
s 
ve
rb
, 
‘is
’, 
si
nc
e 
it 
is
 a
 v
er
b,
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50
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50
7  ‘
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e 
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ifi
ca
tu
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’: 
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461 
ve
rb
um
, a
liq
ui
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t <
se
d>
51
0  s
in
e 
ex
tre
m
is
 n
ec
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
. B
oe
th
iu
s 
di
ci
t 
hi
c 
qu
od
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
us
 d
ic
it 
qu
od
 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, 
‘e
st
’, 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
qu
am
da
m
 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
m
, 
et
 
ce
te
ra
, 
qu
ia
 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, 
‘e
st
’, 
no
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
na
tu
ra
m
 
al
ic
ui
us
 
re
i 
se
d 
so
lu
m
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
m
 e
xt
re
m
or
um
, [
et
 c
et
er
a]
51
1
si
gn
ifi
es
 s
om
et
hi
ng
, 
bu
t 
w
ith
ou
t 
th
e 
ex
tre
m
es
 i
t 
do
es
 n
ot
 
si
gn
ify
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
. 
B
oe
th
iu
s 
sa
ys
 
he
re
 t
ha
t 
A
ri
st
ot
le
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 t
hi
s 
ve
rb
, 
‘is
’, 
si
gn
ifi
es
 a
 
ce
rt
ai
n 
co
m
po
si
tio
n,
 e
tc
., 
be
ca
us
e 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
do
es
 n
ot
 
si
gn
ify
 t
he
 n
at
ur
e 
of
 s
om
e 
th
in
g 
bu
t 
on
ly
 s
ig
ni
fie
s 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
ex
tre
m
es
. 
. 
 
 
 
N
ot
an
du
m
 
su
nt
 
hi
c 
tri
a.
 
Pr
im
o 
qu
od
 
si
 
al
iq
ui
d 
ve
rb
um
 
{s
ig
ni
fic
et
}5
12
 v
er
um
 v
el
 fa
ls
um
, h
oc
 m
ax
im
e 
{f
or
et
}5
13
 v
er
um
 
de
 h
oc
 v
er
bo
, ‘
es
t’,
 q
ui
a 
ci
rc
a 
co
m
po
si
tio
ne
m
 v
el
 d
iv
is
io
ne
m
 
co
ns
is
tit
 v
er
ita
s 
{v
el
}5
14
 f
al
si
ta
s. 
Se
d 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, 
‘e
st
’, 
ve
l 
[a
liq
ui
d]
51
5  e
iu
s 
ob
liq
uu
m
 in
 o
m
ni
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 e
st
 c
om
po
si
tio
 
ve
l 
co
pu
la
 
ex
tre
m
or
um
 
ad
in
vi
ce
m
, 
[e
t]5
16
 
id
eo
 
di
ci
t 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 o
m
ne
m
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
m
 c
on
st
ar
e 
ex
 n
om
in
e 
et
 h
oc
 
ve
rb
o,
 
‘e
st
’, 
<v
el
 
al
iq
uo
 
ei
us
 
ob
liq
uo
. 
C
um
 
en
im
 
in
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
de
 p
ra
es
en
ti,
 h
oc
 v
er
bu
m
, 
‘e
st
’,>
51
7  
in
 t
er
tia
 
pe
rs
on
a 
ve
l 
in
 p
rim
a 
ve
l 
in
 s
ec
un
da
 e
st
 c
op
ul
a,
 e
t 
in
 o
m
ni
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e 
de
 p
ra
et
er
ito
, h
oc
 v
er
bu
m
, ‘
fu
it’
, e
st
 c
op
ul
a,
 e
t i
n 
om
ni
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 d
e 
fu
tu
ro
 h
oc
 v
er
bu
m
, ‘
er
it’
, e
st
 c
op
ul
a 
ve
l 
co
m
po
si
tio
. 
Et
 i
de
o 
ph
ilo
so
ph
us
 p
ro
ba
t 
qu
od
 [
no
m
en
 e
t]5
18
 
 
ve
rb
um
 p
er
 s
e 
su
m
pt
um
 n
on
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
 v
el
 f
al
su
m
 p
er
 
W
e 
ne
ed
 to
 k
no
w
 th
re
e 
th
in
gs
 h
er
e.
 F
irs
t, 
th
at
 if
 s
om
e 
ve
rb
 
w
er
e 
to
 s
ig
ni
fy
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, 
th
is
 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
tru
e 
m
os
t 
of
 a
ll 
w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 t
o 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
be
ca
us
e 
tru
th
 o
r 
fa
ls
ity
 c
on
ce
rn
s 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
or
 d
iv
is
io
n.
 
B
ut
 th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
or
 s
om
e 
ob
liq
ue
 f
or
m
 o
f 
it,
 is
 in
 e
ve
ry
 
st
at
em
en
t 
a 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
or
 c
op
ul
a 
of
 t
he
 e
xt
re
m
es
, 
an
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
A
ris
to
tle
 s
ay
s 
th
at
 e
ve
ry
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
co
ns
is
ts
 i
n 
a 
no
un
 a
nd
 th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘i
s’
, o
r s
om
e 
ob
liq
ue
 fo
rm
 o
f i
t. 
Fo
r i
n 
a 
pr
es
en
t-t
en
se
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘i
s’
, i
n 
ei
th
er
 th
e 
fir
st
, o
r 
se
co
nd
, 
or
 t
hi
rd
 p
er
so
n,
 i
s 
th
e 
co
pu
la
, 
an
d 
in
 e
ve
ry
 p
as
t-
te
ns
e 
st
at
em
en
t, 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘w
as
’, 
is
 th
e 
co
pu
la
, a
nd
 in
 e
ve
ry
 
fu
tu
re
-te
ns
e 
st
at
em
en
t, 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
w
ill
 b
e’
, i
s 
th
e 
co
pu
la
 o
r 
th
e 
co
m
po
si
tio
n.
 A
nd
 th
er
ef
or
e 
A
ris
to
tle
 p
ro
ve
s 
th
at
 a
 v
er
b 
ta
ke
n 
by
 it
se
lf 
do
es
 n
ot
 si
gn
ify
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 tr
ue
 o
r s
om
et
hi
ng
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462 
ho
c,
 q
uo
d 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, ‘
es
t’,
 {
cu
m
}5
19
 in
 o
m
ni
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
 si
t 
co
m
po
si
tio
, n
ec
 s
ig
ni
fic
at
 v
er
um
 n
ec
 fa
ls
um
. Q
uo
d 
ta
m
en
 in
te
r 
om
ni
a 
ve
rb
a 
vi
de
tu
r 
si
gn
ifi
ca
re
 p
er
 s
e 
m
ax
im
e 
ve
ru
m
 v
el
 
fa
ls
um
, 
qu
ia
 n
ul
lu
m
 a
liu
d 
ve
rb
um
 e
st
 c
om
po
si
tio
 s
eu
 c
op
ul
a 
ni
si
 v
irt
ut
e 
hu
iu
s 
ve
rb
i, 
‘e
st
’, 
in
 e
o 
in
cl
us
i. 
<E
t>
52
0  
pe
r 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, ‘
es
t’,
 in
te
lli
go
 in
di
ff
er
en
te
r v
er
bu
m
 p
rim
ae
, s
ec
un
da
e,
 
et
 te
rti
ae
 p
er
so
na
e 
hu
iu
s 
{v
er
bi
}5
21
 –
 ‘
su
m
’, 
‘e
s’
, [
‘e
st
’,]
52
2  
et
 
[e
tia
m
]5
23
 ‘
fu
i’ 
– 
et
 v
er
ba
 o
bl
iq
ua
 d
es
ce
nd
en
tia
 a
 <
ho
c>
52
4
fa
ls
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
is
, 
th
at
 
th
is
 
ve
rb
, 
‘is
’, 
si
nc
e 
it 
is
 
a 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
in
 e
ve
ry
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
do
es
 n
ot
 s
ig
ni
fy
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 
tru
e 
or
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 fa
ls
e.
 Y
et
 th
at
 v
er
b 
m
os
t o
f a
ll 
am
on
g 
al
l 
th
e 
ve
rb
s 
se
em
s 
to
 s
ig
ni
fy
 b
y 
its
el
f 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 t
ru
e 
or
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 f
al
se
, b
ec
au
se
 n
o 
ot
he
r 
ve
rb
 is
 a
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
or
 
a 
co
pu
la
 u
nl
es
s b
y 
vi
rtu
e 
of
 th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘i
s’
, i
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 it
. B
y 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘i
s’
, I
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
in
di
ff
er
en
tly
 a
 v
er
b 
in
 th
e 
fir
st
, 
se
co
nd
 o
r 
th
ird
 p
er
so
n 
– 
‘a
m
’, 
‘a
re
, a
nd
 e
ve
n 
‘h
ad
 b
ee
n’
 –
 
an
d 
ob
liq
ue
 v
er
bs
 d
er
iv
ed
 fr
om
 th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘i
s’
, s
uc
h 
as
 p
as
t-
te
ns
e 
an
d 
fu
tu
re
-te
ns
e 
ve
rb
s. 
 
ve
rb
o 
‘e
st
’, 
ut
 v
er
ba
 p
ra
et
er
iti
 v
el
 fu
tu
ri 
te
m
po
ris
. 
 
 
 
Se
cu
nd
o 
[e
st
]5
25
 
{n
ot
an
du
m
}5
26
 
qu
od
 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, 
‘e
st
’, 
{q
ua
nd
oq
ue
}5
27
 e
st
 s
ec
un
du
m
 a
di
ac
en
s 
in
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
, 
et
 
qu
an
do
qu
e 
<e
st
>5
28
 
te
rti
um
 
[a
di
ac
en
s]
52
9 . 
Q
ua
nd
o 
es
t 
se
cu
nd
um
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
tu
nc
 e
st
 c
at
he
go
re
m
a,
 q
ui
a 
tu
nc
 p
er
 s
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
al
iq
ua
m
 
na
tu
ra
m
, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
es
se
 
ex
is
te
re
, 
{e
t}
53
0  
qu
an
do
 {
es
t}
53
1  
te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
tu
nc
 e
st
 s
yn
ca
th
eg
or
em
a,
 
nu
lla
m
 n
at
ur
am
 p
er
 s
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
ns
 {
de
te
rm
in
at
e}
53
2
 
, e
t h
oc
 e
st
 
Se
co
nd
, w
e 
ne
ed
 to
 k
no
w
 th
at
 th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘i
s’
, s
om
et
im
es
 is
 a
 
se
cu
nd
um
 a
di
ac
en
s 
in
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
an
d 
so
m
et
im
es
 i
s 
a 
te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
en
s. 
W
he
n 
it 
is
 a
 s
ec
un
du
m
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
th
en
 is
 
ca
te
go
re
m
at
ic
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
en
 i
t 
si
gn
ifi
es
 b
y 
its
el
f 
so
m
e 
na
tu
re
, 
na
m
el
y 
th
e 
be
in
g 
of
 e
xi
st
en
ce
, 
bu
t 
w
he
n 
it 
is
 a
 
te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
th
en
 i
t 
is
 s
yn
ca
te
go
re
m
at
ic
, 
si
gn
ify
in
g 
de
te
rm
in
at
el
y 
no
 n
at
ur
e 
by
 it
se
lf,
. A
nd
 th
is
 is
 w
ha
t w
e 
ar
e 
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qu
od
 s
ol
et
 d
ic
i 
qu
od
 c
um
 h
oc
 v
er
bu
m
, 
‘e
st
’, 
<q
ua
nd
o>
53
3  
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
se
cu
nd
um
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
tu
nc
 e
st
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
 q
uo
d 
in
 
se
 e
st
, 
se
d 
qu
an
do
 {
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r}
53
4  
te
rti
um
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
tu
nc
 
{p
ro
ce
di
t p
ra
ed
ic
at
um
}5
35
 q
uo
d 
in
 a
lio
 e
st
. <
U
nd
e>
53
6  
qu
an
do
 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, 
‘e
st
’, 
po
ni
tu
r 
se
cu
nd
um
 
[a
di
ac
en
s]
53
7  
in
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e,
 t
un
c 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
{i
d}
53
8  
qu
od
 {
si
gn
ifi
ca
tu
r}
53
9  
pe
r 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, 
‘e
st
’, 
sc
ili
ce
t 
<e
ss
e 
et
>5
40
 e
xi
st
er
e 
ve
l 
en
s 
ex
is
te
ns
, 
se
d 
qu
an
do
 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, 
‘e
st
’, 
po
ni
tu
r 
te
rti
um
 
[a
di
ac
en
s]
54
1  
in
 p
ro
po
si
tio
ne
, i
ta
 q
uo
d 
[il
lu
d 
qu
od
]5
42
 s
eq
ui
tu
r 
ho
c 
ve
rb
um
, 
‘e
st
’, 
[in
 
pr
op
os
iti
on
e]
54
3  
si
gn
ifi
ca
t 
al
iq
ua
m
 
de
te
rm
in
at
am
 n
at
ur
am
, t
un
c 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
ill
ud
 q
uo
d 
in
 a
lio
 e
st
, 
ho
c 
es
t, 
tu
nc
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
 {
ill
ud
 q
uo
d 
de
te
rm
in
at
e 
es
t q
uo
d 
no
n 
in
cl
ud
itu
r 
in
 h
oc
 v
er
bo
, 
‘e
st
’}
54
4 , 
ut
 c
um
 d
ic
itu
r, 
‘h
om
o 
es
t 
an
im
al
’. 
N
on
 {
na
m
}5
45
ac
cu
st
om
ed
 t
o 
sa
y,
 t
ha
t, 
w
ith
 t
hi
s 
ve
rb
, 
‘is
’, 
w
he
n 
a 
se
cu
nd
um
 a
di
ac
en
s 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d,
 t
he
n 
th
e 
ve
rb
 i
s 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
at
e,
 b
ut
 w
he
n 
a 
te
rt
iu
m
 a
di
ac
en
s 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d,
 t
he
n 
w
ha
t i
s 
in
 a
no
th
er
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d.
 H
en
ce
 w
he
n 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘i
s’
, 
po
si
ts
 a
 s
ec
un
du
m
 a
di
ac
en
s 
in
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
th
en
 th
at
 w
hi
ch
 
is
 s
ig
ni
fie
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d,
 n
am
el
y 
ex
is
tin
g 
or
 th
e 
be
in
g 
of
 e
xi
st
en
ce
, b
ut
 w
he
n 
th
is
 v
er
b,
 ‘
is
’, 
po
si
ts
 a
 t
er
tiu
m
 a
di
ac
en
s, 
so
 t
ha
t 
th
at
 w
hi
ch
 f
ol
lo
w
s 
th
is
 
ve
rb
, ‘
is
’, 
in
 a
 s
ta
te
m
en
t s
ig
ni
fie
s 
so
m
e 
de
te
rm
in
at
e 
na
tu
re
, 
th
en
 t
ha
t 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
in
 a
no
th
er
 i
s 
pr
ed
ic
at
ed
, 
th
at
 i
s, 
th
en
 
so
m
e 
de
te
rm
in
at
e 
th
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 is
 n
ot
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
is
 v
er
b,
 
‘is
’, 
is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d,
 a
s 
w
he
n 
it 
is
 s
ai
d,
 ‘
A
 h
um
an
 i
s 
an
 
an
im
al
’. 
Fo
r t
he
 b
ei
ng
 o
f e
xi
st
en
ce
 is
 n
ot
 p
re
di
ca
te
d 
in
 th
is
 
ca
se
, b
ut
 a
ni
m
al
 is
 p
re
di
ca
te
d.
 
 
hi
c 
pr
ae
di
ca
tu
r 
es
se
 e
xi
st
er
e,
 s
ed
 
an
im
al
 p
ra
ed
ic
at
ur
. 
 
 
 
Is
ta
 a
ut
em
 d
is
tin
ct
io
 d
e 
ho
c 
ve
rb
o,
 ‘
es
t’,
 p
ro
ut
 a
cc
ip
itu
r 
hi
c 
a 
B
oe
th
io
, 
<e
t>
54
6
 
 p
ot
es
t 
pr
ob
ar
i 
pe
r 
ra
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 r
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